

and
Confrontation

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TIPU SULTAN

A Study in Diplomacy and Confrontation

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PREFACE

TIPU SULTAN has long been denied his right place in history. He has been depicted either as an ambitious despot engaged in self-aggrandisement or as an insignificant prince struggling hard to survive the onslaught of an imperial power or a rash adventurer who had no notion of the incompatibility of his own strength with that of a mighty power. However, closer examination of his life and career would reveal that he was an imaginative and dynamic leader, who had a noble mission in life, and that was to prevent the foreigners from gaining control of the country. Although his domestic policy which aimed at making his State prosperous and progressive deserves great attention, the main significance of his rule lies in his external relations, which aimed at seeking the co-operation of both domestic and foreign powers for a concerted action against the English. Undoubtedly he failed in his efforts, but his failure would not minimize the importance of his policy. Long before the events of 1857 when a spirited uprising attempted to throw the English out, and before the formation of the Indian National Congress which set the pace for the National Movement, Tipu struggled hard to rouse the consciousness of the Indians to the impending danger from the English. If history is philosophy in motion, and if history is not merely knowing and understanding the past, but also of completing what had been going on, then Tipu's dream that this country should never rest content until it regained what it had lost assumes added significance. From this point of view the present study may be useful as an effort to present Tipu in the correct perspective.

This study was undertaken as long ago as 1949, thanks to the help received from the Government of Karnataka (then Government of Mysore) in the form of study leave to work for a Ph. D. Degree of Aligarh Muslim University. The author is indeed very grateful to his Supervisor, Professor Shaikh Abdur Rashid, for his consistent help and encouragement at every stage. He is equally grateful to Professor Muhammad Habib, who was mainly instrumental in inspiring and inviting him to Aligarh. He is specially indebted to Professor S. Nurul Hasan who had very kindly placed at his disposal Tipu's correspondence with the Ottoman Court. Special thanks are due to Mr Syed Azam of the Department of History, University of Mysore, Mysore, for very kindly reading the proofs and to Mr K. Balasundara Gupta, Deputy Librarian (Retd.), Mysore University Undergraduate Library, Mysore, for preparing the Index. Finally, the author acknowledges

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INTRODUCTION

TIPU IS CERTAINLY a fascinating figure of Indian history. His short but stormy rule was so eventful that every aspect of his policy could well form a subject of separate study. His encouragement of agriculture and industry, promotion of trade and commerce, administrative and military reforms, innovative measures in coinage and calendar, improvements in moral and material well-being of his people, building up of a strong navy and opening of trade factories in distant places, are all of great interest to any lover of history. But the most significant part of his work lies in his relations with other powers, with the Marathas, the Nizam, the Mughals, the Afghans, the Turks and the French, with whom he desired to build up intimate contact solely for the purpose of finding ways and means to eliminate the British from India. Despite the British victories over the other Indian rulers and the French, they had yet to face limitless difficulties in the South chiefly because of Haider and Tipu. The English had never been confronted in India with a more resolute and fierce contender than Tipu, whose life-passion was to remove them from India. It was so much an obsession with him that even his dreams, which he recorded, were all nothing but bloody encounters with the English. His embassies to distant places like Constantinople and Paris, his machinations in the courts of the Nizam and the Marathas, his invitations to Zaman Shah of Afghanistan to rescue the Mughals from the hands of the English, and his cordial relations with the French were all focussed on the single point of his confrontation with the English. In other words, the central theme working in his subconscious mind was that a new political development had taken place in the country, and that had completely upset the traditional balance of power in the land, and unless that balance was restored, the national identity would be totally lost. Lord Acton has rightly said that history is nothing but "the unfolding story of human freedom", and when that freedom is gone, life would not be worth living. That was the spirit of Tipu's thinking as indicated by his dictum that the life of a lion for a day was far better than the life of a jackal for a hundred years. In order to preserve liberty and dignity, he was prepared to make any kind of sacrifice, not sparing even his own life. True to his maxim he never submitted himself to the authority of any foreign power, never deviated from his goal, and never compromised his principle. He always preferred death to dishonour and died a hero's death.

fighting in a battle against the onslaught of the foreigners. His line of thinking was diametrically opposite to that of his contemporary rulers who never hesitated to align themselves with the English against their own compatriots, not knowing that once Tipu was gone, it would be their own turn to be destroyed. Divide and rule was the set policy of the English, and the Indian Princes were very slow in catching this spirit of foreign rule.

Unfortunately this essential aspect of Tipu's role in history has not been brought out with sufficient clarity. On the other hand, he has been misrepresented in different ways, depending upon the fancy of the several historians. In order to understand why he has been a victim of misrepresentation, a brief recapitulation of Indian historiography may not be out of place here. With the establishment of British power in India historical writing has undergone a great change in our country. Those British soldiers, administrators and even the merchants who came to India took keen interest in writing history and produced an enormous number of works of a 'politically didactic character'. Broadly speaking, the trend of thought was in two directions: one, conservative and the other, liberal; but the objective of both was just the same, namely, the perpetuation of British rule in India. It is undoubtedly true that the British rule in India witnessed enormous changes in almost every sector of Indian life. The socio-religious changes of the 19th century, the new ways of thinking and criticism, the introduction of large-scale trade and industry, the promotion of science and arts, and the vast changes in administrative, legal, political and social areas generated new ideas in India. But this is only one side of the story which is different from how the British built up their power, how they expanded their empire, how ruthlessly they suppressed every local power which resisted their expansion, how they damaged the Indian economy, its arts and crafts, how they disturbed the social balance and exploited the resources of the country to their own advantage, and how they reduced the majority of the people to a bare subsistence level. A foreign power which was never assimilated into the mainstream of Indian life attempted to superimpose its own will to serve its own interests, causing a limitless number of wars in the country. Consequently, the Indian response to such a situation was entirely different from what had been presented by the British historians of the earlier period.

The British historians have depicted Tipu as "a monster pure and simple" and they have "ransacked" the vocabulary of their language to find vile epithets with which to condemn him. Whether it was Moore

or Beatson or Kirkpatrick or Wilks or Bowring, all have indulged in the same task of vilifying Tipu. Wilks, in particular, has depicted Tipu as a bloodthirsty tyrant and an ambitious despot whose sole object was self-aggrandisement at the expense of his neighbours. The reasons for this hostile attitude on the part of the British is understandable. Apart from the ideological strand of various schools of thought, the English were sore on other scores as well. They were prejudiced against him because he was the most formidable rival, and an inveterate enemy, who stood in the way of British expansion in India. It was only after his death that Wellesley could cry "India is now ours." Ever since the battle of Plassey the English had gone on building up their political power so steadily that they had acquired the aura of an invincible force in the country. When Tipu and Haidar had shattered this image, there was consternation in the English camp. Moreover, many of the atrocities which have been attributed to Tipu originated from those who had suffered defeats at his hands, or who had been detained in his jails as prisoners of war. Again, Tipu was painted in the darkest colour so that the people of Karnataka might wipe off his memory and remain loyal to the old dynasty of Wodeyars which had come to power with British assistance.

Excepting one or two, not many Indian scholars have cared to make any intensive study of Tipu, and those who have done have relied either on English sources or English way of thinking. It is only Mohibul Hasan Khan who has made a serious study of Tipu, consulted all available records and come out with an excellent work on the career and achievements of this fascinating figure, but his work too has sadly missed the most significant part of Tipu's life, namely, his determined effort and the missionary zeal to resist the British power in India. The impression one gets by the study of M.H. Khan's work is that Tipu wanted to remain in peace with the English, but they were not prepared to tolerate him, as he was not willing to accept their suzerainty. His entire standpoint is one in which Tipu has been indicated as an innocent prince struggling hard to retain his power and protect his interests against the aggressive designs of a more ambitious foreign rival, which was bent upon expansion at all costs. Unfortunately it is not difficult in history to cull out only that evidence from the sources which suit a historian to prove his point. Consequently, if the British historians had attempted to highlight only those elements which served their purpose, M. H. Khan has emphasized only those aspects which prompted the English to take quick action against a power whose sworn policy was to eliminate them from the country.

The burden of this work is to expose those salient features of Tipu's policy which have hardly been noticed by any historian. This has of course been done with a careful examination of all known data and also of some that has not been utilized before. It is no doubt true that the English through their set policy of subsidiary system desired to crush the independence of every Indian ruler and to reduce him to the position of either a pensioned Nawab or a Raja, but the role of Tipu was not merely to escape this humiliation and be an exception to the general pattern of political picture that was emerging at that time, but also to take a bold venture and root out the cause of the trouble altogether. His was not the stand to protect his own interests, but a general and open declaration that the presence of the English was a source of threat to all Indian powers, that they should all first unite to remove them, and that no sacrifice was too great to accomplish this objective. All his correspondence either with the Nizam or the Marathas or with any other power is reflective of his agitated mood that no one need be self-complaisant of the dangerous political trend in the country. Perhaps he appears to be the only prince of the 18th century who left no stone unturned to warn the other Indian rulers that unless they reversed their short-sighted policy of aligning themselves with the English against their neighbours, and unless they identified the potential source of danger to the country, nemesis would overtake them all, sooner or later.

When he failed to enlist the support of Indian powers, who refused to be shaken from their deep slumber, he attempted to seek outside help. The English had built up their power by exploiting the weakness of the Indians, by making one prince fight against the other, and by training the Indian sepoys to stand firm in the battlefield. Shrewd diplomacy and political foresight had brought them rich dividends, for the British had won the Indian empire more with the help of the Indian blood than with the English valour. This aspect of the western policy of divide and rule had an echo in Tipu in his efforts to woo the French, who were the traditional allies of the Mysoreans. It is a moot point whether in seeking the French aid against the English he would have paved the way for French imperialism in India instead of the English, but it suited his logic that just as the English were making the Indians fight against the Indians, he too should make the Europeans fight against the Europeans. There were certain definite advantages in this policy, for the Indians would get a respite, both western powers would get exhausted, both would seek Indian support, and in the confusion either of the two European powers would be eliminated. If, by

some chance, the English were to be overpowered, it would be much better; for, greater danger seemed to lurk from their side than from the French. Tipu was also aware that in the struggle for supremacy the Dutch had eliminated the Portuguese, and the English had eliminated the Dutch from India, but the English and the French were still present. The French were not as weak as the Portuguese or the Dutch, and the possibility still existed, despite the French defeat at Wandiwash, of reversing the direction of political trend, if concerted efforts were to be made through a powerful alliance of all the Indian powers with the French. It could also be surmised that Tipu might not have been ignorant of what had happened in 1776 in the new world where, with French support, a dynamic leader had liberated the American colonies. The constant presence of a French party at his court, and the frequent visit of the French adventurers to his capital would surely have depicted to Tipu in glowing terms the French role in American War of Independence. That must have prompted Tipu to send his several embassies to France. It is again his misfortune that domestic conditions in India were far different from those that prevailed in the new world, and that the French position itself had steadily deteriorated on the eve of the French Revolution. Whereas the English had learnt a bitter lesson from the events of Anglo-American War, and were not prepared to take any more chances in India, the French did not draw proper conclusions from the same logic—that the surest way to distress the English in India, just as it was in America, was to extend massive support to the natives in their struggle against the English. The French policy in India, despite the pressing promptings from Tipu, was one of utter timidity and weakness, but it cannot be said that they lacked opportunities. Hardly within a year or two after his ascension to power and until his last days, Tipu was constantly sending his embassies to France to drill into the ears of the authorities there that a golden chance was still available to the French to revive their influence in India, provided they took a firm decision, despatched enough troops to India and stood solidly behind Tipu. But all his pleadings proved abortive until Napoleon came to power, and it was he who realized that Tipu could be an effective instrument to force the English out of India, and that was why Napoleon wrote to Tipu from Egypt in 1798 to wait until his arrival in India for a major revolution that might liberate the Indians from the English yoke. If Tipu had not been constantly in touch with the French, it could hardly be expected that Napoleon would have taken such a bold step as to assure Tipu to the effect that together they would attempt to

reduce the English. By the time this situation was brought about, namely, the French willingness for a closer alliance with Tipu, other factors conspired to shatter their dream. Napoleon himself was stopped from his advance towards the east by his defeat at Accre in Syria and Wellesley lost no time in drawing proper conclusions that in Tipu the English had the most challenging rival in India. When Tipu had been so much indoctrinated with French Revolutionary ideas as to declare himself "Citizen Tipu", start a Jacobin Club in his court, and plant a 'Republican' tree outside his palace, it is not difficult to suppose that he imagined it was within the range of possibilities to bring about a closer political alliance of the French and the Mysoreans in order to accomplish in India what had been accomplished in America.

Both Napoleon and Tipu failed in their endeavour, but their failure need not minimize the importance of their grandiose schemes. In history it is not always the success that deserves notice but the presence of a new idea which has the potentiality of far-reaching consequences. Socrates failed in his efforts to orient the Greek youth to rational thinking, and he had to drink the cup of hemlock, but his failure added extra lustre to his glory, for he would rather give up his life than his principle. Tipu's policy should also be seen in the same light—that he went to the logical extent of exerting his utmost, not sparing his own life, to achieve his goal, and yet he failed, because of factors over which he had no control. But his failure should not stand in the way of a clear understanding of the implication of his policy. It is the lack of this correct appraisal of his policy by M. H. Khan that necessitated the present author to undertake a fresh study of the whole problem.

Tipu's dependence for the success of his policy was not entirely on the French. His efforts were concentrated on home front as well. The peninsular India to the south of Narmada was dominated chiefly by four powers—the Marathas, the Nizam, Tipu and the English. The position of the English in this region, from the military point of view, was not as strong as their position in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. They had gained in the North the richest provinces with least resistance from the Indian powers—as if a rotten and ripe fruit, Eastern India, had fallen into their lap. But the Deccan and the South were entirely different. The Maratha Empire in the mid-eighteenth century was at the zenith of its glory. How powerful Haidar and Tipu were could be indicated by the results of the First and Second Mysore Wars, when the British prestige was dragged into mud. With all the weaknesses of the Nizam, he was not as helpless as Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor or

Shuja-ud-daula, the Nawab Vazier of Oudh. The influence of the French in the South had not completely disappeared. Consequently, the British had yet to go a long way before they could consolidate their power in the South. Moreover, the political position, despite the *de facto* power of the English in Madras, was not so stable here as in Bengal, because of the presence of the Nawab of Arcot, Muhammad Ali, who was more a nuisance to the English than help. Until the death of Peshwa Madhava Rao I, the Maratha supremacy in the South was so effective that he was the unacknowledged overlord of the entire region. This being the political picture, Tipu thought that there still existed the possibility of overpowering the English, despite their inexhaustible resources from Bengal and regular military supplies from England, provided all the Indian powers joined hands. There was such a delicate political balance in the South that not even an alliance of two powers among the four—the Marathas, the Nizam, the English and Tipu—would be in a position to overpower the third. It required the combination of three powers to effectively reduce the power of the fourth. That was what happened in the First, Second and Third Mysore Wars. In the First Mysore War, the English, the Marathas and the Nizam joined against Haidar and if only Haidar had not isolated the English by disengaging the Marathas and the Nizam from the confederacy, he would not have gained his brilliant victory that resulted in his dictation of terms to the English in the Treaty of Madras. If all the three Indian powers, the Marathas, the Nizam and Haidar—and later Tipu—had not joined against the English, that wonderful situation could not have been brought about in the Second Mysore War whereby Sir Hector Munro, the hero of the Battle of Buxar, was forced to throw all his guns into the tank of Conjeevaram and take shelter in the fort of Madras. Likewise, in the Third Mysore War, if the English, the Marathas and the Nizam had not joined in a powerful confederacy against Tipu, Tipu would not have lost half of his kingdom and surrendered two of his sons as hostages.

Tipu was conscious of this power balance and tried his utmost to win over the Nizam and the Marathas to his side. But such was the short-sighted-policy of both the Marathas and the Nizam that in three of the four Mysore Wars the Nizam joined in a hostile alliance with the English against Tipu, and the Marathas joined in two of them. It was only in the Second Mysore War, when the very existence of the Marathas as an independent power was at stake, as the Bombay Presidency had successfully conspired with Raghuba to reduce them completely,

that they joined hands with Mysore. But even in that war, in the midst of Haidar's victory, they sadly let him down and concluded a separate treaty at Salbai. But the most devastating effect of their alliance with the English was in the Third Mysore War, when with their as well as the Nizam's active support, Cornwallis had to struggle for more than two years to harass Tipu, and it was only on February 6, 1792 in a surprise night attack, that Cornwallis was able stealthily to enter the island of Srirangapatna. If only the Marathas had not joined the English in the Third Mysore War, or if they had joined Tipu against the English in the Fourth Mysore War, neither Tipu would have lost his power, nor Baji Rao II would have been compelled to adopt the suicidal policy of driving the last nail in the Maratha coffin. But Tipu could not be blamed for not taking the necessary steps to prevent this situation, nor for failure in warning the other powers of the impending tragedy. Nana Fadnavis became conscious of the fact, but it was too late. Only after Tipu's death he cried, 'Tipu is gone; our turn will come next'. Prophetically, it surely did.

The Nizam's role in history is pathetic. If ever there was a prince whose ambition was in inverse ratio to his strength, it was the Nizam. He gained power through treachery and sustained that power through unscrupulous means such as first joining the English in 1766 against Haidar, then joining Haidar against the English and later, joining again with the English to withdraw from the war. His role in the Second Mysore War was still more tragic. With all his tall talk to throw the English into the sea, he did not move a single soldier in 1780 against the English. On the other hand, a simple letter from Warren Hastings that they would not annex Guntur was enough to disengage him from the alliance. His confederacy with the English both in the Third and the Fourth Mysore Wars exhibits the limits of his policy of self-interest, and self-aggrandisement which blinded him to any other consideration except his own self-advancement. Tipu did not miss a single occasion to win him over to his side, extended his hand of co-operation, pleaded with him that the larger interests of the country required that the Indians should stand united and even offered to enter into matrimonial alliance with the Nizam's family—all with the intention of forging concerted action against the English, but such was the short-sighted policy of the Nizam, and so effective was the British diplomacy that Tipu could break no ice with him. It is significant to note that the Nizam was the first victim of Wellesley's policy of Subsidiary Alliances which established British paramountcy over Indian rulers. The prince who

had always stood with the English was the first to be punished, but he was so insensitive to self-respect that he was hardly aware of his own degradation. Although the Nizam's dynasty survived the English power in India, it looked as if Tipu's dictum that 'it was far better to live like a lion for a day than to live like a fox for a hundred years' was meant exclusively for the Nizam.

If the French, the Marathas and the Nizam could not be persuaded to agree to Tipu's way of thinking, the avenues were still open to him to explore other possibilities. That was the reason why Tipu sent his embassies to Turkey and later contacted Zaman Shah of Afghanistan. Owing to the Russian ambition to enter into the warm waters of Mediterranean, Turkey was so much alarmed that it could hardly alienate the sympathy of Great Britain, whose ambassador successfully dissuaded the Turkish Sultan not to have anything to do with Tipu. But Tipu's efforts bore more fruitful results in respect of Zaman Shah, who actually advanced as far as Lahore, only to beat a hasty retreat; thanks again to the superior British diplomacy which brought about a rear action on Afghanistan by coaxing the Persian ruler, Baba Khan, to invade Zaman Shah's territory. Tipu's design was shattered just at the time when it seemed to mature, proving Spengler's view that in the ascendancy phase, all forces work to the advantage of the winning side.

In short, Tipu did all he could to resist the British expansion and, if possible, to eliminate them altogether from the country. His reign began with war against the English and ended in war against them. The keynote of his policy was to pool all his resources for a confrontation with them, as also to enlist the support of as many indigenous and foreign powers as possible. It could well be asked why he failed despite his best efforts. It was because the other Indian powers failed to realize the implication of British imperialism and regarded the English as merely one more pawn on the political chess-board of India. It was Tipu alone who saw them in a different light, but such was the shrewd and skilful diplomacy of the British that they were always successful in isolating Tipu. Apart from the political and military support of the Marathas and the Nizam, the English commanded the limitless resources of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa together with those of Madras and Bombay. The keen interest of the British Parliament in Indian politics after the Pitt's India Act, the cessation of hostilities in the New World, the domestic confusion in France on the eve of the Revolution, the disunity among the Indian powers, the superior military strength of the East India Company with regular reinforcements from the King's

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Add. Mss.</i>	Additional Manuscripts
Beng. Sec. Const. Proc.	Bengal Secret Consultations, Proceedings
Br. Mus.	British Museum
<i>Const./Cons.</i>	Consultations
<i>CPC</i>	<i>Calendur of Persian Correspondence</i>
<i>Des.</i>	Despatches
Eng.	English
G. G.	Governor-General
<i>IHC</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Indian History Congress</i>
<i>IHRC</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission</i>
IOL/I.O.L.	India Office Library, London
<i>JIH</i>	<i>Journal of Indian History</i>
Mal. Sec. Com.	Malabar Secret Commission, Madras Records Office
<i>MAR</i>	<i>Reports of Mysore Archaeological Department</i>
<i>Mly. Const.</i>	Military Consultations, Madras Records Office
<i>Mil. Count. Cor.</i>	Military Country Correspondence, Madras Records Office
<i>Mly. Des.</i>	Military Despatches, Madras Records Office
<i>MM</i>	Mackenzie Manuscripts
OR/O.R.	Original Records, National Archives of India
<i>PA/P.A.</i>	Pondicherry Archives
<i>Pol. Proc.</i>	Political Proceedings, National Archives of India
<i>Proc.</i>	Proceedings
R.A.S.B.	Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal
<i>Sec. Proc.</i>	Secret Proceedings, National Archives of India

TIPU SULTAN

A Study in Diplomacy and Confrontation

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE SECOND HALF OF the eighteenth century witnessed unique events in the history of India. It was a period of great confusion as a result of a clash of three powers in the sub-continent, the Mughals who were on the decline, the Marathas who had reached the zenith of their power, and the Europeans who were just rising to great political authority. This clash of interests offered a fine opportunity to ambitious persons to rise quickly to the highest point of power, and play an important role in the politics of the period. Ali Vardi Khan in Bengal, Shuja-ud-daula in Oudh, the Nizam in Hyderabad, Nana Phadnavis in Poona, Mahadaji Sindhia in Gwalior, and Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan in Mysore appeared on the Indian scene, and played a dominant role until the superior western diplomacy and military strength reduced them all, one by one. Among all the Indian princes of the time, Haidar and Tipu were perhaps the most formidable foes of the British. They had elevated the small state of Mysore to the rank of an important power, and brought it into contact with the bigger world. Their regimes began with wars against the English and ended in wars against them. From 1752, when Haidar first fought against the English, to 1799, when Wellesley destroyed Tipu, Mysore had become "the terror of Leadenhall Street," the headquarters of the East India Company in London.¹ Under Haidar's leadership the Mysore army "proved a school of military science to Indoostan." The dread of a European army wrought no magic spell on him. Alexander Dow, the contemporary historian, writes, "We were alarmed, as if his horses had wings to fly over our walls."² Tipu went a step further, and made it the passion and goal of his life that the British should be

removed from the country. / For this purpose he built up close contacts with the outside world, and used all his means, capacity and power, not excluding even his life. The central significance of his policy lies in his strong opposition to the British in India. Before we pass on to the details of his policy, it seems necessary to have in view the historical background that pushed the several actors on to the stage.

Mysore was a small state in a far-off corner of India, away from Delhi, which was the centre of great political activities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The fall of the two kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda in 1686 and 1687 respectively extended the Mughal frontiers to the borders of Mysore. A new province was created in this region with Sira as the capital and Qasim Khan as its first governor. The area technically remained a possession of the Mughals until 1757, although effective control had passed on to the local Nawabs who merely acknowledged the titular headship of Delhi. With the rise of Haidar Ali to power in 1760, the politics of South India underwent a dramatic change. Just a year later, in 1761, the Marathas were defeated in the Third Battle of Panipat, and they started taking keen interest in the affairs of the south. It was but natural that they should desire to make good in the south what they had lost in the north. Fortunately, they found in their Peshwa, Madhava Rao I, a dynamic leader, both in diplomacy and in military prowess. Consequently, Mysore became the proverbial playground of their military exploits. The whole of South India was much disturbed by their periodic invasions, which frequently altered the boundaries of states. Mysore in particular was exposed to these changes. Two factors were the chief motivations of the Maratha incursions, one, their set policy to plunder, and the other, their desire to check Haidar's growing power. Robert Orme observes, "Like the French kings during the Norman Incursions, the Mysoreans every time they buy the Retreat of the Morattoes who are now Normans of India, only pay them to return."² The English too were aware of the Maratha threat to their possessions in the south, but they adopted the crafty policy of making one Indian power defeat another. They desired that Haidar should fight their battles, a shrewd policy which would ultimately serve the British interests, whether the defeated party was Haidar or the Marathas.

Besides the role of the Marathas, a few other factors must be borne in mind in analysing the policies of the several powers. The first was the strategic situation of Mysore, the pivotal point in the power politics

of the time. It was so situated that all the southern states—the Marathas, the Nizam and the English—wanted it to exist as an independent power. The English did not want the Marathas to conquer Mysore lest their own possessions in the south should become the next target of Maratha attack. Likewise, the Marathas were anxious that Mysore should remain a buffer state, or else the English would be present on their own southern frontiers also. The Nizam of Hyderabad, who claimed legal suzerainty over Mysore, did not wish that Mysore should slip either into English or Maratha hands. All this helped Haidar not only to preserve the integrity of Mysore but also to extend its frontiers, by playing one power against another. The affairs of these powers were themselves in confusion, which further helped him to extend his influence over the smaller principalities that surrounded Mysore. These fell an easy prey to him, as he had, to a certain extent, adopted European methods of warfare.

Secondly, Mysore's good relations with the French had very far-reaching impact on the politics of the time. The French were the first to start the game of converting a commercial company into a political power, and it was the south that first attracted their attention. Dupleix was the pioneer who brought India within the sphere of European politics. His policy was to intervene in the disputes of the Indian powers and to sell mercenaries to them in return for political concessions. By this method he extended French influence over the greater part of South India. Dodwell says that the system established by Dupleix was rather the result of circumstances than the fruit of the political situation.⁴ The superiority of European methods of warfare, and Dupleix's own personal abilities brought sweeping success to the French. But their glory was short-lived. Dupleix had not expected that the English would oppose him so fiercely or so consistently. The French sowed the seeds, and the English reaped the harvest. The English followed the example of the French and removed one by one all their European and Indian rivals. By the close of the eighteenth century Clive, Lawrence, Hastings and Wellesley made the Company a dominant power in India.

In the conflict between the French and the English for the mastery of the South, Haidar played a dominant part ever since the Carnatic Wars of 1750–55. Till the end of 1752 Mysore was an ally of the English, but from that time onwards it fought on the opposite side. This change was brought about by the failure of Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Carnatic, to fulfil his promise of ceding Trichinopoly to the

Mysoreans. Both parties used all their arts and policy, one to retain it, and the other to recover it. This greatly strained the relations between the two powers, who were never reconciled. This was the starting point of the unceasing hostility that continued between the English and Mysore until the overthrow of Tipu. Haider inherited this policy of enmity from Nanjaraj, the Dalay of Mysore, who had sent Haider to the rescue of the English at Trichinopoly, and Haider in turn, passed on this policy to Tipu, who proved to be the most formidable rival the English have ever to confront within India.

When hostilities broke out in Europe in 1756 between France and England, the French found Haider willing to support them. Haider's good relations with the French were always a sore point with the English. This proceeded from their theory that the friends of the French were the enemies of the English. In formulating their policies in India, the English were greatly influenced by the possibility of French revival. The fact that Mysore was associated with the French was never forgotten by the English either in India or in England. The Indian powers had a number of French adventurers in their courts but none had so many as Haider and Tipu. Mysore was the nearest and strongest power to the French settlements. They supplied Mysore with military stores and they trained Mysore soldiers on western lines. Mysore could establish through its western coast direct contact with the French in the Isles. Haider was constantly in touch with the French and in 1767 he was seeking French troops in the Island of Mauritius, where they had nearly 2000 Europeans, who, had they so intended, would have been a real threat to the British possessions in India. From 1777 the French intensified their propaganda in the several courts. St. Lubin, Montigny, Rivern and several others were always busy creating trouble for the English. In 1780 the French court in Paris resolved to cause as much distress to the English in India as they had done in America. They had not much to lose even if they were defeated, but the English had everything to lose. The arrival in India of D'Orves in 1781, of Suffren and Duplemin in 1782 and of Bussy in 1783 was all for this very purpose of removing the English from India. Haider was the ally through whom they could create trouble for the English.

But it must be remembered that Haider was anxious to reduce the English in order not to establish the French in India. To him the French and the English alike were foreigners. He was interested only in protecting his own interests, and he was willing to defend anyone

who would help him in his design. He first tried the English, but found them wanting in will to support him. They had stopped the supply of even a few paltry arms to him from Bombay. Whether the French in India would have been different from the English so far as Mysore was concerned cannot be known because no occasion arose to test their policy. But, in his relations with the French, Haidar offers us ample evidence to infer that he was neither firmly attached to them, nor interested in the increase of their power. His policy towards the Europeans had broadly three aspects: to keep them as a check upon one another, to obtain military supplies from them, and to secure their aid in times of need. He was neither the favourite nor the foe of any of them. The French, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the English should all exist, according to his policy, side by side and serve his purpose of advancing his own interests. He was not interested in causing or promoting conflict among the European powers, unless he was sure that he would gain by aligning himself on any side. When he did participate in the war of 1780 it was to serve his own interests and not those of the French. But the policy of Tipu, so far as the Europeans were concerned, was different from that of Haidar. If the English had honoured their treaty obligations, and had supplied him arms in peace time and military aid in war-like situations, Haidar would have remained as friendly with the English as with the French. But Tipu was the sworn enemy of the English, who would never make any compromise with them. He never entertained any illusions about the danger likely to be caused to Indian sovereignty through British expansion. Haidar desired to make use of the Europeans for his own purpose, but Tipu desired to destroy the English power in order to enhance his own. Haidar had been almost bred in a European camp, admired their system of government, and borrowed much from it. Tipu was quite unlike his father and introduced his own changes in every department.

Thirdly, Haidar's rise to power was a factor of great importance in the history of South India. He was the son of a soldier of fortune. He possessed the privilege of neither birth nor wealth. With difficulty he managed to enter into the service of Nanjaraj, the Mysore minister, but very soon he earned so much esteem from his master that "neither in business nor in pleasure did Nandi Raj ever separate himself from him."⁶ Haidar first witnessed European warfare at Trichinopoly in the Carnatic wars, in which Nanjaraj participated first on the English side and then on the French side. This participation so much exhausted

the resources of Mysore that Haider was enabled within a short period to supplant his own master. A few more difficulties, particularly the opposition of his own minister, Khande Rao, prevented Haider's rise to power until 1761, when both by his military and his political abilities, he removed all his rivals. His personal abilities had great impact upon the politics of the time. He was bold and enterprising, and very different from the other leaders of the period. Although he could neither read nor write, he had an extraordinary memory, and could go through arithmetical calculations of some length with equal accuracy and more quickness than the most expert accountant.¹ Unlike Dupleix who was only a political genius and very much like Oliver, Haider was equally good both in the political and in the military field. He was not self-complacent, and knew his own limitations. He adopted his own technique of warfare, which was to avoid pitched battles, to make surprise night attacks on the enemy, to cut off their supplies, to plunder their baggage and to intercept their detachments. But his political abilities exceeded his military ones. His clear perception of an issue guided him instantly to see where his interests lay. His foresight checked him from entering on grandiose schemes. His resolution, prudence and active nature translated his designs into action. Lastly, his presence of mind and sagacity never failed him even in times of his worst difficulties. A person with such unique genius was bound to play an important part in the politics of the period.

By skilful diplomacy and military ability he made Mysore a formidable kingdom in the south, despite the fact that he was often confronted by frequent Maratha attacks, by the intrigues of the Nawab of Carnatic, by the persistent hostility of the English, and by the jealousy of the Nizam. He took advantage of the confusion that prevailed in the Maratha camp after the third battle of Panipat and extended his territories in the north. The Marathas could hardly be expected to reconcile themselves to the loss of their territories, particularly when a dynamic leader like Madhavrao Rao I was at the helm of affairs. As long as he was alive, he never allowed Haider to remain in peace. The campaigns of 1762-63, of 1764-67, and of 1769-70 were all so serious that Haider had at times to come to great grief. It was only his tenacity and foresight that helped him to retain his territories. But after the untimely death of Madhavrao Rao in 1772 the position was entirely changed. The Marathas ceased to be a source of trouble to Haider. It is rightly said by Grant Duff that the early

death of Madhava Rao I proved to be more disastrous to the Marathas than even the debacle at Panipat in 1761. Their affairs after 1772 fell into great disorder. Internecine warfare in their dominions and the confusion at Poona offered a golden opportunity to their rivals to consolidate their power. Haidar took full advantage of the situation and seized quite a few of the Maratha districts in the Krishna region. When the follies of the Bombay Government further worried the Marathas and threatened their very existence, Haidar proved to be more far-sighted. He forgot all the humiliations he had suffered at the hands of Madhava Rao, and rushed to the help of the Marathas in the hour of their need. A powerful confederacy of the Indian powers was formed in 1780 such as had never been seen either before or was never to be seen later, in which almost all the Indian powers solemnly joined to remove the English from India. It was agreed that Haidar should invade the Carnatic and eliminate the English from Madras. The Nizam was to seize the Northern Sarkars. Madhaji Bhosle was to attack the English possessions of Bengal and Bihar. Madhaji Sindhia and Nana Phadnavis were to fall on Bombay and expel the English from there. Thus a concerted plan was formed to distress the English in all the three presidencies. But in the implementation of the plan none was more successful or consistent than Haidar. He carried fire and sword into the English territories in the Carnatic and inflicted such severe blows even on Sir Hector Munro, the hero of the battle of Buxar—where three important powers of India, namely Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor, Shuja-ud-daula, the Nawab of Oudh, and Mir Khasim of Bengal, had arrayed their forces against the English—that Munro was compelled to throw his guns into the Conjeevaram tank and seek refuge within the Fort of St. George. Baillie's army was completely routed and the English faced the worst disaster of their career in India. While so brilliant was the performance of Haidar in the south, his allies fared miserably in the north. With all the bragging of the Nizam to exterminate the English from India, he did not move a single soldier from Hyderabad. A few lines from Warren Hastings assuring him that the English had no desire to take Guntur from him were enough to cool his ardour. Madhaji Bhosle, likewise, failed to attack Bengal and Bihar and played into the hands of Warren Hastings who, with great shrewdness, disengaged him from the confederacy on the false assurance that the English would support his bid for the Peshwaship. A treaty of alliance was actually concluded between the English and Bhosle by which Chimnaji, the son

of Madhaji Bhosle, was to join the English with 2,000 horses against Haidar.⁷ The performance of Nana and Sindhia, if not so disgraceful, was no more helpful. A single discomfiture in the battlefield at the hands of General Goddard compelled Sindhia not only to sue for peace but also to join him in the attempt to persuade Haidar to end the war. When Haidar was found unwilling to toe the Maratha line for a compromise with the English, Sindhia became a partner in an offensive alliance with the English against Mysore.⁸

Thus the Maratha policy in the latter half of the eighteenth century was to harass Mysore as far as they could. Prior to 1772, not a year passed perhaps, when they did not carry on their depredations in the fertile areas of Mysore, and when they did not squeeze the rich treasury of Mysore. After 1772, when the Maratha affairs themselves fell into confusion and when their own existence as an independent power at Poona was at stake because of the machinations of the Bombay Government, the Marathas, in their own interests, joined hands with Haidar to avert the catastrophe. But the moment the storm seemed to blow over, they reverted to their earlier policy of strained relations with Mysore. It is true that Haidar too had offended them by seizing their territories after 1772, when their affairs had fallen into great confusion. It must be remembered that in the power politics of the period no principles were regarded as sacred other than those of sheer self-interest. But the difference between the policies of the Marathas and Haidar was that the former were willing to go to any length in harassing the latter. They were not reluctant even to join hands with the English in an offensive alliance against Mysore. But Haidar drew a line somewhere, beyond which he would not go, and never wished to align himself with a foreign power to trouble an Indian power. He undoubtedly aspired to unify the whole of South India under his own rule, but he did not like to adopt any policy which would help the English to consolidate further their political authority in India. In short, while the Marathas never hesitated even to play into English hands in order to promote their own interests, Haidar realized the danger of giving any quarter to the English, as his own experience in dealing with them was very bitter.

The English East India Company was yet another powerful force in the politics of the period. Since the Battle of Plassey the English had steadily strengthened and consolidated their position in India. Their political shrewdness, military strategy, superior arms, new techniques of fighting, the able generals they had and the vast economic

resources they obtained after the revolution in Bengal enabled them to play a dominant part in the affairs of the south, and to gain the reputation of an invincible power. An army either under Lawrence or Clive "made Hindoostan, nay some of the powers of Europe, tremble at the bare recital of its victories."¹⁰ Like the ancient Romans the British in India refused to recognise their neighbours as equals, and were desirous of keeping their dominions "as a chain of protectorates and buffer states."¹¹ They were slowly building up their system of subsidiary alliances, by which an Indian power either acknowledged the suzerainty of the Company or paid a high price for its contumacy. The first victim of this policy in the south was Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Carnatic, who was chiefly instrumental in providing the English an opportunity to be a major power in the south. It was Muhammad Ali's breach of promise in failing to surrender Trichinopoly to Mysore that proved to be the seed of all later troubles between the English and Haidar. The complicated and delicate relations of the English with Muhammad Ali formed an important factor that influenced their policy towards Mysore. The Nawab was an ally of the Company, as also of the British Crown in theory, but in practice it was not his will that prevailed. Three factors curtailed his power. First, the defence of his territory was in the hands of the English, to whom he paid 400,000 pagodas a year for 10 battalions, out of the total Madras army of 21 battalions, and all his forts were garrisoned by their troops.¹² Secondly, he had ceded them jagirs in 1763 and 1765, yielding an annual revenue of 400,494 pagodas.¹³ Thirdly, he owed large debts both to the Company and to certain Englishmen. By 1780 these debts had increased to £ 3,340,000.¹⁴ He had incurred them in order to meet the expenses of war, of ambitious schemes, and of his own pomp and luxury. In addition to direct military actions, the Europeans adopted one more method to subjugate orientals, namely the advancement of easy loans to eastern rulers until these loans reached a phenomenal figure. When the rulers were no longer in a position to clear these debts, the Europeans would demand the surrender of their territories. This was how the acquisition of the Suez Canal and the British occupation of Egypt took place at a later date, and the English became the supreme masters of Madras. As early as 1767, John Pybus, John Call and James Bouchier were trustees of the Nawab's creditors, to whom he had assigned 15 districts with an annual value of £ 320,000.¹⁵ The Nawab's debts had become the subject of scandalous stories indicating a general degradation in the morals and policies

of the Indian princes. During the Second Mysore War, Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras, obtained the forfeiture of all the dominions of the Nawab towards the huge amount due from him.

The wrong policies of Muhammad Ali were evident in other matters as well. He was an exceedingly incompetent but ambitious man. How ambitious he was can be seen from the fact that, after the fall of Siraj-ud-daula in Bengal, the Nawab wrote to Clive, "By the favour of God and your bravery I hope to get possession of Bengal."¹ Though he was disappointed in this expectation, he indulged in similar grandiose schemes. He fondly hoped to obtain the *subedari* of the Deccan, the Northern Sarkars of the Nizam, and the conquest of the whole of Mysore. So ambitious a man could hardly resist the temptation of pushing the frontiers of the Carnatic towards Mysore, particularly when he commanded the support of the English, whose military might was decisively superior to that of any other native power. Moreover, Haider had extended his frontiers at the cost of the Nawab, and had consistently fought against him ever since the Carnatic Wars of 1752-55. Therefore, hardly a year passed when the Nawab did not put pressure on the English to reduce Haider. The Nawab's set policy was somehow to involve the English on the side of the Marathas against Haider. There was bitter rivalry between the Nawab and Haider, and the Nawab was chafing under the frustration that the English did not seize the opportunity of frequent Maratha attacks on Mysore to crush Haider. Haider too was ambitious: but for the English support to the Nawab, Haider would have extended his territory upto Tinnevely and Madurai. But there was some difference between the ambitions of these two chiefs. Whereas the Nawab dreamt impracticable schemes, such as influencing official circles in England to free him from his dependence on the Company, to borrow huge amounts from the Company's servants to indulge in his own pomp and luxury, to reduce Tanjore and to conquer Mysore, Haider's ambitions manifested themselves in more practicable ways and exhibited greater consciousness of his own limitations.

Thus the Nawab of Carnatic was the most disturbing element in the relations of the English with Haider. Until the time of Wellesley the English were not the supreme masters in Madras, and their status in this presidency was different from what it was in Bengal. Their relations with the Nawab were delicate and complicated. The Nawab commanded the entire resources of the Carnatic, while they were in charge of its defence. Although, in theory, the Nawab and the English

were independent of each other, they were not so in practice. The Nawab depended on their help for the defence of his territories, and they depended on his resources to defray the expenses of the army. As the Nawab was not well disposed towards Haidar, he always stood in the way of any reconciliation between Haidar and the English. During Madhava Rao's third invasion of Mysore the Nawab openly declared, on the one hand, that he would not give the English even a rupee if they seemed inclined to help Haidar, although the English were bound by the Treaty of Madras of 1769 to go to his help in such a contingency. On the other hand, he tried his utmost to bring about Haidar's downfall by inducing the English to join the Marathas and crush him once for all.¹⁷ The English and the Nawab never agreed on their policy towards Mysore. The English advocated a moderate policy so that Haidar could remain a check against Maratha expansion, but the Nawab was for a firm, inflexible policy towards him. He was satisfied with nothing less than the total destruction of Haidar. There existed bitter rivalry among the four Indian powers of the south, the Marathas, the Nizam, the Nawab and Haidar. Each one of these was anxious to reduce the others but no one was strong enough to do so single-handed. Therefore, each sought the support of another against the third. The Marathas wanted the Nawab to join them against Haidar. The Nawab was willing to comply with their demand lest his refusal should result in the Maratha attack on the Carnatic. The English remained silent spectators watching the game of one Indian power engaged in mortal conflict with another Indian power. They did not want, for two reasons, to interfere in these disputes. First, if they did so, the balance of power in the south would be upset, and the Maratha power would be enhanced to a dangerous degree. Secondly, remaining neutral would serve their interests better, for the exhaustion of either party would be to their advantage in the long run. This difference between the English and the Nawab created great confusion in the Carnatic. The Nawab could neither deny nor grant aid to the Marathas against Haidar, yet the fact that he had been consistently urging the English to join hands with the Marathas embittered his relations with Haidar.

The cause of the mutual-rivalry between the Nawab and Haidar was the ambition of both. Haidar's successes made the Nawab more miserable than ever. His sense of inferiority and his dependence on the English made him resort to intrigues. Haidar, who kept himself informed of all developments at Madras, grew more and more hostile

towards the Nawab. The intensity of the rivalry that existed between these two can be inferred from what Bouchier wrote to Palk, speaking about Haider's demand for the release of Chanda's family, "... the Nawab would sooner lose his life than make the concession Hyder wants to exact from him."¹³ It must be remembered that Chanda Sahib was none other than the Nawab's own brother-in-law, whose family was languishing in jails, and Haider was keen on releasing them, particularly when in 1769, he stood victorious at the very gates of Madras. The treatment given to Chanda Sahib speaks not only of the Nawab's vanity but also of his hard-heartedness. Haider's character clearly appears in a different light. Despite his rivalry with the Nawab, Haider sought an interview with him after the Madras treaty of 1769, sent his *rakils* to him in 1773, offered to settle his differences in a peaceful way and proposed a joint defence against the Marathas. It was the Nawab's inconsistency and duplicity that destroyed all chances of such accommodation. Like the Nizam who later turned down a matrimonial connection with Tipu's family on the ground of his superior social status, the Nawab would not have his name in the Treaty of Madras alongside the "Naik's". Thus the queer character of the Nawab was an important factor in shaping the relations between Mysore and Madras.

One more factor that influenced the relations between these two powers was the constitutional machinery and structure of the English government at Madras. Its composition was such that it was difficult to ensure that all its members agreed on any policy that was not pressing. The fact that a commercial company of London established its political supremacy over vast areas in a region thousands of miles away from its seat of power necessitated a kind of administration which was all paper-work. Every policy had to be put down in writing, every opinion expressed in minutes and every business of the state transacted through despatches, consultations and proceedings. The masters of the Company were jealous of a situation in which their own servants might misuse their limitless power and hence the Home Government had prescribed rigid rules for the transaction of business. Each of the presidencies was governed by a council, headed by a Governor. The council included the chiefs of the subordinate settlements as well, who often failed to attend the council meetings. Every issue was decided by majority vote in order to avoid hasty decisions, to check corrupt influences, and to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of the Governor. This form of government was not without

its disadvantages. In attempting to deny excessive power to any one member, the court opened the door to many to indulge in intrigues. The Nawab was always busy, influencing councillors to endorse his views on Haidar. From 1763 to 1780, seldom did the Madras Government exhibit qualities of greatness. The members were lost in their own mutual rivalries, as if they too had been infected by the virus that prevailed in the Indian courts. A government by the council was not suited to Indian surroundings. The Nawab took full advantage of this situation and his residence became the centre of intrigues. Self-interest was predominant among members even on issues that involved the Company's reputation, such as the decision in 1767 to invade Mysore, the two Tanjore expeditions, and the arrest of Lord Pigot. Moreover, the Court periodically varied the strength of the Council. Between 1760 and 1769 it was less than 12, between 1769 and 1777 it was 16, and after 1777 it was only six. From 1778 a powerful select committee was appointed with exclusive powers to transact all military and political affairs. Haidar frequently complained that what one government at Madras had agreed to, the next would turn down. A successor government did not feel bound to honour the commitment of its predecessor. Bouchier concluded the treaty of 1769, but Du Pré refused to implement that treaty when the occasion arose only a year later. The position was entirely different after the Regulating Act of 1773, when the Bengal Presidency gained supremacy. But Bengal, which was far away from the scene of action, could not see the necessity of a flexible policy in the Carnatic.

What made the situation really worse in the Carnatic was the existence of a number of border disputes between the English and Haidar. The boundaries of the two powers were not clearly defined, and could never be defined when ambition reigned supreme on either side. Haidar's set policy was the expansion of his territories. But he was cautious so far as the Company's territories were concerned. Still, when an opportunity presented itself, he did not spare even those territories. The Tellicherry settlement was in alliance with numerous Malabar chiefs, but he did not hesitate to attack them. This was a serious point of dispute between Haidar and the Bombay Government. On the eastern side of his borders, the rumours of the massing of his troops on the frontiers, of the lifting of cattle, of border raids and poligar trouble constantly created tension. He possessed a chain of strong hill forts, from where he could attack the Carnatic by surprise. The Nawab who was not well-disposed towards him made all this an issue to bring about a

friction between Bidar and the English. Bidar, who was aware of the Nawab's intentions, never relaxed his vigilance, with the result that conflict always existed on the borders making 1761-72 a period of cold or active war.

Thus, during the first phase of Bidar's relations with the English, the policy of the Madras Government was one of neither hostility nor amity, but of neutrality. Despite the hostile propaganda of the Nawab, they were not ready to commit aggression. Bidar could not be included within the zone of their influence. The Muhammad Ali or Shuja-ud-Daula, because his status was higher than theirs. He could not be actively supported because he would then become an enemy. Nor could he be refused because, in that case, the English themselves would become the next target to the Marathas. Therefore, the basic policy for the British was to compromise with him. This policy underwent a great change in 1765, when a variety of factors brought about the First Mysore War. Chief among them were the Maratha ambivalence, the Nizam's indecisiveness and the misguiding policy of the English themselves. Without these factors war might have been averted. If Madhavrao Peshwa had not planned his second invasion of Mysore in 1765, the Nizam would not have proceeded against Bidar. If the Nizam had been sincere, he would rather have attacked Bidar after gaining the aid of the Arzot Sultans, not betrayed the English, after concluding a solemn alliance with them. If the English had learnt any lessons from the Carnatic wars—when it had either no time for Indian power or strange sides—they would have trusted neither Madhavrao Peshwa nor the Nizam. They urged them to reduce the Marathas, they went against Bidar. The Nizam urged speedy success, they delayed unduly long. The Court had warned them not to enter needless upon ambitious ventures, but yet they concluded hostile alliances or destroy a major power of the south. Bidar's estimate of the Madras government is perhaps not far wrong. "Governor Pigot was an invincible warrior, and Governor Palk a profound politician, but this man, Charles Boucher, is a great fool."¹⁰ It was, however, Bidar's shrewdness that saved the situation for him. Anyone with less sagacity could have neither broken the powerful confederacy of the Marathas, the Nizam and the English, nor turned it against his arch enemies, the English. He did not commit a single mistake in this political mising. Sexually and methodically, he used time to break the alliance and then to turn it against the English. And he was successful in both.

The conclusion of the First Mysore War brought a lot of credit to

Haidar. He achieved something remarkable. He had been more than a match for the "invincible". He had displayed firmness and tact, resoluteness and courage, shrewdness and sagacity to a degree that had not been displayed by any other Indian power. He had dictated terms to the English at their own gate in Madras. Even his adversaries had paid him a tribute. Robert Orme had observed, "... he is a very great man, this Hyder Ally and will figure in my history, if God pleases to let me write it."²⁰ Haidar's generosity in making peace with Madhava Rao, his disengagement of the Nizam from the English, his turning their own alliance against them, his victorious battles at Mulbagal and Bagalur, and his sudden appearance before Madras, all these redounded to his great credit. From the English point of view this was the most disastrous war they had ever fought in India. Mackay wrote to Orme, "Such shame and disgrace attended our arms on that unfortunate expedition that I cannot think of it."²¹ The prestige of the Company which had stood very high before the war, was dragged into the mud by an Indian power dictating terms to them at the very gate of Madras. Their finances shattered, their mighty schemes wrecked, their morals sunk low, and their troops beaten, the English stood at the end of the war on the threshold of despondency and despair. The Company's interests suffered so much that the Court of Directors held the view that "the most consummate abilities, persevering assiduity, unshaken fidelity and intrepid courage in our future servants, may perhaps be found insufficient in many years to restore the English East India Company to a proper degree of credit and dignity in the eyes of the natives and inhabitants of Indoostan."²²

One of the important clauses of the Treaty of Madras which Haidar had dictated to the English was a defensive alliance whereby the English were obliged to send him military aid if he required it in the event of any Maratha attack on him. Hardly had the ink dried on this treaty when Madhava Rao made the most spirited attack of his life on Haidar. Haidar's success against the English had thrown such a challenge to Madhava Rao who was a dashing, intrepid and powerful leader of the time, that he was anxious to win the glory of being the conqueror of the conqueror. In the power equation of the time nothing would serve the Maratha cause better, and nothing would better prevent the English from casting an evil eye on Maratha dominions than to humble Haidar who had humbled the English. With this object, only a few months later, Madhava Rao himself descended from the north for his massive

attack on Haidar, who had yet to consolidate his position after the continuous warfare of the previous three years. What was more, the Marathas appeared to be resolute this time in their purpose to bring about the total annihilation of Haidar. In this hour of crisis Haidar invoked the defensive clause of his treaty with the English and urged them to despatch speedily a body of troops. The English repeated their earlier conduct, namely, to ignore his demand, and thus committed the second breach of their solemn treaty. To the injury of 1752, when they had failed to honour their treaty by refusing to surrender Trichinopoly, they now added this insult. This policy of theirs was no better than stabbing him in the back. Haidar neither forgot their wrongs nor forgave them for this breach of trust. He paid them for their perfidy with compound interest, when an opportunity arose just a few years later.

The English provoked not only Haidar but also several other Indian powers. By 1778 there was general unrest and discontent among the Indian powers who began to feel that, under the pretext of punishing the cruelty of one individual, Siraj-ud-daula, the Company had come to possess the whole of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. In order to protect these possessions they had reduced the Nawab of Oudh and the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam. In order to establish their exclusive supremacy they had removed their other European rivals from India such as the French and the Dutch. They had reduced their allies like the Nawab of the Carnatic and the Raja of Tanjore to a degree of subjection which threatened others with a similar fate. They had violated their treaties in various ways—in their failure to assist Haidar, in their demand for remission of tribute from the Nizam and in their capture of Guntur from Basalat Jang. Worst of all, they had the audacity to meddle in the affairs of the Poona Court posing as king-makers. Their support of Raghunath Rao to the Peshwaship at Poona was the last straw on the camel's back. The whole of India was now up against them. The confederacy of 1780 must be viewed in the light of these circumstances. The English were appearing in their true colours, namely to win the empire of India at all costs. They were eliminating one by one all Indian powers to establish their own supremacy. Their attack on the disintegrating Mughal Empire was not so fiercely challenged as that on the Maratha empire which was at the peak of its glory. When the citadel of the Maratha power itself came under attack, what else remained in India, except perhaps Mysore to stem the tide of British expansion? The British espousal of Raghoba's cause brought back to the memory all the sinister designs of Europeans

since the time of Dupleix, who had started the game of using Indian princes as pawns on a chess-board. All the Indian powers from north to south realized the danger to their sovereignty and came together in a confederacy, which was surely a rare phenomenon in Indian history. The only point of regret is that this spirit of unity was not sustained for long and the Indians reverted to their old habit of narrow jealousies, mutual suspicions and short-sighted policies. It was thus owing to the duplicity and inconsistency of the Indian powers that a fair chance of reducing the English was lost. Haidar solely carried on the war against the English until he died in December 1782. He was certainly a remarkable person, who elevated a small kingdom to the position of a major power in the south. His possession of a long sea-coast, his building of a navy, the discipline of his troops on western lines, his control over a chain of strong forts on the Carnatic frontier, and his uncommon military and political abilities never let the English remain complacent towards him.

In addition to the Marathas, the French, the English, the Nawab of Carnatic and Haidar, there was the Nizam too, who influenced the affairs of the southern peninsula to a certain extent. The Nizam himself was the product of the age which offered a fine opportunity to ambitious persons to carve out independent kingdoms out of the debris of the once mighty Mughal Empire. Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I, the *subedar* of the Deccan, laid the foundation of a new state, which was destined, within a short period, to become the hot-bed of European diplomacy and intrigue. The death of Asaf Jah I heralded an era of revolutions which transformed the European commercial companies into dominant political powers. India was brought face to face with new techniques of warfare, new power equations, new types of diplomacy, new political institutions, and almost everything new in moral, social, cultural and economic values. It was the war of succession in Hyderabad that led to the opening of a political Pandora's box which finally changed the history of this land. Dupleix was the high-priest who inaugurated this new era, and thanks to the counter-offensive of Clive, the French empire in India was lost as rapidly as it had been gained. By the time of Nizam Ali Khan, who finally emerged victorious in the court intrigues almost at the same time as Haidar became supreme in Mysore, the French had been completely expelled from Hyderabad. This Nizam must have been a good student of Mughal history, particularly of Aurangzeb, for he treated his brothers in almost the same fashion.

The role of the Nizam in the country's affairs was by no means an attractive one. He was neither a consistent friend nor a steady foe of any power in the south. It took very little time for him to change sides. Although vanity, self-interest, ambition and inconsistency were the traits of almost all the political leaders of the time, the Nizam appeared to be the very embodiment of those traits. Even though political set-up in the country had changed, he considered himself the legal overlord of the entire south by virtue of his claim to be the *subedar* of the Deccan. The difficulty was that his military ability was not equal to his tall claim. But it must be said that in qualities like flexibility, tact, initiative and intrigue, no one could excel him, and it is by their use that he not only survived the onslaught of hostile forces all around him but also preserved his dominions until 1847 and obtained the title of the Faithful Ally of the British Empire. Whereas all the other powers of the eighteenth century, whether it was the Nawab of Carnatic or the Peshwa of Poona, the Raja of Tanjore or the Sultan of Mysore, vanished before the superior diplomacy of the British, the Nizam of Hyderabad alone retained the semblance of his power until quite recent years. How inconsistent his policy was can be seen from the fact that he swore revenge against the English in 1766, when they demanded from him the Northern Sarkars—those narrow coastal strips on the eastern side of India, which like the definition of a straight line were mere length without breadth. The English had secured the Sarkars from Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor, along with the *diwani* of Bengal, following his defeat at the Battle of Buxar. The Nizam was then so furious at the British demand for these strips that he threatened to push the English into the sea. To cool his temper the Madras Government sent General Caillaud to his court, where just the bait of a promise to help him in the conquest of Mysore tamed him so much that this inveterate foe turned in a moment into a devoted ally. On the prospects of getting a good share of the spoils of war, he invaded Mysore in conjunction with the English. But, in keeping with his fickle character, he also obliged Haider by joining his side because he promised him a larger share than the English had done. With regard to his own interests the Nizam was always realistic and pragmatic rather than scrupulous. He quickly realised that, after Madhava Rao's withdrawal from the confederacy, the prospects of liquidating Haider would not be very bright. Moreover, he was aware of the dissensions in Madras between the English and the Nawab. Therefore he must have thought that aligning himself with a rising star like

Haidar was far better than joining the English whose previous record in their relations with any Indian power had nothing to commend it. Naturally it did not take long for the Nizam to desert the English camp and join that of Haidar. History offers few instances of such a sudden change of policy, where a friend turns overnight into a foe and foe into a friend.

The Nizam figures prominently again from 1778, when the Bombay Government launched their ill-conceived adventure of an attack on Poona, and the Madras Government adopted their misguided policy of capturing Guntur. The Nizam seemed again to burst with rage, and vowed to exterminate the English from India. He evinced keen interest in the formation of the Confederacy of 1780 and became a willing partner in the joint offensive against the English in order to seize from them the Northern Sarkars. But, once again, with all his idle bragging, he did nothing. He did not send a single soldier from Hyderabad to trouble the English in the least. His indignation proved as short-lived as a soap-bubble. A soft word from Hastings that his Guntur would not be touched silenced him completely. It is true that the politics of the time knew no principles, and solemn promises and treaties had no meaning for the parties if they suspected the least inconvenience to themselves in carrying them out. But this was nowhere more evident, and more forcibly so, than in the case of the Nizam.

Thus the period preceding the accession of Tipu to power had witnessed the dawn of an era in which old values had completely changed. The traditional Indian diplomacy, which had been totally free from the guileful subtleties of western concepts, was now confronted with a new situation. The idea of a balance of power, imperceptibly introduced by European powers; created much confusion in the minds of the Indian rulers, who failed to grasp the apparently illogical policies of their European rivals. The English who would conclude a solemn treaty broke it readily because its faithful execution would disturb the power balance. But even more important than the political cunning of the Europeans was their new technique of fighting, in which their superior fire power, disciplined infantry, able leadership and efficient intelligence system gave them decisive advantage in every campaign. In every battle from 1749 onwards whether at St. Thome, Arni, Kaveripak, Plassey, Wandiwash, Masulipatam or Buxar, small European armies were able to overpower very large Indian armies and the English in particular built up the myth of their invincibility. It is true that Haidar had to a certain extent weakened this myth by inflicting blows

on them in the First and Second Mysore Wars. Yet it must be admitted that Europeans were far superior to Indians in their technique of warfare. This period is significant in several other ways as well. Like the actors in a Greek drama, it threw upon the stage very strange personalities, each of whom was peculiar in his own way. The Nawab of Carnatic was ambitious but inconsistent. The Nizam of Hyderabad was unscrupulous and opportunistic. Haidar was dashing and intrepid. Madhava Rao was bold and imaginative. Dupleix was shrewd and cunning. Clive was brave and pragmatic. The traits of each of them had a powerful impact on the politics of the time. What was common to all of them was a basic self-interest which would compel them to go to any length and adopt any policy. The absence of a central authority strong enough to impose its will on these fighting elements resulted in utter confusion everywhere. Frequent revolutions became the order of the day. Not a year passed without bitter struggles, armed conflicts, and court intrigues. The period was full of all manner of paradoxes. There was a divorce of the *de jure* from the *de facto* power almost all over India. Shah Alam was only a tool in the hands of his own ministers. The Peshwa usurped power from Shivaji's descendants only to be treated likewise by his own subordinates. Haidar, who was in theory only a Dalvoy, was, for all practical purposes, the very master of Mysore. The French and the English too imitated this political pattern and preferred to retain Indian Nawabs and Rajas rather than assume direct and full charge of government. This experiment proved utterly wrong in Bengal and hence the English had to revise it. What is important to note is the fact that the mutual impact of western and eastern ideas created such complications in India that a new struggle for political supremacy was inevitable. The core of the problem was the existence of a political vacuum in the country, and until that vacuum was filled by the decisive superiority of some single power over the rest, it was evident India would have neither peace nor stability. In this contest for power Haidar too had engaged himself, and, in turn, passed on this heritage to his son, Tipu Sultan.

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The First Phase
ASSERTIVE DESIGNS (1783-89)

CHAPTER I

WAR AND PEACE WITH THE ENGLISH

HAIDAR ALI WAS SUCCEEDED BY his son Tipu Sultan, who stands out even more prominent than his father for his undaunted courage, indomitable will and unyielding perseverance. The short but stormy reign of Tipu Sultan is momentous in many ways, but its main significance lies in his strong opposition to the English in India. They had never been confronted till then with a more resolute enemy than Tipu, "who fought with the fierceness of a tiger and the tenacity of a bull-dog." His life's ambition was to expel them from India, and to make the country free from the clutches of foreigners. It was his cherished maxim that to live but a day like a lion was far better than to live for a hundred years like a fox. He never made any compromise with this ideal, and never forgot to translate it into action. The disunity among the Indian powers and the superior diplomacy and military skill of the British led him to the painful realization that the British were bound some day to establish their supremacy. No other Indian prince of the time seems to have perceived this danger with equal clarity.

Tipu was born on 16 November 1759 at Devanahalli in Kolar District, and was named Tipu Sultan after the saint Tipu Masud Auli, to whose tomb in Arcot Tipu's mother had made a pilgrimage, praying for a noble son. He was also called Haidar Ali, after his grandfather, Haidar Muhammad. Unlike his father, Tipu was a highly accomplished prince, well-versed in the sciences of his time. He had the necessary training in all branches of administration, and particularly in the art of war. At an early age, he accompanied his father in various campaigns, and his first experience of war was in 1776, when he participated in Haidar's attack on Madras, where he displayed great dash and courage.¹ He was present during Haidar's negotiations with the

Nizam in the First Mysore War, when the tact and resourcefulness of the young prince impressed the Nizam and won him over to his side.² Although Haidar had secretly negotiated the treaty of alliance with the Nizam's minister, Rukn-ud-daula, Tipu was sent to obtain the ratification of that treaty. Haidar was careful enough to send Tipu at the head of 6,000 troops to the Nizam's camp. His reason for sending this large force was his apprehension about the Nizam. Haidar is said to have stated, "I am afraid of the perfidious and cruel Nizam; he has assassinated his own brother; will he spare my son? Or, at least, have I not reason to conclude that he will detain him, and compel me by the apprehension of my son's danger either to pay him a large sum or to make great concessions to him? For, in short, I trust my son in the hands of a wretch to whom nothing is sacred."³ This is a reflection on the character of the Nizam, indicating how dangerous others considered him at the time, and also on Haidar, showing how careful and far-sighted he was. However, nothing untoward happened, as Haidar had taken all preliminary precautions. On the contrary, Tipu was well-received and the Nizam conferred on him the title of Nasib-ud-daula, meaning the 'fortune of the state';⁴ and also of Fateh Ali Khan.⁵ This was Tipu's first diplomatic assignment in which he proved highly successful.

During the First Mysore War, Tipu had been placed in independent command of a body of troops, which in September 1767 proceeded as far as Madras and caused much consternation to the Governor of Madras himself, to the Nawab of Carnatic, to his son, to Colonel Call and to almost all the Councillors, who "very narrowly escaped being taken in the country-house in the Company's garden. Happily for them, a small vessel that by accident was opposite the garden, furnished them with the means of escaping."⁶ Peixoto, a Portuguese, who was in Haidar's service and was his historian, says that the battle of Tiruvannamalai on 25 September 1767 would not have been lost by Haidar and the Nizam, if Tipu had been present in the field instead of going to Madras.⁷ He took part actively in the Mysore-Maratha War of 1769-72. After the death of Madhava Rao, he was sent to the northern part of Mysore to recover the territories which had been occupied by the Marathas. By the time the Second Mysore War broke out he had gained great experience both of warfare and of diplomacy. Haidar took his counsel in all important matters of state, but admonished him if he did any wrong. One such instance was during the Maratha war on Mysore in March 1771, when he was

punished for not carrying out Haidar's orders properly.⁸ The Marathas had made a fierce attack, and Haidar had decided to withdraw from Melkote to Srirangapatna. He asked Tipu, who was in the rear, to advance quickly to the front, but he failed to do so, making the retreat a rout. Haidar was so enraged that he punished Tipu. But during 1774-78, Tipu was of immense assistance to Haidar in recovering his lost territories in the Krishna region.⁹ In physical prowess and tireless energy, he surpassed even his father. He inflicted a crushing defeat on Baillie near Polilur in September 1780, and this was the severest blow the English had ever sustained in India.¹⁰ The whole detachment was either killed or taken prisoner. Of the 86 European officers, 36 were killed. In all there were 3,820 prisoners, of whom 508 were Europeans.¹¹ The English lost the flower of their army. And Baillie himself was taken captive, and languished for a long time in the dungeons of Srirangapatna. This defeat caused so much consternation in Madras that half of its Black Town was deserted. Tipu likewise inflicted a fatal blow on Colonel Braithwaite near Tanjore at Annagudi on 18 February 1782. This army consisted of 100 Europeans, 300 cavalry, 1,400 sepoys and 10 field pieces. Tipu attacked this force, seized all the guns, and took the entire detachment prisoner.¹² Earlier, on 12 December 1781 when Haidar had sent Tipu to besiege Chittur and capture it, Tipu had successfully carried out his orders. Thus Tipu had gained sufficient military experience by the time Haidar died in December 1782.

Tipu's accession to power was peaceful, although he had been away in Malabar at the time of his father's death in December 1782 near Chittur. His principal *sardars* and ministers managed the succession smoothly, without the least tumult or disorder. Tipu inherited a powerful kingdom, an overflowing treasury and a strong army. His dominions extended from the river Krishna in the north to Dindigal in the south, nearly 400 miles in length, and from the Malabar coast in the west to the sloping eastern ghats in the east, nearly 300 miles in width. Yet his position at the time of his accession was by no means enviable. The very extent and power of his kingdom excited the jealousy and hostility of his neighbours. He was in the middle of a war which his father had started, and the latter's death during the crucial progress of the war stirred up his adversaries to increased efforts to conquer his territories and reduce his power. Warren Hastings had already broken the first and last Indian Confederacy against the English, which had caused so much consternation in their hearts. The Treaty

of Salbai, 1782, had not only disengaged the Indian powers from the struggle against the English but had also brought about the unhappy prospect of the Maratha union with the English in order to compel Tipu to give up his northern possessions. Anderson was busy in the Court of Sindhia concluding an Anglo-Maratha offensive alliance against him.¹³ According to this alliance territories formerly belonging to the Nawab of Carnatic and those belonging to the Marathas were to be first conquered and restored to their legitimate owners. Out of the rest of the likely conquests, three equal shares would be made, one each for the English, the Peshwa and Sindhia. This alliance was quite against the spirit of the Confederacy of 1780 in which all Indian powers had joined hands against the English. Mysore in particular had participated in it because she wanted to demonstrate her solidarity with the neighbours who were in distress. The Marathas had forgotten the excesses of the English who had caused such consternation to the Poona Court which was now in league with the very power that it had set out to destroy. Like the Nizam in the First Mysore War, who had joined hands with his own enemy against his erstwhile ally, the Marathas were now joining hands with their own foes against their ally, who had rushed to their aid in the hour of their need.

Besides this, Tipu's sudden return from Malabar to the east on Haider's death gave the English a good chance to occupy Mangalore and Bidnur. The treachery of Ayaz, the commander of one of his forts, facilitated their task. Moreover, the Rani of Mysore, Lakshmmammanniavarn, had hatched a plot to overthrow Tipu by inviting the English to Srirangapatna. This was the result of a plan conceived by John Sullivan, the English Resident at Tanjore.¹⁴ In April 1782 Sullivan had informed Madras that it was possible to overthrow Haider with the help of the Rani of Mysore, the wife of Krishnaraja Wodeyar II, whom Haider had dispossessed of power. For this purpose Sullivan had negotiated with the two agents of the Rani, Tirumala Rao and Narayana Rao, who were brothers. As early as 1778, the Rani had employed Tirumala Rao on a secret mission to Lord Pigot, the Governor of Madras, against Haider, but the revolution at Madras, which overthrew Pigot himself, had disappointed the Rani. Being apprehensive lest this mission be leaked out, Tirumala Rao fled to Tanjore, where Father Swartz, a missionary, introduced him to Sullivan, whom he successfully convinced of the Rani's intentions to overthrow Haider.

Tirumala Rao was a man of considerable experience, and had held

high office under Haidar. Taking advantage of the Mysore War with the English, the Rani suddenly got interested in the scheme in order to restore the ancient dynasty. In April 1782 Sullivan informed Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras, that the Rani was anxious to conclude a treaty with the Company, by which, in return for their support in removing Haidar, she would pay them in all five lakhs of pagodas by instalments, three on the fall of Coimbatore, one on entering Mysore, and another on the capture of Srirangapatna. She would pay, besides, two lakhs monthly for the expenses of the war.¹⁶ She further promised to give the English a *jagir* of fifteen lakhs and an annual subsidy of thirty-six lakhs of rupees.¹⁶ Sullivan wrote to Bombay that the Rani had secretly salted away hoards of money which could be made more "productive the moment we have possessed ourselves of any fort in Coimbatore or Mysore."¹⁷ Sullivan wanted Humberston to attack Coimbatore, Goddard to take Mangalore, and Coote to reduce Kolar and Bangalore. Reduction of the whole of Mysore appeared possible to Sullivan, because of the Rani's riches, the expected reinforcements from home and the Bombay offensive on Mangalore. In his further negotiations with the agents Sullivan found out that the Rani was prepared to entrust the defence of the whole of Mysore to the English, pay them an annual subsidy, grant them a handsome *jagir*, waive her claim over those territories in Mysore which once belonged to the Nizam and the Marathas, and discharge punctually the *paishkash* and the *chauth* to those powers respectively.¹⁸ He urged Bombay to hasten the expedition against Mangalore, for the prospects of gain were brighter in Mysore than in the Maratha empire.¹⁹ Later he informed them that the Rani would cede to Bombay Sunda and Honavar—as a *jagir*—which were rich in pepper and sandalwood.²⁰

The Madras Government immediately approved Sullivan's scheme, but Coote did not. He thought that its disclosure might spell disaster to the Raja's family, and retard an accommodation with Haidar. Coote called the scheme "a mischievous impediment to more important arrangements."²¹ Meanwhile, in her anxiety to conclude a treaty quickly, the Rani sent Tirumala Rao to Madras, but Madras hesitated at this stage because Coote was negotiating with Haidar in July 1782. When these negotiations failed, Sullivan drew up a treaty which was authenticated by Swartz and exchanged with Tirumala Rao. It stipulated that the Rani would pay the Company ten lakhs of rupees at intervals, as and when the Madras army captured Coimbatore, Mysore and Srirangapatna. Besides this treaty, another document

called the *kaul* was drawn up. It stipulated that the Company would conquer Mysore for the Rani, that they would not retain any territory for themselves, that in case of peace with Haidar they would refund her the amount she had paid them, and that they would not deliver her up to him.²⁴

As Madras was at this time in dire need of money and provisions, it greatly favoured Sullivan's scheme. Only one member of the Select Committee, General Stuart, opposed the measure and observed, "The President moves much quicker in his Minute from Mangalore to Bangalore than our armies can do in practice."²⁵ But with the support of the other two members of the Select Committee, Davidson and Bader, the scheme was approved and the *kaul* was despatched.²⁶

With Haidar's death in December 1782 the scheme was vigorously pushed through. Colonel Fullerton advanced from the south. Colonel Lang captured the fort of Marur on 2 April 1783. Tirumala Rao hoisted the Raja's flag on the ramparts of this fort near Coimbatore. The management of this fort was also entrusted to him. But Sullivan disapproved of this measure as it might reveal the secret treaty to Tipu, and deprive the English of political and financial advantages. The Rani was active in Srirangapatna, when Tipu was away in Mangalore. She desired to overthrow Tipu by a *coup d'état* with the help of certain disaffected officers of Tipu, like Rangaiiah, Singaiiah, Anche Shamaiiah and Subburaj Urs, who held key posts in his administrations.²⁷ They were all in touch with Tirumala Rao, and with the advancing English army from the south. Colonel Lang seized two more forts, Aruvurichi and Dindigal, but he was soon succeeded by Colonel Fullerton who took Dharapuram. But the Southern army was in great distress owing to lack of money and provisions and also owing to dissensions in the Madras Council. It could not take any offensive action. Meanwhile the French had arrived and General Stuart, who had been stranded at Cuddalore, wanted Fullerton to march to his relief. As for the internal *coup d'état* by the disgruntled officers and the Rani of Mysore, the whole plot leaked out, and the conspirators were severely punished.

In addition to encouraging the Rani of Mysore to hatch a conspiracy, the English had set up the Raja of Travancore, the Zamorin of Calicut and the other Malabar chiefs to join the English against Tipu.²⁸ Constant rumours were there that the Marathas had collected a large number of horsemen to cross the Krishna.²⁹ The most valuable parts of Tipu's possessions had been captured by the Bombay army, while

he was on the eastern front. Moreover, Tipu had newly succeeded to power and was not very sure of loyalty from his own subordinates, who would not hesitate to shift their support to any party that might tempt them with better prospects. Thus the position of Tipu at the time he succeeded to power was not very happy.

The youthful Tipu resolved to struggle hard both against his external and internal foes. His main task was to prosecute vigorously the war on hand so that in a few swift and decisive campaigns, he might be able to compel the English to sue for peace. But to fight against a superior western power was not so easy particularly when all other Indian powers had not only withdrawn from the contest but also the most powerful of them, the Marathas, were threatening to join the enemy. Besides, the English could bring to bear the resources of all their three presidencies together with supplies from home against a single adversary, and they could attack simultaneously from three different directions, from the west on Tipu's Malabar possessions, from the south on Dindigal and Coimbatore and from the east on Bangalore. They had already fomented trouble nearer home for Tipu by encouraging the Rani of Mysore to hatch a conspiracy and by provoking the Malabar Nairs to rise in revolt. Added to these, Tipu's own allies, the French, were of absolutely no use to him, as they had proved a spent force in India. Therefore his strategy at this time consisted in his firm resolve to try his utmost to win victories in the fighting and, at the same time, just in case of any untoward contingency, to keep the channel of negotiations open, so that an honourable peace could be concluded. It was obvious from what had preceded that, except Haidar, the Indian powers at the very height of their solidarity and unity, could not crush the English, despite the fact that the English had been involved in a bitter struggle not only in India but also in Europe and America. Now that their position was decidedly better both in India and abroad because of the cessation of hostilities in Europe and America and of the break-up of the Confederacy in India, they could concentrate all their attention on vanquishing Tipu. What was more, Tipu knew the trend of thinking in the Maratha Court, which had not reconciled itself to the existence of Mysore as a powerful state and which had been offended by the capture of its territories by Haidar during their internecine strife. Hence Tipu's initial policy was to end the war honourably, consolidate his power effectively, and wait for a more propitious time for a trial of strength against the English. Moreover, Haidar himself had initiated negotiations for

a separate peace with the English, and Tipu's efforts too were directed towards the completion of that goal. His immediate aim was to frustrate the Maratha design to join hands with the English and thus recover their territories. Effective prosecution of the war was the only way to achieve his double objective, namely, to compel the English to an honourable peace and to prevent the Marathas from a new attack. Any relaxation in war effort would indicate his weakness and his adversaries would surely exploit such a situation to humiliate him.

Fortunately for Tipu, the situation changed for the better. Sir Eyre Coote, the experienced General, who had been well-known since the Battle of Wandiwash and who had been sent by Warren Hastings to the south to retrieve the sinking ship of the English in 1780, died on 27 April 1783.²⁸ The French had sent the much-awaited reinforcements to India under the veteran general, Bussy, who too had figured prominently in the earlier Anglo-French struggle for supremacy in India. He arrived in Tranquebar with 27 ships and 5,000 men.²⁹ Suffrein, the ablest of the French Admirals, was already present in India with a powerful armada, and he had cut off all supplies by sea from Bengal to Madras. Madras Presidency had been undergoing great distress at this time through serious financial and economic difficulties through a bitter quarrel with the Nawab of Carnatic, and through its differences with the Bengal Government. The Regulating Act had failed in its constitutional machinery by being unable to establish happy relations between the Supreme Government in Bengal and the subordinate presidencies of Madras or Bombay. The serious point of controversy at this time between Bengal and Madras was the issue of peace. Madras was anxious to conclude peace with Tipu, but Bengal was not in favour of any peace unless Tipu himself took the initiative in seeking it.

Meanwhile the Bombay army was active on the western coast. General Mathews took Onore and Bidnur. The Madras Government, whose army had made no progress in the south, felt supremely relieved and thought that it was the only course left to divert Tipu's attention from the Carnatic.³⁰ According to Mill, the English perpetrated great cruelties on the inhabitants of Onore and Anantpur.³¹ Tipu did not allow the English to retain their conquest for long. He fell on Mathews in April 1783 and compelled him to surrender Bidnur.³² Since the time of the heroic defence of Arcot by Clive, the English had never suffered the humiliation of surrendering a captured fort in India. That they were so humbled now speaks of

the military ability of Tipu, who had earlier defeated Baillie and Braithwaite, but had not gained the reputation of recovering any place that had already fallen into English hands. The English surrendered the fort on condition that their troops should be allowed to evacuate the place with full military honours. The garrison was not to take away any property belonging to the fort. Tipu's guard had to escort them up to Sadasivgarh from where they were to proceed to Bombay. He was also to furnish them with sufficient provisions and conveyance to the sick, besides delivering two hostages to guarantee the fulfilment of these terms.³³ But these terms could not be executed smoothly. The English broke them twice. First, they quarrelled with Tipu over the manner of the surrender of arms, violated the truce and fought with the Mysoreans. But they were soon overpowered, and hence they laid down their arms. Secondly, they appropriated large sums of money which aroused the indignation of Tipu. When he ordered a search of their belongings, "every knapsack was found to be lined with gold."³⁴ The search resulted in the recovery of 40,000 pagodas.³⁵ Besides, they had pillaged the public stores, burnt the government records and refused to release the prisoners of war.³⁶ Tipu could hardly stand this breach of trust and hence he marched the English garrison off in irons to several forts. There is no evidence to prove that he deliberately infringed the terms of his capitulation.

From Bidnur Tipu proceeded to recover Mangalore, which had been captured by the English. With the appearance of Tipu, Campbell, the English commander, retreated into the fort.³⁷ Then commenced a long siege which went on from 20 May to 2 August 1783. Just when the fall of the fort seemed imminent, the French deserted Tipu on the announcement of peace in Europe, and he concluded an armistice on 2 August 1783. The hostilities ceased on certain conditions. Finally Campbell was to retain the fort and Tipu, its trenches and batteries. Both parties were to put 100 of their picked troops in the other's camp. The English officers could visit the French. Neither party was to repair the breaches, nor erect any new works, nor resume fresh hostilities. Tipu was to establish a bazaar nearby to supply the garrison provisions at fixed rates. Campbell was to take into the fort provisions needed for 10 or 12 days and no more. Communication facilities were to be allowed to the English by land and not by sea, nor through Tipu's territories. Any dispute of the troops on either side was to be reported to their respective commanders who were to take

suitable action. Elaborate arrangements were made to prevent any breach of the terms of the ceasefire.²⁶ Thus Tipu was able to frustrate the efforts of the Bombay Government to harass him by making surprise attacks on his western possessions.

While Tipu was busy with these campaigns in Malabar, the Madras Government was seriously engaged in concerting plans to invade Mysore from the north-east and the south. They sent a force under Captain Edmonds to attack the north-east of Mysore with the intention of creating a diversion. This suggests how desperately the English were attempting to harass Tipu, and how differently they had to deal with Mysore in contrast to all other Indian powers. In their military campaigns whether in Bengal or Oudh or the Maratha dominions, the English armies were never on the defensive and were never confronted with a situation similar to that in Mysore. The English occupied Kadapa under the pretext that the Nawab of that place needed their assistance. The fact was that the Nawab of Kadapa, Syed Muhammad, who had invited the English, was but a pretender to the throne, and the principality really belonged to Mir Khamruddin Khan, who was a vassal of Tipu.²⁷ The English completely failed in this venture too. Mir Khamruddin acted swiftly, asserted his claim and recovered his principality by dislodging the English from Kadapa. Even the tributaries of Tipu threw a challenge to the English, thus proving that Indians, under the leadership of Haidar and Tipu, were no longer under the dread of an English army.

The course of the war took a different turn through an important event, viz., the cessation of hostilities in Europe. On 24 June 1783 Madras received the intelligence from Europe that peace had been concluded between England and France on 9 February 1783. This information relieved the English of a very serious situation. With the arrival of the French in India, Tipu's army had almost surrounded the principal Madras unit under General Stuart who would have been reduced to the point of surrender unless Fullarton marched to his relief. The good news for the English from Europe made the march of Fullarton to the rescue of Stuart unnecessary, for it came as a great relief to the English at Madras, who hastened in sending a flag of truce to Bussy for the suspension of hostilities against Cuddalore. They invited his attention to Article 16 of the Treaty of Versailles, by which Tipu, the ally of the French, was also to cease hostilities. This was the second time during the course of the war when Mysore had to suffer because of the unilateral action of her allies. The first

time was when the Marathas concluded a separate peace, the Treaty of Salbai, without consulting Haidar, and now the French were doing the same thing. It looked as if all circumstances including unforeseen developments conspired to favour the English in India, and all the efforts of Haidar and Tipu to stem the tide of British expansion, despite their heroism and persistent struggle, were destined to prove futile. All too suddenly and surprisingly a change in the fortune of the war would come just at a moment when everything seemed to go well either for Haidar or for Tipu.

On the receipt of this news from Europe the Madras Government instructed Stuart to hasten to send a flag of truce to Bussy for the suspension of hostilities against Cuddalore. They proposed to send two Commissioners, Sadlier and Staunton, to communicate to him the preliminaries of the peace concluded in Europe and thus pave the way for an immediate suspension of hostilities in India. Under different circumstances the English would not have taken the initiative of informing the French of this peace until they had accomplished the objective on hand. But the precarious situation of their army at Cuddalore, which was on the verge of defeat, compelled them to intimate news of the peace. Within three days after the Commissioners had reached Cuddalore, the armistice was concluded and hostilities between the English and the French ceased on 2 July 1783. Both the English and the French attempted to involve Tipu also in the armistice just as Sindhia had tried to include Haidar in the Treaty of Salbai. But Tipu was reluctant to stop fighting and looked upon the French conduct as a stab in the back. However, on second thoughts he realized that with the desertion of the French the threat of an Anglo-Maratha offensive, the advance of Fullarton from the south and the exhaustion of his army fighting on three fronts, eastern, western and southern, his chances were not bright. Therefore he revised his decision and concluded an armistice at Mangalore on 2 August 1783. With this, the hostilities ceased both on the eastern and on the western sectors of the war.

The period of the armistice from August 1783 to March 1784, when the war came to an end was one of uneasy truce. Both parties had reluctantly agreed to an unavoidable situation hoping that they would seize the first opportunity to outwit each other in order to gain advantage later in the peace negotiations. The English were the first to violate the armistice both in the Carnatic and in Malabar. Although Stuart desisted from hostilities after learning about the conclusion

of armistice by Tipu, Fullarton did not cease his preparations to invade Mysore. He marched to Dharapuram and launched his offensive on Palghat in October.⁴⁰ Disregarding the protests of Roshan Khan, Tipu's commander, he continued to advance and, after occupying a number of small posts, he besieged Palghat.⁴¹ Roshan Khan forwarded a letter of the Madras Government to him to desist from further hostilities, but it had no effect. Fullarton stormed the fort and secured large quantities of provisions, military stores and cash to the extent of 50,000 pagodas.⁴² He then advanced to Coimbatore and captured it on 28 November 1783. The letters of the Commissioners forwarded by Roshan Khan were ignored. This repeated defiance of Fullarton was not without the sanction of the Madras Government, which had been anxious to invoke the Paris Peace Treaty just a while ago, when the English army was in distress. But, at the slightest improvement of their situation, the treaty was conveniently ignored. There is good reason to think that Fullarton's actions had the support of the Madras Government, for despite his apparent disregard of their orders and those of the Commissioners, he was not even reprimanded, much less punished. His actions were not just countenanced; they were encouraged and supported. Macartney sent two sets of orders, one through Tipu's officers and the other direct to Fullarton. In the first he commanded him to desist from hostilities, and in the second, he asked him to retain Palghat and other possessions "as a security for the garrison of Mangalore," and as a bargaining point to secure favourable terms from Tipu.⁴³ On 13 December 1783 Macartney sent specific orders not to restore the captured places, which would afford "the means of retaliation" against Tipu.⁴⁴ Even as late as 24 January 1784, Macartney issued similar kind of instructions to Fullarton.⁴⁵ It was only when Macartney was fully convinced that the duplicity of his conduct would result in the fresh flare-up of hostilities that he asked Fullarton peremptorily to withdraw to the limits he had occupied on 26 July 1783. But, before he retired, Fullarton caused considerable damage to Tipu by plundering Coimbatore, carrying off provisions, guns and ammunition, together with large sums of money. Instead of delivering up the forts to Tipu's officers, he handed them over to the agents of the Mysore Rani, who had been implicated in a plot against Tipu.⁴⁶ Thus the English committed an open breach of the armistice for two obvious reasons. One was to strengthen their own hands to wrest favourable terms at the time of negotiating peace. Quite a few forts of the English were in Tipu's hands, whereas one or

two of his forts which had been conquered by the Bombay army on the western coast had also been recovered by him. Therefore the Madras Government was anxious to retain some of their gains, although these had been obtained by breach of trust. Secondly, these conquests would bring them immense monetary gain ~~at a time~~ when they were in great financial distress. Sullivan had concluded a treaty with the Rani of Mysore who had promised that she would give them three lakhs of pagodas on the fall of Coimbatore. Just to extract this money from the Rani they broke their armistice and captured Coimbatore. This conduct of the English was quite reminiscent of the politics so often seen since the battle of Plassey.

Fullarton was not the only person who had committed the breach of the armistice. Another instance of a similar type occurred through the conduct of Brigadier-General Macleod, who was in command of the troops on the western coast. The Bombay Government had sent this man with three vessels loaded with provisions and a detachment of Hanoverians to help the Mangalore garrison to hold out for a longer period. But more than a fortnight before his arrival, Campbell had concluded the armistice. Although, according to its terms, Macleod could not supply the provisions by sea, Tipu had permitted him to land and even made arrangements for his stay in the town. He was treated kindly and was presented with a palanquin, a horse, and a *khilat*. He was permitted to have a free and frank talk with Tipu for two days, 20 and 21 August 1783.⁴⁷ With him Tipu discussed the peace, and Macleod too attempted to impress on him the advantages to him of British friendship.⁴⁸ He pointed out how the English were now able to extricate themselves from their misfortunes as they had made peace with all except him. Relieved of anxiety from all other directions they would henceforth devote their whole attention to overpower Tipu. The General argued that a protracted war would not serve his interests. He would lose his time, his money and his best troops, which could be more usefully employed elsewhere. The Marathas and the Nizam were depicted as more dangerous threats to his sovereignty than the English, who, he asserted, had no territorial ambition.⁴⁹ Tipu appreciated these sentiments, as he admired valour and frankness in others. But he also knew the worth of British professions of friendship. Ever since the failure of Muhammad Ali to deliver up the fort of Trichinopoly, Mysoreans had lost faith in the promises of the English. Their present anxiety for peace was due more to their adverse circumstances than to any genuine change of

heart or modification of policy. Therefore, when the turn came for Tipu to speak out his mind he dwelt at length on their faithless conduct, their refusal to deliver Trichinopoly and pay the promised sum of one and a half lakhs of rupees, and their intrigues with Muhammad Ali. But Macleod dubbed these grievances as old disputes whose renewal would not help to solve the present issue. Instead it would retard the peace and further complicate the problems. He appealed to Tipu's humanity and pressed for the release of the prisoners. Tipu was agreeable to comply with his request provided the General proceeded to Srirangapatana to take personal delivery of the prisoners. Tipu also proposed to discuss with him the terms of peace which would establish permanent friendship between the two states. But the General pleaded want of authority to conclude the peace, and the interview proved abortive.

These meetings and the cordial talk did not help to implement the armistice faithfully. At first Macleod was satisfied with Tipu's treatment of the garrison.⁵⁰ Tipu tried to accommodate the British as much as he could. When on 13 August 1783 Campbell visited him and pleaded shortage of provisions, he caused a bazaar to be set up near the fort.⁵¹ But these arrangements did not satisfy the English, whose intentions were to enable Campbell to withstand the siege for a long time by reinforcing the fort with sufficient men and supplies. They were bent on capturing Mangalore permanently, and expelling Tipu from the western coast. The expression by Macleod of friendly feelings was all to divert his attention. Macleod appeared twice in October and attempted to dump into the fort lots of provisions. This was contrary to the terms of the armistice by which the garrisons were prohibited from receiving any supplies by sea, as they had been provided enough for their daily consumption through the local bazaar.⁵² Therefore, when Tipu refused permission to provision the fort, Macleod appeared with a squadron and a large army on 22 November and insisted on sending 4,000 bales of rice. Far from yielding to the threat, Tipu prepared himself for the renewal of war. The flagrant breach of the armistice and the despatch of troops and warships had roused his indignation. But through the efforts of the French envoy, Piveron de Morlat, a clash was averted and a compromise was effected between the parties. Instead of 4,000 bags of rice, 1,000 bags were permitted into the fort. Even this was a great concession which the English obtained, as the armistice did not permit the storage of provisions for more than ten or twelve days.

But Campbell could not hold the fort for a long time. The difficulty was not shortage of provisions but the diseases which prevailed among the besieged. The conditions of the garrison had grown pitiable on account of the break-out of epidemics and the inclemency of the weather.⁵³ Scores of men were dying because of scurvy. The Europeans in the garrison were on the verge of mutiny and the Indians were deserting daily. In such circumstances Campbell was forced to capitulate on 29 January 1784.⁵⁴ The fort was to be delivered up in exchange for some other fort in the Carnatic. The garrison was to march out of the fort with full military honours and to be sent on boats to Bombay at Tipu's cost with provisions for the journey. If sufficient boats were not available the troops were to be sent by land, and Tipu was to make all arrangements for their transport through his territories. They were to be permitted to take with them all their belongings but nothing belonging to the Sultan.⁵⁵ Tipu strictly honoured these terms.⁵⁶ The English regretted much the loss of this fort, which they had wished to retain till the release of all their prisoners. Moreover, in the expected peace parleys, their possession of such a strategic place was expected to weigh more in their favour. But Tipu was happy that the repeated breaches of the armistice by the English had resulted in their own discomfiture.

The English were guilty of yet another aggressive act. In December 1783, when the Commissioners had already opened the peace talks, Macleod attacked Cannanore, captured the fort, imprisoned the Bibi, who was its ruler, and obtained four lakhs of pagodas and large quantities of provisions.⁵⁷ The proclaimed reason for this high-handed action was that the Bibi had imprisoned certain English troops who had been driven ashore in November 1783 as the result of the sinking of their boat, *the Superb*.⁵⁸ The real reason why the place was captured was that it formed one of the finest natural ports on the west coast. Macleod wrote, "It is much more valuable to us than Mangalore because no enemy can step between it and the sea."⁵⁹ The Bibi was not released until she had signed a treaty as dictated by Macleod, by which she agreed to pay three lakhs of pagodas to the English, placed her forts at their disposal, granted them the sole monopoly of the pepper trade and waived her claim to the merchandise and other properties captured by them as lawful prize-money.⁶⁰ The Madras Government approved the action of Macleod, but the Bombay authorities objected to his concluding a treaty without their consent. They disallowed and annulled it, and ordered the restoration of the

places to the Bibi. In spite of this, however, the fort was not delivered back to her until after the conclusion of the Treaty of Mangalore.⁶¹

In certain other ways also, the terms of the armistice were broken by the English, much to the annoyance of Tipu. The English instigated the Raja of Coorg to revolt against Tipu and join their side. The strategic situation of the Coorg country, which could be of immense use to them for quickly marching their troops to Srirangapatana, attracted their attention. They were afraid that its possession by Tipu would give him easy access to the Malabar coast, if he ever decided to attack it.⁶² Besides, the English had given refuge to the Raja of Cherikal, who was a dependant on Tipu. They incited the Malabar chiefs to cast off their dependence on Tipu. For Tipu Malabar was a trouble-spot where his disaffected subjects, the Nairs, were constantly seeking the support of the English against him. Peace in the area was frequently disturbed by Tipu's anxiety to consolidate his hold over these possessions, the English intervention in their affairs, both secret and open, and by the hostility of the Nair chiefs, whose mutual rivalries, frequent changes of loyalties and fighting propensities had added to the confusion. Fullarton reported to Madras, "The Rajah of Calicut or the representative of the ancient Zamorins, is now with me, and I receive much assistance from the Brahmins and other inhabitants of this country, on whom I bestow every mark of favour and protection, in order as much as in my power to preserve the English name from the stain too often incurred by violence and oppression."⁶³ It was this disloyalty of the Malabar chiefs that later proved so disastrous to Tipu's interests in the Third Mysore War.

In these circumstances Tipu did not wish to strain his relations with the Marathas, although they had been preparing themselves for an offensive against him. He informed the Peshwa and Sindhia on 29 July 1783 that he was willing to conclude a peace with the English through the help of the Marathas and that he had accepted the Treaty of Salbai as the only means of establishing general peace in India.⁶⁴

Tipu and the French

At the time of Tipu's accession Count d'Hofflize was in command of the French corps in India. On learning of the death of Haidar he desired to hasten to Tipu's camp in order to ensure Tipu's peaceful succession and concert fresh measures for prosecuting the war against the English. As there was no need of French assistance to ensure Tipu's succession, he stayed back at Cuddalore. When Tipu went

to the Carnatic from the western coast, Hofflize joined him at Chuckmaloor and their united forces defeated General Stuart at Niddingal.⁶⁵ Tipu asked Hofflize to accompany him to Bidnur, but he declined on the plea that he was expecting Bussy. Tipu resented his conduct, as he paid the French 40,000 pagodas every month. Hofflize allowed only a company of 600 troops under Cossigny to accompany Tipu to the western coast.

A brief recapitulation of the events that had led to the arrival of Bussy may now be necessary. Ever since the Second Mysore War began Haidar had been in touch with the French seeking their aid. In October 1780 he had sent a vessel to Mauritius in order to inform de Souillac, the Governor of the place, of his victory over Baillie.⁶⁶ In response to this Souillac had despatched d'Orves to India, but the French unpreparedness to enter the contest in earnest led to the recall of the expedition. In July 1781 Haidar again urged Souillac to fulfil the promise of aid.⁶⁷ In August 1781 Haidar learnt of the arrival of French forces on the Isle which he hoped might be sent to India.⁶⁸ Piveron informed Haidar that France would send a powerful expedition under an able commander with a fine artillery and all proper equipment of war.⁶⁹ In March 1781 the French had already despatched a fleet of five ships of the line with 1,000 marines and 1,200 troops under the command of Pierre Andre de Suffrein, who was one of the greatest French admirals. These troops along with 2,300 men from the Isles were to form an army in order to recover the French territories lost in India. In November 1781 France sent another expedition to the east under Marquis de Bussy, an able soldier and a politician who had played a significant part in the Anglo-French wars of the earlier period. This was in response to an interesting memoir submitted by Bussy himself on the advantages of a well-concerted expedition to India.⁷⁰

He stated that the time was opportune for the reduction of British power in India, as all the native princes were against the Company. The object was to capture Bombay and Surat, to co-operate with Najaf Khan, Shah Alam's minister, and assist Haidar to take Madras. Bussy was hopeful of success in view of the French alliance with the Dutch and the Spaniards, the Indian Confederacy against the English, and the British confrontation in America. He suggested the raising of a loan if the French treasury could not afford the cost, which was estimated at 20 million livers.⁷¹ The French accepted these proposals and agreed to send an expedition of 8,000 troops with a naval force, which Bussy could put to any use he liked.⁷² Although Bussy left

France in December 1781, he did not arrive in India until March 1783, by which time Haidar had passed away. Thus, four years after their promise of aid, a French force appeared in India, and even that was ill-equipped and ill-commanded.

Bussy arrived in March 1783 at Porto Novo with 2,300 troops to cooperate with the Mysoreans. Tipu had left in the carnatic 3,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry at the disposal of Hofflize, besides a large army under Syed Saheb.⁷³ The French and the British were occupying a certain position near Wandiwash. Bussy, who had returned to India after a lapse of two decades, was no longer the earlier warrior who had struck terror in the country. Twenty years of idleness and incapacity had quite impaired his faculties and rendered him incapable of decision and enterprise.⁷⁴ Selected merely because of his past reputation, he was as ill-suited to the command as Duchemin and d'Hofflize. Hence Bussy completely failed in his main task of rallying round him the princes of India against the English and in reviving the French power in the country. Soon after his arrival, he took decisions which were harmful to the interests of both France and her allies. He discouraged Hofflize from retaining Permacoil and caused every outlying fortification to be abandoned, with the result that he had to shut himself up at Cuddalore. When General Stuart forced a battle on him on 7 June 1783 he just remained on the defensive, although a vigorous offensive could have routed the English. Admiral Suffrein, Hofflize and Bussy's own troops urged him to action, but he did not make any move. Covered by the fleet, he could, without any risk, have accomplished the task of crushing the English, but he let the fine opportunity slip from his hands.

Bussy's attitude towards Tipu was from the beginning very critical and unhelpful. He held Tipu responsible for all the French failures. Even the presence of a small detachment of 600 Frenchmen with Tipu was resented by Bussy.⁷⁵ He accused Tipu of failure to supply the French with enough men and money.⁷⁶ Bussy was upset about such trivialities as failure to accord proper reception to him on his arrival.⁷⁷ He passed uncalled-for strictures both on Haidar and on Tipu. He charged them with insincerity and called them "brigands and tyrants." He observed, "In effect it is only by the monstrous exactions that the father has become a power, and it is by continuing the same methods that his son is maintaining this power at present."⁷⁸ He regretted that the French had joined the Mysoreans, and felt that they should have preferred the Nizam or the Marathas.⁷⁹ Secretly he even attempted

to court the friendship of these two powers. Disappointed in his efforts and afraid of the possible conclusion by Tipu of a separate peace with the English, he did not pursue his efforts.⁵⁰ In short Bussy was throughout guilty of double dealing and was waiting for further reinforcements from home only to carry out his own designs.

Bussy's accusations were thoroughly unjustified. It was Tipu who was the aggrieved party. The French had forgotten that the Mysoreans had gone to war against the English, because the English had captured Mahé and Pondicherry and because the Mysoreans wanted to retaliate against the English, who had broken their treaties with almost every power in India. Moreover, Haidar and Tipu had already spent a large sum of money over the war, they had already lost both men and money and had personally suffered the fatigue of a long and exhausting war. At a time when all their allies had withdrawn from the contest, the Mysoreans alone were carrying on that war. On the other hand, the French record was uniformly deplorable. They had repeatedly broken their promises to send speedily large reinforcements from France. They had announced the despatch of a large body of troops, but no troops had arrived in the country until 1782, four years after the French had declared war upon the English and two years after Haidar had invaded the Carnatic. The troops that were sent were far fewer than what was promised. The choice of the commanders whether d'Orves, or Duchemin, or d'Hosflize or even Bussy was particularly unfortunate, for they exhibited utter incapacity and were guilty of gross insincerity. Haidar and Tipu, on the contrary, had not failed to fulfil their promises. They had regularly been paying 40,000 pagodas every month and providing the French with all possible facilities. Even when Tipu had to go to the western coast to recover his lost territories, he left behind him 35,000 men under Syed Saheb to cooperate with the French.⁵¹ The absence of Syed Saheb at the time of Bussy's disembarkation was not deliberate, as he was engaged in the relief of Karur, nor was this such a grave offence during a war period. So Bussy's conduct as a soldier on 7 June 1783 was highly reprehensible, as he wantonly threw away the chance of crushing General Stuart.

While the English had laid siege to Cuddalore, news arrived in Madras of the Peace of Versailles, which affected adversely the interests of Tipu. After the death of Haidar, the French had been entrusted mainly with the task of carrying on the war in the Carnatic, while Tipu was busy in the west. But hardly had they started their campaign

distance and finally went to the British possession of Coimbatore. The French conduct was incomprehensible to Tipu, who was, naturally, greatly annoyed. Even granting that the seizure of Srirangapatna was justified because of the orders from France, his policy towards the small regiment in Tipu's service was highly unjust and unwarranted. Tipu was disgusted with the whole affair and condemned the French action as desertion. He wrote to his uncle, Muhammad Ismail, "The French have not only concluded a peace with the English for themselves, but they have deceived me. I, therefore, cannot put my confidence in them."⁵⁵ Tipu was trying to realise that there was not much to choose between the English and the French, both of whom were equally unreliable, their own interests being uppermost to them.

Bussy was keen that Tipu should suspend hostilities and conclude peace with the English for three reasons. First, the sixteenth article of the Treaty of Versailles required that the allies of France and of England should also be partners to the general peace. Secondly, the restoration of the French possessions in India was conditional upon the ceasefire by Tipu. Above all, Bussy was keen that he should be remembered as a peace-maker between the English and Tipu. His vanity was tickled and he assumed the role of a self-appointed mediator hoping that this measure would ensure for him an honoured place in history. Tipu was greatly embarrassed by these developments. He was not at first disposed to desist from the siege of Mangalore, but ultimately yielded because of a conspiracy of several hostile forces. At home the Rani of Mysore had hatched a plot to dislodge him from power. In the north there was the threat of an Anglo-Maratha invasion. Added to these, the French were now leaving his camp. These factors compelled him to sign the Armistice of 2 August 1783. With this Bussy had accomplished his first objective. Then he tried to consummate the peace through his mediation, which was his second target. He sent his agent, Krishna Rao, to urge Tipu to conclude the peace, and instructed the French agent at Tipu's court, Piveron de Morlat, to pressurize Tipu to yield in favour of peace.⁵⁶ There was perhaps yet another motive in these efforts of Bussy for peace. He might have been anxious to make up for his military failure by diplomatic success. But he was sadly disappointed in this effort as well. Neither the English nor Tipu desired his intervention, as both distrusted him. The English were apprehensive that it would diminish the French prestige at a time when the cherished demise seemed imminent. Tipu was sore 1

insincerity and incompetence had so greatly damaged his interests, would needlessly be rewarded as makers of peace in India. Moreover, as the fighting had stopped, neither party was in any hurry to conclude peace immediately, much less to resort to French mediation. The English were now supremely happy that they had gained an opportunity to sow the seeds of discord between their two enemies, Tipu and the French. In short the French had forfeited Tipu's confidence and at the same time had excited English jealousy.

Bussy then laboured hard to show himself off by proving that he alone could effect the peace. He wrote to Madras requesting the English to depute one or two persons of rank and send them either to himself or to Khamruddin to open negotiations.⁸⁷ Contrary to his expectations, when Tipu opened direct talks through his own agents, Srinivasa Rao and Appaji Ram, Bussy also sent his two agents, Paul Martin and Krishna Rao, to Madras to witness the proceedings.⁸⁸ He even threatened, "If Tipu Saheb attempted to conclude a peace without the interposition of the French, the consequences will be fatal and he will at last be ruined."⁸⁹ Bussy did all he could to impress upon Tipu that his independent negotiations with the English would be detrimental to his own interests, and that it was better to let the French conduct them for him.⁹⁰ Such an attitude, far from helping the French, further strained their relations with Tipu, who completely ignored Bussy. The Madras authorities were also happy at these developments, which contributed much to widen the gulf between their two rivals. They argued that the sixteenth Article of the Treaty of Versailles prescribed the French interference merely for the suspension of the hostilities which had been already effected on 2 August 1783.⁹¹ Moreover, negotiations through Bussy would be a more circuitous and tardy method, which the English could not afford at such a critical period in their affairs. The upshot was that Bussy was disillusioned and had to recall his two agents from Madras where they had been looked upon with disfavour by both parties.

Thus the part played by the French in the Second Mysore War was inglorious, being consistent neither with their promises nor with their ambitions. An unprecedented opportunity had offered itself to them for building up their power, when all the princes of India had taken up arms against the English, and when the English were engaged in a bitter struggle both in Europe and in America. The French themselves were conscious of the importance of the moment. Bussy had rightly observed, "If one is well-determined of making a

revolution in India, this is the moment of acting effectively."⁹² Even after the withdrawal of the Marathas and the Nizam from the confederacy, active cooperation of the French with Haidar and Tipu could have afforded them an opportunity to retrieve their losses. In fact, the arrival of a French expedition under Admiral Suffr in near the Coromandel coast in February 1782 had materially altered the policies of several Indian powers. The Nizam, Nana and Bhosle who were urging so long the ratification of the Treaty of Salbai started obstructing its ratification on learning about the arrival of the French. But the French did not use this fine opportunity in the right manner. They needlessly provoked both Haidar and Tipu by making exorbitant demands for money and provisions and by raising a fruitless controversy concerning the conclusion of a treaty. They wasted valuable time in quarrelling with Haidar over such issues as a plan of operation, the division of conquests, the question of command and the supply of finances.⁹³ Bussy writes in his *Journal* that the French officers excited Haidar's contempt "by their shameful cupidity."⁹⁴ The Mysoreans and the French were thus quarrelling because they had nothing in common except their hostility towards the English. Both had their own interests to serve. As early as 1778 Bussy held the view that the French could make Haidar their principal ally because of his riches and the strategic position of his dominions. "As it would be dangerous to have him against us, and as he wishes to aggrandise himself in the north of the Kingdom of Travancore, it is good to hold forth the hope of assisting his views on this subject."⁹⁵ Haidar and Tipu were shrewd enough to understand the French policy. A French memoir mentions that Haidar was not interested in encouraging the Europeans in India.⁹⁶

Another memoir declared, "... let us not flatter ourselves that he will put down the power of the English to make that of the French succeed it. He likes neither the one nor the other to more than a moderate extent."⁹⁷ In a way both the French and the Mysoreans were insincere and each group desired to use the other for their own purpose. The French were more interested in exciting general unrest in India, if possible a revolution, "from the heights of the Ganges to the Carnatic" than in advancing the interests of the Mysoreans.⁹⁸ On the other hand, the Mysoreans were interested in using one European power to drive away the other. It is difficult to ascertain as to who were more insincere, the Mysoreans or the French. From the policy of the French it appears they were more insincere. They treated the

Mysoreans more as a pawn than as an ally. Their inactivity, cupidity, and the demand for more territories even before the conquests were made alarmed both Haidar and Tipu. It should be remembered that the Mysoreans had gone to war against the English on the Mahé issue, and they were consistent in their policy of supporting the French ever since that period. The French promised to send them aid but delayed so long that all hopes of any aid were given up. When it came it never cooperated either in 1781 or in 1782 or in 1783. When peace was made in Europe in 1783 the French hastened to cease hostilities without consulting their ally. They could never have found a more zealous and intrepid ally than either Haidar or Tipu. Because of their misguided, timid and indecisive policy, they rendered incalculable harm both to their own interests and to those of their allies.

✓ The Treaty of Mangalore

The English had hoped that Tipu would be involved in domestic affairs after the death of his father and there would be a slackening of his efforts to conclude the war successfully. But Tipu ascended to the throne without any civil war and was determined to prosecute the war effectively. The Madras Government, on the other hand, was compelled to desire peace on account of their ruined finances, broken credit, devastated provinces and a hostile Supreme Government. Conditions of near famine were raging in the country. There was the apprehension of a mutiny among the troops, their salaries being long in arrears.⁹⁹ The dissensions of the civil and military authorities made the effective prosecution of the war very difficult. Their resources were scanty and their rich provinces were in the hands of "the powerful invaders of the Carnatic."¹⁰⁰ The uncertainty of the Maratha attitude, the military reverses, the loss of Bidnur, the siege of Mangalore and the arrival of Bussy with reinforcements further reduced them to a sorry plight. Their financial distresses caused grave concern to them, as the revenues of their territories hardly sufficed for the expenses of the war. The Nawab of Arcot obstructed the collection of revenues assigned to the Company in 1781. The Bengal Government advised Madras in January 1783 to restore the Carnatic revenues to the Nawab and made it depend entirely on the periodical assistance from Bengal.¹⁰¹ But, right at this time, the Bengal finances also were far from satisfactory. The presence of a French fleet on the Coromandel coast prevented the supplies to Madras. The Court of Directors were also eager for an early peace and they

wrote on January 25, 1783, "A safe and speedy peace with all Indian powers is our primary consideration. This must never be forgotten. Nor must any step be taken but such as shall have a direct tendency to accomplish this desirable object."¹⁰²

Such were the circumstances that compelled Madras to initiate peace negotiations despite the bitter opposition of the Governor-General. However, on 19 October 1782 the Bengal Government permitted Madras to conclude peace as a last resort, if their conditions reduced them to utter helplessness.¹⁰³ Lord Macartney realized that the situation could in no other way be retrieved than by peace.

Tipu also was inclined to treat with the English. Since his accession, he had had no time to consolidate his position at home. The royalist conspiracy, the secret plots of Shama Iyengar and Muhammad Ali and the rebellions in Coorg and Ballam made his presence in the capital essential. Though he had high hopes of French military assistance, they disappointed him. Even when a small reinforcement arrived at Port Novo on 16 March 1783, (very much smaller than originally announced) they could be of no use to him. Bussy was now an old man of sixty two, "chilled with age and infirmities" and shorn of his old initiative and enterprise.¹⁰⁴ When intelligence of the peace in Europe was received in India, the French ceased hostilities, despite the entreaties of Tipu and the imminent fall of Mangalore. In the event of a long-drawn war, he could no more rely on them. Yet another factor was the attitude of the Marathas towards Mysore. The superior diplomacy of Warren Hastings had dissolved the powerful confederacy against the English and the Treaty of Salbai had been concluded, which not only ended the Anglo-Maratha hostilities but also called upon the Mysore Chief, on the threat of invasion of his kingdom, to evacuate the Carnatic and to treat with the Company. Haidar died before the ratification of this Treaty, and Tipu had paid no heed to it so long. His refusal, or at any rate his silence, had caused consternation amongst the Marathas and the English who planned for joint action against him. Their designs were to partition the Kingdom of Mysore for which Mahadaji Sindhia worked out even the details, in case a joint invasion was undertaken.¹⁰⁵ He envisaged the cutting up of Mysore into three parts, one each for the Peshwa the English and himself. These proposals were likely to be soon incorporated in a definite treaty and the Governor-General had approved all the terms. Thus Tipu was threatened by the Maratha attack

which he could not resist at a time when his resources in men, money and supplies had been much diminished as a result of his long war against the English. Whatever might be the degree of his hostility towards the Company, he could not alienate the Marathas.

Lastly, Tipu was conscious that he was carrying on a lonely struggle against the English, his two other confederates, the Nizam and the Marathas, having already withdrawn from the alliance. The English had ended their wars with the French, the Dutch, the Spaniards and the Americans in the West and were now free to oppose Tipu with all their resources. Thus, by the close of 1783, both the parties had come to feel the necessity for peace.

Despite the difficult position in which the Madras Government stood, the Supreme Government was not inclined to treat with Tipu. A bitter controversy raged between them. Warren Hastings held that the surest way of obtaining a lasting peace was to compel Tipu by effective campaigns to sue for peace. On the other hand, Lord Macartney asserted that Tipu should be appeased and that they should convince him of their sincere desire for peace. The Madras view ultimately prevailed. The aggressive forward policy of Hastings would have landed the Madras Government in greater difficulties. Ever since his assumption of office in 1781, Macartney desired to end hostilities and made overtures for peace. As they proved abortive, he received a censure from Bengal, which under the Regulating Act, had the exclusive right of concluding peace. Before the death of Haidar, Sir Eyre Coote had been empowered to conclude the war if he felt it necessary. With the death of both Haidar and Sir Eyre Coote, Macartney commenced his negotiations for peace.

As early as February 12, 1783, Lord Macartney had appointed Sambaji, a *vakil* of the Raja of Tanjore, to sound Tipu as to his inclinations for peace and to the release of the British prisoners.¹⁰⁶ He was to proceed to Conjeevaram where he would confer with persons enjoying Tipu's confidence and attempt to secure better treatment for the English prisoners, detach Tipu from his French allies and conclude a peace satisfactory to both parties. If Tipu was willing to conclude peace, the next question would be the terms which should be acceptable to both. The English proposed that the Maratha Treaty of Salbai be the basis of the new treaty whereby no indemnity was required of Tipu. They pointed out that this treaty was highly favourable to him, as it would make secure all his dominions, and required of him only the evacuation of the Carnatic and the release

of all the prisoners. The advice of the Supreme Government was sought whether in case of Tipu's refusal to evacuate the entire Carnatic, he should be pacified by the surrender of certain unimportant districts like Pudukottah and Holapady which bordered upon the kingdom of Mysore.¹⁰⁷ The Madras Government expressed the opinion that the loss of such small districts would be more than compensated by the advantages of peace, the release of the prisoners, the evacuation of the Carnatic and the isolation of Tipu from the French.¹⁰⁸ This was strongly resented by the Governor-General who reprimanded the Madras Council for its anxiety for peace. He discouraged the idea of surrendering any posts or districts, however insignificant they might be. He argued that, if they were of "little value," they were so to both parties but Tipu's insistence on them showed their importance. "It would apply with equal strength, after they were ceded, to the next small districts of little value or importance, and so on *ad-infinitum*."¹⁰⁹ Tipu's demand for these places was viewed only as a pretext for future invasion. But Macartney differed from these views and felt that "interior conquest or territorial acquisition on the East Indies, by the sword is incompatible with their real interests and consequently so with the state of Great Britain."¹¹⁰ He allowed the Supreme Government to fret and fume over his peace negotiations and engaged himself in completing his task.

Meanwhile Sambaji returned to Madras, having met Tipu's confidants at Conjeevaram, and brought the news that better treatment would be meted out to the English prisoners and hostilities would cease if reasonable terms of peace were proposed.¹¹¹ He was accompanied by Tipu's *vakil*, Sreenivasa Rao, who had come to ascertain the terms of peace. But the Madras Council was divided over the English initiative for peace and General Stuart strongly opposed the measure. He lamented, "Our moderation will be construed into apprehension or inability . . . In the opinion of all the country powers, Tipu's superiority will be exhibited and as if Haidar himself from his grave had dictated terms of peace to us."¹¹² But Macartney, being conscious of the difficulties of the Madras Government, proceeded to negotiate with Tipu's *vakil*, who assured him of his master's humane attention to the English prisoners, but stated that they would be released only on the conclusion of the peace.¹¹³ He then recounted the causes of the war, the breach of engagements by Muhammad Ali, his failure to cede Madura and Trichinopoly and to pay a large sum of money, for which he had executed a bond bearing interest

which was still due. Macartney observed that all these demands were inadmissible as a treaty had been concluded subsequently in 1769 which nullified the previous obligations. The English made a counter-demand that the French in Tipu's service should be delivered up to them, and they would return them in safety to the Isle of France.¹¹⁴ Sreenivasa Rao pointed out that Tipu had promised them protection and that he would not break his word. However, he suggested the designation of a person of rank to Tipu to confer about the points of difference. He then returned to Mysore for further instructions, but did not go back again to Madras, and the negotiations were dropped at that stage.

The arrival of the French reinforcements under Bussy in March 1783 caused apprehension in the English camp. The interruption of the supplies from Bengal by the presence of the French navy of the Coromandel and the uncertainty of Maratha attack on Mysore made them desire peace. On the receipt of information in June 1783 of the Treaty of Versailles in Europe, the Madras Government revived the peace proposals with Tipu, taking advantage of XVI Article of that Treaty, which called upon the allies of both France and England to conclude peace. Accordingly, the two English commissioners that were sent to Bussy to arrive at the terms of peace invited Tipu also to suspend hostilities and release the English prisoners.¹¹⁵

The Madras Government again requested Bengal for instructions regarding the terms to be proposed. Warren Hastings repeated his sentiments that no separate treaty with Tipu was necessary as the engagements with the Marathas provided for general pacification in India. The Madras Government argued that the Treaty of Salbai was defective for it contained specific stipulation only for the evacuation of the Carnatic and not for any indemnity of war.¹¹⁶ When Bussy and Salheen, the English Commissioner, wrote to Tipu to cease hostilities and conclude peace, he replied to Madras, after some hesitation, that he was willing to treat with them.¹¹⁷ Bussy recommended to Madras that the designation of one or two men of rank either to him or to Meer Khumruddeen Khan was the only quick method to conclude peace.¹¹⁸ Bussy's anxiety to play the role of peace-maker induced him to press both Tipu and Macartney to expedite their peace efforts. He wrote to Macartney appealingly: "I believe, My Lord, that this peace is become not only necessary but useful for the tranquillity and restoration of one of the first maritime provinces of Hindustan which

the war has laid waste in a manner shocking to humanity, which will require many years to recover."¹¹⁹

Meanwhile Tipu had written to the Commissioners, Sadlier and Staunton, in reply to their letter expressing his inclination to make peace. He also informed them that he had ordered his forces in the Carnatic under Moinuddeen Khan to ceasefire and he would send two persons, Appaji Ram and Srinivasa Rao, to Madras with his proposals.¹²⁰ The Madras authorities forwarded Tipu's letter to Bengal and sought instructions. They felt that Bussy's mediation was unnecessary and preferred to have direct contact with Tipu's *vakils*. Lord Macartney pointed out that XVI Article of the Treaty of Versailles prescribed the French mediation merely for the suspension of hostilities, which had been already effected but for the conclusion of a definitive treaty, it was better to discuss the terms with Tipu's *vakils*.¹²¹ It would avoid inordinate delay and eliminate the French interference, which was one of the objects of the English. They wanted that Tipu should first release on parole all the English officers in his custody as a proof of his sincere inclinations for peace.¹²²

The Bengal Government strongly resented and severely censured these activities of Madras. They wrote, "We imagine every advance to a negotiation with him was but an encouragement to him to persist in the war We cannot consent to any direct and independent Treaty with Tipu, nor to any conclusive agreement whatsoever which you may make with him."¹²³ Regarding the indemnity of war from Tipu, they wrote, "to solicit a peace to claim a reimbursement for the expenses of the war is a new doctrine in negotiation which will not answer in India and we doubt of its efficacy in any country."¹²⁴ Thus they refused their sanction to a separate Treaty and authorised only the suspension of hostilities and the release of the prisoners. In their opinion the Madras Government had allowed Tipu to dictate the terms of peace which they felt to be both impolitic and disgraceful. They took objection even to their direct contact with Tipu for the suspension of hostilities on the receipt of information of Peace in Europe, which should have been left to the French. The initiative of Madras in first suspending hostilities as a proof of their sincerity was particularly censured by Bengal.

Undaunted by any of these strictures, the Madras Government proceeded with peace parleys with Tipu's *vakils* who had arrived in Madras in October 1783 with a list of Tipu's proposals. These were: mutual restitution of all the conquered territories, except Triagdrug,

Collecour and some other small districts to be retained by Tipu, mutual release of all prisoners and strict neutrality by either party during a war with any other power.¹²⁵ The instructions of the Court of Directors dated March 6, 1783 to conclude peace on terms of mutual restitution of places and prisoners sufficiently empowered the Madras authorities to proceed with this work. Moreover, Tipu had written to the Governor-General expressing his desire to conclude a treaty which had the desired effect of forcing the Supreme Council to abandon its adherence to the Treaty of Salbai and to consent to a separate peace with Tipu. Thus Tipu gained his point ultimately.

Certain difficulties arose in the work of the *vakils* at Madras which necessitated frequent reference to their master causing undue delay. For example, among the proposals of Tipu the release of Ayaz, the former Governor of Bidnur, was specially demanded by Tipu, which the English were reluctant to concede. Likewise, Tipu's propositions of an offensive and defensive alliance was rejected by them on the ground of past experience.¹²⁶ As these differences were likely to protract the negotiations, the *vakils* asked the deputation of one or two "men of character and consequence" to Tipu to settle the terms of peace.¹²⁷ The Select Committee at Madras accepted this proposal, and in their letter of October 21, 1783 informed Meer Khamruddeen of the appointment of Sadler, Second in Council and Staunton, Private Secretary to Lord Macartney, to proceed to Tipu.¹²⁸ They suspended the hostilities and ordered the release of the prisoners in their custody to create the necessary atmosphere for peace negotiations.¹²⁹ The news of Tipu's acceptance of the Treaty of Salbai in his letter to the Peshwa and Sindhia dated July 29, 1783 gave great satisfaction to the English at Madras. The news was received just previous to the departure of the Commissioners on the November 9 1783, which materially improved the prospects of peace. When Tipu learnt of their departure, he ordered the commanders of the forts in the Carnatic to abandon the places and withdraw to Mysore territory.¹³⁰

The Commissioners arrived at Arnee on November 18, and were received by Meer Moinuddeen Khan with due civilities and attention.¹³¹ As a gesture of friendship, Macartney proposed to give up the fort of Cumbum for a fort of equal value in the Carnatic.¹³² Nevertheless, differences soon arose over the mode of evacuation. The Commissioners desired to restore immediately Tipu's places in the east but not those in the west which would be retained until the release of all their prisoners. But Tipu was reluctant to concede this demand

and desired the English to relinquish Mangalore prior to the release of prisoners and the restoration of places in the Carnatic.¹³³ As he was already in Mangalore, he insisted on its restoration first, as a proof of English sincerity.¹³⁴ But they were apprehensive lest the simultaneous surrender of all places both in the eastern and in the western ghats should thwart their main purpose of securing the release of their prisoners. Tipu also equally suspected the good faith of the English, who might not surrender Mangalore, considering its importance, after the accomplishment of their main object. As both refused to give in, the negotiations reached an impasse. Even the pledge of personal faith by the Commissioners could not resolve the differences.¹³⁵

The priority for the surrender of Mangalore or the release of the prisoners soon became a serious point of dispute not only between Tipu and the Commissioners but also between the two Commissioners themselves. The first Commissioner, Sadlier, was willing to concede Tipu's demand and stated that the faith and honour of the Mysore *vakil*, Appaji Ram, was enough guarantee for the faithful performance of the obligations on Tipu's part.¹³⁶ Therefore he was in favour of surrendering Mangalore simultaneously with other places in the Carnatic and prior to Tipu's release of the English prisoners. But the other Commissioner, Staunton, objected to this and maintained "that not till the restoration of all the prisoners could there be an evacuation of Mangalore."¹³⁷ Tipu's *vakils* proposed a compromise that the English should deliver Mangalore but retain all the places on the Eastern Ghats till the release of the prisoners, but even this was not accepted.¹³⁸

Tipu insisted on the surrender of Mangalore because of his apprehension that it might not be given up at all later, as the Bombay Government had set its heart on it.¹³⁹ The two Commissioners appeared divided before Tipu's *vakils* who naturally approved the views of Sadlier, but wanted both the Commissioners to apply jointly for a pass to proceed to Mangalore. Staunton would not apply and the matter had to be referred to their superiors at Madras.¹⁴⁰

There was, however, one point on which an agreement was reached between the Commissioners and *vakils*, namely the exchange of Chitapet for Cumbum. The former asked Major Laysaught to give up Cumbum and the latter wrote to Khamruddeen Khan to surrender Chitapet. Regarding the irreconcilable differences, the advice of the Madras Council was sought.¹⁴¹ The Select Committee upheld the opinion of Staunton and decided not to surrender Mangalore. It

took offence at the communication of their disputes to Tipu's *rakits*, "from whom of all persons it ought to have been concealed."¹⁴² It strictly prohibited holding any conference with Tipu's *rakits* without the consent of both the Commissioners. To prevent constant references to Madras, they appointed a third member to the commission, Huddleston, and vested full authority in any two members. It was a provision against any recurrence of dispute between the two Commissioners causing delay.

The Governor-General had so long refused to give Madras power to conclude a separate peace with Tipu. The Madras authorities had taken the initiative and had appointed the Commissioners on the strength of instructions from England and on the ground that the deplorable conditions of their finances had justified their action. Warren Hastings, who had bitterly opposed and totally condemned the conduct of his subordinate presidency, at last reconciled himself to their measure of concluding a separate Treaty. Accordingly, he intimated his consent both to the Madras Government and to Tipu."¹⁴³ However, he took objection to the proposal of Tipu that, in case of war, no assistance was to be given by either party to an enemy of the other. He feared that such a stipulation would be offensive to the Marathas with whom the English were in alliance. Moreover it was incompatible with the true interests, in India, of the British who always desired to fish in troubled waters. Hastings, therefore, proposed that, "as long as Tipu abstains from hostilities against us and our allies, that is, the Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Nawab of Arcot and the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore, we shall also abstain from hostilities."¹⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, this clause would have given greater offence to the Marathas, as they were omitted in his reference and the Nizam was specifically mentioned as an ally of the English.

The sudden change in Hastings to an accommodative spirit towards Tipu was due to three reasons. First, the instructions from the Court of Directors were specific, that peace should be concluded with all the Indian powers. Secondly, the financial and economic conditions of even the Bengal Presidency were too deplorable for any renewal of hostilities with Tipu. Lastly, Hastings' confidence in the Maratha ability to compel Tipu to accept the Treaty of Salbai was shaken. Anderson informed him that the Marathas, far from working for peace, desired to foment further Anglo-Mysore discord to recover their lost territories. Before peace was made they wanted to settle their claims on Tipu, for which they had made full preparations. The Maratha

mediation would create more problems than it would solve. Hastings was apprehensive that their agency would surely land the English in trouble, and the Company would be involved in a war in case of a Mysore-Maratha rupture.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the Maratha Confederacy was at the time in such a factious state between the Sindhia and Holkar groups that it could render no effective help to the English. Thus Hastings was convinced that it was futile to object to a separate peace with Tipu.

Regarding the terms of the Treaty with Tipu, Hastings insisted on the release of prisoners prior to the restoration of Mangalore and after the mutual restitution of the eastern conquests.¹⁴⁶ He opposed the surrender of any fort or place to Tipu. The delivery of certain discontented persons from Calicut, Kallangudi and other places was to be a subject of a separate agreement and not to be a specific article of the treaty. He was afraid that such a clause might become a pretext for Tipu to break the Treaty, if by any chance the English failed to surrender these men. Hastings was keen on the inclusion of a clause requiring Tipu to renounce his claims on Trichinopoly and Madurai.¹⁴⁷

The Commissioners were proceeding to Tipu's court to finalise the Treaty and secure the release of the prisoners. But the Mysore *vakils* dissuaded them from going to Seringapatam and directed them towards Mangalore.¹⁴⁸ They resented such an attitude and protested that the Madras agreement was violated by which they were entitled to visit Seringapatam.¹⁴⁹ The *vakils* pointed out that, as the negotiations at Arni had failed and the mutual restitution of the places had not taken place, they were justified in preventing them visiting the capital.¹⁵⁰ At first the Commissioners were reluctant to proceed to Mangalore and even threatened to return to Madras, but when the *vakils* remained firm, they decided to march to Mangalore.¹⁵¹

Tipu had disallowed the Commissioners to march to Seringapatam, lest they should obtain first-hand information regarding the military position of the capital. Moreover, the hostile activities of Colonel Fullarton, the internal dissensions of the Commissioners and the tardy peace negotiations still cast doubts as to the final conclusion of peace and cautioned Tipu to be on his guard. The Commissioners adopted the route of Malavalli and travelling at their leisure, reached Mangalore, on February 4, 1784, three months after they had left Madras.

As soon as they arrived at Mangalore, they presented Tipu a memorandum asking him to evacuate the Carnatic and release the prisoners in conformity with IX Article of the Treaty of Salbâi. As for the places

in the hands of the English. they suggested a scheme of restoration by stages. Soon after one hundred English prisoners, half of whom were to be officers, were released, the English would give up Onore, Karwar and certain other places. With the release of the rest of the prisoners, the Company would restore all the other conquests. If Tipu refused these terms, the English would compel him to consent to these by joining the Marathas.¹⁵² Tipu replied that soon after the conclusion of peace, he would release not only one hundred but all the prisoners and would deliver them personally into the hands of the English. The threat of the Anglo-Maratha Alliance to compel Tipu to accept the Treaty of Salbai was greatly resented by him, as such an attitude could not establish any sincere or permanent peace with him. As he was not a party to the treaty, and as an independent ruler, he claimed the right to reject it. The mediation of any other state would mean only the delay of the business on hand.¹⁵³ If the English sought the Maratha alliance, he threatened that he would join the French to neutralize their designs.¹⁵⁴

In his turn, Tipu presented a list of counter-demands similar to those that were proposed at Madras, namely, the cession of certain districts in the Carnatic, the surrender of Ayaz and an offensive and defensive alliance.¹⁵⁵ These were unacceptable to the Commissioners. In another Conference on February 19, 1784, Tipu offered to release all prisoners but surrender only a few forts in the Carnatic until the complete evacuation by the English of all their conquests and the payment of 55,000 pagodas which Colonel Fullarton had taken away from Palghat.¹⁵⁶ Even these proposals were rejected by the Commissioners who set forth their own terms in the form of a draft treaty with twenty-nine articles, embodying all their demands.¹⁵⁷ They stated that Tipu should release the prisoners and evacuate the Carnatic simultaneously, renounce his claims on Muhammad Ali, set free Morari Rao and the subjects of Venkatagiri Raja, allow a British agent to stay in his capital with two companies of troops, provide communication facilities through his country to the English, restore Mount Dilli to Tellicherry, reinstate in their principalities the Rajas of Cherikal, Coorg, Kottayam and Kadattanad, and, lastly, grant commercial privileges to the English in his kingdom.

Apparently such impossible terms would not be accepted by Tipu, who rejected them, and informed the Commissioners of his intention to proceed to Seringapatam the next morning.¹⁵⁸ The terms aroused the indignation of the Sultan, particularly the commercial privileges

which sought to control the economy of his kingdom.¹⁶⁰ The Commissioners realized the exorbitant nature of their demands and modified them by dropping a few like the stay of a Company's representative, the communication facilities through his kingdom, the release of Morari Rao and the reinstatement of the Malabar Rajas, and by claiming moderate commercial privileges.¹⁶⁰ Tipu in his turn, waived his demands for the surrender of certain forts in the Carnatic, the release of Ayaz, the payment of 55,000 pagodas and promised to send all the prisoners to the nearest English fort.¹⁶¹

Thus agreement was reached on a number of questions but there remained still two more knotty problems which eluded settlement, and on these Tipu refused to make any concession. The first was a stipulation that the contracting parties should not help their enemies directly or indirectly in times of war. Tipu insisted on its acceptance on the refusal of which he would march off to Seringapatam and renew the hostilities. The Commissioners hesitated to concede the demand as the instructions from Bengal permitted them to agree merely to a conditional clause of neutrality, namely, "as long as Tipu abstains from hostilities against us and our allies, that is, the Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Nawab of Arcot, and the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore, we shall also abstain from hostilities."¹⁶² This would not satisfy Tipu who wanted that the English should not give assistance to any power excepting those that were under the immediate protection of the English. For example, the Nizam who was one of the principal powers of the Deccan was not under the immediate subordination and protection of the English, nor was the Raja of Travancore. Tipu wanted that the principle of neutrality by which the English would be precluded from interfering unprovoked whenever Tipu was at war with other powers, should be accepted in its entirety. The policy of the English had so long been to assist invariably the enemies of Mysore, and Tipu desired to prevent its recurrence in future. It was a far-sighted policy which would secure Tipu a better position amongst the Indian rivals and at the same time prevent the Company from expanding their dominions in India on the pretext of assisting the enemies of Mysore. The Commissioners were forced to accept Tipu's modification, despite orders to the contrary of their superiors. It was, however, an improvement on the clause suggested by Warren Hastings, in so far as it avoided the Maratha jealousy by the omission of their (Maratha) name and the specific mention of the Nizam as the ally of the Company. The Commissioners realized that Tipu had considerably reduced his

claims, that he would not yield further on this point and that it would be unwise to break with him and resume hostilities.

The second obstacle in the way of the peace was the mode of the restitution of places. The question had troubled the parties ever since the beginning of the peace parleys and yet no satisfactory procedure had been evolved. The Commissioners at first (on February 12) suggested that the Company would evacuate Karwar and Onore as soon as Tipu released one hundred prisoners and that they would surrender Karur, Dharapuram and Arvakurichi after he released all the prisoners and evacuated the Carnatic. This proposition fell through and another was suggested, namely the simultaneous evacuation of all the conquests by both the parties, with one reservation—the retention by the Company of Dindigal and Cannanore as a pledge for the release of the prisoners. Tipu took objection to this condition which distrusted his sincerity to release the prisoners and, in his turn, he doubted the English faith with regard to the surrender of Dindigal and Cannanore. The issue was driving to a crisis and Tipu threatened to dismiss the Commissioners. However, as a last attempt to resolve the differences, he proposed five alternatives, the failure to accept any one of them would almost precipitate war. This was a last chance he gave to the Commissioners. The propositions were:¹⁶³ First, the Commissioners were to stay with Tipu till the restoration of Dindigal and Cannanore, and till the delivery of the Treaty duly signed by the Madras Government. Second, either two, or at least one of them, were to stay behind, duly authorized by the other two, to restore Tipu's possessions, after the evacuation of the Carnatic and the release of the prisoners. Third, in lieu of Dindigal, Tipu was to retain either Tiager and Nellore or Ambur and Satghur. Fourth, the Commissioners were to restore either Dindigal or Cannanore, retaining only one. Last, Cannanore should be restored in the presence of Tipu's officers at the same time as Onore and other places.

The Commissioners would not accept any of these and they informed Tipu of their decision. Staunton was more adamant than the other two. It looked as if all the labour was lost and the whole project of peace was wrecked. Tipu wrote to them that their distrust compelled him also to doubt their sincerity and that he would march off to Seringapatam the next day. The Commissioners, feeling that this was no empty threat, decided to yield, and chose one of the alternatives that was least objectionable to their superiors. They preferred the third alternative which permitted Tipu to keep Ambur and Satgarh

as long as the English retained Dindigal and Cannanore, and that immediately after the release of all the prisoners, both the parties were to evacuate their respective possessions.¹⁶⁴ At last an agreement was reached on all points and the Treaty was signed on March 11, 1784.¹⁶⁵

The Treaty of Peace which was signed and sealed by Tipu on the evening of 11 March 1784, and which ended the long war begun by Haidar, contained ten articles. The first article established peace between Tipu Sultan on the one hand and the East India Company and their respective friends and allies on the other. The allies of Tipu mentioned by name in the Treaty were the Bibi of Cannanore and the Rajas or Zamindars of the Malabar coast and those of the English were the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore and the Carnatic Payenghat. The last expression referred to the Nawab of Arcot, Muhammed Ali, whose name was deliberately omitted giving rise to a bitter controversy later on between the Madras and Bengal authorities. In the first article itself mention was made of the strict neutrality to be observed by both parties in case either of them was at war with other powers. The high contracting powers agreed not to assist, directly or indirectly, each other's enemies nor to make war upon their respective friends or allies.

The second article referred to the restoration of all the places occupied during the war and the release of all English prisoners on the part of Tipu. He was to evacuate the Carnatic entirely, with the exception of Ambur and Satgarh, within 30 days after the signing of the Treaty. Likewise, he was to release all European and native prisoners in his custody and deliver them up, making arrangements for conveyance and provisions, safely to the nearest English forts or settlements, within 30 days from the date of signing the Treaty.

The third article specified the withdrawal of the English from Onore, Karwar, Sadasivgarh and the forts and places adjoining thereto and the evacuation of their garrisons from these places to Bombay with the necessary assistance of provisions and conveyance by Tipu. At the same time, the Commissioners were likewise to give orders for the delivery of Karur, Auracatchery and Dharapuram. After the release and delivery of all the English prisoners by Tipu, Dindigal was to be evacuated and restored to him, and none of the Company's troops should remain thereafter in his territory.

The fourth article dealt with the procedure for carrying out the evacuation of Cannanore, by the English who should restore the place in the presence of an Officer of Tipu to Ali Raja Bibi, the Queen of

Cannanore, as soon as all the English prisoners were delivered up by Tipu. Likewise, the forts of Ambur and Satgarh were to be given up to the English by the Sultan, and the mutual restitution of places should be completed on both sides.

By the fifth article Tipu agreed to relinquish all his claim on the Carnatic. The sixth article permitted the return of all persons, with their families and children, belonging to the Carnatic who had been taken captive by Haidar Ali Khan or Tipu Sultan. The seventh article stipulated the grant of a general amnesty by Tipu to those Rajas and Zamindars on the Malabar coast who had favoured the English in the last war. The eighth article conferred on the English commercial privileges and immunities enjoyed by them in the past, as specified in the Treaty of 8 August 1770. The ninth article restored to them the factory at Calicut and also Mount Dilly and its district belonging to the settlement of Tellicherry. The tenth and last article defined the way in which the treaties were to be exchanged by the parties. First all the three Commissioners were to sign the treaty; secondly it was to be signed by the select Committee at Madras and sent to the Sultan within one month; and lastly the Governor-General in Council and the Select Committee at Bombay were to attest their signatures to the Treaty as binding upon the Government of India, and send it to Tipu within three months.

The Treaty redounds to the great diplomatic skill of Tipu Sultan. It was beneficial to both parties. By the principle of the mutual restitution of places and prisoners, it aimed at establishing peace in the region. It fulfilled the just demands of both, effecting a compromise only in unimportant matters.

Tipu secured a number of advantages through the Treaty. He had honourably concluded the long-drawn war, which at the time of his advent to power had assumed an unfavourable turn with the loss of Bidnur, Mangalore and other Western possessions. The southern command under Colonel Fullarton was threatening his capital and Hastings was contriving by diplomatic pressure to compel Tipu to sue for peace, and had succeeded in inducing Sindhia formally to call upon him to relinquish the English territories in conformity with the Treaty of Salbai. In the alternative, he would have to face the united forces of the English, the Peshwa and Sindhia.¹⁶⁵ The Marathas had fully prepared themselves to attack Tipu.¹⁶⁷ The treaty averted such a contingency. Tipu's conclusion of a separate Treaty with the Company was a rude shock to the Marathas who had contemplated

bringing him to their fold or in case of his refusal, wresting from him his northern territories. The Treaty gave a decent burial to IX article of the Treaty of Salbai, in two ways. Firstly, the mediation of the Marathas to compel Tipu to relinquish the English territories and release the prisoners was thwarted. Secondly, the defensive alliance which the Marathas had secured through that Treaty, namely, "so long as Hyder Ali Khan shall ... continue in friendship with the Peshwa, the English will in no respect act hostilely towards him" was ignored by Tipu and in its place was substituted the principle of strict neutrality by which no party was to give direct or indirect assistance to the other's enemies. Nana condemned the whole transaction and felt that the gentlemen at Madras were not entitled to negotiate it without the mediation of Sindhia at the time when a plan of action in consultation with Anderson had been finalised.¹⁶⁸ Tipu frustrated the Maratha expectations of regaining their lost territories through the Company's assistance.¹⁶⁹ He prevented the English from joining the Marathas if ever the latter chose to fight against him. Not long after this treaty, when the Mysore-Maratha relations were again strained and hostilities followed, this clause yielded its result and the English observed perfect neutrality.

It is true that Tipu did not acquire any fresh territory or compensation for the losses suffered, but his greatest satisfaction was that he had reduced the English to that situation of "eager and importunate" desire for peace that compelled them to stand suppliant before him. The English with their enormous resources of three presidencies and supplies from home, with peace having been established in Europe and India and with the possibility of an Anglo-Maratha alliance, could have inflicted severe blows on Tipu. In such circumstances Tipu had concluded an honourable peace. He had shown himself to be very generous in not insisting on his demands for the surrender of certain districts in the Carnatic, the payment of 55,000 pagodas seized by Colonel Fullarton from the fort of Palghat, the delivery of his treacherous servant, Ayaz, and the inclusion of an offensive and defensive clause in the Treaty. Whatever might be the material shortcomings of the Treaty, Tipu had fulfilled his great desire of showing to the powers of India "that he could dare to treat the English power with open contempt and derision."¹⁷⁰

In spite of the bitter opposition to and adverse criticism of the Treaty, describing it "obviously a truce reluctantly accepted by the two powers, each unable to destroy the other, but both fully convinced

that without the destruction of the one, there was no safety for the other," the treaty as such contained no clause which would precipitate hostilities in future. Unlike the Treaty of 1769, it did not secure any offensive and defensive alliance between the two powers, each knowing full well the limitations of the other. It went only to the practicable extent of securing neutrality in times of war. It contained no provocative or difficult terms, the execution of which would cause friction. It did not unduly affect the British interests so as to leave behind strong sentiments of resentment to avenge the wrongs. It aimed at establishing the *status quo* which was particularly helpful to Tipu in his relations with other powers. Though it cannot claim to have settled all the problems and established the peace on the most solid foundation, it had led to amicable relations between the two ambitious powers. In one sense, no Indian power could ever hope to have any solid and permanent peace with the English without loss of self respect, and without being degraded to a subordinate position. Since the Regulating Act the British policy towards Indian States was already shaping itself towards "Subordinate or Subsidiary Alliances." At such a time and directly in opposition to an adroit statesman like Hastings, the Treaty of Mangalore was a great achievement on the part of Tipu.

Another advantage that accrued to Tipu was that the commercial privileges so freely promised by Haider to Bombay Government were scaled down. Though the grant of some privileges was mentioned in the Treaty, it was circumscribed by so many conditions that the Company could derive actually no benefit from them. What Tipu granted to the English was very much in contrast to the exclusive freedom and privilege of trade they had obtained from the Marathas by the Treaty of Salbai.

Of all the persons involved, the treaty affected most Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Carnatic. Ever since his faithlessness and fraudulent conduct in 1752 in not surrendering Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans, he had been the object of particular hatred to them. He was one of the worst specimens of an oriental despot who owed his authority to the arms and influence of the Company. He had proved a worthless and treacherous ally even to the English.¹⁷¹ One of the reasons for declaring the Second Mysore War was to wreak full vengeance upon him for his failure to fulfil the promises of 1752. The Treaty of Mangalore, therefore, aimed at punishing him. It simply ignored him and treated him with contempt. It was his political death, for the legal ruler of the Carnatic had failed to get any recognition in the Treaty.

The names of the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore and even the Zamindars of Malabar found a place in the Treaty, but the supposed sovereign of the entire Carnatic in whose dominions the English were but the servants and for the protection of whose territory the Treaty was made, was not even mentioned except once in the whole Treaty and even that in an insignificant context and without his proper titles. The Treaty damaged his prestige and, despite the efforts of Hastings, not much was done to retrieve him from disgrace.

Lastly, Tipu had not committed himself to break away from the French. The Treaty was entirely silent about his alliance with the French and was in a way a tacit recognition of the fact. Whereas the English were invariably successful in isolating the other Indian powers from all contacts with foreign powers, they could not do so in the case of Tipu.

Yet another advantage of the Treaty to Tipu was psychological. Though not materially beneficial to him, the mode of its conclusion was highly satisfactory to the Sultan. The anxiety and initiative of the English for peace, the march of the Commissioners to his presence and their ultimate submission to one of his proposals made it seem a diplomatic victory for Tipu who had almost dictated his own terms to the English. Further, certain other factors contributed to make the Treaty appear advantageous to Tipu. The failure of the Marathas in their attempt to act as mediators and recover their lost territories prompted them to call the English humble suppliants for peace before Tipu. Again, a section of the English public opinion was hostile to the Treaty and did much to discredit it. Hastings himself called it a "humiliating pacification" and was only prevented from openly disavowing and annulling it by Tipu's fulfilment of a part of the terms.¹⁷³ Munro felt that such indignities were throughout poured upon the British that united efforts seemed necessary to repudiate the Treaty at the earliest time.¹⁷³ Such public opinion in the country highly gratified Tipu who felt that it was his great triumph over the English.

The disadvantages of the Treaty to Tipu were not many. But being in a favourable position, he did not try to secure any districts as compensation for the heavy losses incurred in the war. He surrendered all the conquests he and his father had made during three years of war, and in the mutual restitution of places the English had very few, almost a handful, forts to surrender, while Tipu had almost everything

to concede, the Carnatic itself being a vast tract of land in his possession. One of the objects of the war, namely, to secure Trichinopoly from Muhammad Ali and compel him to pay the promised sum, was not fulfilled. Though Muhammad Ali suffered lots of indignities otherwise, the prime object of Tipu remained unaccomplished.

The English did not fare very badly, considering their situation. "A desolated country, a menacing famine, an empty treasury, an exhausted credit, a heavy establishment, dubious resources and universal distress, all conspired at this moment to render any peace desirable."¹⁷⁴ At such a time, the restoration to them of all their possessions and the preservation of their power and prestige were the great advantages they gained. Any persistence in war might have resulted in doubtful and distant successes but certain and immediate expenses of the war which their slender resources could have hardly borne. The Treaty secured for them every inch of the territory which they had lost in the war, and which was quite extensive. Moreover the release of the prisoners for which any price was trifling was accomplished. The captivity of a large number of them in Tipu's hands had caused great anxiety. The Treaty released all of them but the English alleged that Tipu had still retained some more of them.

The terms of the Treaty were so fair to them that even an antagonist like Hastings could not find fault with them. His only objection was to the form and construction of it but not to the concessions and stipulations made on both sides.¹⁷⁵ The English secured the renewal and confirmation of commercial privileges given to them by Haidar by the Treaty of 1770, though with greater restrictions. They obtained their factory at Calicut with the privileges they had possessed until the year 1779. They also secured the restoration of Mount Dilly, with its districts, belonging to the settlement of Tellicherry. They were also happy in having elicited a promise from Tipu not to molest the Rajas and Zamindars of Malabar who had treacherously joined them during the war. They retained the forts of Cannanore and Dindigal as a guarantee for the release of all the English prisoners. In short, they obtained all their legitimate and essential rights and compromised only on unimportant or exorbitant demands. They were not compelled to relinquish any of their territories as they had to do while making the much-talked-of and much-praised Treaty of Salbai, by which they had surrendered Baroach and other districts yielding a revenue of three lakhs of rupees. The tranquillity and benefits of peace with a powerful neighbour, his renouncing of the

extensive conquests of the Carnatic and the release of all the prisoners were the advantages which had accrued to the English by the Treaty.

Whatever might be the real benefits, the Treaty still failed to satisfy English public opinion. Except those who were nearer to the realities of the situation, all condemned it outright and it attracted such a volley of criticism, censure and reproach that the Governor-General desired to propose the suspension of its authors from office. Manifestly the Treaty had nothing in it to offend them so much. But it became specially reprehensible to them because it was very different from the typical English treaties in India. For the Treaty denied to the English commercial, political and military advantages which they had expected. That was why they called it disastrous to their interests.

The chief objections of the English to the Treaty were the failures of the Madras Government firstly to make the specific mention of the Nawab of Carnatic by name, secondly to prevent the possibility of a Franco-Mysorean alliance against them, thirdly to exclude Tipu's claims on Trichinopoly and the payment of a sum by Muhammad Ali as stipulated in the treaty of 1752, fourthly to make any reference to the Maratha Treaty, fifthly the inclusion of the Raja of Tanjore as the ally of the Carnatic which enhanced his prestige and gave him an independent status, and lastly the acceptance of the principle of neutrality in time of war.

Article X stipulated the signing of the Treaty by all the three presidencies. Accordingly Madras signed it and sent it back to Tipu within the stipulated time of one month. But its acknowledgement by the Bengal and Bombay Governments within three months resulted in a bitter controversy between the Subordinate Presidency of Madras and the Supreme Government of Bengal. Hastings pointed out various objections mostly to defects in form. He had not reconciled himself to a separate and speedy peace with Tipu. He still harped upon the Maratha assistance to overpower Tipu. He had expected spectacular success from Fullarton. Both these expectations were belied and he realized that the internal affairs of the Marathas would not permit them to support the English. As for the success of the southern command, he felt that a single defeat of Colonel Fullarton would have left the English without an army in the South.¹⁷⁶ Seringapatam was still 100 miles away and the English army was long in arrears. This peculiar situation of Madras could not admit of any renewal of war. These factors compelled the Bengal Board not to refuse their consent to the Treaty. At the time when the Treaty reached Calcutta,

Hastings was away in Lucknow. Hence the Bengal Government acknowledged the Treaty fearing delay and sent it to Madras. Hastings resented the formal defect in the Treaty and was so deeply roused that he appealed to the King and Parliament to punish the Madras Government, for "the faith and honour of the British nation have been equally violated."⁷⁷ Nevertheless, he ratified the treaty, urging one condition that the Nawab of Carnatic should be made a party to it. He wrote to Madras to make the "most strenuous endeavours to obtain a formal acknowledgement from Tipu to think that the name of Muhammad Ali was implied wherever the term 'Carnatic Paypanghat' was used."

The Madras Government felt it difficult to open the topic again with Tipu. They pointed out that Muhammad Ali as a party was included neither in the treaty of 1769 nor in that of Salbai. They were apprehensive that Tipu would not accept this modification and would resume hostilities. Hence Lord Macartney was firm in his attitude and declared his unwillingness to carry out the orders of the Supreme Council. Hastings was so much put out that he sent to Madras James Lucy Dighton to enquire into the matter. But the Madras Governor categorically refused to communicate the additional clause to Tipu despite the threat of being suspended from his office. Fortunately nothing happened, as the regime of Hastings was drawing to a close. All along it was the high-handedness of the Governor-General that had created difficulties. The terms of the Treaty were very fair and just and were not very different from those obtained by himself from the Marathas. The Court of Directors approved the action of Lord Macartney and rejected the appeal of Hastings. They also thanked the Governor of Madras for his active and useful part in securing the peace in the Carnatic.

Another reaction of Hastings to the Treaty was his apprehension that the Marathas, particularly Sindhia, would be greatly offended by the conclusion of a separate peace without their mediation. In order to appease Sindhia, Hastings informed him that the Maratha Treaty was the basis of the new Treaty, and that the Maratha agent at Tipu's court was kept informed of the negotiations at every stage.⁷⁸ When Sindhia desired a declaration from the Bengal Government to this effect, Hastings gladly agreed to send one. This had the effect of preserving the Maratha prestige in the eyes of the other powers. The total omission of the names of the Peshwa and Mahadaji Sindhia in the Treaty had mortified them, as Sindhia had done much earlier

to compel Tipu to accept Article IX by writing persuasive letters to him and by entering into a treaty of alliance with the English. Added to this, he had prevailed on Nana Farnavis to march a grand army to Tipu's frontiers and to apply for a body of troops from Bombay.¹⁷⁹ The Marathas had thus manifested their hostility against Tipu. But the superior diplomacy and timely action of Tipu averted a grave contingency and made the Marathas the object of his resentment for this unprovoked act of hostility on their part earlier.

Thus the Treaty of Mangalore is an important document in the history of the relations of Mysore with the English. It was the last occasion when an Indian power dictated terms to the English. The English were made to play the role of humble suppliants for peace. They were not slow either in drawing the right inference from such a situation, namely that their political and commercial interests would suffer as long as Tipu was suffered to exist as an independent power. It was obvious from the flow of events that despite their best efforts, they could not recover their territories from his hands in the Carnatic. Even the diversionary attack by Bombay on the western coast or the advance of the southern army under Fullarton had made no headway. This suggests that the English had still to go a long way before they could reduce all Indian powers to a position of subordination, and that the Indians still had a chance to retain their sovereignty, if they acted wisely. Both the Treaty of Madras in 1769 and of Mangalore in 1784 are shining examples which destroyed the myth of British invincibility. They indicated that the danger to India was not so much from the military might of the British as from the disunity among the Indian powers. The best chance the English had in winning supremacy in India was through their diplomacy, which made one Indian power fight against another. Nowhere was this phenomenon more apparent than in the case of Mysore, where the Nizam and the Marathas became willing instruments in English hands to destroy Tipu. That was the reason why Warren Hastings was so anxious that the Madras authorities should hold their hands for a little longer until his diplomacy in involving the Marathas into the war was successful. If they had done so, Tipu would have been subdued much earlier than expected. Tipu saw through this game and successfully averted such a situation. Even when he had just come to the throne, he proved superior in the art of diplomacy, and outwitted both Nana and Warren Hastings. In short, during his stormy and hectic reign of hardly seventeen years, the Treaty of Mangalore is the only bright spot in his contest with

the English, the only proud event which had humbled even a mighty power.

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CHAPTER II

HOSTILITIES WITH THE MARATHAS AND THE NIZAM (1785 - 87)

THE TREATY OF MANGALORE contained the seeds of a strife with the Marathas. It was a diplomatic victory for Tipu which had defeated the expectations of the Marathas to act as mediators as had been promised in the Treaty of Salbai. It disappointed their hopes of recovering their lost possessions in the north of Mysore. Tipu had emerged with enhanced prestige after the Second Mysore War, which excited the jealousy of his neighbours. The relations of Mysore with the Marathas had not been cordial ever since the days of Haidar, as both the powers were serious political rivals for the supremacy of the Deccan. The Marathas were not reconciled to the separate existence of Mysore. Haidar Ali had encountered their numerous invasions and frustrated their attempts to subdue him. Madhava Rao had launched three expeditions against Haidar but the latter had survived all their attacks. After the death of Madhava Rao, Haidar had consolidated his power and recovered from the Marathas considerable territory in the north of Mysore, which had offended Nana Farnavis. But the latter could not openly quarrel with and incur the hostility of Haidar so long as Raghoba had been in politics. Therefore he had negotiated an alliance with Haidar in 1780 and recognized his full sovereignty over the districts of the Krishna region. Nana had been compelled to acknowledge Haidar's claim to the territory owing to the interference of the English in the Maratha war of succession and their protection of Raghoba. But the Mysore-Maratha harmony had been short-lived and the English had successfully dissolved the confederacy of the Indian Powers which had been concluded in 1780.

The decision of the Marathas to conclude a separate peace with the English, contrary to their engagements with Haidar, was the chief

cause of Mysore-Maratha rivalry at the time of Tipu's accession. Mahadaji Sindhia and Bhonsla had been the first to detach themselves from the alliance and fall a prey to the intrigues of Warren Hastings. Sindhia had been converted into a friend of the English who had concluded a treaty of peace with him on the 13th October 1781 by which that chief agreed if it should be deemed advisable, that he would endeavour to mediate a peace between the English and Hyder, and also between them and the Peshwa, but if these objects should not be effected, he engaged not to assist or oppose either party.¹ This treaty had not only detached Sindhia from the alliance but also weakened the Maratha confederacy and ultimately compelled the Poona Court also to cease hostilities against the English. Haider had first been informed of the nature of the English treaty with Sindhia by his *wakil* at Poona, Nur-ud-Deen. Nana had distinctly made it clear to the Mysorean *wakil* that the Poona court accepted the mediation of Sindhia to terminate the Anglo-Maratha war and that it would unite with the English in compelling Haider to make a reasonable peace.² But he had stipulated one condition which would prevent him from joining the English. If Haider immediately evacuated the territories north of the Tungabhadra and abandoned his claims on the poligars of that region, Nana would not only continue his war with the English with renewed vigour but also compel Sindhia to revoke his treaty with the English and secure his co-operation for the alliance.³ Nur-ud-Deen was granted time to secure his master's instructions on this point, during which interval Nana had promised to take no decision. Haider had naturally resented these proposals of Nana which were a threat held out to him, that in case of his refusal to surrender the territories, the Marathas would join the English to make good their demand. As Haider was then unwilling to alienate the Marathas, his answer was of a nature intended to protract the negotiations. Nana would not wait indefinitely and the Treaty of Salbai had been concluded on May 17, 1782. By the ninth article of that Treaty, the Marathas had engaged that, within six months after the ratification, Haider should be obliged to relinquish to the English and to their allies all territories taken from them since the date of his treaty with the Peshwa, Madhava Rao, on the 10th of February 1767.⁴ Nana had not fixed the date for the ratification of this treaty. Though the Governor-General had signed it on June 7, 1782, Nana had deferred it till December 22, 1782 by which time he had secretly known the death of Haider on the 7th of the same month. During this interval of six months Nana

had consistently tried to secure the peaceful surrender of these territories from Haidar on the promise of scrapping the treaty which had not yet been ratified. Nana's jealousy of Sindhia for his prominent part in the negotiations for peace would not permit the immediate ratification of the treaty by him and the operation of its ninth article.⁶ But Nana had explained the delay as due to his consideration for Haidar, in order to give him time for peaceful cession of the territory. These developments were thoroughly incomprehensible to Haidar who had not expected the Maratha desertion from the alliance. They had not only left him in the lurch and obliged him to resist the English all alone but had also turned aggressive by demanding the return of territories which Nana had permanently ceded to him only two years earlier by the Defensive and Offensive Alliance of 1780. Naturally Haidar could not comply with such a demand and the negotiations had been protracted.

After the death of Haidar, the Marathas offered the same terms to Tipu and called upon him to abide by the treaty. The death of Haidar was looked upon both by the English and by the Marathas as a happy augury for the accomplishment of their respective objects—the English for the termination of the Carnatic War to their advantage and the Marathas for the recovery of their lost territories. But Tipu refused to submit to the Maratha terms and denounced the Treaty of Salbai as contrary to the spirit of the Mysore-Maratha Alliance of 1780.⁶ He informed Nana through his *vakil*, Nur Muhammad Khan, that he had suffered much owing to the withdrawals of the Marathas from the war and that a treaty should not have been concluded with the English. However, as it had already been concluded, its ratification might be indefinitely postponed and hostilities with the English might be recommenced.⁷ These proposals were not accepted by Nana whose main aim was to force the Treaty on Tipu and thus establish that the Mysore Chief was a Maratha dependant and a tributary.⁸ When Tipu refused to accept these terms, the Marathas prepared themselves to enforce the demands by force. Mahadaji Sindhia once again formally invited him to cease hostilities against the English and threatened that his refusal would result in the immediate combined attack on Mysore by the Marathas and the English. Nana also consented to such an attack and informed Sindhia that soon after the monsoon, he would invade Mysore in conjunction with Holkar's troops in order to support the English.⁹ Sindhia was then completing the negotiations for the conclusion of an offensive

treaty with the English, which was actually done on 28th October 1782 for the purpose of enforcing II article of the Treaty of Salbai. According to this, the Peshwa was to call upon Tipu to release the English prisoners of war and to evacuate the Carnatic. In case of his refusal, the Marathas would make war upon him. Neither party was to conclude a separate peace with Tipu and both were to equally divide the conquests.

This offensive alliance was not, however, translated into action owing to the mutual jealousies of Nana and Sindhiya. Nana felt that the implementation of this treaty would further enhance the prestige of Sindhiya who had already gained prominence by concluding the Treaty of Salbai. Moreover Nana was negotiating an alliance with the Nizam for the same purpose, namely, of recovering the Maratha territories from Tipu. Even if he had declared an immediate war on Mysore, he could not have accomplished much, as the command of the Peshwa's troops was in the hands of Holkar who was a rival of Sindhiya. The latter could not personally participate in the war as he was not far away from the south and was involved in subjugating the chieftains of the north. These factors compelled the Poona Government to procrastinate on the subject of carrying and enforcing the offensive treaty concluded by Sindhiya. Meanwhile Tipu was busy in foreshalling the designs of the Marathas by concluding a separate peace with the English. The Madras Government, distressed by their ruined finances and completely exhausted by war ignored the treaty concluded in Sindhiya's court and accepted a separate peace with Tipu. The Treaty of Mangalore was thus signed, in which even a reference to the Treaty of Salbai was omitted. It was this omission and the diplomatic triumph of Tipu that offended the Marathas most. They resented the conduct of both the English and Tipu. The Poona Court could not imagine a treaty with Tipu without its consent, and it upset all its programme. Nana had completed his preparations for war and awaited only the proper season to invade Mysore. He felt that the English had proved unfaithful in concluding a separate peace contrary to the Treaty of Salbai and their offensive alliance with Sindhiya. Although he was not very happy about the mediation of Sindhiya for the conclusion of this second treaty, he was not opposed to the measures in it that had been agreed upon. Hence he could not reconcile himself to the Treaty of Mangalore which was not in any way advantageous to the Marathas. Far from crippling the power of Tipu, it had raised his prestige and this was resented by the Marathas.

Thus the Mysore-Maratha relations were strained at the time of Tipu's accession to power. His successful conclusion of the English war further estranged the Marathas, who were now determined to wrest their territories in the Krishna region. The causes of the ill-feelings were the deep-seated hostility and jealousy which always characterised the Mysore-Maratha relations, and not any offensive act which Tipu deliberately committed. He had been very careful to avoid giving them any just ground of offence and tried to cultivate good neighbourly relations with them. Even in concluding the treaty with the English, he did not keep the Marathas in the dark. He writes in his memoirs that for six months he contrived to put off the arrival of the English ambassadors to his court and was in correspondence with the Maratha Government on the subject of peace with the English.¹⁰ According to him, he wrote fifteen letters to the Poona Government and caused the Maratha *rakil* at his court also to remind his Government repeatedly. Prior to his negotiations for peace with the English, he declared his acceptance of the Treaty of Salbai. "The Treaty of Mangalore as such did not contain any offensive clause against the Marathas. Therefore Tipu had not deliberately given them any cause for offence. On the other hand, he was the aggrieved party, as the Marathas had carried on war preparations against him without any provocation on his part."

The Nizam of Hyderabad was yet another important power with whom Mysore had to deal. Unfortunately, in this case as well the relations were far from satisfactory. Ever since the accession of Nizam Ali Khan to power in 1761 through the murder of his brother, Salabat Jang, he had pursued a policy of consistent hostility towards Mysore. In 1766 he had joined the English against Haidar and invaded Mysore but he had soon been won over by Haidar. In the Grand Confederacy of 1780 also, he had figured prominently but he had soon withdrawn from the war and deserted Haidar.

The Nizam was not happy at the rise of a powerful kingdom like Mysore in the South. He was more apprehensive of the growing strength of Haidar than of the Marathas. Therefore he disputed the very claim of Haidar to independent authority and always regarded him as his vassal. In the capacity of the Subah of the Deccan, the Vicegerent of Mughal authority in the South, he claimed to be the overlord of Mysore rulers and expected them to remain in a subordinate and tributary relation to him. But he avoided any open rupture with them for asserting his legal claim. He exploited the opportunities

of either the English or the Maratha wars on Mysore to wreak his vengeance. Both Haidar and Tipu were cautious enough to adopt a conciliatory policy towards him and they never co-operated with other powers to make war on him. In 1761 when Basalat Jang, the brother of the Nizam, invaded Mysore but failed to annex Sira, Haidar, instead of humiliating his adversary, paid him three lakhs of rupees and obtained the *sanads* for the Nawabship of Sira.¹¹ The Mysore rulers sought every opportunity to develop friendly relations with the Nizam and, many a time, Tipu went out of his way to secure his alliance against the English. But the Nizam failed to reciprocate these sentiments of friendship and there was always a strong pro-English party at his court which dissuaded him from entering into cordial relations with Mysore. Even when the aggressive designs of either the Marathas or the English compelled the Nizam to compose his differences with Mysore, his friendship with the latter was always short-lived.

Thus the main cause of the Nizam's hostility towards Mysore was the unwillingness of both Haidar and Tipu to remain a tributary to him. He looked upon Haidar as an upstart and denied him the rank and honour he deserved. But Haidar asserted his right to the Nawabship of Sira, as having been legally invested by Basalat Jang and desired to maintain his position, if need be, by force of arms. The second point of dispute with the Nizam was the incorporation in Mysore Kingdom of certain territories like Cuddapah and Kurnool which were feudatories of Hyderabad. Haidar had extended the limits of Mysore by freely encroaching upon the territories of both the Marathas and the Nizam who resented his action bitterly. Within three decades the small principality of Mysore had grown into a powerful kingdom which threatened the security of its neighbours. Haidar had not ceased to cast covetous glances on the other vulnerable places of the Nizam, which made him even more bitter. He longed to wreak vengeance upon Haidar for these excesses. He had withdrawn from the confederacy of 1780 as he wanted his adversary to be completely crushed. He was happy at the withdrawal of the Marathas also from the war which left the Mysore ruler all alone. The development of the events on the death of Haidar and the possible Anglo-Maratha co-operation which were aimed at the reduction of Tipu's power further pleased him. But Tipu's successful conclusion of the treaty with the English surprized the Nizam as much as the Marathas.

The aims of both the Nizam and the Marathas being identical, namely, to humble Tipu and wrest from him their lost possessions, they secretly planned to form a confederacy to accomplish their objects. Nana wanted an excuse to go to war and it was not difficult for him to find one. The question of the arrears of tribute gave him the required excuse. Nana demanded four years' tribute from Tipu. The latter did not deny the claim or the justice of the demand but evaded its immediate payment on the ground that his war with the English had drained his financial resources. He wanted some time for its payment.¹² But Nana pressed his demand and in order to show the justice of his claim, he made a similar demand on the Nizam. At the time he claimed the arrears from Tipu, he dispatched his *vakil* Krishna Rao Ballal to Hyderabad, ostensibly to demand from the Nizam the outstanding claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* but in reality to propose a secret offensive alliance against Tipu. There existed at this time an unprecedented understanding between the Poona and Hyderabad courts which Nana desired to exploit for a war. Nana sought the help of the Nizam for two reasons, firstly, to deprive Tipu of his territories in the north of the Tungabhadra and secondly, to outwit Sindhia whose brilliance might otherwise overshadow him.¹³ Sindhia had carved out a powerful kingdom in the north by his military ability and even his diplomatic skill had lately been displayed in his conclusion of the treaty of Salbai. Nana had not accomplished anything striking in his own sphere, which perhaps prompted him to make up for that failure by initiating an alliance with the Nizam. He was hopeful of the Nizam's co-operation as he had done him a favour by defeating the rebellion of Ihtesham Jang, the Jagirdar of Nirmal.¹⁴ When the agent of Nana disclosed the true purport of his visit, the Nizam readily consented to hold a personal conference with Nana. Such a meeting was essential to mature the plans of invasion. Accordingly both the parties, attended by a large army, set out from their capitals and in the month of June 1784 had a meeting at Yadgir, near the junction of Bhima and Krishna.¹⁵

The parties explored the possibility of mutual co-operation against Tipu. They first discussed their outstanding problems. The Nizam demanded the surrender of certain places like Bijapur and Ahmednagar which were now in possession of the Marathas.¹⁶ But his claim was not conceded. The Marathas made the counter-demand of immediate payment of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* for two seasons.¹⁷

The Nizam insisted on the cession of Bijapur and Ahmednagar as a condition for his co-operation in the offensive alliance against Tipu. Nana was reluctant to cede both, but was half inclined to surrender Bijapur and that, after the recovery of the Maratha territories in the north of Tungabhadra. These proposals satisfied neither party and they agreed to disperse after the conclusion of a general treaty of alliance by which they accepted the principle of mutual co-operation against Mysore. The details of the alliance were to be settled later. The points of their agreement were: first both parties were to make war on Tipu in the following year; second, they should first recover their lost territories from Tipu and then turn to the conquest of the rest of his kingdom, which should be equally divided between the two parties.¹⁸ Having agreed upon these terms, they returned to their respective capitals early in July 1784. Their conference had lasted for more than a fortnight from June 7 to 25.

When Tipu was informed of these events, he attempted to defeat the designs of the confederates. He had not offended or provoked either the Marathas or the Nizam; still they had conceived the plan for his overthrow. He, therefore, wanted to detach the Nizam from the alliance by holding out the threat of invading his country if he should join the Marathas. He knew quite well that Nana could not come to the Nizam's immediate relief, owing to a conspiracy organised in Poona to install Baji Rao, the son of Raghoba, by overthrowing Madhava Rao Narayan. Tipu formulated counter-charges against the Nizam and informed him that the ruler of Mysore had a claim over the subedari of Bijapur by virtue of Haidar's treaty with Salabat Jang.¹⁹ Though Bijapur which the Nizam wanted to secure for himself from them as a bargain for his co-operation, was itself in Maratha hands. Tipu disputed the right of the Nizam over the rest of the district which was still in his possession. Tipu was provoked to make this extraordinary demand because the Nizam had asked him to pay the *paishkush* for the Carnatic Balaghat which was in Tipu's possession. The Nizam gave no response to this claim and Tipu carried on war-like preparations to make good his demand. This made the Nizam highly apprehensive, as he thought that Tipu seriously meant to invade his country. He immediately dispatched an envoy to Srirangapatna to mollify Tipu, and another to Poona urging Nana to expedite the offensive operations against Tipu.²⁰ But the Marathas were not prepared to do so, owing to their preoccupations at home of suppressing the conspiracy of Baji Rao. It was a very serious plot in which even Mahdaji Sindhia had a hand against.

Nana.²¹ Therefore the Marathas were not of immediate help to the Nizam, who asked his agent at Srirangapatna to conciliate Tipu. As the latter also had not seriously contemplated the invasion of the Nizam's dominions, the event passed off without a clash of arms. But the Marathas and the Nizam had only temporarily postponed the war and were waiting for a better opportunity to crush Tipu. Tipu's policy was not to initiate a war with his Indian neighbours but to resist their aggression, if they ever attacked him. When the Nizam expressed his peaceful intentions, Tipu was satisfied and gave up his claims. But the confederates again revived their hostile activities, which forced Tipu also to prepare himself for any eventuality.

It is alleged that Tipu precipitated the war with the Marathas by his indiscreet attack on the Desai of Nargund. But the facts show that this gave only a good excuse to Nana to execute his long-meditated invasion of Mysore. Nargund is a small principality in the north of Mysore which had been conquered in 1778 by Haidar who had compelled its chief, Venkata Rao Bhawe, a Brahmin Desai, to pay an annual tribute and acknowledge the supremacy of Mysore.²² Nana had confirmed the right of Haidar over the principality by the arrangements of 1780. After the Second Mysore War, Tipu enhanced the annual tribute from the Zamindar, which, all at once, raised a serious controversy and resulted in the Mysore-Maratha War.

Tipu was provoked to enhance the tribute owing to the fact that the Desai had indulged frequently in subversive activities against Mysore. His past record deserved some chastisement as he had offended both Haidar and Tipu. Since the conquest of the principality, he had not ceased to look upon the Peshwa as his overlord and had not reconciled himself to his new position of a tributary chief to Mysore.²³ He secretly carried on hostile correspondence with influential persons at Poona. His minister, Kolapant Pethe, instigated the Maratha chiefs to invade Nargund and recover all the lands south of the Krishna.²⁴ He addressed a letter to Chintan Rao Patwardhan to seize the opportunity of Haidar's death for the invasion of Mysore.²⁵ When the Marathas did not respond favourably to his instigations, he turned to the English, knowing well their enmity towards Mysore. He opened correspondence with them and posing himself as an independent chief, he offered them his co-operation against his own master. He applied to the Bombay Government through an Englishman under his service, named Yoon, for the assistance of some British troops to invade Mysore from the north.²⁶ This

application was made at a time when the English at Madras were negotiating a peace with Tipu and hence no notice was taken of these overtures of his.

Besides these subversive activities, the Desai was guilty of other offences. He had incited the peaceful subjects of the Sultan to rise in revolt. He had induced the neighbouring poligars of Punganoor, Madanpalli and other places to raise their contumacious heads. He attacked the fort of Sedam in the district of Gurramkonda and had "opened the doors of fraud and treachery on the peasants of the country."²⁷ He had defied the authority of the Sultan and had not paid him tribute for two years. He evaded the payment imagining that he belonged to a powerful group of the Marathas, namely the Patawardhans, who would assist him if he chose to break his connection with Tipu.²⁸ He constantly kept the Poona Court informed of all the developments in Nargund and tried to embitter the Mysore-Maratha relations.

Owing to these hostile activities, Tipu felt justified in his action of increasing the annual tribute and demanding the arrears for two years. The activities of the Desai had gone unchecked so long as Tipu was engaged in the war against the English. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Mangalore, he decided to punish the Desai. When Tipu made his demand, the Desai failed to discharge the dues. On the contrary, he sought the help of the Poona Government and complained that Tipu had arbitrarily enhanced the tribute imposed on him. Tipu knew that Nana could not keep aloof in view of the relationship of the Desai to the Patawardhans. Therefore he despatched two envoys, Mohamed Ghiyas Khan and Noor Mohamed Khan to the Poona court to explain the true state of affairs and to prevent Nana from taking sides with the Desai.²⁹ The intention of the Sultan was to give the Poona Government a chance to bring the Desai to reason. If the Desai still persisted in his attitude, there was no alternative but to chastise him. The Sultan felt, "if a petty Zamindar and a subject of our Government like this may not be punished, how shall our authority be maintained?"³⁰ The justice of his case was admitted even by Rao Rasta.

But without inquiring fully into the facts of the case the Poona Government declared that the demand made by Tipu was much more than the usual tribute raised in the past. Nana expressed the view that Tipu had absolutely no right to make any arbitrary and exorbitant demand. Added to this, he quoted the convention that guided the

exaction of tribute from the Brahmin feudatories — “that Jagirdars on the transfer of districts were liable to no additional payments and that *the rights of sawasthanees* who had been guilty of no treason against the state to which they owed allegiance, had been invariably respected.”³¹ The interposition of Nana, far from solving the problem, complicated the issue. Tipu would not submit to a declaration which would diminish his authority in the eyes of the Desai. His reply was that there would be an end of his authority if a foreign power intervened in the internal affairs of his country and that he had every right to levy what he chose from his subjects. Besides, even according to the general principle enunciated by Nana with respect to the Brahmin Zamindars, the Desai deserved chastisement as he was actually guilty of treason against the state and that his past record was one of continuous disloyalty towards Tipu. Therefore Tipu was not bound to respect the “rights of *sawasthanees*”. Despite these excesses of the Desai, he was willing to excuse him, provided he agreed to make good “due compensations for the injury sustained by our dominions and payment of the arrears due by him for several years past.”³² These terms were not agreeable to Nana and their rejection precipitated the war.

Having failed in peaceful persuasions to bring round the Desai, Tipu had to resort to force. He sent his commander, Syed Ghaffar, to inquire into the conduct of the chief, and the latter reported that the Desai was instigated by Parsaram Bhao into his contumacious design. The Desai's conduct was growing into a serious rebellion and had to be crushed speedily. Therefore Tipu detached two separate bodies of troops to frighten the Desai, who was still offered a chance to submit.³³ But the Zamindar chose to resist, expecting help from the Marathas. He fought bravely for a time. The fort was besieged by the Mysoreans, while Kolapant had been expecting succour day after day, from the Marathas. When Parsaram Bhao came to know of Tipu's attack, he urged Nana immediately to send relief.

Though Nana was willing to assist the Nargund chief, he was prevented from doing so by the disturbed state of the Marathas. He sent orders to the Maratha commanders not to precipitate hostilities, as the preparations for war were not fully complete. The presence of Tipu's *vakils* in the Poona Court also had the effect of restraining him from any hasty action. He was, however, confident and hopeful of settling the dispute amicably, and he was aware of the equally pacific intentions

to the orders of Nana, a party of the Maratha troops made a premature attack on Tipu's army and were repulsed with great loss.³⁶ This development convinced Nana of the propriety of adopting other methods. He despatched Parsaram Bhao and Ganesh Pant Behro with a considerable force to the relief of Nargund. Nevertheless he took the precaution of instructing Bhao to avoid hostilities, if Tipu's commander raised the siege. Nana contacted Tipu also, expressed his concern over the affair and desired accommodation. Tipu was equally willing to solve the dispute peacefully and would go a step further by offering to pay tribute for two years to the Poona Government if his sovereignty over Nargund was recognised by Nana.³⁷ His *vakils* at the Maratha court were actually in possession of this cash, so as to remit it, in case a settlement proved a success.³⁸ Tipu was willing to raise the siege if the Zamindar agreed to pay the old arrears and some compensation for his ravages. The siege was actually raised and the commander of Tipu's forces, Burhan-ud-din, withdrew from Nargund. The cause for the relinquishment of the siege was not so much the scarcity of water (which Grant Duff made out to be the chief factor) as the anxiety of Tipu to settle the dispute amicably. Rao Raste, the Maratha chief who was favourably disposed towards Tipu in the Poona Court, was instrumental in persuading him to take this measure.³⁹ For such a step was expected to facilitate Rao Raste in expediting the settlement, but its effect on Nana was otherwise. He felt that the siege was raised on the approach of a powerful body of Maratha troops and that Burhan-ud-din was not capable of conducting the siege. He, however, instructed Bhao that as the siege was raised, he should not provoke Tipu's armies to further hostilities and ordered him to evacuate the Desai and his minister to some different place; but they refused to be evacuated.⁴⁰ Contrary to the orders of Nana, Parsaram Bhao and Ganesh Pant fell on Tipu's troops, but were once again repulsed.⁴¹ Nana highly disapproved of the action of Bhao and reprimanded him. But to cover up the disgrace, he sent Tukoji Holkar with a big force and busied himself in preparing for a major campaign.⁴²

If both sides had acted with tact and moderation, the clash could have been averted. The *vakils* of Tipu had long been in the Poona court professing the pacific intentions of their master. They had been charged with the task of settling the outstanding disputes, particularly of Nargund. They possessed ready cash to be remitted, as a proof of Tipu's sincerity in desiring friendly relations. The *vakils*

proposed to pay immediately to the Peshwa the tribute for two years if Tipu's claim to the fort of Nargund was accepted. This appeared quite reasonable to Nana and, as a temporary measure, he consented to these proposals. He allowed a period of 27 days for the *vakils* to obtain the approval of their master for the payment of the amount.⁴³ It looked as if a peaceful solution was at last worked out.

But this hope was a delusion rather than a reality. The differences could not be resolved by a mere profession of peaceful intentions on the part of either party. The negotiations failed because Tipu realized that Nana was committed to hostilities, sooner or later, by virtue of the Maratha alliance with the Nizam. Moreover, the tribute Tipu would pay was sure to be utilised by the Marathas for more effective rearmament for future hostilities against him. Even if an agreement were to be patched up, it would merely be a truce till the end of the monsoon.⁴⁴ Therefore Tipu decided to withhold the payment and break off the negotiations. Tipu was not willing to make any compromise on the basic issue of his right to deal in his own way with the Zamindar of Nargund. But Nana refused to concede this claim of Tipu. He was only gaining time to outwit his adversary. Tipu in his turn desired to capture the fort before the commencement of the rains and the approach of the confederate army. But Nana's policy was to lull Tipu into a sense of false security till he got the confederate forces ready for action. He also tried to exact the maximum amount of tribute from Tipu by appearing to be peacefully disposed.

The unprovoked attack of Parsaram Bhao on the Mysore forces gave Tipu the pretext to recommence the suspended operations against Nargund and the fort was heavily invested. Kolapant was given one more chance for surrender, but he refused to do so, being directed by the Poona Government.⁴⁵ The fort was so severely attacked that it surrendered, accepting terms of capitulation.⁴⁶ The garrison consisted of about 1,650 men,⁴⁷ all of whom were set free under Tipu's orders, except the unfortunate Desai and his minister, who were sent to Kapaladrug along with their families.⁴⁸ They secured their release only after the close of the Mysore-Maratha War in 1787. They had been detained, contrary to the terms of capitulation, on account of the gravity of the offence they had committed against Tipu. Within a short period after this, not merely Nargund but a number of other small principalities such as Kittur, Hoskote, Dodvad, Khanapur and Sada, which had become nests of rebellion, were subdued and their territories incorporated.

The fall of Nargund was a severe blow to Nana whose designs had been forestalled by Tipu. Parsaram Bhao being dissatisfied with Nana's indecisive attitude, had withdrawn from the field. Nana would have personally assumed the command but for the disturbed affairs in the capital, which demanded his presence.⁴⁹ There was no alternative for Nana but to wait till the proper season. He did not want to take any risk by fighting single-handed. But he had to involve himself ultimately in a war with Tipu to strengthen his position. His rivalry with Sindhia who had accomplished much in the North prompted him to adopt dynamic and an aggressive policy in the Deccan.⁵⁰ This could be done in no better way than by fighting with Tipu. As Tipu was formidable, Nana needed the assistance of others. That is why Nana thought of a confederacy. He employed the interval between the fall of Nargund and the end of the monsoon most usefully in contacting the various Maratha chiefs and other powers and in inducing them to join a confederacy against Tipu.

Nana first turned to the Nizam who ranked at that time among the principal powers of the Peninsula. Nana dispatched Krishna Rao Ballal once again to the Nizam to reopen the question of an alliance and to impress upon him the immediate necessity of concerted action against the common enemy. The success of Tipu had humiliated both the powers and unless they vindicated their cause, their honour was at stake.⁵¹ But the Nizam was not much moved by the gravity of the situation. On the other hand, he placed his personal interests in the foreground, before expressing his views on the question of participation in the confederacy. He demanded a sum of twenty lakhs of rupees for war expenses, besides the cession of Bijapur and Ahmednagar as the price for his joining the alliance.⁵² But thinking of the inordinate delay that would be caused in securing Nana's approval to these propositions, Krishna Rao Ballal took the responsibility on his own shoulders and assured the Nizam that his demands would receive the greatest consideration. Besides, he persuaded him to hold one more personal conference with Nana, where he could discuss these problems at length.⁵³ The Nizam was satisfied with these assurances and consented to meet Nana. He proceeded in November 1785 to the appointed place, Yadgir, where Nana also had arrived with Haripant and Parsaram Bhao.⁵⁴

The conference lasted nearly a month but was at first productive only of a lot of controversy over the question of ceding Bijapur and Ahmednagar to the Nizam and paying him a sum of twenty lakhs

of rupees, which had been so lightly promised by the Maratha envoy. Nana was reluctant to concede these demands and failed to satisfy the Nizam on these points.⁶⁶ Despite these differences, however, he induced the Nizam to join the confederacy and make war on Tipu immediately. Agreement was also reached on the mode of the division of Tipu's kingdom after the conquest.⁶⁶ After recovering their respective territories then under Tipu's possession, they were to share equally all other conquests. But the recovery of the lands between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna should have preference over other parts.⁶⁷ Having settled these terms, Nana returned to Poona.

The Marathas thus secured the alliance of the Nizam. Yet Nana was not relieved of his anxiety, as he was not satisfied with the efficiency and discipline of the Nizam's army. The excellent state of Tipu's army compelled him to seek further alliances and he desired to include as many Indian and European powers in the Confederacy as he could. He first appealed to the different Maratha chieftains to rally round him in vindication of their national cause. The response was quite encouraging and a number of them volunteered to join the Confederacy. Mudhoji Bhonsle promised 10,000 troops, Tukoji Holkar 20,000, the Pindaris 10,000, and even Parsaram Bhao was willing to join with his troops in spite of his personal differences with Nana.⁶⁸ The combined forces of all these confederates mounted up to a staggering figure. Even then Nana did not feel secure and sought further support from the English.

Just on the eve of the confederates commencing their operations against Mysore, serious misunderstandings arose among them when Nana desired to return to Poona leaving the command to the Nizam and Haripant. They ascribed his intention to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of their principal ally. The Nizam declared that he would retire to Hyderabad. Likewise, Mudhoji Bhonsle and Parsaram Bhao were keen on returning to their respective places. Nana had no other alternative than to postpone his departure. Even then he failed to induce the Nizam to stay on and the latter withdrew to his capital, and the reason was that he had not been satisfied over the question of Bijapur and Ahmednagar.⁶⁹ Thus the Confederacy began at the very outset to show signs of dissension.

When all these hectic activities were going on in the camps of his rivals, Tipu stood alone to face a powerful Confederacy with his battalions which were in excellent state of discipline. He was not solicitous of support from any quarter. Most of his Indian neighbours had

been actually won over by Nana. Among the Europeans, the attitude of the English towards him was too well known to expect anything from them. Far from assisting him, they would have actively conspired against him. Anticipating such an eventuality, he had desired a defensive alliance with the English in the Treaty of Mangalore, but they had deliberately avoided such a commitment. They had accepted instead the principle of neutrality, preventing both parties from assisting each other's enemies. Therefore Tipu could at best expect only neutrality from the British. On the other hand, nothing would have prevented them from helping the Marathas, if they so desired. Macpherson had already decided to assist the Marathas and the Nizam with five battalions each.⁶⁰ This was an open breach of the treaty of Mangalore which stipulated that neither of the contracting parties should assist directly or indirectly the enemies of the other. But to go back on the solemn engagements of a treaty had been neither new nor difficult for the English. If at all they desired to remain faithful to the treaty, that would be not out of any deference to it, but in obedience to mere expediency.

Tipu could not hope to get any assistance from the French as he had already had bitter experience of them in the last war. Having long been his allies, they had deserted him and, without his consent had concluded a separate peace with the English. Moreover, ever since the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the French power in India had been on the wane: their factories had been disorganized, their resources meagre, their fighting forces scanty and their political status on the decline. Neither were they inclined, even if they had been able, to assist him against the Marathas and the Nizam. In spite of their unfriendly acts in the late war, Tipu, for his part, had maintained friendly relations with them. For he expected that they might yet prove useful in case of war with the English or with any of the Indian powers. But, in the present context of a war with the latter, they did not choose to assist Tipu but remained neutral.

The reason why they adopted such a policy was their desire to divert the energies of all the country's powers against the English under their own leadership. Bussy wrote to Marscel de Castries that he had done his best to unite all the three powers, but the disposition of the Marathas and the Nizam towards Tipu was still menacing.⁶¹ Bussy also wrote to Comte de Vergennes. "The Marathas and the Nizam have leagued to destroy Tipu. This project admirably suits the English. I have laboured and still labour to break it and at the same

time to unite the three Indian powers against the English without compromising ourselves.”⁶² Thus the French policy was to warn the Indian powers of the dangers of providing an opportunity to the English to profit by their dissensions. Instead of aligning themselves with any power, they tried to resolve the mutual differences of the Indian powers. The Vicomte de Souillac, Governor-General of the French Establishments in the East, advised all three, Nana, Tipu and the Nizam, to forget their internal differences and stand united against the English.⁶³ Nobody paid heed to their counsel. When the war actually broke out, they attempted to mediate between these powers and endeavoured to evolve a working basis of pacification.⁶⁴ The French were not inclined to assist Tipu for another reason as well. The sixteenth article of the Treaty of Versailles forbade both the English and the French to take part in the wars of the Indian powers. Besides, the French policy had undergone a radical change and they no longer looked upon the Mysore chief as their natural and traditional ally. They thought that the combined forces of the Marathas and the Nizam would humble him and hence they did not wish to join the losing side. They regarded the power of Tipu as new and unstable but that of the Marathas more stable, strong and “proper to create a revolution.”⁶⁵ They were anxious to enter into an alliance not with Tipu, but with the Marathas.

Tipu was thus forced to rely on his own strength in this war. He was confident that, if the English remained neutral, he would be able to defeat his enemies. But if they assisted the Marathas, he would compel the French to give up their neutrality and join him.⁶⁶

Whereas Tipu was indifferent about securing outside help and had been virtually isolated, Nana was anxious to secure foreign aid. The superiority of Tipu's arms and the possibility of his entry into a new and closer alliance with the French threw a gloom over Nana and made him seek British help. Nana made his formal application for British aid to Boddam, Governor of Bombay. In view of the known strained relations of the British with Tipu, he counted on their immediate and positive alliance against him on almost any terms.⁶⁷ He sent an agent to Bombay in July 1785, seeking the British assistance. In return he offered to surrender to them two of the sea-ports belonging to Tipu on the Malabar coast after their conquest. As it was not within the power of Boddam to grant this aid, he referred the matter to the Governor-General, Macpherson, to whom Nana also had sent a personal agent.⁶⁸ The absence of any British resident

in the Court of Poona necessitated that the matter should be pursued through Sindhia. He intimated to James Anderson that Tipu had committed an act of aggression against the Marathas, the ally of the English, and hence, in accordance with the Treaty of Salbai, they should conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with them to crush Tipu.⁶⁹ Macpherson did not readily accept the argument of Sindhia that the British were bound by treaty to help the Marathas. He pointed out that the Treaty of Salbai did not stipulate that the friends and enemies of either of the two states should be treated as such by the other, but that neither party should afford assistance to the enemies of the other.⁷⁰ Further the English were allied to Tipu also by the Treaty of Mangalore not to assist his enemies directly or indirectly. Any infraction of that Treaty would compel him to join the French and thus would result in the expansion of the theatre of war.

Though the Governor-General declined to assist the Marathas, he professed friendship with them and assured them that, in case of their being overpowered by Tipu, the English would certainly come to their rescue.⁷¹ Anderson convinced Sindhia that though Tipu had not given any immediate cause of offence to the English, they would not allow the Marathas to be over-powered by him.⁷² The problem of the prisoners was still a sore point with them. The question of the minor principality of Cherikal troubled them. Besides, their inveterate and deep-rooted hostility towards him might have easily prompted them to array their forces against him. But the explicit instructions from the Home Government, the spirit of Pitt's India Act of 1784, and the sixteenth Article of the Treaty of Versailles, all prevented them from entering into an alliance with any native power that would involve the Company in war, except in the event of French interference on the side of Tipu.⁷³ Besides, the financial conditions of the Company did not warrant them to launch a fresh venture.⁷⁴

Nana was disappointed with the British attitude and his anxiety to secure their aid increased in proportion to their reluctance to grant it.⁷⁵ He urged them to alter their policy at least in the light of a new treaty said to have been concluded between Tipu and the French. He informed Sindhia, "Tipu has entered into an alliance with the French and that 4,000 French soldiers and 10,000 sepoys are ready to march to his aid. Mr Anderson should be told that since the French are assisting Tipu, the English must necessarily assist the Peshwa."⁷⁶ In reality no such treaty had been concluded and the French were not

committed to assist Tipu. Nana was either misinformed or he deliberately invented the story in order to induce the British to join him.

Macpherson did not, however, stick to his refusal of British aid to the Marathas. Being pressed by Nana, he changed his policy and seriously thought of joining the Marathas. When the pacific intentions were no longer productive of any material results, the English were prepared to adopt such policy as would offer decisive political advantages. He violated the Treaty of Mangalore and consented to help the Marathas and the Nizam with five battalions each.⁷⁷ He stipulated, however, that these troops should be employed exclusively for the defence of the two powers and not for any offensive campaigns. This conditional assistance did not suit Nana, as he did not contemplate the mere defence of his country but the recovery and conquest of Tipu's kingdom. Therefore he rejected the offer of Macpherson.⁷⁸ Moreover the grant of such an aid was disapproved by the Home Government. Thus, in spite of Nana's great anxiety for British help and the willingness of Macpherson to give it, the Anglo-Maratha co-operation did not materialise.

Nana was so desperately in need of an alliance with some European power, after his disappointment with the English, that he made overtures even to the Portuguese, by whom he was promised assistance.⁷⁹ Circumstances, however, did not permit him to avail himself of this help. The French were willing to co-operate with him, but he was not keen on obtaining their help.⁸⁰ Nana wrote to Sindhia, "Some time ago the French approached the Peshwa for friendship but their overtures were rejected, as the Peshwa had engaged with the English not to have connections with any other European Power."⁸¹ Besides, he believed that a secret treaty existed between the French and Tipu. The Maratha envoy at Pondicherry remonstrated with the Governor against this bad faith, and the French Governor absolutely denied any such connection.⁸² Even after Nana was convinced of the sincerity of the French, he was not inclined to take their help and was solicitous of only English friendship. The French persisted in their efforts to make Nana desire their alliance by sending a special agent, Mons. Guder, to Poona and to establish friendly relations.⁸³ But they failed in their attempts. However, at one time, their influence had so far increased that Nana contemplated a union with them and promised them a share of the area which their joint forces might take from Tipu and one of his own forts called Revadanda near Bombay.⁸⁴ The English tried to counteract these designs by the appointment of a Resident

been about the Maratha claim on Tipu for the arrears of tribute, the Sultan was now ready to discharge it, and the *vakils* were actually possessed of cash and banker's bills to pay them immediately on demand.⁹⁰ But from the dilatory tactics of Nana it was obvious that the question of tribute was not the principal dispute either with the Marathas or with the Nizam. Both Governments had planned to oppose and check the rising power of the Sultan whose bold and independent policy had excited their jealousy. That was why Tipu failed in his attempts to pacify his adversaries, in spite of his submission to all their just demands.

There was another reason for the Sultan's anxiety to avoid a war with his neighbours, if he could do so without submitting to the disgrace of being dictated to by a foreign power. His main object was to check the growth of the British power. A war with the Nizam and the Marathas obstructed his designs and strengthened his enemies. Though the active co-operation of his neighbours was highly desirable, yet at least their neutrality was absolutely essential for his designs against the English. Unfortunately the policy of Nana was quite different from that of Tipu. Whereas Tipu desired to end all hostilities with his neighbours and conserve energies for a struggle against the English, Nana was seeking the British help to subvert Tipu's authority.⁹¹ It is true that Tipu viewed the Marathas as serious political rivals and did not like their interference in his internal affairs but he neither hated them nor planned to subvert them. On the other hand, he wished to develop friendly relations with them. The same thing was true about the Nizam, with whom he desired to have still closer alliance and even matrimonial connections. The agents he despatched to the Nizam urged him that "for the sake of their country and religion, they should fold up the carpet of enmity and strengthen the foundations of their friendship and regard by the rites of matrimonial connections."⁹²

But all attempts to break up the confederacy failed and the hostilities were resumed by the confederates with the attack on Badami. The war lasted for nearly twelve months, from May 1786 to April 1787; the interval being occupied by scenes of innumerable battles, sieges, surprise attacks, daring exploits and crushing defeats. A detailed account of these brilliant events is not necessary to recount here. Enough for our purpose to know that Tipu exhibited such proof of his military superiority as made his enemies willing to retire from the contest. They were made to suffer severe defeats and heavy losses and on the whole Tipu gained advantages in the war.

The sincerity of Tipu's desire for good neighbourly relations with the Marathas and the Nizam is established not only by his exertions to avoid the war but also in conceding just and liberal terms after he had almost won the war. It is not generally expected of a winning side to make concessions to the vanquished. The victors dictate their own terms. But Tipu, having won the war, was extremely accommodative towards his adversaries. This was not without purpose. He expected that his friendly gestures would bear good political results later.

Tipu had won uniform success in the war. All the same in the month of September 1786, he took the initiative of sending his *vakil*, Nur Muhammad Khan to Hari Pant with a letter to end the hostilities. The confederates were at a loss to account for Tipu's motives in suddenly opening negotiations for peace.⁸³ One of the reasons for such a decision was his suspicion of the English. He distrusted their pacific intentions and their military preparations indicated that they would not long remain neutral.⁸⁴ The intrigues of Malet at Poona had the effect of compelling the English to join the Marathas. Malet expatiated in a letter to the Governor-General upon the advantages of joining that power.⁸⁵ Firstly, by this alliance they would secure the friendship of a mighty Empire. Secondly, they would relieve themselves of the expenses of a large body of troops as the Marathas would defray the charges. Thirdly, it would remove all apprehension of the French influence on Poona. Fourthly, they would gain additional security for their possessions by keeping the Marathas on their side. Fifthly, they would be able to secure such additional territory as would enhance their political power. Lastly, they would reduce Tipu's powers so low as to prevent any future hostile designs against the Company's territories. Such were the arguments of Malet to induce Lord Cornwallis who was the Governor-General now in India, to give up the neutrality. Tipu was rightly concerned about the future turn of the British policy and this consideration went a long way in making him seek the end of hostilities.

Tipu sent overtures of peace to Hari Pant by writing to him that such an insignificant affair as that of Nargund should not be the cause of a war with the Marathas. It was in the interest of both the states to stand united and, therefore, he was asking him to send two *vakils* to settle the terms of peace.⁸⁶ He wrote similar letters to Poona and when no response was received, he revived the negotiations again in

November through the agency of Raste and Holkar.⁹⁷ Nana had turned down all overtures of peace so far, expecting British assistance. But two principal factors made him change his views. Firstly, the progress of the confederate army was so hopelessly discouraging and the expenses of the war so enormously high that the Poona Durbar was reduced to the necessity of entering into a treaty. Moreover, Nana had reasons to doubt the ability of his commanders and the good faith of his allies and even of his own chieftains.⁹⁸ Secondly, when Lord Cornwallis decided, for a variety of reasons other than any consideration for Tipu, not to join the Marathas, Nana had no recourse but to accept the peace proposals. The English were reluctant to help Nana; for to do so would add to the Maratha power by facilitating their ascendancy over Tipu and, secondly, they were apprehensive of Tipu's entering into an alliance with the French to wreak vengeance on the English.⁹⁹ Despairing of the British aid, Nana consented to treat with Tipu, who sent Badruz-Zaman Khan and Ali Raza Khan with peace proposals. Tukoji Holkar and Gangadhar Raste were appointed by Hari Pant to treat with them. The negotiations in which both sides attempted to bargain on advantageous terms were long-drawn. Tipu proposed the mutual restoration of the conquered places and recognition by the Marathas of his sovereignty over the territory between the Tungabhadra and Krishna. In return he would clear the old arrears of forty-eight lakhs of rupees in two instalments, thirty-two immediately and sixteen after six months; and he would undertake to pay regularly in future the annual tribute of twelve lakhs of rupees.¹⁰⁰ Hari Pant rejected these terms and insisted on the relinquishment of the disputed territory to the Marathas and Adoni to Mahabat Jang. Tipu would not give up these territories and was reluctant to make further concessions. Hari Pant suggested that he should release Kolapant, surrender Nargund, Kittur, Adoni and Savanur to their respective chiefs and cede Badami and Ganjendragarh to the Peshwa, besides making the payment of the old arrears, durbar charges and the regular annual tribute in future. Tipu accepted these proposals with some modifications.¹⁰¹ He would release Kolapant and restore Adoni, Nargund and Kittur to their respective chiefs but Savanur would be retained until the full clearance of the arrears due from Nawab Abdul Hamid Khan. He would cede Badami to the Peshwa but retain Gajendragarh. He would settle all the old dues and pay in future twelve lakhs annually. The Marathas in return

should restore all their conquests. They should acknowledge him as the undisputed lord of all the territory south of the Krishna, from sea to sea.¹⁰² They must enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with him. Lastly, they should concede him the title of king or "Padshah".¹⁰³ Haripant accepted all the proposals except the last but even that was resolved by a compromise suggested by Tukoji Holkar to address him as "Nawab Tipu Sultan Fateh Ally Khan" and the treaty was signed in April 1787. The name of the Nizam was at first omitted but was included later. Thus the war came to an end by the Treaty of Gajendragarh.

The Treaty was highly disadvantageous to Tipu. It was consistent neither with the objects with which he had gone to war nor with the military skill he had displayed during the campaign. He had uniformly triumphed in the war, yet he now failed to make political profit out of his successes. He had won the war but lost the peace.¹⁰⁴ Far from making any additions to his kingdom, he surrendered Nargund, Kittur and Badami to the Marathas. Instead of reimbursing his treasury from indemnity towards the heavy expenses he had incurred on the war, he agreed to pay them a considerable sum of money with promise of further payments in future. The advantages he secured in return did not compensate him for the losses he had sustained. It is true that he secured certain places like Gajendragarh, Kanakagiri, Anecondi and Savanur, but the loss of Nargund and Kittur, compromised the very purpose of his war and meant the reduction of his kingdom and revenue. They were frontier posts of strategic importance and their possession by the Marathas was a definite advantage to them. The other advantages such as the title of Nawab and the offensive and defensive alliance with the Marathas he secured were equally illusory. They could not be trusted to keep their engagements when opportunities of aggrandisement presented themselves to them. They had consented to treat with him only because they were losing on the field. Very soon it was obvious that they were willing to league again in a more formidable confederacy for destroying his power. He made a faulty calculation that the concessions he made would permanently secure the Maratha friendship for him. But they accepted the treaty with reluctance and reservation. Despite its generous terms, they regarded it, as Yoon wrote to Malet, "For the present the Government has considered this the wisest method; but it appears and is suspected this treaty of peace cannot last long, though it is thought to be stipulated for the term of three years."¹⁰⁵ Thus the treaty did not fulfil

Tipu's expectation of winning the Marathas over to his side, in case of a clash with the English.

However, the treaty had the advantage of dissolving a formidable confederacy and ending a war, for the time-being, between the country's powers. Its prolongation would have drained their resources and helped the foreigners. Tipu deliberately conceded to the Marathas more concessions just to disengage the Nizam from them. Though the confederates received some forts, they failed to recover from Tipu all their territories. Above all, Tipu had the satisfaction of gaining time for the prosecution of his designs against the English. Despite the very liberal terms the Marathas secured, the treaty was not a favourable topic with Nana and the Poona Government was very reserved on the subject.¹⁰⁸

Thus Tipu's relations with his two immediate neighbours, the Nizam and the Marathas, were marked by a kind of power politics which would not allow any power to remain in peace until the decisive superiority of one power was firmly established. Each of those three powers, the Nizam, the Marathas and Tipu, was involved in a contest in order to become the supreme master of the south. Among these three the least powerful but the most ambitious was the Nizam whose strong point was his opportunism in joining hands with the winning party. He had neither the strength to impose his own will nor the capacity to alter any decision already taken by others. When the Marathas decided to attack Tipu, the Nizam had no alternative but to support them. When, half-way through the war, the Marathas desired peace he dared not oppose the intention. Despite his tall talk, he was no better than a camp-follower of either the Marathas or the English. He figured in all the four Mysore wars but in all of them his role was no better than that of a sleeping partner who would rouse himself up only to demand a share in the spoils of war. Despite the shock they had suffered in 1761 when they lost the third battle of Panipat and in 1772 when their dynamic leader, Madhava Rao passed away the Marathas were yet powerful. They would have been extremely powerful, had they remained united and had not divided themselves into a pentarchy. Sindhia, Holkar, Gackwar, Bhosle and Nana had carved out zones of influence of their own. Like the Balkan powers of the late nineteenth century, they were frittering away their own energies either in their mutual rivalries or in their mutual ambitions to expand at the cost of their neighbours. What is significant and noteworthy is that the Marathas also failed to perceive the inevitable

danger that was building up in the form of western expansion. It was Tipu alone who was sensitive to this aspect of the problem. But the difficulty was that, far from strengthening his hands, his neighbours were bent upon destroying him altogether. When he was too strong to be thus crushed single-handed by any of his Indian neighbours they were to achieve their object by aligning themselves in a powerful confederacy with the very power that was bound in course of time to wipe out their own existence. In short, hardly had Tipu completed his war with the English, when the Nizam and the Marathas knocked at his door. Tipu was quite a match for the combined might of these two, and they could not overpower him. Despite the slight edge he had in the field, he showed them concessions and concluded a treaty with them on honourable terms, only to gain their favour for any contest against the English at a later date. He exhorted them to see the writing on the wall, namely that unless the Indian powers stood united, they would succumb to the machinations of the West. His neighbours ignored his call, and the events inevitably moved in a direction which helped only the English.

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CHAPTER III

SEARCH FOR SUPPORT FROM TURKEY AND FRANCE

TIPU SULTAN WAS VERY FOND OF developing friendly relations with foreign powers, and this he accomplished through the appointment of trade agents and diplomatic missions. He is the only prince of that period who tried to secure foreign assistance for his design of defeating the English. His efforts had the effect of linking the history of a small state like Mysore with the outside world. The advent of the Europeans in India with their insatiable ambition to build up their power, introduced a new political party in the country. Western diplomacy and military technique called for a change in the traditional political outlook of India. The inherent weaknesses of Indian rulers and their failure to unite even at the hour of national danger decided Tipu's desire to seek outside help. Haidar had as his natural allies the French with whom Tipu also continued to have friendly relations; but they were not in a position, despite their best efforts, to offset the designs of the English. Moreover their policy was not consistent as they would support the Marathas rather than Tipu. This made Tipu look elsewhere for allies. If the French authorities in India failed to help him, he would try to contact the French king himself. If he failed to secure allies in India he would exert himself to enlist the support of other powers like Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. By appealing to their religious sentiments, he hoped to form a formidable front against the English. Even if such contacts did not bear good political results, he would at least have the satisfaction of promoting the trade and commerce of his country. Mysore, situated as it was with good harbours, had the monopoly of certain very valuable commodities like pepper, cardamom, sandalwood, ivory, silk, cocoanut, tobacco and elephants which were in great demand outside.¹ Tipu developed commercial relations with a number of forei

like the Ottoman Empire, China, Muscat, Pegu, Armenia, Jiddah, Ormuz and Cutch.² But more important than these commercial relations were the political objectives which prompted the Sultan to send embassies to far-off countries.

During the last quarter of the 18th century Turkey was still the biggest and the foremost political power of the Muslim world. Despite its decay, which had already set in, it was still a force that had arrested the further expansion of Russia in the south. Tipu had great respect for the Sultan of Turkey and he viewed the expansion of the British in the East as a threat to Islam. He called the English "the enemies of the faith,"³ and identified his struggle with the general cause of the entire Islamic world. He thought it his duty to warn the Islamic countries of the dangers of western advance on their territories. He desired the Sultan of Turkey to join his crusade against the Europeans. These factors prompted him to develop relations with Turkey and to send embassies there.

The first embassy was sent to Constantinople in the year 1784, hardly a few days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Mangalore.⁴ At the head of it was Usman Khan an experienced diplomat, who had been the *vakil* of Haidar Ali Khan at Madras.⁵ He was deputed first for the purpose of sounding the Turkish Sultan whether he was favourably disposed to receiving a more formal embassy.⁶ The response being encouraging, Tipu sent his second and principal embassy in 1785, consisting of four persons, Gulam Ali Khan, Lutf Ali Baig, Shah Nurulla and Muhammad Haniff.⁷ They were instructed first to finish their task at Constantinople and then to proceed on a special mission to the courts of France and England to seek the alliance of those powers against the Marathas.⁸ If any active support was not available, at least they should be dissuaded from assisting his enemies. But on hearing the personal report of Usman Khan, Tipu cancelled the further journey of the envoys from Constantinople to Paris and London. At the beginning of 1787 he deputed to these courts a more direct and expeditious embassy, by the sea-route from Pondicherry, consisting of three persons, Mohammed Dervish Khan, Akbar Ali Khan, and Usman Khan.⁹

The purpose of this important mission to the Sublime Porte is difficult to analyse. Ostensibly the mission was undertaken to secure commercial privileges in the Ottoman Empire. The English agent at Basra wrote: "We have reasons to believe that the embassy to the Porte is for the purpose of obtaining firmaunds to establish

factories in the Turkish dominions.”¹⁰ But this might have been only a secondary intention of the Sultan. It could not have been purely commercial, for factories established in such far-flung places without adequate merchantships and effective naval power would be useless. It would have entangled him with the British on the seas also instead of eradicating their threat on land, nearer home. He did not seriously pursue this object later. Much less could the object have been to secure English or French alliance against the Marathas. For he bore no such inveterate hostility towards the latter, as he did towards the English. It had never been the policy of either Haidar or Tipu to work against the Indian neighbours by seeking European support. He was confident of successfully terminating the Maratha war without such assistance and there was no necessity to undertake any diplomatic mission to such far-off places. On the other hand, his policy was to secure Nana's co-operation to build up a confederacy against the English. That was why, even after defeating the Marathas in 1787, he treated them generously to win their friendship.

The real purpose of the embassy was thus to conclude a political and military treaty with the Sultan of Turkey. Tipu was anxious to secure foreign aid as he was determined to drive out the English from the country. The ambition of both Haidar and Tipu had been to check the rapid growth of the British power and to establish their own ascendancy in the Deccan.¹¹ The times were propitious as the Nizam and the Marathas were not strong enough to compete with the Mysore Chiefs for the supremacy of South India. Only the English whom Haidar and Tipu had attempted to subdue by organizing confederacies were their serious rivals. But they failed, owing to the superior diplomacy of their adversaries. Tipu was, therefore, desirous of defeating them by obtaining foreign aid. His plan was neither impracticable nor new. Haidar had obtained in 1775 a body of one thousand troops from Shiraz in Persia which encouraged Tipu to hope for similar aid from Turkey.¹² In his letter to Sultan Abdul Hameed, Tipu wrote:

“Thirty-five years ago as a result of the weakening of the Timurid Sultanate and the short-sightedness of some officials, the ill-behaved Christians acquired some coastal territory in the *iqlim* of Hindustan on the excuse of trade and acquired detailed knowledge about the condition of this land. Gradually a large number of Europeans came by ship and by means of fraud and deception brought under control many towns and territories such as Bengal, yielding thirty-fiv

annually and displaced and overthrew the unsuspecting officials... on account of religious enmity and their innate wickedness the evil-minded Christians are still entertaining mischievous ideas and the impropriety of these adversaries following the dark path is boundless. Consequently ambassadors are sent to you to explain the situation and happenings (in this country) and to seek the restoration and strengthening of the luminous faith and the destruction of the villainous army."¹³

The fourth article of the treaty proposed to be concluded with the Sultan of Turkey referred to the military co-operation between Mysore and Turkey. It mentioned, "whatever forces the Sultan of Turkey is prepared to despatch through the ships, Tipu engages to bear all their expenses. Whenever the Sultan of Turkey wants these forces back, Tipu undertakes to send them at his own cost through the sea."¹⁴ To impress the Caliph of the urgency of the demand, the envoys were instructed to rouse the religious feelings of the Caliph by expressing the excesses of the English, their capture of Bengal, Bihar and the Carnatic belonging to the Mughals and the future danger to which the country would be subjected by their advance. Accordingly, the ambassadors submitted a memorandum to the Ottoman Court:

"As a result of the revolution of fortunes and chances of events, the Timurid Empire in Hindustan has become very weak since long; and no powerful or resolute scion of the family has sat on the throne (for sometime past). Consequently villainous Christians who were in the ports of India in the garb of traders are intent upon creating trouble and chaos with the connivance of some of the commanders who were unmindful of their duty and were engrossed with falsehood, brought under their domination the vast territories of Bengal and half of the territories of the Deccan. They let loose floods of tyranny over the masses of the people in general and began attacking the honour of the followers of Islam in particular."¹⁵

The ambassadors then related the campaigns of the Second Mysore War. They expressed the desire of Tipu to conclude a military alliance with Turkey by which the Ottoman Government was to send a body of troops to Tipu, the expenses of which would be borne by him and would be sent back when required by Turkey at his cost. They proposed a treaty of five articles which Tipu had instructed them to conclude with the Turkish Sultan. Its different clauses were:

Clause 1: Let friendship and harmony increase between the two states as long as the sun and moon endure.

Clause 2: Basra along with its country and officials be ceded for the exclusive use of the Sarkar (Mysore) by the Sultan of Turkey.

Clause 3: Any port which the Sultan of Turkey desires from the Sarkar (Mysore) would be ceded for his exclusive use along with its country and officials. Let the system of communication between the peoples of Islam be continued for ever so that the religion of Islam (Dine-e-Ahmedi) may always flourish.

Clause 4: Whatever forces the Sultan of Turkey would send through the ships, the Sarkar would bear all their expenses. Whenever the Sultan of Turkey wants these forces back, Tipu would dispatch them at his own cost through the sea.

Clause 5: Among the available technicians and craftsmen in Turkey, the Ottoman Sultan was to send a few who knew gun and cannon making. Any technicians whom the Turkish Sultan wants from the Sarkar (Mysore) would be sent to him. These artisans and workers along with their families were to be sent through the sea. Two persons well-versed in making gun-powder were to be brought personally by the ambassadors.

(Written on 15th Haidari of the year Julu corresponding to Thursday the 14th Muharram 1200 A.H. (November 17, 1785 A.D.) near Zafarabad (Srirangapatna)¹⁶.

The embassy aimed at the accomplishment of not only the political and military objects but also economic and commercial. Tipu desired to develop trade relations with Turkey by founding factories in the important ports of the Ottoman Empire. He realized that the neglect of commerce and industry was the main cause of the misfortunes of the eastern countries. Tipu in his instructions to the ambassadors observes, "The Christian nations who have dominated the world to-day have been able to do so only because of their mastery over trade and industry. The good kings of Islam could promote their religion only by paying attention to these factors."¹⁷ Tipu wanted to establish factories in the Ottoman Empire. The second, third and fifth articles of his proposed treaty referred to the commercial relations with Turkey. He desired to secure the port of Basra for the

exclusive use of trade in exchange for some port of his dominion where he would allow similar commercial privileges to the Turks. Besides, he asked his ambassadors to bring a number of artisans and technicians for his industrial programme who could make guns, muskets, glass, china-ware and other things.¹⁸

According to Wilks, Tipu proposed an exchange of Mangalore with Basra which the Turkish Vazier refused to surrender. But it is not correct to say that Tipu intended to surrender his best port for the sake of acquiring a place in a far-off country. All that he desired was to secure facilities in Basra for establishing factories and anchoring his ships during the rainy season. The second and the third clauses of the treaty speak of the exchange of places for the exclusive use of the parties.¹⁹ Just as the European powers in India secured the monopoly of trade in certain commodities or of certain areas, Tipu also wanted to secure exclusive commercial privileges in Basra for which he was prepared to show similar concessions to the Turks in his country. In 1766, Haidar had sought the permission of the Persian Shah to establish factories in his kingdom in return for similar privileges in Mysore to the Persians.²⁰

Another important purpose which I.H. Qureshi considers the main object of the embassy was the anxiety of Tipu to secure the confirmation of his legal right to the throne of Mysore and to get recognized as an independent monarch at the hands of the Caliph of the Muslim world.²¹ The legal position of Tipu was very insecure. Among all the princes of India, his was the weakest claim to royalty. The Nizam was the Viceroy of the entire south and the Nawab of Carnatic was the deputy of the area further south under the Nizam. Clive's treaty with Shah Alam in 1765 exempted Muhammad Ali from his traditional dependence on the Nizam and gave him an independent legal status.²² The Marathas had the legal *sanads* from the Mughals and similarly the English had obtained from them the privileges of the *Diwani* and *Nizamat* administration over the areas under their direct control. The Rajas of Mysore had been the tributaries of the Mughal Empire and thus nominally under the Nizam. Thus everyone except the new Mysore Chief had his definite place in the legal set-up of the country. Haidar and Tipu, having newly risen to power, had not been legally assimilated into this system. Haidar never had any pretensions to sovereignty, being content to be a "dalvoy" or servant of the Raja. But Tipu ended even this fiction of his dependence on the Raja, which made his legal title still weak. The Nizam and the Marathas justified

their schemes for the destruction of Tipu because they considered him to be a mere usurper with no right to his territories. The English were conscious of this weakness of Tipu and exploited it to their advantage by instigating the Nizam, the Marathas and the Nawab of Carnatic to treat Tipu as a usurper. Besides, they fomented the internal disputes and, by supporting the claim of the old dynasty, they always conspired with the Rani of Mysore to subvert Tipu's government. He did not like any recognition from the Mughal Emperor because that would make him legally subordinate to the Nizam, or the Nawab of Carnatic, a position which he hated to accept as both of them were virtually puppets of the English. Further, there was no use trying to obtain Mughal recognition, as even the court of Shah Alam was not free from British influence.²³

The only solution to this difficulty lay in proclaiming his independence, which he did by dethroning the Raja of Mysore. In the Treaty with the Marathas and the Nizam, he insisted on being recognized as "Padshah", a new title on which, not without reason, he laid great emphasis.²⁴ But they agreed only to the compromise of calling him a Nawab, which did not satisfy him. The recognition he failed to obtain in India, he tried to secure from abroad. He was fond of cultivating the friendship of countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and France with the intention of gaining recognition for his newly acquired independence. He was successful in this object, as Sultan Salim of Turkey addressed him as an independent monarch, in spite of the British machinations at Constantinople.²⁵ The Sultan of Turkey had better authority to grant such recognition than any other political power. He was the Caliph of the Islamic world and legally the supreme authority. It had been the custom in the past to seek recognition only at his hands and even the most despotic and powerful monarchs of the east had condescended to remain nominally subordinate to such foreign authority. Mahmud of Ghazni, Iltutmish, Muhammad Bin Tughluq and Firoz Shah had secured their investiture from the Caliph. The idea as such was no innovation on the part of Tipu who only followed the precedent of the Sultanate period. No doubt, it had been given up by the Mughals who ruled India by virtue of their own right, but Tipu could display to the Nizam and Walajah that he had a superior and more secure claim to his authority as it had not emanated from a defunct power like the Mughals.

Mir Gulam Ali Khan was the leader of the delegation that sailed from Mangalore on March 10, 1786 with four ships bearing valuable

presents to the Sublime Porte and samples of Mysore products to be sold at the ports of call. They reached Muscat, where on June 24, 1786, the Imam of Muscat, named Sayeed, came to see them. The diary of Abdul Qadir, one of the secretaries of the embassy, gives details of the geography, climate, flora, political and social conditions, revenue prices and exchange rates of the currency of the places visited.²⁶ After staying six days in Muscat, the embassy sailed towards Basra. The ship *Fakhr-ul-Marakhib* was damaged and a hired boat was taken. They came to Bushire on July 22, 1786 where they negotiated for the establishment of a factory. From Bandar Dilam, they sent advance information of their visit to Ibrahim Agha, the Governor of Basra.²⁷ One of the ambassadors, Muhammad Hanceef, died at Bushire. The Governor of Bushire, Shaikh Nasir, enquired whether Tipu would give him permission to build a factory in Mangalore.²⁸ They proceeded to Basra where one of their ships, *Nayyar Baksh*, caught fire and sank. They had set out from Mangalore in four ships called *Fakhr-ul-Marakhib*, *Nayyar Baksh*, *Fath Shahi* and *Gharb-i-Surati*. The sinking of the ship *Nayyar Baksh*, caused the death of about fifty persons including women and children, besides the loss of two elephants, two silver *howdahs*, one palanquin and other merchandise and spices.²⁹ Mons Rousseau and Mons Edoward, the agents of the French factory at Basra called on the ambassadors and said that Basra could be taken by Tipu for trade.³⁰ Gulam Ali Khan sanctioned Rs. 1200 for the presentation of offerings to holy places like Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad and Kazimain.³¹ There was considerable trouble in Basra at that time because the forces of Jafar Khan, nephew of Karim Khan of Iran, had arrived quite near the sea and gun-fire could be heard.³² The ambassadors had brought with them considerable merchandise like pepper, cloth, turmeric, ginger, cardamom, sandalwood, scent, gold and silver coins of Haidar and Tipu, besides four elephants, three silver *howdahs* and two palanquins. The merchandise was meant for sale to cover part of the expenses of the journey and also as an advertisement for the Mysore products. The elephants and other things were meant for presentation to the Ottoman Sultan and also to the kings of England and France.³³ News came on December 3, 1786 that the ships *Fath Shahi* and *Gharb-i-Surati*, had sunk owing to the storm at Basra.³⁴ Only one hundred and three persons survived out of the four hundred on board.

On December 9, 1786, they embarked for Baghdad in four boats. *En route* they were accompanied by the men of two units of *Asad-Ilahi*.

They first reached Khirna, from where Baghdad and Najaf are one or two days' journey. At Khirna, they learnt that the Governor of Baghdad had been dismissed and, therefore, the river convoy was not safe enough for travel. They returned immediately to Basra, only to find that they had been misinformed and that the Governor had not been dismissed.³⁵ With an escort of 500 men they again proceeded to Baghdad.³⁶ Thus the ambassadors had lingered long, nearly for three months, in Basra before they set out on their forward journey. Sulaiman Pasha, the Governor of Baghdad, could not secure the permission necessary for their travel to Constantinople.³⁷ When the necessary passports were issued, differences between the ambassadors, Gulam Ali Khan and Nurullah Khan, over the adoption of the land or water route further delayed the journey. At last they agreed to travel by boat. On January 12, 1787 they set out by river to Baghdad. From there they travelled overland via Mosul and Diarbakar to Constantinople.

The envoys were treated with great courtesy and respect at the capital. They had a pleasant time visiting the highest dignitaries and officials. They were publicly entertained on many occasions as a proof of the sincerity and friendship of the Ottoman power towards Mysore. At their interviews with the high officials they intimated the purpose of their visit. However, the audience with the Sultan was delayed for long and some months elapsed before they were presented to the Sultan. He received them with honour but evaded the issue of concluding an offensive alliance against the English.³⁸ In reply to Tipu's letter, Sultan Abdul Hamid I wrote a letter expressing his great satisfaction over the successful conclusion of the Second Mysore War by Tipu. He felt very happy about the intention of Tipu to build the canal in Najaf. He addressed Tipu as *Nasirul-Islam-wal-Muslimin*, the defender of Islam and Muslims.³⁹ Regarding the main purpose of the embassy the Sultan wrote:⁴⁰

"This friend also adopted with supreme courage the path of holy war and the traditions of his forefathers. The black-faced Russians who have turned away their face from the qualities of faith and have adopted fraud as their profession, are night and day intending to humiliate the Muslims . . . we are massing troops in the territories of these infidels of evil ways. As regards the other matters which were orally explained by the honourable ambassadors, the image of their replies has been drawn in the book of minds of these honourable persons on behalf of the *Vakils* of this Majestic State. From their (ambassador's)

speech, these will become clarified before the mind (of Tipu Sultan).” Thus the Turkish Sultan gave an evasive reply and avoided concluding a military alliance. The reasons why he did not wish to break contact with Great Britain were the internal difficulties of Turkey. Russia was following at this time a relentless policy of aggression to secure an outlet to the sea at the cost of her neighbours. The control of the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles with the priceless city of Constantinople had become the historic mission of Czarist Russia. With the accession of Catherine II, a German woman of insatiable ambition, the integrity of Turkey was further endangered. She had already completed the first partition of Poland in 1772 and was contemplating seriously in 1787, the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire. In her designs she secured the willingness and friendship of the Austrian Emperor, Joseph II, who wanted Russian help for his own aggrandisement in Central Germany. Thus Turkey found herself at this time in the midst of great national danger. She was at war with Russia and Austria. Her traditional ally, France, was also on the eve of the greatest upheaval and she was not in a position to render any assistance to her. It gave an unprecedented advantage to Great Britain to further her cause in the Ottoman Empire by appearing to be helpful to her. The apprehension of the Russian expansion was the factor that compelled the English to adopt the doctrine of “the inviolability of the Turkish integrity”. Therefore the Caliph could not afford to alienate the British by concluding an alliance against them with Tipu. The British ambassador, Sir Robert Ainslie, was closely watching the events and would not allow the British interests to suffer. Tipu was conscious of such efforts, for he wrote to Gulam Ali Khan, “We have lately received a letter containing an account of the conferences or negotiations going on between the Sultan of Room and the English ambassador. Consider well the contents and hasten to accomplish the business upon which you have been deputed.”⁴¹ Thus the political objects of securing the Turkish alliance were defeated by the peculiar difficulties of the Ottoman Empire and the vigilance of the British ambassador.

But another very important purpose was served, namely the confirmation of Tipu in the position of an independent ruler. This recognition at the hands of the supreme head of the Muslim world was the greatest achievement. The ambassadors brought a *firman* from the Sultan of Turkey, in spite of the British machinations.⁴² Tipu secured the title of king, the right to mint coins and to have the

Khutba (sermon) read in his name.⁴³ The Turkish Sultan addressed him as an independent monarch. The other political and commercial objects were not fulfilled and the immediate outbreak of the war with the English did not permit him to pursue these objects with zeal.

Having performed their task the envoys set out from Constantinople. They liked the place very much but had to leave it sooner than they expected because of the outbreak of an epidemic in the capital. They arrived at Calicut in December 1789 via., Alexandria, Cairo, Suez, Jiddah, Mecca and Medina, having performed the pilgrimage on the way. After the absence of nearly four years, they returned home just at that time when the attack on Travancore lines had taken place.

Relations with the Mughals

Tipu was very respectful towards the Emperor of Delhi whom he considered the Supreme head of the country.⁴⁴ In accordance with his general policy of cordial relations with Indian powers, he desired to be on very good terms with the Mughals. He appointed diplomatic agents at the court of Delhi like Bal Mukhand Rao, Mul Chand and Sajjan Rao, who kept him informed of Delhi affairs. But the Mughal authority being reduced to a limited sphere in the north, he had not much to do with them. He was interested in only two things, firstly to secure the confirmation of his title to the throne and secondly to dissuade them from falling under foreign influence. In both these he was disappointed. Before he tried to secure legal recognition, he tested the disposition of Shah Alam by applying for the *Sanads* of Arcot.

In 1783, thinking that the Mughal Emperor would entrust the affairs of the south to able hands, Tipu applied for the Nawabship of Carnatic.⁴⁵ Nawab Walajah had neither superior claim nor greater capacity to administer the country. By ceaseless intrigues and utter subjection to the English Company, he had managed to hold his position. But he had forfeited his claim to the Nawabship and had already bartered away his sovereignty to the English. Tipu felt that if by peaceful means the transfer of the Nawabship of Carnatic to himself could be effected by persuading the Mughal Emperor, he could check the further expansion of the English. The French also actively supported his design and Montigny, their representative at Delhi, laboured hard to convince the Emperor that in the general interests

of the country, Tipu should be encouraged.⁴⁶ Bussy also wrote a letter to Shah Alam and Colonel Demante was specially deputed to Delhi for the purpose.⁴⁷ Tipu pleaded that he would remain within the legal limits, accepting the nominal suzerainty of the Emperor and the payment of an annual tribute. Besides he agreed to pay a large sum of money initially, if the *sanads* of Arcot were conferred on him and he was elevated to the rank of 7000.⁴⁸ Tipu's *rakil*, Mukhand Rao and the French deputy tried their best to gain their point. They convinced the high dignitaries at Delhi of the happy consequences that would result from this momentous measure. Nawab Amir-ul-Umra (Mohammed Shafi Khan) and other high officials were won over, and they wrote very pressing letters to Mahdi Quli Khan and the sons of Munni Ram to favour Tipu with the grant.⁴⁹ Its effect was so far encouraging that the Emperor seemed willing to form an alliance with the French to expel the English from India and grant the necessary *sanads* to Tipu. But ultimately this project was defeated partly through British machinations and partly by the attitude of the Nawab Vazir of Delhi. Major Browne, the British representative, successfully foiled the French influence through the chief minister, Nawab Majuda-ud-Dowlah, the favourite of Shah Alam and the staunch supporter of the English cause.⁵⁰ He at first kept the matter in abeyance. On further pressure from the French and the Mysore *rakil*, and from his own officers like Amir-ul-Umra, the Nawab Vazir dismissed the Mysore *rakil* and ended the affair.⁵¹ Tipu thus failed in his efforts to obtain the *sanads* of Arcot. Even the ordinary courtesy of presenting him with a *Khillat* was denied to him. All that was done was to ask the *rakil* himself to present a *Khillat* to Tipu on the Emperor's behalf.⁵² The British had thus successfully defeated a measure of far-reaching consequences. The French had sincerely tried their best to help Tipu.

The denial of even a *Khillat* from the Emperor convinced Tipu that it was futile to attempt to secure from Delhi the confirmation of his title to the throne of Mysore. The cold treatment meted out to him was not taken seriously by him and it did not give rise to any antipathy towards the Mughals. Knowing well the motive force behind the rejection of his request by the Emperor, he did not defy or slight the Imperial authority. He maintained his diplomatic agents there and personally wrote to Shah Alam in terms couched with great respect and gratitude. He wrote, "Upon the receipt of the Imperial Mandate, my glorified head touched the summit of honour. The

special gifts of ennobling quality which Your Majesty in your boundless favour graciously bestowed on me by the hands of Rao Bal Makhan Dass also arrived in the most auspicious conjuncture and put me in possession of the wealth of distinction and pre-eminence. In acknowledgment of this magnificent donation, I respectfully offer my most humble obeisance."⁵³

The agreeable news of the conclusion of the Treaty of Mangalore was also conveyed to the Emperor by Tipu with a note of his ardent desire. "With the divine aid and blessing of God, it is now again my steady determination to set about the total extirpation and destruction of the enemies of faith."⁵⁴ He sent by way of *nazar* or present 121 gold *mohars*. This letter gives us an idea of the inner recesses of Tipu's mind that as early as June 1785, he desired to seize the first opportunity of utterly "extirpating" and "destroying" the English. The allusion to "the enemies of faith" does not refer to the Marathas who were not his immediate enemies. The expression refers to the British. He was so much determined in his purpose that he never took any pains even to conceal it fully from Indian or Foreign powers.

After the withdrawal of Bal Makhan Dass as the *vakil* at Delhi, he appointed Mul Chand and Sajjan Rao to keep him informed of affairs at Delhi.⁵⁵ He wrote to his agents on August 2, 1785 to present the newly-struck gold *mohars* sent by him to the Emperor, "for the purpose of ascertaining the pleasure of His Majesty concerning them."⁵⁶ In these new coins, the name of the Emperor also had been inserted. The favourite object he had at heart was again mentioned, "that the manner in which we heretofore chastized the Nazarenes (the English) is too well known to require to be recapitulated. Mussalman leaders should pursue such effectual measures as may bring the ruin and disgrace and impart additional strength to the true Ahmedi faith."⁵⁷ The agents were instructed to perform another essential task, "You will also procure imperial mandates to be written and dispatched to the Naboo Nizamud Dawlah Bahadur and the other Musalman rulers directing them to unite together in support of Ahmedi faith."⁵⁸ As the Nizam was constitutionally subordinate to the Emperor, Tipu expected to exert pressure on him to cease hostilities. Likewise he wrote to the principal commanders and to the Nawab of Delhi like Mohammed Baig Hamdani, asking them to give publicity to "an abstract of God's Ordinances and of the commands of his prophet. It is requisite for the support of our religion that all . . .

unite together... that the weakness of Hindustan may be changed for efficient dominion and power; that the abominations of the wicked may find neither habitation nor retreat within the kingdom of His Majesty.”⁵⁹

Thus it is obvious from Tipu's contact with other powers that the main object of his heart was to expel the foreigners from the land. Being convinced that it was futile to expect any cooperation from his immediate neighbours such as the Nizam and the Marathas, he thought that the Turks, who had once conquered Constantinople and had reduced a good part of Eastern Europe, might perhaps be of some use to him in his project. He tried to play upon the sentiment of religion as well, thinking that it might arouse their sympathy. But by his time religion had ceased to be a political force, and the Sultan of Turkey very clearly indicated that, owing to the Russian hostility towards his country, it was unavoidable for him to seek British help. Thus Tipu was disappointed in his main purpose. It appears to us now that he was always conceiving all manner of impossible schemes to defeat a major European power, which was far superior to him in both political and military skill. But due credit should also be given to him that he left no stone unturned, and spared no personal effort to expel the English from India. Despite his failure, which was due to factors beyond his control, it cannot be said that he lacked either in sincerity of purpose or in consistency of effort, or in the boldness of his schemes. Like a drowning man catching at a straw, he resorted even to intrigue at the Mughal court and hoped that he would win his point by reviving the old game of Anglo-French rivalry in the south. What might have happened if the Mughal Emperor had given him the Arcot *sanads*, and the French, who had come with a large army under Bussy at this time, had taken the matter seriously is very difficult to imagine. However, it is clear that Tipu spared no efforts to eliminate the English from the land.

Relations with the French

The French Alliance was of little help to Tipu Sultan during the Second Mysore War. Their conclusion of a separate peace without consulting him was a great shock to him. They pursued a policy of self-interest which would give them a safe place in the affairs of the Carnatic by appearing to be arbiters between the English and Tipu and thus to accomplish by diplomacy what they had failed to achieve by war. But in the end they offended Tipu, who was their only powerful

and sincere ally in India. Both Haidar and Tipu had been always their steadfast allies and had conferred on them special favours.

In spite of his bitter experience with the French in the Second Mysore War, Tipu did not sever his connections with them. He maintained his friendly relations in the hope that they would revise their policy. When the war with the Marathas broke out, he expected that they would assist him. Tipu had been practically isolated from every quarter and the English had pledged secret support to the Marathas. At such a critical time, Tipu looked to the French for help. But the French policy was once again wavering and unhelpful. It proved inconsistent with their professions of friendship with him. They did not come to his rescue but adopted a policy of neutrality, which was interpreted by Tipu as an act of definite hostility towards him. Later they endeavoured earnestly to join the Marathas. At first they refused to help Tipu and announced strict neutrality on the ground that they desired to prevent a war among the Indian powers.

Soon after the Treaty of Mangalore, the French tried their best to bring about peace among the Indian powers. Bussy informed Marechal de Castries that he had done all he could to unite the three powers.⁶⁰ Such a war would serve only the interests of the English who would further consolidate their position in India. Therefore the French were greatly perturbed about the growing rift among the Indian powers and felt that it was the Marathas and the Nizam who were hostile to Tipu.⁶¹ They were sincerely convinced, at this time, of the desirability of avoiding a war, as they had nothing to gain by it. Conscious of his own weakness and the strength of the English, Bussy wrote to Comte de Vergennes, "Their superiority is in contrast to our own feebleness and still more to the Asiatic princes to whom our negotiations would still be of some weight."⁶² In such a position the only way to promote the French interests was to avert a war through their mediation. Hence they did not see any propriety in concluding a separate alliance with Tipu. "As things stand, we remain without establishments in any part of India and without hope of forming there any useful alliance."⁶³ Though their state of affairs both in Europe and in India precluded them from playing an effective part in Indian politics, they were primarily concerned with preventing the English from advancing their interests. That was why they were highly perturbed when the Indian horizon was cast again with war clouds. "The Marathas and the Subah of Deccan had made a league for destroying Tipu Sultan. This project suits marvellously the English."⁶⁴ It was

to defeat their designs that they desired to remain neutral. Bussy laboured hard to bring about an understanding among the parties. "I have laboured and still labour to break it [the Maratha-Nizam alliance] and at the same time to unite the three Indian powers against the English without compromising ourselves."⁶⁶ Bussy was hopeful of his efforts and wrote, "I believe that the event that has come does not arrest the success of these negotiations."⁶⁶ Not only Bussy but also the Governor-General of the French Establishments in the East, Vicomte de Souillac, informed Nana Farnavis through Cossigny, "The English would profit one day by the disunion of the princes of the country."⁶⁷ He urged the three powers to sink their differences and unite. The Governor of Pondicherry, Cossigny, also impressed on the Marathas through the French envoy, Montigny, the urgency of peace and the necessity of unity among the Indian powers.

The French, however, were not successful in their efforts. The Marathas were not prepared to listen to their warning and relinquish their object of recovering their lost conquests. Therefore the Poona Court resented a peaceful settlement of its disputes with Tipu. Nana was keen on securing the English support. Cossigny made it known to him that the French would not remain inactive if the English joined the Marathas.⁶⁸ Despite these protests, when Nana continued his war-like preparations, the French were convinced of the Maratha intention of a war of conquest. Cossigny wrote, "I do not at all view Tipu as the aggressor".⁶⁹ Tipu showed his inclination to accept the French mediation and establish peace with the Marathas.⁷⁰ But poor was the response of Nana who made "conditions rather than propositions of peace."⁷¹ Cossigny continued to persuade Nana to accept reasonable terms and wrote to him, "My opinion being always that you ought to seek peace."⁷² When all efforts failed, the French informed the Marathas that Tipu also no longer appeared desirous of peace and was busy with plans for carrying on a war. In such an event they did not wish to hide from the Poona Court what the nature of their relations with him would be.⁷³ They informed Nana frankly that in all probability they would support Tipu. The Maratha agent, Gopala Rao, further ascertained the French attitude and Cossigny made it clear that the French were bound to support Tipu, if the Marathas sought the English alliance.⁷⁴ He gave clear warnings to Nana not to underestimate the French strength and that he commanded in Pondicherry a great number of troops always ready to march.

Thus in the beginning, the French appeared well disposed towards

Tipu. But when the war actually broke out, they changed their policy. Their efforts were directed to prevent the Marathas from receiving the English help. They invoked XVI Article of the Peace of Paris by which neither the French nor the English were permitted to assist the Indian princes who would be at war with each other.⁷⁶ In their anxiety to disengage the English from the Marathas, they grew cold towards Tipu and developed intimacy with the Marathas. Cossigny now enquired of Nana the conditions on which he was ready to make peace with Tipu.⁷⁶ But Nana remained silent and the French influence in Poona proved insufficient to effect a compromise.

Having failed to reconcile the Indian powers, the logical step for the French should have been to observe strict neutrality, but they began to court the Maratha alliance by writing to them conciliatory letters. Cossigny wrote to Nana, "I shall repeat to you always with pleasure that I desire nothing so much as the augmentation of your power, of your glory, and your prosperity."⁷⁷ The French inconsistency was again conspicuous when they desired to sacrifice their traditional alliance with the Mysore Chief. Marechal de Castries found that Tipu would not be so helpful to the French. He wrote, "The accounts which have been received do not permit of flattering ourselves that the son of Haidar Ali Khan conserves the power of his father and has inherited only his father's hate. His power is new and has not acquired real stability. The Marathas have a stability, stronger and more proper to create a revolution in India."⁷⁸ The French were impressed more by the extensive possessions of the Maratha Empire than by Tipu's power. But Nana did not encourage them as he was desirous of securing the British aid. He grew so cold towards them that Marechal de Castries bitterly complained of Nana's conduct.⁷⁹ But Nana kept them in good humour by promises of alliance and thus tactfully managed to isolate them from Tipu.

Tipu was greatly disappointed with the French conduct. It was again the unscrupulous selfishness of the French that prompted them to pursue the policy of active alliance with the Marathas. Even after Nana categorically rejected the French overtures for alliance, the latter did not cease to persuade him.⁸⁰ They sent a special envoy, Gudar, to Poona to bring about an alliance.⁸¹ They tempted the Poona Court with their offer to cede a small fort near Bombay, called Revadanda.⁸² But the English successfully defeated these designs and Nana was not prepared for such an alliance. He doubted the sincerity of the French and believed that a secret treaty might be in existence

between them and Tipu. Though the French Governor emphatically denied the existence of any such connections, Nana would not accept their help, as one of the conditions for securing the English assistance was not to have any relations with other European powers.⁸³ Nana thought that the British aid would be more reliable and effective than the French one. The appointment of a permanent Resident, Malet, to the Poona Court finally sealed all French hopes of an alliance with the Marathas.

Tipu's failure to secure French assistance both in the Second Mysore War and in the Mysore-Maratha War convinced him that the French authorities in India were entirely responsible for this defective policy which he wanted to rectify by approaching their superiors in Paris. In spite of Tipu's differences with the French, there was one very strong common point between him and them, namely, the bitter opposition of both towards the English. The French hostility towards the English was old. Their hatred and animosity went back to the days of Crecy and Agincourt and their rivalry lasted all through the centuries until the First World War of 1914-18. This identity of purpose had brought the French and the Mysore chiefs closer together and each regarded the other as an effective agency to strike at its rival. Even though Tipu was disappointed with the French conduct in his first two wars, he retained the French friendship, being conscious that he could turn to his advantage the Anglo-French rivalry at a later date. The French had helped the Americans in their War of Independence and Tipu knew that it was equally their policy to eliminate their rivals from India as well. But the French authorities followed a misguided and inconsistent policy in India and Tipu resolved to make certain that the French would not fail him again. He expected that the French would be in readiness to renew a war against the English. That was why he undertook to send an embassy to Louis XVI to ascertain what help he could hope to get, in case his project of an attack on the English materialised.⁸⁴

Thus the main purpose of sending an embassy to France was to secure military assistance and to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance. It was not strange that Tipu took such an extraordinary step. Sending embassies to the western courts on special missions was not uncommon for the Indian powers. In 1767 Nawab Muhammad Ali had deputed John Macpherson to England and had received Sir John Lindsay as an English ambassador at his court.⁸⁵ Raghoba sought to stabilize his usurpation of power at Poona by deputing his

representative, Mashiar Parsi, to England. Even Nana Farnavis contemplated for a long time the despatch of a formal embassy to England to secure their help for reducing Tipu.⁸⁶ Thus there was nothing new or strange, if Tipu also undertook to send an embassy to Europe. It was in consonance with his determination to break the English power that he sought the French aid.

Another object of the embassy was to promote the trade and industry of Mysore. Tipu wanted skilled French technicians to train his men in various arts and crafts. It was the dream of Tipu to make Mysore industrially and commercially a prosperous state. He personally wrote to Louis XVI, "I frequently indulge in an inclination for arts . . . if that friend out of his ancient regard would dispatch some persons skilled in every art, I should esteem it as a proof of the most perfect friendship."⁸⁷ Tipu instructed his ambassadors to bring technicians proficient in various arts and crafts to Mysore, such as cannon-founders, ship-builders, manufacturers of China-ware, glass and mirror makers, engineers, mechanics, gold-plating experts and a host of other technicians.⁸⁸ Therefore the purpose of the embassy was as much political as commercial and industrial.

The political purpose of the embassy was to secure French aid and conclude an alliance.⁸⁹ The real purpose was set down in the detailed instructions furnished to the ambassadors.⁹⁰ They were asked to inform the French of the excesses which the English were committing in India and impress on them the dangers of English expansion. It was to be explained that the French followed a defective policy in India and that their conduct helped the enemies more than Tipu in the Second Mysore War. Unless the French changed their policy, their interests would definitely suffer. In a letter to the French king Tipu complained of their policy which entailed enormous sacrifice of men and money on his part, "for the purpose of increasing our mutual friendship and renown."⁹¹ The ambassadors were instructed to convince the other party of the urgency of concerted action and "no measure was calculated to accomplish the object more speedily than a treaty of perpetual alliance between Tipu and the French."⁹² That was the main object of the embassy which was instructed to propose that the French should dispatch 10,000 troops to India and that these should act under the direct command of Tipu.⁹³ Even the details with respect to the misbehaviour of the foreign troops were set down by Tipu. The offensive alliance was to remain in force for ten years during which period neither the French nor Tipu should conclude a

separate peace with the English. Peace was to be granted to the English only on their total surrender of all their Indian possessions which should be divided equally between the French and the Mysore ruler.⁹⁴ Tipu proposed the same terms later in 1797 when he solicited French aid. In his turn, he promised to furnish them all provisions and supplies. Tipu asked the envoys to recall the great friendship that existed between France and Mysore and to recount the achievements of Tipu against the British. The Mysore chiefs had rendered great services to the French in the past and their entry in the Second Mysore War was purely for the French cause. But French officers had not fulfilled the promises made to Haider. Therefore an offensive and defensive treaty consisting of five articles was now proposed by Tipu. Its different clauses were:^{94a}

Let friendship and harmony increase between the two governments as long as the Sun and Moon endure.

Article First: A war against the English being considered advisable, war should be declared against them and till the capture of Madras, the Carnatic, Bombay and Bengal, the two parties should never make peace, even if the war were to be continued for ten years. However greatly the English might desire and seek peace, their overtures were not to be accepted until the capture of the above forts and places.

Article Second: The French were to send ten thousand troops under able and experienced officers. If they land either in Pondicherry or Calicut or in any other port of Mysore, Tipu would provide them with bullocks for guncarriage, necessary provision, tents, gunpowder and cannon.

Article Third: The French chiefs and their forces should be under the command of Tipu in all matters of military direction. If any one failed in his duty, he would be punished according to the law of Tipu's government.

Article Fourth: After the conquest of the whole of the Carnatic, the fort of Madras and the adjoining country would be ceded to the French. The ports of Trichinopoly and Tanjore which once belonged to the Muslims should be ceded to Tipu.

Article Fifth: After the conquest of Madras, the combined army should proceed by land and sea routes to the north for the subjugation of Bombay and Bengal. After the conquest of these places and forts, both the parties should divide them equally.

Tipu asked his envoys to observe strict secrecy in proposing these terms. The despatch of an embassy took place towards the end of 1785 with instructions first to go to Constantinople and then to proceed to the courts of France and England. A separate and an independent embassy to France exclusively would cause unnecessary speculation in the English camp. Therefore Tipu commanded his envoys to proceed to the court of London also soon after their mission was completed at Paris. This measure was intended to conceal the secret negotiations with the French for an alliance. The embassy consisted of four persons, Gulam Ali Khan, Lutf Ali Baig, Shah Nurullah and Muhammad Haneef.⁹⁵ But this proposed embassy did not proceed to France and England. Tipu changed his mind and decided to send a more direct and expeditious embassy by the sea route from Pondicherry consisting of three persons, Muhammad Darvesh Khan, Akbar Ali Khan and Usman Khan.⁹⁶ The idea of sending an embassy to France and England was given up on hearing the personal report of Usman Khan who had returned from Constantinople. He was informed of the conferences and negotiations going on between the Sublime Porte and the English ambassador, who was actively undermining the objects of the mission.⁹⁷ Kirkpatrick's explanation that Tipu gave up the mission owing to the enormous cost involved does not seem justified. He observes, "The embassies proposed to be sent to the court of France by land failed through the parsimony of the Sultan who could not be induced to supply the funds necessary on the occasion."⁹⁸ That financial considerations were not in the way is obvious because a separate and a larger mission which was sent later with valuable presents entailed greater cost.

The idea of sending a second embassy occurred when a French representative from Pondicherry, Pierre Monneron, visited Tipu in the middle of the year 1786 for the purpose of obtaining commercial privileges.⁹⁹ He was a native of France but Portuguese by naturalisation, and had come to settle the French claims outstanding since the Second Mysore War. Tipu expressed his desire to send an embassy to France and asked him to accompany it. Monneron readily agreed "you may send whomsoever you please and I give you my word that I will conduct them and bring them back to you."¹⁰⁰ Monneron arranged to take the envoys in a special ship called *Roy l'Aurore*, fitted out by Vicounte de Souillac, the Governor-General of the East.¹⁰¹ The ship set sail from Pondicherry on July 22, 1787 with three principal ambassadors and an entourage of fortyfive men.¹⁰² The chief

ambassador was Mohammed Darvesh Khan whose brother-in-law was the Commander-in-chief of Tipu's fortresses. The second ambassador, Akbar Ali Khan, was a scholar aged about seventy. The third was Muhammad Usman Khan who was to carry on correspondence on behalf of the embassy.^{103a}

The voyage was a long one, lasting from July 1787 to June 1788. In spite of Tipu's instructions not to break the journey anywhere, Monneron stopped and called on a number of ports. They were delayed for sometime at the Cape of Good Hope by unfavourable winds and they finally touched the French shore at Toulon on June 9. They were received with great honour. The French king had made special arrangements for their reception. He had even sent some of his own carpets with other articles of furniture.¹⁰⁴ Large crowds had gathered to cheer the ambassadors who admired the cheerful nature of the French and expressed their gratitude for the hospitality shown to them. They left Toulon on June 25, and by way of Marseilles, St. Vallier, Lyons and Moulins, they reached Paris on July 16, 1788 where they were shown every mark of respect and honour.

But the chief purpose of the embassy remained as unaccomplished as ever, and they had to depart disappointed. They were received by Louis XVI in a public audience on August 3, 1788 with every mark of distinction. They placed before the King Tipu's proposals for an offensive alliance and the dispatch of military aid. While professing great friendship towards Tipu, Louis politely evaded the issue of concrete alliance with Mysore. The French conditions did not warrant anything better as the events were fast moving towards an upheaval which had been rendered irresistible by the successive periods of misrule by the degenerate monarchy. Moreover, Marechal de Castries, the Minister for Marine who had been Tipu's friend and had desired his co-operation, had retired by the time the ambassadors had landed in France. Tipu had written him letters and had hoped that his influence would be enough to crown his plans with success. With his retirement, the active forward policy was discarded in favour of appeasement of England. Comte de le Luzerene who had succeeded to power believed in consolidating the French power at home before launching an expedition abroad. He followed a timid policy and was afraid of the growing strength of the British in India. Moreover Luzerene doubted the consistency of the Indian powers in their struggle against the English. All these factors had compelled him to contemplate the total withdrawal of all the French forces from India and stationing them in the Isle of France.¹⁰⁴

These forces worked against Tipu in the French Court and his proposals were turned down. The time he chose for the embassy was not propitious. France was in the grip of economic and social chaos and she could not spare a large force. At such a time, a military pact, with a foreign power, whose results were doubtful, had not even the chance of being studied dispassionately. Hence the French evaded the issue and made vague promises of help. But there was a large amount of warmth, affection and friendship towards Tipu. The ambassadors were highly pleased with the polished culture of the French court and they were so greatly fascinated that they desired to prolong their stay in France.¹⁰⁶

Disappointed in their main object, they thought of returning home in October 1788, having stayed for nearly three months in Paris. They left the capital on October 9, 1788, accompanied by Macnamera and landed at Pondicherry on May 10, 1789. Though their political mission had failed, they brought a few technicians, a carpenter, a weaver, a blacksmith, a locksmith, a cutler, a watchmaker, a dyer, a physician and a surgeon.¹⁰⁶ Tipu felt happy about the treatment accorded to his envoys and wrote to Luzerene, "We have been singularly satisfied with the report which our ambassadors have submitted to us about your kindness and your noble behaviour."¹⁰⁷ He also wrote to the French king acknowledging the receipt of his two letters and expressing his thanks for the despatch of a large number of artisans of various kinds. Louis had sent in his turn his representative, Macnemera, to pay a courtesy call and to confer with Tipu on subjects of common interest. Macnemera was accorded a dignified reception by Tipu. The list of craftsmen sent by Louis was not complete and he had promised to send some more.¹⁰⁸

In his letter to Louis Tipu did not refer to the failure of the political and military objects of the embassy. He, however, expressed his grave concern about the French decision to withdraw their forces from India. He wrote, "To-day, above all, when he sees on the one hand the French troops retiring from Pondicherry to the Isle of France and on the other the embassies multiplying between our two countries, the unjust jealousy of our common enemy carries him to the path of action."¹⁰⁹ When war broke out with the English, over the Travancore dispute, Tipu wrote again to the French king appealing for help. "We entreat you, therefore, to give at once formal orders to your commanders of Pondicherry and the Isle of France that on our requisition they should send us 2000 soldiers, and to recommend to them not to

allow themselves any excuse or delay but move at the first signal, ready to obey our orders.”¹¹⁰ But by this time France was already in the throes of the Revolutionary events and Tipu's request was not complied with.

While the French were reluctant to have political and military connections with Tipu, they were anxious to secure commercial privileges. Luzerene desired to convert the French Company in India into a purely commercial body. As Mysore was well known for her valuable products, the French longed to have closer commercial contacts. All the French settlements except Chandernagar were in the South, quite close to Tipu's country and hence well suited for a prosperous trade with Mysore. Tipu was also anxious to promote the trade and industry of his country. The French proposed a commercial treaty with Tipu in October 1788. They wrote, “The Company solicits from Tipu the monopoly of the exportation of pepper, sandalwood, cardamom, yarn, wood and all the products of his state and of the importation of merchandise from Europe.”¹¹¹ In return, it offered to supply him cannon, musquets and other materials of war. If there was any balance to be paid, it would pay this in bullion or silver. The French promised neither to help the enemies of Tipu nor to shelter any of his rebellious subjects, particularly the Malabar chiefs. They proposed a defensive clause which would protect both on the seas, when the vessels of both were to co-operate with each other. The Company sought to deal in all important commodities of Mysore but if Tipu objected to these, he was requested to permit them to purchase directly from the merchants at prices fixed by Tipu. They desired to build warehouses on the coast and in other places. Permission was asked to transit goods without duties. On the imported commodities from Europe, they would pay the tax once a year and no tax was to be levied for their exportation. A certain quantity of rice was to be exported duty free from Mangalore. Gold and silver were also to be exempted from duties. The Company's servants were to remain under the French jurisdiction. The French proposed these terms to Tipu's ambassador, Muhammad Hussain Khan, who had been sent to France.¹¹²

These proposals would naturally have given the French a complete monopoly of Mysore trade. Tipu rejected them as very harsh. Moreover, when the French had turned down his proposals for an alliance, he was not prepared to sacrifice the prosperity of his State by surrendering his entire trade into foreign hands. But he did not like to break

off completely with them, as a new war was brewing with the English and hence he permitted them to export certain commodities like sandalwood, spices and rice at his own price. The French declined this offer which limited their trade with Mysore and the negotiations broke down.¹¹³

Thus Tipu was not happy with the French policy. Their commercial treaty was in the nature of total exploitation of Mysorean trade. Added to these, certain other factors further estranged the Franco-Mysorean relations. A dispute arose over the occupation of a small territory by Tipu near the French possession of Mahé, belonging to Karangod Nayar. Tipu took this step as the Nayar was in league with the enemies of Mysore and with the Raja of Travancore.¹¹⁴ The French claimed the Raja to be their tributary and complained that their trade would suffer if the principality fell into Tipu's hands. They requested him to restore it to the Nayar. But he was reluctant to do so. When the French insisted, he appointed an arbiter, the Raja of Colastri, to decide the dispute, and he gave the verdict against Tipu. Tipu gave orders for its restoration but his officers delayed the restoration. The noncompliance of his orders was regarded by the French as the reluctance of Tipu to surrender the place.¹¹⁵ Tipu levied taxes on the merchandise that passed through his territories. But the French longed to evade all taxes and to capture the spice trade of Malabar. When the French intentions became known to Tipu, he commanded his Malabar chiefs not to export to the French valuable commodities and spices.¹¹⁶ Moreover the English were getting the rice supply from Mahé which Tipu resented. He did not restore the territory of Karangod Nayar in order to break the monopoly of the French trade. But he did not offend them and did not wish to sever his political connections with them. When he proposed that as a counter-measure to the triple alliance of the English, the Marathas and the Nizam, the French should join him to form a dual coalition, they rejected the proposal and replied that they did not wish to interfere in the affairs of any power so long as it did not harm them.¹¹⁷

Thus during the period 1784-90, the French did not co-operate with Tipu. They followed an isolationist policy and kept aloof during Tipu's contest with the Marathas and the Nizam. His embassy to France failed in its main purpose of securing military aid. The commercial proposals of the French displayed their selfishness. Tipu had conceived very high hopes of the French but he was bitterly disappointed. The French policy in India had undergone a radical

charge after 1763. They had no will to revive their power, and had reconciled themselves to be a second-rate power. Certain factors compelled them to adopt a very cautious policy. First, the events of the Carnatic war were still fresh in their mind. They were aware of the nature of Indian diplomacy, and were reluctant to put their trust in any one, whether it was Tipu, or the Nizam or the Marathas. Change of policy in an Indian court did not take longer than a minute and hence the French were afraid that any deeper involvement in an Indian war might prove more dangerous to their interests. Secondly, the French were aware that their entry into any war would surely involve the English as well. In such an event the English had a decisive advantage over the French in view of the fact that the English navy was superior, their resources were larger, their troops were more numerous and their supplies from home were more steady and uninterrupted. Moreover, the English Company, which was a private organization of merchants whose sole motive was profit, was more flexible in policy, more prompt in action and more dynamic and practical in approach. But the French Company, which was a department of State, depended upon the whims and fancies of a ministry which was not only slow, inefficient and degenerate but also unimaginative and corrupt. Thirdly, although France had played a very important part in the long and expensive war in the west which had resulted in the loss to England of those thirteen rich colonies which emerged as the United States of America, she had not herself derived any advantage from that war. England's loss did not necessarily mean France's gain. Therefore, in any fresh contest in India, there was no guarantee that the elimination of the English would result in the entrenchment of the French. Consequently, France adopted a cautious policy in which she wanted the Indian powers to sort out their own affairs. She was more desirous of bringing about a revolution for the expulsion of the English through the instrumentality of the Indians themselves. For this reason, instead of joining hands with Tipu, they tried to resolve his differences with his neighbours. A strange drama took place at this time as a result of this French policy. Tipu desired French aid, but they were reluctant to give it. The Marathas desired English aid, but they were reluctant to give it. The French offered their aid to the Marathas, but they were reluctant to receive it. The French hesitated to join hands with Tipu, lest the English should join hands with the Marathas. The English hesitated to join hands with the Marathas lest the French should join hands with Tipu. Thus the

policy of each power was dictated by an anxiety not to disturb the existing balance of power. Lastly, France was incapable of any bold design at this time. For she was on the verge of a great revolution, and hence it was too much to expect that she would rush to the aid of an ally, thousands of miles away, however logical or attractive the project might appear to be.

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CHAPTER IV

UNEASY RELATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH (1784 - 89)

TIPU'S RELATIONS with the English did not improve even after the Treaty of Mangalore. Hastings denounced the treaty as being full of indignities and as thoroughly incompatible with the real interests of the English. He considered it to be a mere truce of short duration, and only reluctantly he had given his consent to it. The Bengal Government wrote to Madras, "Though we cannot approve the treaty, we have yet agreed to acknowledge because an exercise of the power which this government possesses of disavowing and revoking any treaty not concluded in conformity to their instructions would in the present instance be productive of the greatest confusion and embarrassment to the Company's affairs."¹ Hastings desired to secure from Tipu "some additional stipulations which shall secure the interests of the Company."² Even Macpherson who succeeded Hastings in 1785 expressed the same opinion. Anderson at Sindhia's court encouraged the Marathas to recover their lost territories. Though Tipu desired to remain friendly and was determined to fulfil the treaty engagements, the English attitude continued to be hostile towards him.

The English who offended Tipu by not carrying out the fourth Article of the Treaty were guilty of the first infraction of the treaty.³ According to the treaty, the fort of Cannanore should have been evacuated and restored to Ali Raja Bibi, the Queen of that place, in the presence of Tipu's officers. But Macleod evacuated it without informing Tipu and in the absence of an officer from Mysore.⁴ The Madras Government did nothing to rectify the mistake. Tipu wrote a letter complaining it to be a breach of the treaty. Moreover, the English had destroyed one of the forts of the place and had taken away its stores. They had plundered certain villages and had exacted revenues

from certain other villages. Fullarton took possession of Paliakat-cherry and plundered it.⁵ Similarly the English Commander had destroyed the fort of Sadasivagarh, thrown the guns into the water, set fire to its houses, and carried away some of its guns and stores.⁶ In the surrender of Dindigal, the English were not guilty of committing such offences but they refused to surrender the place until all the prisoners were released. It would have taken a long time to satisfy the English on this point. However, better counsels prevailed and they surrendered the place. Their refusal would have provoked Tipu to take the place by force, thus renewing hostilities with the English, for which they were not quite prepared.⁷ On July 25, 1784, Macleod surrendered the place.

The question of Venkatagiri caused considerable strain in the Anglo-Mysore relations. The Raja of Venkatagiri near Nellore district, was a tributary of the Carnatic, who had seized the small *jagir* of Kanakagiri belonging to Qamruddeen and had rented it to the *Faujdar* of Cuddapah.⁸ This Raja had not paid the rent regularly and the arrears had mounted up to a large sum. Tipu demanded these arrears and sent Qamruddeen to collect them. The English protested and wrote to Tipu that the Raja was a tributary of the Carnatic and that they would not allow him to bring pressure on the Raja. Tipu replied that the Raja had to pay his tribute and then, if Qamruddeen desired to allow the Raja to retain the *jagir*, he could have it, otherwise he had to give up his claim. The English advised the Raja to surrender the place, but he delayed. He sent a *vakil* to Qamruddeen to urge him not to press his claim, but the latter did not comply with the request. Hence Qamruddeen seized not only Kanakagiri but also other places in Venkatagiri.

The English were perturbed and appointed Francis Lend to inquire into the situation. Lend was joined by another member, Lt. Barry Close, to form a commission. Qamruddeen would not surrender the places. Tipu was approached and he ordered Qamruddeen to evacuate the places and return to Srirangapatna.⁹ But he insisted that the Raja should clear the arrears which, he claimed, amounted to 50,000 pagodas, while the Raja placed the amount at 16,546 pagodas. The dispute caused unnecessary ill-feelings between Tipu and the English. The Madras Government asked the Commissioners to draw up a fair statement of accounts, which was done, and the Raja was asked to clear his dues. The English felt that the dispute was quite minor but Tipu gave it unnecessary importance. The amount fixed

for payment by the Raja was 42,769 pagodas to be discharged in two instalments.¹⁰ But the full amount was not paid and the dispute was kept alive till the outbreak of the Third Mysore War. Tipu accused the English of insincerity and connivance with the Raja.

Yet another issue that estranged the Anglo-Mysore relations was the Cherikkal dispute. Kolathri or Cherikkal which was a petty state in Northern Malabar was a tributary of Tipu. The other Malabar principalities were Kottayam, Kadattanad, Karangod, Calicut, Cochin and Cannanore, all of which had supported the English during the Second Mysore War.¹¹ No mention was made in the peace of 1784 of the chiefs of these places and they were included by Tipu among his "friends and allies." Tipu treated them well, forgiving their past conduct. His relations with the Raja of Cherikkal were very friendly. The English settlement at Tellicherry owed to the Raja a certain sum and he demanded the settlement of the account. He claimed that the factory had to pay him one lakh of rupees.¹² The English refused the claim of the Raja and accused Tipu of instigating him.¹³ The Madras authorities wrote to Tipu that the Raja's conduct was little short of provoking hostilities and that the Raja was himself indebted to the Company to the extent of four times his claim.¹⁴ They requested him to make the Raja desist from pressing his demands but settle their account.

But the Raja insisted that the Company was indebted to him. He sent his minister to remain at Tellicherry till the amount was paid.¹⁵ As the English made the stay of the Minister difficult, he left Tellicherry strongly protesting against the English conduct. On June 7, 1788 the Raja occupied the island of Dharmapatnam which belonged to Tellicherry since 1773.¹⁶ Tipu was again approached and asked to induce the Raja to restore the island and make good all the damages caused to the Company. Tipu wrote back that the Raja had certain just grievances against the Company, and they should be redressed first. The Raja had mortgaged to the Company certain villages for money and the Company's servants had already collected from the villages double the amount of the debt and would still neither return the bond to the Raja nor restore his villages. Tipu desired that the Company should redress these grievances of the Raja. At the time the Raja occupied Dharmapatnam, Tipu was at Coimbatore where he accorded the Raja an honourable reception.¹⁷ He was assured that the English dared not molest him. But the Raja died on his way back from Coimbatore at Palacatcherry. His brother who succeeded him

was a friend of the English and was not inclined to follow the same policy. Lord Cornwallis ordered the annexation of Dharmapatnam by force, which was done on January 3, 1789. Tipu accused the English of high handedness and breach of faith.

~~The release of prisoners was yet another sore point in the relations of the two powers. Whereas the English claimed that all the prisoners were not released, Tipu asserted that he had none with him. He claimed that he had released all the 4261 of the prisoners he had and that he was not so cruel as to retain just a few after liberating so many.¹⁸ The English doubted Tipu's sincerity and claimed that he had still many of the officers, and the King's and the Company's troops.¹⁹ The authorities in England directed the Madras Government to ascertain the facts and to adopt every method, short of war, to procure their release. The Madras Government carried on an endless correspondence and demanded an exact number of the prisoners that had fallen into his hands. The number of prisoners restored in March and April 1784, reported by the Indian Gazette of May 17, 1784 is 1146 English privates and 3,000 sepoys who arrived at Arcot. Beveridge gives the number as 180 officers, 900 British soldiers and 1,600 sepoys.²⁰ According to Innes Munro, there were 200 officers, 1,100 British soldiers and 2000 sepoys. Thus the questions of Cannanore, Dindigal, Venkatagiri, Cherikkal and the release of prisoners of war caused bitter feelings between Tipu and the English. The terms of the treaty were infringed and each accused the other of bad faith.~~

English relations with the Marathas improved vastly after the Treaty of Salbai. Just previous to the conclusion of the peace of 1784, both the powers had completed their plans to launch an offensive against Tipu, if he still opposed the English. Even after the peace was concluded, both the powers fondly expected that the peace would not last long, as it was just a truce reluctantly patched up as a measure of expediency. Nana had taken it for granted that he could secure the English alliance against Tipu at any time. But it was a rude shock to him that his calculations proved wrong. The English were aware that Nana was counting on their support. Even before any formal application for help was made by Nana, Macpherson had informed the Bombay Government that the English might have to co-operate with the Marathas against Tipu.²¹ Anderson kept Sindhiar also informed that the English were willing to undertake any such joint venture.²² But in the middle of 1785, when the Marathas had to postpone their offensive because of the disturbed state of their own

affairs at Poona, the English regretted the delay and felt that a speedy offensive should have been launched against Tipu.²³ When Nana first applied for help, he was so sure of their aid that he did not appear very solicitous.²⁴ He had offered to surrender some ports on the Western coast in return for their help. Boddam, the Governor of Bombay, referred Nana to the Governor-General, to whom Nana sent a private agent.

Sindhia had pressed James Anderson to recommend strongly to his government for aid. He had assumed as a matter of course that the English would afford every assistance, as by the Treaty of Salbai "the friends and enemies of the Marathas were mutual."²⁵ To induce the English to join the Marathas, Sindhia informed the English that the Nizam was also participating in the alliance and all plans were completed for the reduction of Tipu's power. Nana also felt that the English were morally obliged by the Treaty of Salbai to come to the rescue of the Peshwa.²⁶ In December 1785, Anderson forwarded a letter from Sindhia to the Governor-General requesting for a body of troops from Bombay to co-operate with the Marathas against Tipu.²⁷ The Peshwa undertook to defray the expenses of these troops which would not go out of the Peshwa's dominions except with the previous consent of the Governor-General and after settling the share of the conquests.²⁸ Sindhia further mentioned that the French were willing to help the Marathas but the Peshwa rejected their offer out of consideration for the English.

Macpherson, however, did not agree with the Marathas and observed that the Treaty of Salbai did not stipulate that the friends and enemies of the two states should be mutual. On the other hand, it simply prevented both the parties from assisting the enemies of each other. Its thirteenth article prohibited the Company from affording help to any nation against the Peshwa. The Governor-General promised that he would strictly adhere to this clause and would not support Tipu against the Peshwa. Moreover, the English were equally bound by the Treaty of Mangalore not to assist the enemies of Tipu.²⁹ But Macpherson promised that he would never allow the Marathas to be overpowered by Tipu. As Tipu had not given any immediate cause for offence to the Company the English were compelled to observe strict neutrality.

Macpherson was deterred from joining the Marathas because of the emphatic and explicit orders from England to observe strict neutrality. The Constitution of the Company had been revised in 1784

by Pitt's India Act which forbade the Governor-General to involve the Company in any fresh war with the Indian Powers. Clause 34 of this Act stated, "And whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of this nation, be it therefore further enacted that it shall not be lawful for the Governor-General and Council without the express command of the Court of Directors or of Select Committee in any case . . . either to declare war or commence hostilities or enter into any treaty for making war against any of the country princes or state in India."³⁰ The Select Committee had explicitly instructed the Governor-General not to support the Marathas except when the French joined Tipu Sultan. The Sixteenth Article of the Treaty of Versailles also made it difficult for the contracting parties, England and France, to participate in any contest between two Indian powers. The internal conditions of the Company were far from satisfactory. But more important factor for English policy at this time was the ruined finances which ruled out the possibility of any war. Macpherson wrote to the Directors, "The public distress was never so pressing as at this moment. The season of the heavy collections is over; the demands of Madras and Bombay are most pressing and our arrears for the army are upwards of 50 lacs."³¹ Macpherson had issued in lieu of these arrears certificates bearing 8% until redeemed.³² Thus the Company was thoroughly unprepared for a war against Tipu.

But the English were willing to assist the Marathas in the event of the French joining hands with Tipu. If the Marathas sought French aid, the Company would regard it an act of hostility to the English and would be obliged to afford aid to Tipu.³³ Similarly, if Tipu joined the French against the Marathas, the English would help the Peshwa.³⁴ Thus the British policy was at first to observe strict neutrality. They were not in favour of helping the Marathas as it would upset the balance of power in India, paving the way for the Maratha supremacy. The English resented the Maratha expansion as much as they did Tipu's.

But the English policy did not remain consistent. Even the Marathas were not hopeful of any change in their decision in view of such categorical rejection of their request. Nana had lost all hopes of help, when Macpherson gave another surprise. The apparent advantages of crushing Tipu were too tempting for him to stick to his original decision. He gave up his neutrality and offered to supply the Marathas five battalions of troops for the defence of the Maratha territories.³⁵ Macpherson offered similar help to the Nizam and permitted the

Marathas to employ the English troops anywhere they liked.³²

Why did Macpherson take such a step? It was a definite departure from the original decision of neutrality and he took upon himself great responsibility by acting so boldly. He was tempted by the bright prospects of success against Tipu. Several factors compelled him to revise his decision. The Maratha Confederacy appeared to him so formidable that he judged it wise to secure its friendship. The alliance would reduce the enormous military expenses of the Company. It would minimize the French threat by keeping the powerful Maratha Empire on their side. The Company would receive additional security. It might extend its frontiers as a result of the war. It would render Tipu incapable of causing any trouble in future. Refusal to assist the Marathas might result in a Franco-Maratha alliance. The French were already carrying on an intrigue in the Poona court. The Company's relations with Tipu were not very smooth and they were apprehensive that he had considerably strengthened his position since the Treaty of Mangalore.³³

But the authorities in England took a different view. They were unable to determine whether the Maratha or Mysore ascendancy was more dangerous to their real interests. They disapproved the action of Macpherson and informed him, "You ought to have gone no further than to intimate to the Marathas that in the event of the French joining Tipu, they might rely on the assistance of our troops."³⁴ Therefore the Board of Directors decided to observe strict neutrality. They declared, "We are completely satisfied with the possessions we already have and will engage in no war for the purpose of further acquisitions."³⁵

In only one case would the English support the Marathas and that was if the French joined Tipu. Moreover the British policy was to keep the Indian powers engaged in their differences and a mutual war of exhaustion was just the thing that suited their interests best. If they actively supported the Marathas, Tipu would naturally join the French. These factors compelled the Directors to cancel the promised help to the Marathas.⁴⁰

Macpherson was not allowed to remain long in office after his decision was disapproved by the Home Government. Lord Cornwallis was appointed Governor-General in September 1786 with increased powers. Immediately after he took charge of his office, he reconsidered the effects of his predecessor's policy.⁴¹ Macpherson's decision had involved the Company in a critical and dangerous situation. It was an open breach of the peace of 1784 with Tipu who

would be provided with a just ground for offence. It militated against the spirit of Pitt's India Act as no exceptional event had happened to warrant the British intervention. Cornwallis was faced with the dilemma that he could not possibly assist the Marathas without going to war and that he could not go to war without offending the laws of his country. Hence he was advised to follow a pacific policy repudiating his predecessor's engagements. Accordingly he informed the Nizam and the Marathas that he had revoked the previous engagements and withdrawn the offer of help to them.⁴² The Governor-General pointed out to Dundas the absurdity of Macpherson's policy, that he was "guilty of a breach of an Act of Parliament in the offer, which he made of aid to Poona Government and that he was guilty of basely degrading the national character by quibbles and lies which he made use of to evade the performance of it."⁴³ Cornwallis felt it difficult at first to extricate the Company from its commitment. He declared, "We got in a very awkward foolish scrape by offering assistance to the Marathas; how we shall get out of it with honour, God knows, but out of it we must get and give no troops."⁴⁴ Hence, on the ground of strictly adhering to the subsisting treaties, he refused help to the Marathas and the Nizam.⁴⁵

Such an attitude was not adopted by Cornwallis out of any regard for Tipu, nor was he wedded-irrevocably to a pacific system but as a measure of opportune policy. He was as conscious as Macpherson of the accruing advantages of a war of conquest. He wrote to the Court of Directors that the safety of the Company's possessions would best be preserved by engaging the two formidable native powers in a war of exhaustion.⁴⁶ But his apparent disinterestedness in the war was a temporary measure and the natural outcome of the exasperating conditions of the Company. About the Company's military position he wrote, "the European infantry on whom the defence of these valuable possessions may one day depend, are in a most wretched state."⁴⁷ The army was thus in a pitiable state. The financial position was still worse. Added to this, a war would involve the Company in diplomatic complications as, by the Treaty of Paris, England and France were prevented from participating in a war among the native powers. Cornwallis was afraid that English assistance to the Marathas might compel Tipu to conclude the war with them even in adverse conditions to devote all his energies to wreaking vengeance on the English. He might seek French aid which meant the defeat of the very purpose for which the Company went to war, namely to

eliminate the French from the arena of Indian politics. The effect of Macpherson's promised aid to the Marathas had already caused an improvement in Tipu's relations with the French and Tipu had applied for 4,000 Europeans to remain constantly in his pay.⁴⁸ These considerations compelled Cornwallis to revise the decision of his predecessor.

Cornwallis knew well the implications of his action. He was sensible of the chagrin and disappointment of Nana on the refusal of British aid to him, which might compel him to seek accommodation with Tipu. But the Governor-General saw in that accommodation more probable benefit than injury to the Company's affairs. A peace between them would render the European aid unnecessary and the French intrigues in either of the courts would lose their object.⁴⁹ The Company would be relieved of the necessity of remaining prepared for war. The Directors had instructed the Governor-General to omit no opportunity of strengthening the Company's connections with Indian powers by a steady adherence to the fundamental principle, namely, the preservation of all treaties.⁵⁰ Thus various factors forced the English to maintain neutrality during the Mysore-Maratha War.

The peaceful and defensive policy which Cornwallis professed in the beginning was not followed by him all along. Soon after he re-organised the financial and military conditions of the Company, he launched on a fresh venture. He began to sound the various Indian powers in order to form a confederacy against Tipu. The success of Tipu in the Mysore-Maratha war aroused the jealousy of the English who felt that Tipu constituted a real threat to the growth of British power. His kingdom commanded an enviable position with rich resources, formidable defence, efficient administration and sound finances. Cornwallis viewed with apprehension the facility with which Tipu opposed the Marathas and secured a just and prudent peace which kept open the door for an alliance with them. He did not wish the Maratha peace with Tipu to last long. He observed, "Whether the Peshwa can place any reliance in Tipu's adherence to the Treaty after the final dissolution of the compact between the Peshwa, Madajee Bhonsla, Tukojee Holkar and Nizam Ali Khan, is equally at present a subject of conjecture."⁵¹

Tipu, for his part, naturally had his own misgivings towards the English whose infringement of the Peace of 1784 on previous occasions had aroused his apprehensions. Though they had maintained neutrality in the Maratha War, that was only because of the force of circum-

stances. He knew full well that the moment the English felt strong enough, they would declare war. Hence he desired to keep himself fully prepared for any eventuality. Thus the period that preceded the Third Mysore War was one of mutual suspicions and jealousies in the Anglo-Mysore relations.

Immediately after the Mysore-Maratha War, in the middle of the year 1787, wild rumours spread that Tipu was carrying on hostile activities against the English. Archibald Campbell, the Governor of Madras, informed the Bengal Government that Tipu and the French had completed their plans for the invasion of the Carnatic.⁵² The arrival of Pierre Monneron, a Frenchman in the Court of Tipu in July 1787 gave rise to serious conjectures of a treaty to be concluded between Tipu and the French. The Bengal Government received a report that the French were actively engaged in subverting British power, "with all that refinement of negotiations which the French could so dexterously employ."⁵³ Malet confirmed the French intrigue in Tipu's court and informed his government that in his conference with Nana on October 29, 1786, Govinda Rao, the *vakil* of the Nizam, asserted that the French had engaged to assist Tipu by sea and by land.⁵⁴ It was alleged that a new treaty was concluded to humiliate the British.⁵⁵ An exaggerated figure of 10,000 French forces in India was reported.⁵⁶ But these rumours were baseless, and, later on, Campbell himself confessed that interested persons had caused the unnecessary scare. He wrote, "From all I have yet been able to learn, our first intelligence respecting Tipu's intentions of invading the Carnatic is by no means well-founded."⁵⁷

Though the rumours of an immediate war subsided, Cornwallis began to suspect certain other acts of Tipu. The despatch of embassies to France and Constantinople, the moderate and appeasing terms of peace to the Marathas and the Nizam and the gearing up of the economy of Tipu's country to war level roused the apprehensions of the Governor-General. The latter knew that Tipu had applied to the French for 4,000 troops to remain constantly in his service.⁵⁸ Tipu's ambassadors had gone to France avowedly for the purpose of seeking military aid to expel the English from the Carnatic. Moreover, the French Governor in Pondicherry, Marechal Cossigny retired and General Conway, whose hostility towards the English was more pronounced and who had been in America, succeeded him. It was thought that he had brought 4,000 troops with him.⁵⁹ The fortification of Pondicherry and the stationing of Mysore troops on the North-East caused further

anxiety. The Madras Government felt that Tipu could completely destroy the Carnatic with 20,000 horse without hazarding a single action with the Company's troops.⁶⁰ Thus the English inferred that Tipu was preparing himself for war and was only waiting for an opportunity when, like Haidar, he could form a powerful confederacy of Indian powers.

Therefore the English busied themselves in serious preparations for war. They mobilized their forces on the Coromandel coast and informed Tipu of their apprehensions. But Tipu assured them that he would not violate the peace and that the movement of his troops were merely to chastise some of his rebellious poligars on the Malabar coast.⁶¹ In answer to a subsequent letter, he repeated the same peaceful and friendly intentions. But Cornwallis was not convinced by these assurances and engaged himself in framing a confederacy. He directed Malet to enquire of the Nana whether he was willing to enter into an offensive alliance with the English.⁶² Cornwallis was conscious of the reactions that would follow his proposal in the Poona Court to which he had earlier denied the promised aid. Therefore he instructed Malet to initiate the subject discreetly, after carefully studying "the disposition of the Poona ministry."⁶³ But the Madras Government urged him strongly to secure Maratha help. Campbell wrote to Bengal, "I cannot therefore, lose a moment in communicating this intelligence [invasion of the Carnatic by Tipu] and to press with eagerness to your Lordship that no time might be lost in using the best endeavours of the Government to get the Marathas to penetrate the Northern frontiers of Tipu."⁶⁴

But Cornwallis hesitated for two reasons to press Nana for help. Firstly, it was still doubtful whether Tipu seriously meditated an invasion or not. The rumours might have been concocted by interested parties like the Nawab of Carnatic and the Raja of Travancore. These rumours subsided after some time. Secondly, it was a rather delicate job to ask for Maratha help after refusing it to them in the hour of their need. It would give Nana an advantage which the English could not counterbalance by any other measure. The close secrecy of the Poona court and its habit of procrastination did not encourage Cornwallis to have high hopes of support. The refusal of Nana to join the English would seriously damage their prestige. Therefore Malet was urged to handle the affairs with utmost tact and caution. He was to introduce the topic without giving Nana reason to believe that the English were "alarmed by any apprehension of the

event which we are solicitous to guard against."⁶⁵

Cornwallis next informed Malet of what should be the basis of an alliance, which was the joint invasion of Tipu's country and the appropriation of his territories adjacent to their frontiers.⁶⁶ But the invasion was to take place when Tipu attacked the Carnatic with or without the French. In return the English would assist the Marathas when the French and Tipu jointly attacked the Marathas. But if Tipu, unassisted by the French invaded the Maratha country, the English did not promise help. If Tipu had already invaded the Carnatic, Malet was urged to secure Maratha help at all costs by impressing on Nana, "the fair prospect of curbing effectually the dangerous ambitions of a powerful enemy and of recovering the lost territory."⁶⁷ The Madras Government suggested that the Marathas should penetrate into Tipu's northern frontiers and that a Company's brigade with a battalion of Europeans and battering artillery should accompany the Marathas.⁶⁸ All the conquests of the combined army in the north would be given up to the Marathas who had to bear the expenses of the British detachment. These proposals were felt particularly attractive as they meant the surrender of all the places in the North to the Marathas. It would gratify the Maratha ambition of recovering their lost territories yielding a revenue of 15 to 20 lakhs. It would secure the Maratha assistance without binding the English to help them if Tipu attacked their country. Campbell was so anxious to get the Maratha aid that he would waive the expenses of the British detachment.⁶⁹

Cornwallis knew from the beginning that Nana would not accept these terms. He endeavoured to impress upon Nana that the English would not deceive him this time and the orders from England were very explicit that the Company should join the Marathas.⁷⁰ Cornwallis tried his best to convince him that there was a great difference between the earlier offer of aid by Macpherson and the present offer, as the previous one had been without orders from England and his present proposal was in strict conformity with instructions from home. He tried to flatter Nana by writing that he had "the most friendly disposition for the Peshwa and the Marathas, and will ever pride myself in performing all public and private engagements with the strictest honour and good faith."⁷¹

But these assurances had no effect on Nana who would not approve of a conditional alliance. He presented counter-proposals of equal commitments and reciprocal behaviour in case Tipu attacked them.⁷²

Nana refused to join in any alliance which precluded the English from assisting the Marathas, if Tipu alone attacked them. Malet was at great pains to explain to Nana that, unless provoked, the English could not enter into hostile engagements against Tipu.⁷³ Cornwallis was in a dilemma whether he should forego the Maratha help or agree to Nana's proposal. Finally, he rejected Nana's offer on "the principles of policy enjoined by the Home Government and the Legislature of England."⁷⁴

The reasons why Nana declined the English offer are obvious. It seemed strange to him that he should hasten to the rescue of the English in their distress but that they should not be prepared to do the same thing if the Marathas were in trouble. He felt that the English would merely make "a merit of relinquishing imaginary conquests as a compensation for the sacrifices."⁷⁵ Nana remarked bitterly "Yours will be the real advantage, while we will incur the expenses of war."⁷⁶ He regarded Malet's argument of the want of necessary permission from England as a flimsy excuse and told him that he was not concerned with the English constitutional procedure or the diplomatic complications in Europe, which, Cornwallis asserted, was the chief obstacle in accepting Maratha proposals.

Despite the refusal of Nana to comply with the English request, he was kept in good humour. Malet employed all his ingenuity to soften the Marathas to his viewpoint. He lured them with prospects of unprecedented advantages. Tipu was accused of self-conceit, bigotry, pride and prejudice. Nana's jealousy was excited by gross untruths such as that Tipu indulged in boasting of great success in the late Maratha war and that the Marathas had failed to recover their lost territories.⁷⁷ The just and generous terms of the late Treaty were interpreted as Tipu's device to lull the Marathas into inactivity for attacking them at a later favourable opportunity.⁷⁸ The Marathas were urged to seize the present occasion to recover their northern districts, while Tipu was engaged in opposing the English. Tipu was depicted as an enemy of peace and it was stated that "the interests of every state in Hindustan points out the necessity of checking his power which is always directed against some of his neighbours."⁷⁹

Everyone of these arguments failed to convince Nana. He had just then concluded peace with Tipu on honourable terms and he was not prepared to break it in return for flimsy and imaginary benefits. He resented the repeated reference of Cornwallis to the acquisition by Tipu of the northern districts as an inducement to join the alliance.

He knew well that the English would keep all the Carnatic for themselves and yet they posed as if they were relinquishing all the conquests in Nana's favour. In fact, in the treaty of Srirangapatna later, the Marathas were not given a single district merely on the ground that the Krishna provinces once belonged to them; and they who were so loud at first in offering the principal share to the Marathas would not take one district less. The Calcutta Council had written to Malet that their principal object was not the extension of their territories but the recovery from Tipu of what he or his father had taken from the Marathas. They observed, "The truth is that we do not think that any advantage would be obtained by possessing ourselves of any part of Tipu's dominions."⁸⁰ But very soon they changed their minds and proposed equality of shares in the spoils of war on the plea that "it might be imprudent to make so unreserved a declaration to the Marathas."⁸¹

Though Nana refused to join the English, they constantly told him of the apparent advantages of such an alliance. They tickled even his personal fancy and pride by saying that the venture would enhance his reputation, besides paving the way for a prosperous, secure and stable Maratha State. Cornwallis desired to cultivate the closest personal friendship with Nana. But all these efforts were in vain, and nothing tangible came out of them at the time, though they greatly facilitated an alliance later on.

Cornwallis did not confine his attention to secure only Nana's cooperation. He tried to induce other Maratha chiefs also to join in a formidable confederacy against Tipu. He wrote to Foster, the Company's agent at Nagpur, to invite Madaji Bhonsle to a defensive alliance. Foster was authorized to propose an engagement "to act with efficacy against Tipu."⁸² Madaji was approached for the purpose of persuading the Poona Government also to join the proposed confederacy. His permission was sought for free passage of troops from Bengal to the Carnatic through Cuttack.⁸³ The same inducements were employed to attract Madaji as were used in the case of Nana, namely territorial gains.

Mahdaji Sindhia was also likewise approached with the same proposal of an alliance. Major Palmer was entrusted with the task of compelling Sindhia not only to participate but also to induce the Poona Court to do the same thing and to lead personally in a campaign against Tipu. But neither Bhonsle nor Sindhia responded favourably to the English request.

Tipu was fully aware of these developments. He felt that he had given them no offence. If there had been any minor infringement of the terms of the treaty, both the parties were equally guilty of them, and more often, the English. The rumours of his designs to invade the Carnatic were pure fabrication. It is true that he sought French aid, but that was because he knew the English designs. If the English were afraid of his design to invade the Carnatic, he was much more afraid that they would organize a formidable confederacy to destroy him completely. The English intrigues in the courts of Poona, Nagpur, Gwalior and Hyderabad roused his apprehensions. He too tried to win over the Marathas to his side and organize a confederacy of Indian powers against the English. Even before the close of the Maratha war, Tipu had suggested a proposal for concerted action against the Company.⁸⁴ The situation seemed favourable, as Nana was indignant with the English for their failure to help him. When the Nizam was also inclined to join such a venture and sent a *rakil* to Poona with the proposal of a coalition consisting of the Nizam, the Marathas, the French and Tipu, Nana was found willing to approve the proposition.⁸⁵ Nana wrote to Sindhia, "We must not only insist on the reparation of our wrongs but we must recover that part of the Carnatic conquests of the great Shivaji which is now occupied by the English."⁸⁶ Tipu also was only too happy to join such a league. In fact, that was his ardent desire and firm policy. He was engaged at this time in a conference with the Nizam's envoy, Hafiz Fariduddeen Khan to which he invited the Maratha envoy, Shivaji Rao also. The Nizam was interested in regaining the Guntur Circar. Before concluding any positive alliance, the parties agreed upon a truce for three years and six months.⁸⁷ Tipu was anxious to convert the truce into an alliance with the Marathas, but all his efforts failed.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the Nizam of Hyderabad played a prominent part in South Indian politics by virtue of his legal claim as the Viceroy of the Deccan. After the dissolution of the Maratha-Nizam confederacy, both the English and Tipu were anxious to secure his co-operation. Owing to strong rumours of a rupture between the English and Tipu, Cornwallis set about seriously to win over the Nizam. The task was not easy for him, as the English had offended the Nizam by compelling him to surrender the Guntur Circar.

Guntur Circar, commonly called the Northern Circars was one of the northern provinces lying on the east coast. Since the death of Basalat Jang in 1782, the question of this Circar had been a sore

point in the Anglo-Nizam relations. The Treaty of 1768 stipulated that it should be ceded to the Company on the death of Basalat Jang.⁸⁸ In 1782 Basalat Jang died and the Company claimed the reversion of Guntur, but the Nizam evaded the issue on various pretexts. He ignored their demand for some years and the Company's preoccupations did not compel him to restore it. Moreover, the Company was in arrears of *Paish-Kash* (rent money) due to him, which justified his stand. Though Sir John Macpherson sent Johnson to Hyderabad to demand the restitution of the area, the Nizam did not comply with the request.⁸⁹ This territory was of immense importance both to the Nizam and to the Company. To the Nizam, it was his sole outlet to the sea and to the Company, it linked Madras with the Northern Circars. The Nizam successfully defied the repeated requests of the Company until the coming of Cornwallis.

At first, Cornwallis also did not insist on its surrender, being afraid that the Nizam would be offended and driven to join Tipu. He observed, "The business of the Guntur Circar is a very delicate one and requires the most mature reflections."⁹⁰ But in June 1788 when the Company's affairs were well settled, Cornwallis was determined to annex it. The Nizam was not prepared for war as he had just then ended his hostilities with Tipu. French intrigues were at the lowest ebb. The French and the English were at peace in Europe. As for Tipu, it was felt that "he was neither better prepared nor more inclined to hostilities than at the end of 1787."⁹¹ These factors convinced the Governor-General, that "No period can occur in which this claim can be asserted with less risk to the interests of Company than at present."⁹² Captain Kennaway who knew the country, language and customs was deputed specially for the purpose. As the relations of the Company with Tipu were strained at this time over the question of Cherikkal, Kennaway was advised to act with prudence. He was instructed, "Instead of declaring the real object of your mission, confine yourself to the general expression of friendship, and assurance of our earnest desire to cultivate a good understanding between the two Governments."⁹³ Meanwhile the Governor-General made preparations to effect his decision by force of arms.

Cornwallis who is praised for his moderation and pacific disposition proved aggressive over the Guntur question. Previous to his making the formal demand, he had completed all his military plans to seize the territory by force. He surprised the Nizam by making a sudden demand for the restoration of Guntur, and warning that

failure or delay in complying with it would mean the occupation of the province by troops within fourteen days.⁹⁴ Colonel Edgerton was despatched on September 9, 1789 to the boundaries of the Nizam's territories with a detachment consisting of Europeans and four battalions of Sepoys. The Nizam was stunned by the faithlessness of the English. He could neither mobilize his forces nor organize a general plan of resistance with the help of his neighbours. The sudden appearance of the British troops and the short notice of fourteen days to comply with the demand virtually meant an ultimatum to the Nizam. Tipu could not come to his rescue as the time was too short. The Marathas were also busy with their affairs in the North, in reinstalling Shah Alam on the throne of Delhi. The Nizam had thus no alternative but to surrender the Circar. But at the same time he protested against the violent attitude and injustice of the Company. He complained that the English should have paid their arrears before they insisted on the restoration of the area. "What security have I that they will be more punctual in future in discharging their *peiscash* than they have hitherto been?"⁹⁵

The acquisition of Guntur was Cornwallis's first act of aggression. It confirmed the misgivings of the Indian rulers about the expansionist policy of the English. The Nizam had to suffer the loss of his valuable and strategic territory on the plea that the English had a claim on it by some old treaty. He was highly disappointed. Munro writes, "It was the humiliation of a Great prince compelled to sacrifice his dignity to necessity and to suppress his indignation at being told that it is done with his own approbation and purely from motives of friendship by the English."⁹⁶ The acquisition was quite contrary to the declared policy of having no expansionist designs. It would antagonise all princes of India against the Company. Colonel Read says, "I believe it is a received opinion among the princes of India that we have desire to enfeeble every power in connection with us and consequently every one who is tenacious of his dependency is wary in trusting to our support."⁹⁷

The next step after the recovery of Guntur Circar was the renewal of the Treaty of 1768. That treaty which was invoked to deprive the Nizam of his territory, also contained the germs of a hostile alliance against Mysore. It stigmatised Haider Ali as a rebel, a usurper and an enemy of peace, and called upon the Nizam, "to divest him of, and revoke him from, all *sannads*, honours and distinctions conferred by himself or any other Soubah of the Deccan."⁹⁸ In the interest of

"peace and for the general benefit of all the neighbouring powers," the Company and the Nizam had agreed to punish and reduce him. Cornwallis desired to revive this clause of the Treaty by which the English could once again form an offensive alliance against Tipu. He maintained that the clause was still in force and Tipu should be looked upon as an enemy. But he conveniently forgot that subsequent to the conclusion of this treaty in 1768, the English had entered into other treaties of friendship with Mysore which nullified the effect of all former treaties. The Treaty of Madras in 1769 with Haidar recognized him as the ruler of Mysore and the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784 further acknowledged this, besides establishing peace and friendship between the Company and Mysore. Yet in total disregard of the Parliamentary Act of 1784 Cornwallis contended that the offensive clause of the Treaty of 1768 was still in force. There might have been some justification for thoughts of some offensive alliance earlier as Haidar had invaded the Carnatic, but the situation in 1789 was entirely different, as Tipu had given the English no cause for hostility.

Cornwallis argued that though Tipu had not yet started a war, he might do so sooner or later and hence he was justified in his action. He was therefore, "determined that this critical situation should not occur without his having previously secured the co-operation of two efficient allies, the Nizam and the Marathas."⁹⁹ But the English were not completely innocent and Tipu alone was not guilty of offence. The English were well known for violating their engagements ever since 1769 when they had failed, in spite of their promises, to help Haidar against the Marathas. They never accepted the Treaty of 1784 with sincerity and had infringed it on numerous previous occasions. Their Tellicherry factory always afforded shelter to the rebellious subjects of Tipu. Thus Cornwallis had no justification to revive the offensive alliance, throwing all blame on Tipu.

Cornwallis wanted to revive the old treaty of 1768 for an offensive alliance with the Nizam because he could not conclude a fresh one, as that would be against the spirit of Pitt's India Act. Very diplomatically he devised the means of evading this Act by reviving an old one which would avoid the censure of his critics. By this he would be guilty of neither offending the law of his country nor curbing his ambition. The sixth Article of that Treaty provided a basis for a powerful co-operation with the Nizam against Tipu. According to it, the English promised to assist the Nizam with two battalions of sepoy and six pieces of cannon manned by Europeans, "whenever the

situation of affairs will allow such a body of troops to march into the Deccan."¹⁰⁰ Cornwallis decided to implement this clause. The British contingent would be sent to the Nizam at any time except in one situation: "that it is not to be employed against any power in alliance with the Company, viz. Pundit Pradhan Peishwa, Raghojee Bhonsla, Madajee Sindhia and the other Maratha Chiefs, the Nawab of Arcot and Nawab Vazier, the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore."¹⁰¹ The list of "with only one exception" was so long and exhaustive that it included every important prince except Tipu. He was deliberately excluded, as he was the main target. Even the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore were mentioned but not Tipu. The purpose was to isolate Tipu by a specific mention of all the allies.

To lure the Nizam into an alliance against Tipu, Cornwallis revived another part of the old treaty, namely, the recovery of the Carnatic Balaghat which was in possession of Tipu. He regretted that circumstances had not so long permitted the implementation of this treaty obligation, which he was determined to do now.¹⁰² He assured the Nizam that hereafter he would endeavour to recover these territories.¹⁰³ Cornwallis next informed Tipu that if he "landed into a contest with him he might lose a large portion of his territory."¹⁰⁴

Thus the Governor-General concluded virtually an offensive alliance against Tipu, bypassing the spirit of the Parliamentary Act. Thus, against all convention he transformed his letter, to the Nizam, of July 7, 1789 into a Treaty of Alliance. John Malcolm criticised it, as to him it was questionable in point of faith and was more calculated to produce a war with Tipu than to limit his inordinate ambition.¹⁰⁵ Thornton observes, "It is highly instructive to observe a statesman, justly extolled for moderate and pacific disposition, thus indirectly violating a law, enacted for the enforcement of these virtues, by entering into a very intelligible offensive alliance."¹⁰⁶ But Cornwallis was confident that authorities at home would support his policy. He was quite influential with Dundas and Pitt. Dundas wrote to Cornwallis, "It is so very essential to our interests to detach him [the Nizam] from all other connections and unite him in the closest connections and dependence upon our protection, that there is no alliance formed upon that basis to which you may not expect our concurrence."¹⁰⁷ Thus Cornwallis was at last successful in his efforts to win over the Nizam to his side.

Tipu was conscious of the English activities in the Hyderabad court. Until the coalition of 1790 was finally concluded, it was not

certain whether the Nizam would ultimately join the English or not. Though Cornwallis had tried his best to revive the treaty engagements of 1768, Tipu was equally busy dissuading the Nizam from co-operating with the English. Certain factors had vastly improved the Nizam-Tipu relations during this period. Cornwallis had offended the Nizam by suddenly demanding the Guntur Circar. The Nizam's relations with the Marathas also were not happy, as he was not treated justly in the peace negotiations and even his name was omitted in the first draft of the treaty. He was practically isolated at this period and he was very bitter against all his three neighbours. He proposed to the French a defensive alliance which would protect him from the ambition of his neighbours.¹⁰⁸ The French tried to pacify and reconcile him with Tipu. They advised him to "cultivate and cement an alliance with Tipu Sultan" whom they called a firm friend and a dangerous enemy. The Nizam agreed as a measure of expediency to be friendly with Tipu.¹⁰⁹ He expressed his willingness to let the French mediate on his behalf with Tipu and settle all his disputes with him.¹¹⁰ These events resulted in unexpected cordiality and friendship between Tipu and the Nizam.¹¹¹ The relations appeared to be so cordial that the English suspected a triple alliance of the Nizam, the French and Tipu.¹¹²

The conciliatory policy of Tipu Sultan in conceding liberal terms to the Nizam in the preceding war encouraged him to propose an alliance with Tipu. In August 1787, he engaged Intiaz ud Daulah, his brother-in-law and Shams ul Umrah, the commander of his household troops, to sound Tipu about an alliance. Tipu was only too well-disposed to such a proposal, which resulted in the despatch of two ambassadors, Hafiz Farid-ud-Deen and Bahadur Khan from Hyderabad to Srirangapatna. They were charged with the secret task of negotiating a treaty for the Nizam. They left Hyderabad in October 1787 and reached Tipu's capital in November 1787.¹¹³ Tipu responded very favourably to the proposals of the Nizam and wrote to him that at no time either he or his father had ever entertained any hostile design against him. He reminded him of the period of their co-operation in the Second Mysore War, which had prevented the English from demanding the surrender of Guntur. Though the relations in the meanwhile had been strained owing to the participation of the Nizam in the Mysore-Maratha war, Tipu wrote that he would forget the past and added, "I am desirous of entering into a firm alliance with Your Highness and, to show how earnest I am in it, request

you will appoint a time and place for a personal conference that all matters relating to our respective interests may be taken into consideration and a treaty concluded for our mutual advantage."¹¹⁴

Tipu would go a step further and, as a proof of his earnest co-operation, he would relinquish the Nizam's territories previously acquired by Mysore.¹¹⁵ Besides, he proposed a matrimonial alliance which would further strengthen the basis of a political confederacy. It was proposed that the daughter of the Nizam should be given in marriage to a son of Tipu. Read says that Tipu himself desired to marry the Nizam's daughter, but this is incorrect.¹¹⁶ It is not very clear however, whether the daughter or the niece of the Nizam (Imtiaz ud Daulah's daughter) was sought in marriage. Even Kirmani is silent on this point and speaks only "of matrimonial alliance."¹¹⁷ Read says that, on their return from Srirangapatna, the ambassadors took a casket of jewels for the bride, viz. the daughter of the Nizam.¹¹⁸ The relations seemed so far improved that Tipu ordered a statement of the territories to be prepared, which once belonged to the Nizam. But the Nizam was not very keen on these proposals and hence his reply was vague and the negotiations broke down. The possibility of an active alliance remained just a pious hope.

With the acquisition of Guntur by the English, the Nizam was roused to a sense of danger and revived his overtures again with Tipu. He dispatched, in November 1788, his agents Hafiz Farid ud Deen and Ramachandra to Tipu who was encamped at that time near Coimbatore. The Nizam sought Tipu's help and urged that they should forget their differences and become friends.¹¹⁹ He sent a copy of the *Quran*. He depicted the English as the common enemy of both and revealed the secret that the Treaty of 1768, which had deprived him of Guntur, envisaged hostile designs on Tipu's country also.¹²⁰ According to that Treaty, the Nizam was obliged to join the English in compelling Tipu to surrender the Carnatic Balaghat.

Tipu's response was again favourable and he was willing to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Nizam. He revived the proposal of a matrimonial connection between the two families, which Tipu regarded as very important as it would end all old feuds. In the middle of September, Tipu held a conference with Hafiz Farid ud Deen at Coimbatore, when the Maratha *vakil*, Shivaji Rao, was also present. He proposed four points: first, the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance; second, the Nizam's co-operation with Tipu against the English; third, cession of Guntur to Tipu in return for

the usual rent and last, a matrimonial alliance between Tipu's son and the Nizam's daughter.¹²¹ After the conference Tipu sent, along with the Nizam's envoys his own *vakils*, Qutbuddeen Khan and Ali Reza Khan to Hyderabad to finalise the proposals.

But these proposals were destined to fail. By that time the English intrigue was quite active in Hyderabad. Cornwallis was strenuously engaged in dissuading the Nizam from joining Tipu. The prospects of recovering the Carnatic Balaghat were employed as an inducement. Moreover the Nizam also was not sincere in his offer of alliance with Tipu. At the time he despatched agents to Srirangapatna, he had sent an envoy, Mir Abul Qasim, popularly known as Mir Alam, to Calcutta ostensibly to settle the arrears of tribute with the English, but in reality to urge Cornwallis to fulfil the sixth Article of the Treaty of 1768 by which he was entitled to obtain from the English two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of cannon manned by Europeans. As the Nizam was isolated at this time, he was anxious to secure, as speedily as possible, the assistance of either Tipu or the English. The subtle diplomacy of Cornwallis immediately came to the rescue of the Nizam and the sixth Article of the old treaty offered him the required help. The presence of the English Resident also made the Nizam lukewarm towards Tipu. This shrewd and subtle English diplomacy destroyed the possibility of the Nizam-Tipu rapprochement. Tipu's ambassadors in Hyderabad were suspected and were kept under guard.¹²² The matrimonial connection was also turned down on the ground that Tipu came of a low family and that he was the son of Haidar Nayak, "a soldier of fortune of the lowest birth." A connection with a family of upstarts was thought derogatory and disgraceful. Tipu resented bitterly this insulting attitude of the Nizam which prevented the conclusion of an alliance between two great states in South India.

From the Persian records in the National Archives it would appear that when the Nizam first sent Hafiz Farid ud Deen to Tipu, he himself proposed the marriage of a son of his with a daughter of Tipu but Tipu did not agree.¹²³ He proposed, on the other hand, the marriage of a son of his with one of the Nizam's daughters. When Farid ud Deen was deputed a second time to Tipu, he proposed, at the instance of the Nizam, reciprocal marriages between the families.¹²⁴ These records say that Tipu rejected the proposal this time as the Nizam was busy negotiating an offensive alliance with the English through Mir Alam at Calcutta. The Nizam did not like to antagonize Tipu

until his treaty with the English was finalised. Therefore he demanded as a price of his alliance with Tipu the payment of arrears of eight lakhs of rupees per year which Haidar had promised by the Treaty of 1766.¹²⁵ The Nizam knew what the reactions of such a proposal would be, but he had nothing to fear, as Cornwallis was more anxious than he to send him military aid.

Thus the negotiations completely failed, apparently on the sentimental ground that the Nizam was scornful of a marriage connection with Tipu's family. But there were other reasons as well. Tipu would not have taken very seriously a personal matter like the marriage and the Nizam would not have been imprudent enough to make the birth of Tipu a decisive factor in politics. The plain fact is that the Nizam did not really desire an alliance with Tipu. His only anxiety was to break the isolation in which he stood at that time. He was simply dodging Tipu to exact better terms from the English. Moreover, he was surrounded at the time by two rival groups of advisers in his court, one of Imtiaz ud Daula and Shamsul Umrah who were the partisans of Tipu and the other of Mushir ul Mulk, the Prime Minister and Mir Alam who were the supporters of the English. The Anglophile party which successfully opposed the matrimonial connection was more powerful and more intriguing than the other. Tipu's *vakils* were outwitted by the superior British diplomacy which aroused the jealousy of the Nizam and lured him with the prospects of territorial acquisitions. The Mysore *vakils* could not convince the Nizam that it was in his interests in the long run to join Tipu. The English Resident, Kennaway, poisoned the growing Nizam-Tipu relations by aligning himself with the court clique against Tipu. Tipu's anxiety for an alliance was misrepresented as a struggle for personal aggrandisement. Thus there was a keen contest between the English and Tipu to win the Nizam's alliance. It was unfortunate that the Nizam finally decided to join the English.

Thus in the interval between the Second and Third Mysore Wars a number of issues disturbed the relations between Tipu and the English, who were never destined to remain in peace. Hardly was the ink dry on the Treaty of Mangalore when several fresh problems created tension between these two powers. The failure in the proper implementation of the peace, in the prompt restitution of places, in the release of prisoners and the border disturbances had already changed the atmosphere in 1785 with suspicion and distrust. when the fresh outbreak of the Mysore-Maratha War further estranged the relations

between Tipu and the English. Contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Mangalore, Macpherson's offer of military aid to the Marathas indicated the degree of English insincerity. However, no occasion arose for the English to join hands with the Marathas because of the strict instructions of the Home Government prohibiting such a venture, because of Macpherson's own exit from office, and because of the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, who did not approve of this policy. Very skilfully Cornwallis extricated the Company from the commitment which Macpherson had made. Cornwallis adopted such a policy not because of any conformity either to the orders from home or out of his own pacific intentions but because of his desire to consolidate his own position before he ventured on a new project. However, he learnt that Tipu was not the man who would allow the English to be the supreme masters in the country, and that his embassies to Turkey and France for aid, the successful conclusion of his war with the Marathas and the Nizam, his policy of appeasement towards them to win their support against the English, and the excellent state of his army and economy, all indicated to Cornwallis that there was danger to the English from Tipu. Therefore Cornwallis revised his earlier policy of strict neutrality in the affairs of the Indian powers and started sounding the Marathas and the Nizam for an offensive alliance against Tipu. The job was not easy as he had himself denied aid to the Marathas earlier, and had offended the Nizam by his demand of Guntur. But such was the short-sighted policy of the Indian powers and the superior diplomacy of the English that both the Marathas and the Nizam played into the hands of Cornwallis. Tipu tried his best to keep the Nizam on his side, and a fine opportunity had presented itself when even a matrimonial alliance was proposed. But the Nizam's advisers were too much under the influence of the English Resident, Kennaway, who frustrated all the efforts of Tipu to win over the Nizam. The Nizam, whose sixth sense to scent which policy would serve his interests most was very strong, at once tilted the balance in favour of the English. He realised that a closer contact with Tipu would perhaps rouse the hostility not only of the English but also of the Marathas. In the power equations of that period it was hardly possible for him to face two such powerful rivals. Therefore, he ignored all entreaties of Tipu, who spared no argument to win his favour. Tipu desired a personal interview with the Nizam, proposed a matrimonial connection between the two houses, sent ambassadors to Hydrabad, and encouraged the courtiers, Imitaz ud Daulah and

Shams ul Umrah, who were well disposed towards Tipu, to cement the relations between the Nizam and himself. But all his efforts failed because of the insincerity and duplicity of the Nizam, and the shrewdness and alertness of the English.

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The Second Phase
CONFRONTATION POLICY (1789-93)

CHAPTER V

THE TRAVANCORE QUESTION (1789-1790)

THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS of the Deccan had grown tense since 1787 owing to the intrigues of the English in the courts of Poona and Hyderabad. But the immediate cause for precipitating a war came from Travancore, a small state in the southern extremity of the Indian Peninsula, which, by purchasing two disputed fortresses from the Dutch, hastened the Third Mysore War. The conditions of Malabar in the 18th century were anything but satisfactory. It was divided into numerous small principalities which were always at war with one another. Before Travancore came into prominence, the Zamorin of Calicut and the Raja of Cochin held the supremacy over Malabar. But their internecine wars paved the way for the rise of Travancore under Martanda Varma who built up his power and expanded his territories.¹ He made his kingdom strong, stable and fairly extensive.

The first contact of Mysore with Travancore came when Martanda Varma sought Haidar's help in his wars of conquest. Haidar agreed to help him and proceeded to his assistance, but the Raja declined either to accept the help or to pay damages for having invited him to no purpose. Such a conduct excited Haidar's fury and led to animosity. Martanda Varma was succeeded by his nephew Rama Varma in 1758 who was equally ambitious and unscrupulous. Haidar asked him to be a tributary of Mysore but he declined. Being afraid that Haidar might attack him, he began to strengthen the Travancore lines, the defensive structures that existed on the border. He sought English aid and offended Haidar by affording shelter to the rebellious subjects of Mysore. As Haidar was busy with the English and the Marathas he could not punish the Raja. The hostile activities of the Raja did not cease even after the death of Haidar. He joined the English in the war against Mysore. He excited rebellions in Tipu's country

and gave shelter to his rebellious subjects. As Tipu was also engaged against the English and the Marathas, Rama Varma intensified his hostile activities and the conditions in Malabar fell into confusion. The Raja was also one of the parties in fabricating the rumour that Tipu would invade the Carnatic. Under the pretext that Travancore stood in immediate danger of Tipu's attack, he secured British aid in 1783, consisting of two battalions of native sepoys to be maintained at his own cost, with a promise of further help of Europeans and natives at the Company's expense.² He excited the Malabar chiefs to rebel against Tipu and invited English to help them in recovering their kingdoms from Tipu.³ He laid claims to the territory of Kolat Nayar, a tributary of Tipu, on the ground of his relationship with the chief.⁴

Thus the intrigues and subversive activities of the Raja had disturbed Malabar. His ambition was to deprive Tipu of his possessions and unify and consolidate the entire land under his own rule. For this purpose he had crushed the Nayars, the Zamorin, the Raja of Cochin and the Dutch power. But with Tipu the task was not so easy and hence he resorted to subversive activities. Tipu took serious note of his conduct as Malabar formed a very strategic and valuable part of the kingdom of Mysore. The preoccupations of Tipu from 1782 to 1788 did not permit him to deal with the Raja who had considerably strengthened his position in the meanwhile. But in 1788 the affairs were brought to a crisis chiefly by three factors, the demolition of the Travancore lines, the purchase of Cranganore and Ayacottah by the Raja and the sheltering of Tipu's rebellious subjects in Travancore. These were the three actual and immediate causes of Tipu's rupture with the Raja.

The question of the Travancore lines was briefly this. The kingdom of Travancore consists of a narrow strip of land full of hills and valleys extending from Cochin to Cape Comorin. The high mountain ranges and the rivers in the east and the sea on the west act as a powerful defence of the country. Nature has well guarded Travancore on all sides except on the north where, near the Cochin border, the country is open to foreign attack. That was the only weak point in the otherwise impregnable frontiers. Expecting danger from here, Rama Varma erected strong defensive lines in 1764 with the help of a Flemish called De Lannoy. They are described by Mr Powney, the English Resident at Travancore thus:

"They run from west to east, commencing at Chinamangalam on the opposite side of which they begin again and extend to Elephant

mountains . . . From the sea to Chinamangalam river the lines are four or five miles; from the opposite bank to the extremity of the mountains they are twenty-four or twenty-five miles. They consist of a ditch sixteen feet broad and twenty feet deep, with a thick bamboo hedge, a slight parapet and a good rampart and bastions on rising ground almost flanking each other, from one extreme of the lines to the other. They are only assailable by regular approaches from the north."⁶

A major portion of these lines was constructed in the territory of the Cochin Raja who was a tributary of Tipu. One could not go from Tipu's country to Cochin without crossing these lines. By 1777, they were vastly improved, as a result of which Cochin was cut off into two, one-half to the north of these lines and the other to their south.⁶ The Raja extended them frequently to the eastward as far as the river Cranganore leaving little space for Cochin.⁷ The construction of these lines, having been commenced in 1764 under the direction of De Lannoy, was completed only in 1777. Throughout this period the lines were extended to all the strategic points in the area. In 1766 the Dutch objected to their extension towards Cranganore, as Haidar would be offended under the suspicion that the Dutch had connived at the action.⁸ By 1775, purchasing a strip of land near the island Vypeen from the Dutch, the Raja extended the lines to about 1500 yards in the rear of Ayacottah.⁹ He threw up strong and fortified lines on the opposite side of the Cranganore river and thus, within thirteen years, he made the defences impregnable. He added to them an imposing ditch, sixteen feet broad and twenty feet deep, with a thick bamboo hedge, a parapet, a good rampart and bastions.¹⁰ Such a defensive wall stretched over a length of thirty miles.

Tipu objected to the erection of those lines which were in the territory of the Raja of Cochin who was his tributary. He demanded their demolition on the ground that the lines had been constructed in his territory. The whole of Cochin was legally a part of the kingdom of Mysore and the Raja of Travancore had transgressed the limits by erecting fortified ramparts which prevented Tipu's visit to his own country. Tipu was cut off from about two-thirds of Cochin which was to the south of the lines.¹¹ Therefore he demanded the demolition of those lines which were in Cochin. Moreover Tipu suspected the Raja to be the source of all the troubles in Malabar and desired to punish him for his hostile activities.¹² According to Tipu, the lines were built subsequent to the inclusion of Cochin in the kingdom of Mysore and that the Raja had no moral or legal right to

do so in the territory of another. He resented that at time when Malabar was disturbed by rebellions, he had no access to a large part of Cochin, an area of which he was the undisputed sovereign.

The Raja refused to demolish the lines, on the ground that he had lawfully acquired from the Raja of Cochin the territory where the lines stood.¹³ He explained that the Raja of Cochin had ceded this territory to him in return for his assistance to him in 1759 when the Zamorin of Calicut had overrun Cochin. He further argued that he had built the lines much earlier than Cochin had passed under the suzerainty of Mysore and that no extension had been made afterwards.¹⁴ The Raja asked why Tipu had been silent all the time and why no mention had been made in the treaties of 1769 and 1784, if the lines were so indisputably on the soil of Mysore. He suspected some hostile design on the part of Tipu, as the demand was quite new and at no period before was the inconvenience of passage through the lines reported to the Raja. On these grounds he declined to demolish the lines.

But the Raja's stand was not justified. Regarding his claim that he had lawfully acquired the territory from the Raja of Cochin, the Dutch Records mention that the Malabar Princes "always had claims, often of great obscurity, to places in one another's territories."¹⁵ There are no authentic documents to prove conclusively that the land had been ceded to Travancore. Taking advantage of the disturbed conditions, the Rajas of Travancore had occupied strategic lands but the Raja of Cochin could not have been a party to the lawful transfer of a land right in the middle of his country. The Raja's claim that no extension had taken place after Cochin had passed into Mysore was equally unfounded. The lines had been continuously extended from 1764 to 1777, but Haidar had conquered Cochin as early as 1766. The Dutch had warned the Raja that the extension would offend Haidar. The reasons why the Mysore chiefs had suffered the lines to exist so long were these. They had not found time to deal with them. They had expected that the Raja would be friendly with them. But his late conduct, when the English support had been sought by him in the form of two battalions of sepoys, had alarmed Tipu. But the aggressive designs of the Raja had only increased and he had absorbed one after another, all the tributaries of Cochin.¹⁶ He had disturbed the peace of Malabar. Therefore, even if Tipu had been lenient so long, he was not prepared to tolerate these hostile activities any more.

The second and the more serious grievance of Tipu against Travancore was the purchase of two Dutch places, Ayacottah and Crangacore

by the Raja. Ayacottah was a military post at the northern extremity of the narrow island of Vypeen on the Malabar coast and Cranganore was about two and a half miles on the northeast of Ayacottah. The purchase of these two places by the Raja resulted in a bitter controversy and finally led to war. They were undoubtedly places of strategic importance, almost the key to Northern Malabar. The Dutch had improved them and despite the anxiety of Haidar to acquire them they had retained them. Their possession had become a necessity to the Mysore chiefs as they served as a door to their territories in Malabar.¹⁷ After Haidar had failed to secure them, Tipu had renewed the negotiations with the Dutch and offered to pay a handsome price. Being sensible of their value to the English in times of war as they were the only communicating links between Malabar and Madras, Tipu was keen on purchasing them. In 1788 Tipu proposed an alliance with the Dutch but they evaded the issue.¹⁸ But when he came to know that Cranganore and Ayacottah were for sale, he was anxious to buy them and instructed the Raja of Cochin to negotiate the purchase for him. He invited the Raja to meet him at Palghat in June 1789 but the Raja could not come on account of his ill-health.¹⁹ Tipu suspected disloyalty on his part, when even his Dewan was not sent to discuss such an important matter and, from that time the Raja was regarded as an enemy of Mysore. Tipu directly contacted the Dutch who were about to accept his offer, when the Raja of Travancore intervened. The Raja tried his best to secure the forts for himself. He sought the permission of the Governor of Madras, Sir Archibald Campbell, through Bannerman, the Resident.²⁰ But he was dissuaded from buying them, as the English did not regard the forts essential for his defence.²¹ To allay his apprehensions, the Company promised to send him two battalions for the defence of his possessions.²²

But undeterred by the English warning, the Raja proceeded to purchase the forts. He first concluded a Treaty of Alliance with the Dutch by which he promised military aid to them.²³ When Powney enquired whether the Raja would assist the Dutch if Tipu attacked them, he asserted that he would.²⁴ Besides he demanded from the English the promised aid of Europeans and sepoys.²⁵ The next act of the Raja was the purchase of the two forts, which had been pending over two years. Without informing the Madras Government, he finalised the transaction. On July 31, 1789, the sale was effected by the Dutch East India Company to "the Illustrious and mighty King

of Travancore. Wanke Walla Martanda Rama Varma." The English were completely ignorant of the affair till 17th August, when Powney wrote to them. Holland, the Governor of Madras regretted, "We lament very much that we were not acquainted with the Raja's negotiations with the Dutch until it was too late to prevent their being concluded."²⁵ The forts were sold for a sum of three lakh Surat silver rupees along with their arsenal of cannon and ammunition, their plantations and gardens. The Raja promised to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000 in ready money and the remainder (2½ lakhs) in four annual instalments, to be carried to the credit side of the pepper-sale account. The Jewish merchants, David Rahaboy and Euphraim Cohen, and Anta Setty acted as sureties for the debt.²⁷ Thus the Raja secured the places for himself and invited trouble from Tipu.

Why the Dutch sold the forts to the Raja and not to Tipu is of importance, as this has a close bearing on the actual commencement of the Third Mysore War. The Dutch were a decaying power in India and they were afraid that the hostile designs of Travancore would involve both the Raja and their Company in trouble. Their relations with Mysore were not happy, as they had not shown any accommodation either to Haidar or to Tipu. They had rejected Tipu's proposal of an alliance in 1788. The news of Tipu's arrival in Malabar further frightened them. They enquired of the English at Madras whether they could help them in case of Tipu's attack.²⁸ When the English refused to commit themselves, they turned towards the Raja of Travancore. The Dutch forts stood on a portion of land claimed by the Raja of Cochin, and the Dutch were afraid that Tipu might confiscate them at a time when neither the English nor the Raja of Travancore would come to their rescue. Even if the Raja were willing to help them, his treaty with the English would prevent him from doing so. The repeated pleadings of the Dutch Governor, Van Anglebeck to Batavia for supplies were of no avail and the Dutch settlement was reduced to a desperate condition.

But more apprehensive than the Dutch were the Jewish merchants of the settlement who felt their trade was in immediate danger. Two of them, Euphraim Cohen and Abraham Samuel having gone far into the interior of Travancore, had seen the activities of the Raja and concluded that Tipu's attack was inevitable. They created a scare in the settlement and compelled the Dutch to take steps to avert any danger. The Raja of Travancore was also conscious of the impending peril. Thus strangely enough, as Furber points out, the Raja of

Travancore, the Dutch and the Jewish merchants all found themselves in dread of Tipu.³⁹ The scheme that was hatched to extricate themselves was to engage Tipu in a contest with the English. But the latter would not be involved unless Tipu invaded the Raja's country. Hence the plan was to include the Dutch forts in the Raja's territory which the English were bound to protect by the Treaty of Mangalore. The scheme served the purpose well as the Dutch and the Jews and the English were ultimately involved in the contest. That was why the Dutch declined Tipu's offer even though he offered them double the price. The Dutch did not get any cash from the transaction which was not a monetary but a political bargain. It was a paper adjustment by which the Raja promised to supply pepper worth 2½ lakhs and for the balance the merchants of Cochin stood surety. Both the English and Tipu were outwitted. Though the Raja took it at the time as his personal triumph, he suffered in the long run, being ultimately reduced to the rank of a vassal of the British. The Dutch lost the only foothold they had in India. The Jewish merchants alone whose trade flourished during the period of the war benefited by the sale.

Tipu by making collusive purchase of forts or places in the territories of one of his tributaries not only without his consent but even at a time such tributary was threatened with resentment . . . he will justly draw Tipu's resentment upon himself and at the same time forfeit all rights to the Company's friendship or interference in his favour."³⁴ The Raja was asked to remain peaceful and neutral and not "engage himself in transactions which must be considered by all the world as acts of violence and injustice." The places were to be restored to their former owners and left to their fate.³⁵ Cornwallis instructed Madras as to what should be done if Tipu, resenting the Raja's conduct, invaded his country without informing the English. In such an event Tipu was to be told that the English disapproved the Raja's action and they would endeavour to restore the places either to the Dutch or to the Raja of Cochin, provided he desisted from further demands for reparations by force of arms.³⁶ Despite these offers, if Tipu invaded the hereditary kingdom of the Raja, war was to be declared. The Bengal Government censured the conduct of even the Resident, Powney, who abetted the acts of the Raja.

Thus the first reaction of the English was of disapprobation of the Raja's conduct. Tipu was assured that proper action would be taken to redress the wrong.³⁷ The Raja was asked to relinquish the forts. But he replied that the Dutch would not take them back *per spite* of his persuasion.³⁸ Therefore he hoped that the English would be kind enough to accept the fact as accomplished and to think that the forts were essential for his defence. But Hollond informed the Raja that the English would not be responsible for the ultimate consequences of not restoring the places. The Madras Government demanded all the papers that had passed between him and the Dutch. Meanwhile, the Bengal Government ordered an inquiry whether the Dutch had an independent right to dispose of the forts or not. It was to be ascertained whether Cranganore and Ayacottah originally belonged to the Portuguese who handed them over to the Dutch or whether the Dutch were dependent upon the Raja of Cochin. If the former was true, the transaction was to be regarded as valid and if the latter was the case, the sale was to be held null and void.³⁹ The Raja was to restore the places. If Tipu, by any chance, had already taken possession of the two places, a letter was to be addressed to him and sent with a flag of truce complaining of his impatience in not waiting for the result of the investigation. To go into the claims of both the parties a commission consisting of representatives of

both Tipu and the Raja was proposed.⁴⁰ The Madras Government took action on these instructions of Bengal and wrote letters to Tipu, the Raja and the Dutch to furnish them with all authentic documents in support of their claims. But the documents from the Dutch and the Raja would not conclusively establish anything. Tipu, however, received the information late, after 29th December, when a new development had taken place.

The Raja defended his case by pleading that he had ascertained the undoubted rights of the Dutch to dispose of the forts.⁴¹ He maintained that these places had belonged to the Portuguese before the Raja of Cochin became a tributary of Mysore. The Dutch had obtained them from the Portuguese unconditionally, without any stipulation of dependence upon him.⁴² The Dutch had never paid any tribute to the Raja of Cochin. Yet another argument of the Raja was that the places were absolutely indispensable for the defence of Travancore.⁴³ The purchase had been made not entirely without the consent of the English. The predecessor of Hollond, Governor Sir Archibald Campbell had approved the measure.⁴⁴ Finally, he (i. e., the Raja) had tried to restore the places but the Dutch would not take them back. In the light of these factors he requested the Governor of Madras to waive the proposed action.

But these contentions of the Raja were untenable. Despite the best efforts, Hollond could not procure the deeds and documents which could conclusively establish the Raja's claim that the Dutch had an independent right to dispose of the places. The real nature of the tenure by which the Dutch held these places was shrouded in obscurity as they acquired them as far back as 1654. However, it was found that the Raja's contention that the Dutch had never paid any tribute was unfounded. Ever since the days of the Portuguese, the Raja of Cochin was entitled to levy duties, which proved the dependence of the forts on the Raja, and the Dutch had continued this practice.⁴⁵ The Raja's treasury was replenished by what the Dutch had paid on their imports and exports. The Dutch Records mention that the Company paid half the receipts of its total customs.⁴⁶ The levy of customs has always been the essential test of sovereignty in Malabar. Despite the best efforts of the Dutch to secure exemption from them they had not been successful. Even a powerful Governor like Van Goen could not escape them.⁴⁷ The Treaty concluded between the Dutch and the Raja of Cochin in 1663 not only stipulated the payment of all customs but also maintained the Raja's unqualified

sovereignty over all his possessions.⁴⁶ When Cochin yielded to Mysore, Haidar stood in the same relation to the Dutch as the Raja. Even the Madras Government acknowledged the fact that whatever might be the nature of the tenure by which the Dutch held these places, it was contrary to the laws of nations to dispose of them at a critical juncture.⁴⁹

The second contention of the Raja that the places were indispensable for his defence was also equally wrong. Even Campbell who was noted for his hostility towards Mysore, did not consider them to be essential to him.⁵⁰ Hollond held the same view and even Cornwallis, who later took a different view, was not convinced of their importance.⁵¹ Powney wrote, "Cranganore and Ayacottah will be found upon examination to be very inconsiderable and not acquisitions worthy of serious competition."⁵² Even the Raja confessed that the places brought neither any revenue nor any other advantage.⁵³ If the places were important to the Raja, they were much more so to Tipu, who had a better claim to buy them as they stood in his territory. Cornwallis rightly observed, "... Of whatever importance the two places may appear to the defence of the Raja of Travancore, it cannot be opposed to the serious consequences of a war."⁵⁴

Even the third argument of the Raja that he had previously secured the English permission to buy them was untenable. When the question was later raised in the British Parliament and the Court of Directors ordered an inquiry, a reference was made to Campbell, who denied the existence of such a sanction.⁵⁵ When it was suggested that Ayacottah would be a proper post for the British troops which were about to be subsidized by the Raja, Campbell had disapproved the idea.⁵⁶ The last excuse that the Dutch were not prepared to receive the forts back was simply flimsy and absurd. It had all been the result of a secret scheme or conspiracy to involve the English in war. As Mr Hollond observed, the most honourable mode of settling this dispute would have been either to return the forts to the Dutch, or if they would not receive them, to raze them to the ground.

The third grievance of Tipu was that the Raja had harboured many rebellious subjects from Mysore. It had been a constant source of complaint that the Raja excited revolts in Tipu's country and afforded shelter to the rebels. Tipu received the report that the rulers of Cherikkal, Calicut and Kadattanad had sought refuge in the Raja's country.⁵⁷ At first he did not believe it but when he personally went to Malabar to settle the affairs, the report was found true. He wrote

to the Raja that he was greatly offended both by his purchase of the forts and the protection of the rebellious Nayars from Mysore. He asked him to avoid affording any further cause of provocation.⁶⁸ Besides this, on December 15, 1789, Tipu sent his *vakil*, Khader Khan, to the Raja, who received the *vakil* in the presence of the Raja of Cochin, Captain Knox, Powney and his own ministers.⁶⁹ The *vakil* complained that the Raja was guilty of sheltering political offenders from Mysore and asked him to surrender such rebels. He further suggested that all the disputes should be settled through the mediation of the Madras authorities.⁶⁰

Though the Raja confessed that he had protected the rulers of Calicut, Kadattanad, Contumgherry and Cherikkal, he pleaded that they were his relations.⁶¹ He denied having stirred up the chiefs but maintained that they had come to him on their own accord. If Tipu insisted on their return, he would send them back. But as this question was connected with the other two disputes, no settlement was possible.

The first two disputes caused great tension in Tipu's relations with the Raja. From the sale of the forts in July to December nothing happened for five months. Tipu was hopeful of a peaceful accommodation, but on the question of the forts he could not make any compromise. It would upset the balance of Malabar politics besides affording the English a strategic point if they wanted to invade his country. Tipu waited for five long months, continuously urging the Raja to comply with his first two demands. He directly wrote to him and then sent the Raja of Cochin to convince Rama Raja of the desirability of settling the disputes amicably.⁶² When these efforts failed, he sought the intervention of Madras. He explained to the English that the purchase of the forts by the Raja would be most injurious to his interests.⁶³ He called upon the English to direct the Raja to evacuate the fort, to withdraw his troops and restore the places to the Dutch.⁶⁴ He offered the Dutch double the price the Raja had paid.⁶⁶ Tipu's *vakil*, Khader Khan, besides discussing the question of rebels, tried to persuade the Raja in person to give up his claims to the forts. But all these efforts proved abortive.

The Madras Government was genuinely interested in preserving peace in the Deccan. They assured Tipu that they would take all needful steps to redress his grievances. But Cornwallis was not actuated by the same anxiety to preserve peace. He ordered an investigation to be made of the claims of the respective parties, which naturally

entailed delay. Tipu was then present in Malabar and the defiance of a petty Raja infuriated him. The situation demanded some positive and quick action, and the English suggestion of an inquiry could not allay his misgivings. Even the Madras authorities were not convinced of the prudence of such a measure. The tactics of Cornwallis confirmed Tipu's feelings that he could not secure justice at English hands.

Tipu, therefore, marched towards the lines of Travancore with the hope that at least his presence would compel the Raja to change his decision and yield. On December 24, he was within four miles of the lines, from where he sent an agent with an elephant and a *howdah*, inviting the Raja for a peaceful accommodation.⁶⁵ But this served no purpose. Tipu had already cautioned the Raja to withdraw his troops from the Cochin border to avoid any clash of arms with the Mysore army stationed there. With the nearer approach of Tipu, tension increased, and on December 29, 1789, the first clash took place which set the stage for the Third Mysore War.

Even after the incident of December 29, there had yet been a chance of peaceful accommodation but the intransigence of the Raja and the changed attitude of Cornwallis destroyed it. As Mr M. H. Khan says, the so-called attack on the lines was nothing but a frontier incident. "In reality it was an accident, a minor affair and not regular hostilities."⁶⁷ Tipu asserted that he had no intention of a war against the Raja. When he approached the Travancore boundary, he had commanded his troops not to molest any of the Raja's men. But the rebels from Mysore had hidden themselves in the adjoining hills and jungles, and Tipu ordered them to be seized. During this process, the Raja's troops fired on the Mysoreans and eventually a clash followed. On being informed of this event Tipu withdrew his troops from the Raja's border.⁶⁸ But the Raja's contention was quite that he had not. But there was still a possibility of resolving the dispute amicably. For Tipu had not declared war on the Raja. He had not come prepared for that, as he had hardly more than 2000 men with him.⁶⁹ Tipu knew that an invasion of the Raja's territory would mean declaring war against the Company. Only he was enraged by the insulting attitude of the Raja, and he desired to obtain a satisfactory solution of the disputed points.

Tipu once again called upon the English to mediate and invited Powney to his camp.⁷⁰ But the change of the Governor of Madras finally sealed any possibility of a settlement. Having waited for more than three months, Tipu took the final step of invading Travancore

on April 12, 1790. Within a short time he took not only Cranganore, Ayacottah and other forts but also destroyed the Travancore lines and would have overrun the whole kingdom but for the threat of invasion of his country by the English.

Cornwallis who had called the Raja's conduct imprudent, offensive and upon every principle indefensible, had suddenly changed his attitude and begun to support the Raja. He wrote to Madras, "We cannot see how a negotiation can commence in an honourable manner unless Tipu should show a disposition to make a proper reparation."⁷¹ Without a thorough investigation, he confirmed the Dutch claim to an independent right to dispose of the forts and approved the Raja's conduct in purchasing them. Cornwallis thus changed his original stand because he had made up his mind to reduce Tipu. The incident of December 29 gave him the necessary excuse to stigmatise Tipu as an aggressor. He had already revived the offensive treaty of 1768 with the Nizam and had carried on negotiations for an alliance with Nana, Sindhia and Bhonsla. He strongly censured the opinion of Madras and dismissed Hollond on the ground that he held pro-Tipu ideas. Cornwallis even denied Tipu a chance of explaining his position and looked upon the incident of Dec. 29 as a declaration of war. Tipu had been informed of the proposal of appointing commissioners to hold an inquiry very late, by which time the incident of December 29 had taken place. Tipu accepted the proposal and asked the English to send their representative to meet him on the borders. Instead of appointing a representative of his own, he suggested that he would himself serve on the commission. The English took objection to this. Hollond who tried to settle the dispute peacefully invited upon himself the wrath of the Governor-General and was suspected of having taken a bribe from Tipu.⁷² He was dismissed from office and General Medows was appointed on February 20, 1790. He viewed the suggestion that the English should send commissioners to Tipu as highly improper, which would "tend to lessen the consequences of the Company's Government in the eyes of the princes of the country."⁷³ Only a few days before Hollond had agreed to send commissioners, Medows carried on war-like preparations and did not even reply to Tipu's letters. Cornwallis approved the action of the Madras Governor who rejected Tipu's offer of settling the dispute through commission. He thought that it was a humiliating step to send commissioners to him.⁷⁴ But Tipu meant no insult to the English and there had been precedents of the English agents being sent to Indian princes. For

instance, the Treaty of Mangalore had been concluded by the dispatch of Commissioners to Tipu. And in this case, the affair was quite a minor one, as the Company was not directly involved. This was the last hope of a peaceful settlement. With its failure, war was declared.

Thus the Travancore Question proved to be the most complicated, confusing and controversial issue of the time. A simple issue of the sale of two outposts of relatively insignificant value led to a serious war in which were involved for more than two years all the major powers of the south together with the mighty English. For the first time certain new elements which had never been heard of before, such as the Dutch, the Jews and the Raja of Travancore played an important role in this situation. It was the anxiety of the Dutch to throw away their political responsibility and concentrate on commercial activity that led to the idea of the sale of those two small forts, Ayacottah and Cranganore. It was the shrewd economic instinct of the Jews that allowed to Tipu no chance to purchase those places. It was the ambition of the Raja of Travancore that prompted him to venture upon a project of bold design. It would appear that a clash between the Raja and Tipu lay in the logic of history. When all the Nayars of Malabar had been subjugated by the Mysoreans except the Raja of Travancore, it was quite natural on the part of both Tipu and the Raja to look forward to the inevitable course of events—Tipu to seize the first opportunity to reduce the Raja and the Raja to remain fully prepared for any eventuality. Moreover, the strategic importance of the area, the rich commercial produce of the region, the presence of the Europeans ready to fish in the troubled waters, the intense love of the Nayars for independence and at the same time their own mutual rivalries had all really made the area an explosive spot. For many of the rebellious chieftains of Malabar who had not reconciled themselves to the rule of the Mysoreans, Travancore was the only place of refuge. When the Raja had sheltered many of the contumacious subjects of Tipu, the latter resented the action of the former. Besides, the frequent strengthening of the border security on the part of the Raja, one, in particular, those defensive lines known as Travancore lines which consisted of a wide and deep ditch, a thick bamboo hedge, a slight parapet and a good rampart all along the area about twenty-five miles long east to west gave him strong protection. But Tipu claimed that the Raja had encroached on his territory and that these defences prevented the Mysoreans from reaching their own territory, namely certain parts of Cochin, which was a tributary to Tipu. Thus.

a variety of factors, together with the past conduct of the Raja who had assisted the English in the Second Mysore War, and the later aggressive mood of the Raja when he had acquired the two forts from the Dutch outwitting Tipu, led to the confrontation between Travancore and Mysore. Initially the Madras Government was very fair in this matter, and it did all it could in order to prevent the Raja from provoking Tipu. It was the Raja who ignored the advice of Hollond. Perhaps the Raja was aware that the Supreme Government in Bengal was on his side, and that he would not be punished if he slighted the Madras Government. Having settled many of the domestic problems in Bengal, Cornwallis was now ready for a confrontation with Tipu. The Governor-General had been seriously working for the two preceding years to convince the Marathas and the Nizam that it was necessary to reduce Tipu. Only a good pretext and a suitable opportunity were required. The Raja of Travancore furnished the English what they wanted.

Till February 12, 1790 Tipu was kept under a sense of false security that the disputes would be settled amicably. He was repeatedly informed that his grievances would be redressed and the commissioners would be appointed.⁷⁵ But the English policy was changed overnight and no time was given for further negotiations. Tipu was willing to accept the original English proposal and he promptly informed Madras of this.⁷⁶ He wanted to send a *vakil* to explain all the points in person to the Governor. But Medows refused to see any *vakil* of Tipu.⁷⁷ Instead, Tipu was asked to pay reparations to the English and the allies for the losses suffered.⁷⁸ This was such an unjust condition that Tipu could hardly accept it. Thus the Third Mysore War became inevitable; it was neither forced on the English nor was it completely unavoidable. The Raja of Travancore on whose behalf the war was fought, did not benefit in any way by it. On the other hand, he was reduced to the rank of a vassal, like the Raja of Tanjore, the Nawab of Arcot and the other princes. The English exhausted his resources and after the close of the war, they appropriated the rich trade of his country. Far from realising the dream of establishing his supremacy over Malabar, he lost the little political liberty he had enjoyed before.

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CHAPTER VI

HOSTILE CONFEDERACY (1790)

TIPU'S RUPTURE WITH TRAVANCORE provided the English an excuse for organizing a powerful confederacy against Mysore. Cornwallis had been restrained so long by the Act of Parliament of 1784 which prevented him from entering into an offensive alliance against any Indian prince. But, according to him, the incident of December 29 removed the Parliamentary checks, and he was free to renew his efforts to compel the Marathas and the Nizam to join the English. Ever since 1787, the Governor-General had been actively engaged in isolating Tipu and in drawing all the other Indian powers towards the Company. The revival of the old Treaty of 1768 with the Nizam, the dispatch of military aid to Travancore and the intrigues of Malet in Poona were hostile designs against Tipu. But an offensive and defensive Treaty could not be concluded unless Tipu provoked the English by an open breach of peace. Therefore, when the so-called attack of Tipu on Travancore lines took place, Cornwallis felt that he was justified in forming an alliance against Tipu.

The Marathas whose co-operation was regarded as indispensable were approached first. Malet had been engaged since his appointment in detaching the Marathas from Tipu. But the task was not so easy in view of the English conduct in the Mysore-Maratha war. Nana had rejected the English proposals in 1787 on the ground of unfairness of the terms. Cornwallis had to employ now all the arts of diplomacy to persuade Nana to join the English. Malet was instructed, immediately after Tipu's attack on the Travancore lines, to intensify his work at Poona, and to secure Nana's consent for an offensive alliance against Tipu, "to exact the most ample reparations from him for so flagrant and unprovoked a breach of the late Treaty of peace."¹ Cornwallis was very keen on securing Maratha support. Without their co-operation, he observed, "I could not flatter myself

with a certain prospect of the speedy conclusion as well as the decided success of the war.”² But he warned Malet not to betray any anxiety on the part of the English to obtain their aid as “the supplication or statement of our own difficulties would not be the most effectual mode of obtaining it.”³ As an inducement, Nana was told that the English proposals offered a fair chance of avenging “the injuries that the Marathas have suffered from Tipu and his father by engaging heartily and vigorously with us in carrying on the war against him.”^{3(a)} If Nana still hesitated to join, the English threatened him that they would not help the Marathas if Tipu attacked them, for they were not obliged to assist those “who have contented themselves with looking on a scene, in which the future peace and tranquillity of India was so materially implicated, with indifference.”⁴ But if the Marathas responded favourably the English further undertook to enter into a defensive alliance for protecting those territories which might be conquered during the war.⁵ Even the religious sentiments of Nana were excited. “The turbulency of the mind of this tyrant urges him to try every measure that may tend to the ruin of every sect of religion, whether Hindu or other, and he is continually attempting to destroy every power in the Deccan whose strength he conceives an obstacle to his designs of totally annihilating the Religion of Hindus.”⁶ By these and other “judicious arguments”, Malet was urged to secure Nana’s consent.

These instructions arrived in Poona at a time when Malet had already prepared the ground for an alliance. Nana’s agent, Behro Pant was an intimate friend of Malet, who had been sufficiently impressed with the necessity of a war against Tipu. Malet had so successfully excited the Maratha jealousy that Behro Pant himself often talked of an alliance against Mysore. Malet wrote, “I endeavoured to convert his language to the acquiescence of a clear declaration of the disposition of this court in the event of the expected rupture.”⁷ Therefore, when Malet formally proposed the alliance in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General, the Poona Court was well disposed towards it, and on February 8, 1790, the readiness of the Marathas to participate in the war was conveyed to the Bengal Government. On 7th February the Maratha Court had officially declared its intention to join the English after settling preliminaries.⁸ The next business of Malet was to compel the Poona Court to execute its declaration and propose its stipulations. On February 22, Behro Pant announced the ten preliminaries which the Marathas regarded as essential for their co-operation. They were: first,

those territories to the Peshwa, which once belonged to him: second, reinstatement of the displaced Zamindars: third, equal distribution of the "nazarna" collected from these zamindars: fourth, the right of the Peshwa to exact tribute from them: fifth, equal division of Tipu's territories among the confederates: sixth, equal military commitments in the war: seventh, mutual consent of all for concluding peace: eighth, safeguards against unreasonable obstacles in the way of peace: ninth, a defensive pact to prevent future attacks from Tipu, and last, the conclusion of a definitive Treaty of Alliance, if these preliminaries were approved.⁹

These proposals pleased Cornwallis as they were made voluntarily by the Marathas. But their final adjustment caused endless delay and difficulties. They gave rise to very intricate and perplexing points of difference which annoyed the English. Cornwallis was apprehensive that the failure to satisfy the Marathas on all points would mean driving them to Tipu's side.¹⁰ The most difficult problems which evaded settlement were the claim of the Peshwa to negotiate with the Nizam for his inclusion in the alliance, the number of the troops which each party was to supply, the definition of the words zamindar, poligar and district, the expenses of the British contingent attached to the Maratha army, and the general plan of attack on Tipu. Malet tried to adjust these differences in a way most advantageous to the Company.

Malet proposed four different modes of attack on Tipu by way of military cooperation between the partners. First, a separate attack should be launched by both the parties with the right to retain their respective conquests: second, a joint attack should be made with the aid of a British detachment: if this course was adopted, the conquests were to be equally shared: third, in case the Peshwa and the Nizam should take the field in person, the Company was to furnish two more battalions of native infantry: and last, an immediate attack should be made on Tipu's country on all sides, the Marathas from the North, the Bombay army from the West and Madras from the South. Among these proposals the first was preferred by Malet himself but the fourth was acceptable to Nana.¹¹ But this plan of action was not approved and the Marathas finally accepted another by which they agreed to invade Tipu's country with at least 25,000 troops joined by a British detachment of two battalions, after the English and the Nizam had actually commenced the hostilities.¹²

Malet objected to the Maratha stipulation that their old possessions should be ceded to them, on the ground that the description of

these areas was vague and that they included large tracts and districts. The English did not like to forfeit their claim to these territories without due compensation.¹³ Cornwallis refused to concede the Maratha demand about their right to exact tribute from the Zamindars. He regarded the Maratha claim exorbitant as inclusion of this right would entitle them not only to their fair share of the general partition of Tipu's territories but also to the tribute of twelve lakhs from the Zamindars.¹⁴ But Nana was not prepared for a compromise on this point and Cornwallis had to yield. The Poona Court, however, was asked, in lieu of this concession, to forego many other demands proposed in the preliminary treaty of March 29.¹⁵

The third difficulty was to resolve the controversy about who should bear the expenses of the British detachment co-operating with the Marathas. Nana was not ready to accept this responsibility, and, when he agreed, he insisted that the English should have no claim to those possessions which once belonged to the Peshwa.¹⁶ Malet suggested that the Company would likewise retain all its conquests.¹⁷ He argued that the territories which the Nizam and the Marathas called their ancient possessions were large districts yielding revenues ranging from sixty to forty lakhs and it was not fair that these territories should be excluded from the general redistribution. But Nana remained adamant and doubted the utility to him of the British aid. He declined to bear the expenses of the British detachment. He argued that these charges would be an extra burden on him as the Company also would be entitled to an equal share of the conquests. Secondly, he might not draw the full benefit of the expenditure incurred on these troops as the rainy season was near when no conquests could be expected. Thirdly, the acceptance of this aid would deprive the Peshwa of the large tribute which Tipu had sent through his *vakils* who were already in Poona. Lastly, the small English force was superfluous as the Marathas intended to employ a large army. But Malet would not listen to these excuses and urged Nana to accept the aid. He argued that if the expenses were the cause of his hesitation, he would reduce it to the barest minimum, just equal to the maintenance of 800 Maratha horse and that the English force would be particularly useful in expediting the recovery of Tipu's northern districts. Moreover, the refusal of this proposal would make the English conclude that Nana had succumbed to Tipu's intrigues in Poona Court. These arguments had the desired effect and Nana was persuaded to agree to the requisition of the British troops and bear their cost.¹⁸

The fourth difficulty was with regard to the correct meaning of the word "district". Malet insisted that it meant "*Paragnah*" but the Marathas interpreted it differently. Nana raised an objection to the word "district" mentioned in the 9th Article of the treaty as being indefinite and applicable to places producing crores of annual revenue. He wanted the term to be understood as exclusively relating to the capitals of the *paragnahas* and not to the capitals of the Circars.¹⁰ The difference in the interpretation of the word district arose because the English desired that their troops, after reducing the capitals of a *circar* or *paragnah*, would oppose the entrance of the troops of another confederate into the district, whereas the Marathas wanted to enter the dependencies of such circar composed of many *paragnah* even after the capture of the capital by the English.²⁰ Malet opposed this view and in a conference with Nana, he introduced a clause in the treaty to the effect, "The attack of the capital and the possession of it by one party to be preventative against interference in the district by the others, which term of district may be understood as either Circar, Samasthan or *Purgunna*."²¹ Nana refused to accept this view as his intention was to secure the right of exclusive conquest of the ancient possessions of the Marathas north of the Tungabhadra, over and above the general partition. According to him, these possessions would not exceed fifty lakhs of rupees in terms of revenue. He wanted the company to give up its claim of one-third share out of this territory which would not very much exceed fifteen lakhs in revenue. Malet was not prepared to make this concession. According to him, the annual amount of revenue of what the Peshwa called his ancient possessions would come to upwards of sixty lakhs. Moreover, if the English made this concession to the Marathas, they would have to make a similar concessions to the Nizam who would claim an exclusive right over Cuddapah, a territory yielding forty lakhs. At last a compromise was evolved and the term "district" was finally defined as a portion of territory which would yield an annual revenue of not more than fifteen and not less than ten lakhs. Thus Nana had to yield ultimately to the English view even in the controversy about the term "district."

Besides these difficulties, Malet and Kennaway created another controversy, namely, the basis on which the offensive alliance was to be concluded with the Marathas and the Nizam. Whereas Malet viewed the Alliance as a new measure voluntarily entered into by the three parties, Kennaway thought that the Alliance with the Nizam

was merely the revival of the Treaty of 1768. Malet was afraid that such a position would seriously prejudice the right of the Nizam so as to prevent him from accepting the treaty that was being negotiated at Poona. To avoid this difficulty two separate treaties were proposed, one with the Marathas and the other with the Nizam who would settle his own term with Kennaway.

Thus all controversies having been settled, the preliminary treaty was completed by March 29, 1790. The Peshwa was exempted from personal participation on account of his youth and Parsaram Bhao was given the Maratha command. The important terms of the treaty were: the claim of the Company to the conquests effected before the entry of the other allies in the war, equal division of the subsequent conquests, payment for the Company's detachments joining the allies, invasion of Tipu's country soon after the English initiative, the posting of *vakils* of each party in the army of the other, peace by mutual consent and the employment of the maximum force by each party in the war.²² Though all outstanding differences were removed, the final execution of the Treaty was delayed. The Maratha court was jealous of the Company's independent negotiations with the Nizam. Moreover, the persuasion of the Rasta family in favour of Tipu, whose agents had brought large sums of tribute and offered cession of territory to the Peshwa, caused endless delay.²³ The English grew anxious as the rainy season drew near and the Marathas exhibited no sign of finalising the treaty. Malet was impatient and criticised the Poona Court as lacking in consistency. He wrote to Cornwallis, "I am at a loss to account to your Lordship for the reasons of the Treaty not being yet signed, since it is impossible to explain to you the trifling verbal disputes and cavilling on terms by which it has been delayed since my last address."²⁴

The Poona Court raised another objection namely that Kennaway had promised to provide the Nizam Colonel Cockrell's detachment besides the one stipulated in the Treaty, which was contrary to the spirit of equality in a confederacy.²⁵ Nana enquired when the rulers of the Carnatic and Tanjore would be restored to their full authority and privileges. He felt justified in demanding this information as the Raja of Tanjore belonged to a branch of the Satara family which had a connection with the Peshwa.²⁶ But the English gave evasive answers to these questions and Nana did not pursue the matter further. There remained yet a few minor things to be adjusted. The Peshwa wanted his name to be mentioned first in the treaty. Nana asked the third

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and the sixth Articles of the treaty, to be omitted but, on Mier's refusal, he yielded. The reward for those Zamindars who had deserted Tipu was left to the discretion of the *vakeels* in the respective capitals. All differences having been removed, the treaty was finally signed and exchanged on June 6, 1790. Cornwallis was so rashly it within seven-and-the days, and he did so on July 5, 1790. On the same day he wrote to the Peshwa, Nana and Selim Punt expressing his great satisfaction. He called the treaty an important business "which teems with benefits to all the world." The important purpose of the treaty was to furnish and deprive Tipu of his territories. By this Treaty the Nizam and the Marathas undertook to invade Tipu's dominions with a force of not less than 25,000. The English detachment to the Peshwa was to join together 2,000 Maratha horse. If necessary, the Marathas and the Nizam agreed to furnish 1,000 horse to the Company at its cost. The parties were to come to the rescue of one another in distress. All the conquests were to be equally divided with due regard to the frontiers and the convenience of the parties. Certain zamindars were to be restored to their *jagirs*, their *nuzaratu* being divided equally among the confederates. Overtures of peace from Tipu to either party should be communicated to the others. If after the peace, Tipu attacked any of the parties, the others should unite to punish him.

Negotiations with the Nizam

While Mier was busy in Poona, Kemarvay carried on his work of inducing the Nizam to join the Company. Cornwallis was anxious to secure the Nizam's co-operation also as he desired to make the confederacy formidable. The task did not present great difficulties in Hyderabad. The removal of the offensive Article of the Treaty of 1768 had prepared the ground and both Asim-ul-Umrah and the Nizam were willing to enter into a separate Treaty if the English so desired. Cornwallis was highly gratified at such "the liberal manner in which they received my propositions to join with the Company."⁴⁷

Immediately after the receipt of instructions from Bengal, Kemarvay urged the Nizam by every argument to join the alliance and commence hostilities without loss of time.⁴⁸ The Nizam too was hurried by the same prospects of territorial acquisition. He was convinced that at a time when Tipu was engaged with the English, he could easily seize his Indian possessions. Moreover he was offered a European military, three companies of *infantry* and a suitable train of field-

pieces.²⁹ The Treaty of 1768 was made at first the basis of these negotiations but when complications arose with the Marathas, a separate Treaty was proposed. Cornwallis's intention was to conclude a single treaty binding all the three parties, but he left it to the option of the Nizam to choose either a separate or a joint treaty. In case a separate treaty with the company was preferred, the Nizam was requested to conclude a similar treaty with the Marathas.

Though the negotiations with the Nizam were relatively smooth, yet they presented some difficulties. First, the Nizam took objection to the Maratha claim of making terms on his behalf. But the Poona Court was not willing to allow him to enter into a separate treaty with the Company. It looked upon the Nizam as a political dependent upon the Peshwa, an attitude which the Nizam resented bitterly. The alliance afforded him a chance to assert his independent rights. This controversy caused some bitter feelings between the two courts. The Marathas deprecated the presence of the Nizam in the alliance as his forces were inefficient.³⁰ However, the English, tactfully dealt with these rivalries and pacified both. The second objection of the Nizam was to the division of tribute due from the zamindars. He complained that the Marathas proposed to appropriate fifty to sixty lakhs of tribute whereas the share allotted to him was much less. He wanted equal division of all the conquests without any reservation.³¹ But Cornwallis, in his anxiety to secure the Maratha co-operation, was inclined to offer them some exclusive privileges. The Nizam's proposal that he would command the Maratha forces if the Peshwa was absent was not appreciated.

Another demand of the Nizam which caused considerable difficulty was for guarantees against the Maratha aggression. He was afraid of the Marathas and wanted positive assurances of assistance from the English. At first Cornwallis instructed Kennaway to avoid all discussions on this delicate subject. If that was not possible, he was to give only general assurances of protection against attacks.³² But such vague assurances did not satisfy the Nizam, and Cornwallis would go no further, lest he should offend the Marathas. He valued the Maratha co-operation more and hence was reluctant to satisfy the Nizam. These hesitations of the English caused further apprehensions in the Nizam's mind. Cornwallis too was greatly worried about the problem. He had an idea now of the differences that might arise later in his relations with the two confederates. The Nizam insisted that the English should bind themselves to support him and a defensive arrangement

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should be included in the Treaty. A separate article was to be added guaranteeing the integrity of his kingdom. It was to be stipulated that the Company and the Nizam should assist each other if they were attacked not only by Tipu but by any other power. He felt that the purpose of the renewal of the Treaty of 1768 was to secure British aid for the defence of his country. The letter from Cornwallis of July 7, 1789 had promised him every support. But the English were not prepared to accept this demand of his and desired to confine the defensive clause only to an attack by Tipu. If the English undertook to defend the Nizam against all external dangers, he would naturally be a vassal of the Company. Kennaway desired to introduce such a defensive clause but the opposition of the Marathas compelled him to drop it. As a compromise, Cornwallis proposed, "Should differences arise between any two of the confederates, the third party shall be bound to interpose his good offices and to take every means in his power to bring these differences to a just and amicable settlement."³³ When these assurances did not satisfy the Nizam, the Governor-General personally wrote to him, "you will always find me in the best disposition to endeavour to save His Highness from the necessity of submitting to mortification or injury."³⁴ Thus, despite the best efforts of the Nizam, the general defensive arrangements were not approved.

The Nizam demanded another favour from the English, and extra aid besides the stipulated two battalions. He was afraid that while the English and the Marathas were busy in their sectors of the war, Tipu might attack him with full force. On May 11, 1790 Kennaway conveyed the anxious request of the Nizam for another detachment to Cornwallis, recommending its sanction.³⁵ Colonel Cockrell's detachment was ordered to proceed to the Nizam's help on his request. But this step caused misunderstanding in the Poona Court and the Nizam had to forego even this concession. Thus all points being at last adjusted, the Treaty was signed, sealed and exchanged at Paungal on July 4, 1790 and ratified by Cornwallis on July 29, 1790. The terms of the treaty were similar to those concluded with the Marathas

Negotiations with Other Powers

Cornwallis was anxious to secure the co-operation of the other Maratha chiefs. He wrote to Raghuji Bhonsla that all the Marathas should join the English to recover their territories and obtain reparations from Tipu. Sindhia and Holkar also were urged to use their

influence in compelling the Poona authorities to co-operate with the English. Sindhia responded favourably and consented to persuade Nana to join the alliance. But he proposed that he would act as the mediator between the Company and the Marathas as in the Treaty of Salbai.³⁶ Moreover, he demanded the English assistance for subjugating the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur or persuade them to accept his suzerainty. In return for these services, he would proceed to Poona to hasten the conclusion of the alliance.³⁷ But Cornwallis turned down these proposals which might involve the Company in inextricable complications. Moreover, there was no necessity for Sindhia to go to Poona and persuade Nana.

The response of Tukoji Holkar was different from Sindhia's. He declined either to join the English or recommend to the Peshwa to do so.³⁸ On the contrary, he attempted to dissuade both the Peshwa and the Nizam from co-operating with them. When they disregarded his advice and joined the English he regretted the fact very much.³⁹ Cornwallis resented his action and wrote to him that his conduct was extraordinary and was likely to be misunderstood as hostility towards the Company.⁴⁰ Only the war with Tipu restrained the Governor-General from punishing Holkar. To prevent the other Maratha chiefs from taking the line of Holkar, Cornwallis wrote to Sindhia that it would not be good to be friendly with Tipu. Such a gesture would be a threat to the Company, for which the Company would take serious action after the war against Tipu. The policy of the Governor-General was to secure at least the neutrality of the other Maratha chiefs, if not their active support, and to prevent them from joining Tipu.

Besides the Maratha chiefs, the tributaries and the refractory subjects of Tipu were induced to join the English. The Nayars in Malabar were furnished with arms and were promised liberal *jagirs* after the war for their co-operation. Other Malabar chiefs also were encouraged to rebel, with a promise of full protection to them. Treaties were concluded with the Rajas of Chirakkal, Kadattanad and Kottayam, by which the Company agreed to assist them in recovering their territories from Tipu.⁴¹ Powney concluded a treaty with the Raja of Cochin who agreed to pay annual tribute to the Company at the rate of eighty thousand rupees in the first year, ninety in the second and a lakh thereafter.⁴² The Bibi of Cannanore also entered into a similar treaty permitting the English to garrison the fort of Cannanore and granting them commercial privileges.⁴³ The Raja of Coorg also

concluded a treaty with the Tellicherry factory on October 20, 1790, by which he agreed to co-operate with the British army against Tipu. The English in return promised to liberate him from Tipu's control. The Raja undertook to furnish supplies to the English and grant them commercial privileges. Lastly, negotiations were revived with the Rani of Mysore promising her the restoration of Mysore as she appeared to be to its rightful owner, if the allies emerged victorious in the war.

The Real Motives of the Confederates

Cornwallis organised the Confederacy apparently for the protection of an ally, the Raja of Travancore. If that had been the sole intention, no confederacy was required. The combined forces of the Company and Travancore could have successfully resisted Tipu's invasion. Cornwallis knew well that the Marathas and the Nizam would not join Tipu.⁴⁴ The English had already taken enough precautions to disengage the two Indian powers from Tipu. The Nizam had received the British aid and was committed not to join Mysore. The Marathas were not happy over the results of their last war with Tipu and were still anxious to recover their ancient possessions from him. The whole of Malabar was in rebellion. The French were not in a position to help Tipu, owing to the outbreak of the Revolution. Hence Tipu had been practically isolated in 1790 and, single-handed, he could not have overpowered both the English and the Raja of Travancore. Cornwallis was conscious of his strength to exact full reparations from Tipu.⁴⁵ Malet also thought that the Maratha aid was superfluous, if the English merely desired to protect their ally and vindicate their honour.⁴⁶

Therefore, the real aim of the Confederacy was not merely the protection of Company's dominions but also their extension. Cornwallis felt that the Parliamentary Act of 1784 had imposed neutrality in India too long which was not productive of any material benefits. He conceived that such a policy would always compel the Company to commence wars without alliances.⁴⁷ He was, therefore, in favour of abandoning it. His experience of over three years of stay in India had shown that the policy of peace and neutrality would not help to strengthen the Company's position. The political conditions of 1790 convinced him that the proper time had come for setting the next stage for British expansion. The Confederacy was not a sudden arrangement to resist Tipu's aggression but a mature and pre-mediated plan.⁴⁸ The renewal of the old offensive treaty of 1768 with the

Nizam, the despatch of troops to Travancore and the intrigues of Malet at Poona were all directed to reduce Tipu's power⁴⁹. The Travancore question was only a convenient excuse to cover up the aggressive designs of the English.

Cornwallis accused Tipu of violating a number of articles of the Treaty of peace. He complained that the first article was infringed by an attack on the Raja of Travancore who was an ally of the English, the second article by withholding the prisoners of war, the eighth by denying the English commercial privileges in Mysore and the ninth by refusing to restore Mount Dilly to them.⁵⁰ But these clauses had been equally broken by the English. In fact, they did not recognise the Treaty at all but called it "a humiliating pacification," a temporary measure which would be revised at the earliest convenience. Tipu had in his turn a long list of grievances. But even with regard to the particular charges levelled against him, Tipu had strong grounds to defend himself. The Raja had offended him by secretly obtaining the forts which he was, even otherwise, anxious to buy. He had a better claim to them as they were situated in his territory. The Raja had provoked him by refusing to comply with any of his three legitimate demands. The English grievance about the prisoners was more imaginary than real, for, after the Third Mysore War, it became apparent to the English that Tipu had not retained them. It was a propaganda to accuse Tipu of harshness and cruelty. It was also a convenient device to secure the sanction of the Home Government for a new war. Even the breach of the eighth article by Tipu is defensible. He had denied the English commercial privileges in his country, but he had every right to do so being an independent prince. He was not expected to sacrifice his revenue and destroy his commerce by obliging foreigners. He suspected that they carried on intrigues under the cover of peaceful trade, and that the English traders were secret political agents. His apprehensions were well-founded on the basis of the experiences of Bengal, Bihar and the Carnatic. Mysore enjoyed profitable trade in rich spices and other valuable commodities and that was the main cause of the trouble. Tipu would not allow such trade to pass into their hands. And the English were afraid that the adoption of similar policies by other princes would inevitably entail ruin to their prosperous trade in India.⁵¹

Lastly Cornwallis justified his action because of "the avowed and implacable enmity" of Tipu towards the English. His hostile acts mentioned were sending an embassy to France for an alliance against

the English, proposing to the Marathas and also to the Nizam the formation of a confederacy for the same purpose and negotiating a matrimonial alliance with the Nizam's family.⁵² Cornwallis thought that a war with Tipu was inevitable and the sooner it was waged, the better for the Company. But Tipu had been compelled to take these steps by an equally hostile policy of the British since the days of Haidar. They were not reconciled to the existence of Mysore as a strong kingdom, and Tipu, in his natural anxiety to protect his own interests, had invited his neighbours to an alliance. As an independent prince, he had the right to propose political or matrimonial alliances with other powers. It can thus be seen that the main purpose of the Confederacy was not to redress their grievances, but to secure other advantages. The English desired to build up their power without exciting the jealousy of the other two powers. The Marathas and the Nizam would not have allowed any addition to the Company's power without some compensations for themselves. The balance of power would have been disturbed and they might have joined Tipu against the English. The Company would have involved itself in unnecessary complications, if it had gone to war unaided by others. As the Marathas and the Nizam had claims on the northern districts of Tipu, their exclusion would have caused controversies and embarrassments to the English. Apart from military assistance, the Confederacy had many political advantages. It would silence the opposition of the native powers and employ their energies in reducing Tipu.

The Marathas joined the Confederacy for different reasons. Their country was not in immediate danger of Tipu's attack and they were not genuinely interested in protecting the Raja of Travancore. Nana was anxious to put down the growing power of Tipu, which obstructed the Maratha activity in the South. Their territories in the Krishna region were in Tipu's hands and their recovery was their cherished dream. Even their previous war in 1786 against Tipu had not been successful in accomplishing its main object. This was no great credit to their arms. Nana was, therefore, determined to make speedy amends for the Maratha setback. That was why when Cornwallis proposed an offensive alliance in 1787, Nana not only responded favourably but also suggested measures which would quickly reduce Tipu's power⁵³. The alliance did not materialize then, as the English were not prepared to attack Tipu unprovoked.⁵⁴

Besides, the increasing jealousy between Mahadajee Sindhia and Nana Farnavis was another factor. Sindhia had created a separate

kingdom in the north which he had consolidated by his military skill and diplomacy. But his ambition prompted him to extend his control over the whole of the Maratha Empire.⁵⁵ His interests clashed with those of Nana who was equally ambitious of strengthening his position. But Nana lacked the military skill of Sindhia whose dashing exploits in the north had given him due prominence in the Maratha Confederacy. In contrast to that, the Marathas under Nana had suffered a setback in their war against Tipu, despite their alliance with the Nizam. Nana was no soldier, all his ingenuity being confined to diplomacy. His shrewd and subtle mind conceived, therefore, that the Maratha power in the south should be built up by other methods—through an alliance with the English. What Sindhia had accomplished through great risk and war, Nana wanted to do at less cost and exertion. Moreover, Sindhia had scored a point even in the diplomatic field in the Treaty of Salbai, but Nana had no such striking achievement to his credit. As a compensation, he sometimes meditated the despatch of an embassy to England, seeking British aid for the reduction of the whole of India “to the power of the Marathas in the Peshwa’s person.”⁵⁶ Hastings had encouraged Sindhia but Cornwallis wanted to favour Nana, as the activities of Sindhia in the north caused grave concern to the English.⁵⁷ Moreover, the Poona Court was better suited to serve the British interests on account of its proximity to Tipu’s dominions and its anxiety to recover the lost territories. Nana was less preoccupied than Sindhia who was engaged in subjugating the rulers of Rajputana.⁵⁸ When Nana was prepared to co-operate, there remained no necessity for the English to seek the alliance of any other Maratha chief.

Having agreed to join the alliance, Nana delayed the execution of the final treaty because he wanted to exact the most advantageous terms for the Marathas. Nana was conscious of the English strength, resources, discipline and diplomacy and he knew that they would become the masters of the country unless enough safeguards were provided in the treaty. Hence there was a well-defined and clear-cut policy behind his procrastination and his delay in signing the final treaty. The Marathas were not interested in the destruction of Tipu, “whose existence with the prospect of the French Power proving a check upon the English, was considered essential in India’s interest.”⁵⁹ They were mainly concerned in recovering their lost territories.

The Nizam was prompted to join the alliance by factors which had no connection with the immediate causes of the war. He was

seriously agitated by his political dependence on the Marathas. He had offended them by not paying the huge arrears of *chauth* for many years.⁶⁰ He was afraid that they might attack him to recover their dues.⁶¹ Cornwallis exploited the rivalry of these two powers and informed the Nizam that he would not find a better occasion to emancipate himself from the Marathas.⁶² The Nizam was anxious to secure the English aid against the Marathas and insisted that defensive arrangements should be included in the treaty. It was the dread of the Marathas and not of Tipu that compelled him to join the alliance. He was afraid that his refusal might increase the threat of the Marathas who, in the event of an attack by them, would receive the English sanction to reduce him.⁶³ He was not in favour of remaining either neutral or co-operating with Tipu as, in both cases, he would excite the English fury and facilitate the Maratha invasion. Therefore he had no alternative but to join the English.

Thus the aims of the Confederates were not identical. That was why Cornwallis cautioned Kennaway, "I must desire you to keep it for ever uppermost in your mind that the great objects to which I with so much anxiety and indeed almost solely look forward are not the same with those which principally occupy the thoughts of the Nizam or at least of his minister and Meer Abdul Kassim."⁶⁴ The English desired to humiliate Tipu and compel him "to submit to the terms that we may think proper to impose upon him."⁶⁵ The Marathas desired merely to recover their ancient territories but not reduce Tipu to any great extent, which might only facilitate the establishment of British supremacy in India. The Nizam was interested only in preserving the integrity of his state from the hands of the Marathas. He was not very keen on the conquest of Tipu's country. The Nizam and the Marathas, as P. E. Roberts says, "were unwilling allies and rendered no useful aid, but at least they were prevented from joining Mysore."⁶⁶

Tipu's Attempts to break the Confederacy

Tipu tried his best to disengage the Marathas and the Nizam from the English. On the first report of the English negotiations at Poona, he sent his two *vakils* with arrears of tribute to counter the efforts of Malet.⁶⁷ They first went to Wyhe about thirty miles from Poona, where the Rasta family resided in order to seek its mediation. For a long time the Rastas had been the supporters of the cause of Mysore and formed a powerful group in the Poona Court. Tipu hoped to

dissuade the Marathas through inducement of gold in the shape of a large amount of money. The prompt payment of the old arrears of tribute was considered a good device to invoke Nana's sympathy for Tipu. It would be a great help to Tipu, if at least the neutrality of the Marathas was secured. His agents were successful in causing considerable delay in the final execution of the treaty. They had taken with them large sums of money and were authorised to offer even cession of territories in lieu of Maratha neutrality.⁶⁸ The agents exhorted the Poona Court not to join the English by urging that the War would enormously consume resources of the Marathas both in men and money, that the advantages of the Confederacy were doubtful, that the English were unreliable, that Tipu would clear all arrears and that he would pledge to live in peace with them. They personally met the Peshwa on June 8, 1790, despite the protests of Malet.⁶⁹ They prolonged their stay in the Poona Court and wanted to pay the cash they had brought only on securing the guarantee of Maratha neutrality. Their persuasion had some effect on Nana who informed Malet that the Maratha participation in the alliance was a favour to be conferred on the English, as Tipu was courting their friendship and an accommodation with him was possible.⁷⁰ Even as late as July 4, the *vakils* were active and, despite the vehement protests of Malet, Nana tolerated their presence in the Poona Court. The agents had brought fifteen lakhs of rupees, besides the Darbar charges, which they would not pay unless Nana promised neutrality. But the intrigues of Malet were at last successful in securing the dismissal of the agents on August 4, 1790. The *vakils* thus failed in their mission, as Nana was determined to recover the Maratha territories.

Tipu likewise attempted to defeat the English activity in Hyderabad where he had a more powerful group of supporters. Tipu's relations with the Nizam had been vastly improved and the prospects of disengaging the Nizam looked at first much better. The Nizam had himself earlier proposed an alliance of the French, the Marathas, Tipu and himself against the English, and for this purpose he had despatched Soorji Pandit, the Maratha *vakil* at Hyderabad, to Poona.⁷¹ Tipu's party in Hyderabad, consisting of Imtiaz-ud-Daulah and Shams-ul-Umra, were in favour of a close alliance with Tipu. Even after the incident of December 29, the Mysore *vakils* were present in Hyderabad trying their utmost to secure the Nizam's co-operation or at least his neutrality.⁷² But their efforts failed as the Nizam could

not be convinced that his interests would be better served by joining Tipu. The superior diplomacy of the English outwitted the Mysore *rakils*. The embassy of Meer Alam to Calcutta facilitated the English task. The death of Shams-ul-Umra further weakened Tipu's cause. Moreover the dread of the Marathas finally compelled the Nizam to decide in favour of the English.

Thus true to the principle of Toynbee that the growth of a movement depends upon withdrawal and return, the English were adopting in India a technique by which they would alternate their aggressive policy with soft policy. They would sometimes send a dynamic leader who would vigorously extend their dominions, and at other times, a conciliatory leader who would just consolidate their possessions. For nearly a quarter of a century after Clive had acquired the *Diwani* of Bengal, the Company's possessions had not been extended, and hence Cornwallis might have felt that it was high time that the old policy was revived. Moreover, it was a question of retrieving his own reputation that had grievously suffered in the United States where he was compelled to lay down arms at Saratoga. He was very anxious that a similar fate should not overtake him in India, and hence he was careful to rally almost every power round him in order to ensure success. Not only were Nana and the Nizam contacted but also Sindhia, Holkar and Bhonsla, and even the petty chieftains of Malabar. This indicates the dread Tipu had created in the heart of the English. The Confederacy of 1790 was organized not because the English were keen on preserving the integrity of the State of Travancore, but because they desired to use this pretext for crushing Tipu once for all. He had proved too strong for any of the powers including the mighty English, for he had not only concluded the Treaty of Mangalore on his own terms but also ended the Maratha-Nizam War in almost the same fashion. His growing power had caused apprehension in every southern court, although for different reasons. The English were afraid because he was their sworn enemy, and they had never been confronted with a more formidable foe in India. The humiliation of Bailley and Braithwaite was too fresh in their memory. They were aware that Tipu's embassies to Turkey and France were conceived with designs to subvert their power, and that his intrigues even in the court of the Marathas and the Nizam were directed to the same purpose. His kingdom produced the rich commodities which were in great demand in the European markets, but they had no access to these. He was still in league with the French

who were their most serious rivals and who had been instrumental in bringing about the loss of their dominion in America. In short Tipu was a thorn in their flesh, and they could not have peace until it was removed. The Marathas joined the Confederacy for their own reasons. They were just keen on recovering their territories in the north of Mysore. They tried to recover them through their war of 1785-7, but had not been able to accomplish the objective fully. Moreover, the survival of the Maratha Confederacy depended upon the performance of something spectacular by each of the Maratha leaders. Sindhia had proved his worth both in diplomacy and on the battle field. But Nana had yet to establish his claim as the undisputed leader of the Confederacy. He had gone to war against Tipu but the purpose had remained unaccomplished. With British co-operation there was now a chance to make good the loss. However, the Maratha policy was not total destruction of Tipu, but just cutting him to size. They were aware that his elimination would increase the English power so much as to be a threat to their own existence. That was the reason why the Marathas did not join the English later during the Fourth Mysore War. But the Nizam's policy was quite different. He had no principle of his own. When the English and the Marathas were going to war, he could not just stand aloof. Not to have joined them would have invited the hostility of both. He had no particular reason to oppose Tipu in this war. He had more reason to be afraid of the Marathas than Tipu, and still he joined the Confederacy, because he wanted to win the goodwill of the English, and keep them on his side just in case the Marathas were to turn against him. How utterly wrong he was in his expectations became very clear in 1795 in the battle of Kurdla, where the Marathas nearly finished him, but the English did not send a single soldier to his aid. In short the Confederacy of 1790 was the result of diverse factors that converged only on one common ground viz., the prospects of gain to everyone in the war. Each of the Confederates was motivated by some peculiar reason of his own. The English were guided by political motives to eliminate their rival once for all, or at least to clip the claws of the tiger so much as to disable him for ever. The Marathas were guided by the territorial ambition of recovering their losses in the Krishna region. Moreover, Nana was interested in boosting his own prestige in the eyes of the other Maratha leaders, who might otherwise attempt to interfere in the affairs of Poona. As for the Nizam, it was just the question of his own survival. He dared not remain neutral, much

less join hands with Topl. when his neighbours had decided to make war on him. Hence strange circumstances brought about a powerful Confederacy which proved far-reaching in its effects. Frank moved his from that time until in another fifteen years, i.e., by about 1815 there was not a single Indian power to challenge the British supremacy, thanks to the short-sighted policy of the Indian govern.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Cornwallis to Maber. Jan. 27. 1791. *Sec. Fraz.*
2. Cornwallis to Maber. June 7. 1791. *ibid.*
3. *Id.*
4. *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*
6. *Cons.* March 22. 1791. *Vol. Fraz.*
7. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 42.
8. *ibid.* No. 42.
9. Maber to Cornwallis. Feb. 24. 1791. *Cons.* March 24. 1791 *Sec. Fraz.*
10. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 42.
11. *Cons.* March 24. 1791. *Vol. Fraz.*
12. *Mitchison.* Vol. VII. p. 46.
13. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 42.
14. G. G. to Maber. May 11. 1791. *Sec. Fraz.*
15. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 43.
16. *ibid.*
17. Maber to Cornwallis. March 24. 1791. *Vol. Fraz.*
18. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 42.
19. The controversy was about the three terms, *Circa*, *District* and *Fergana*. Maber desired to apply the term *Circa* to those territories of Topl. which were on the eastern and southern sides of Mysore, contiguous to the Company's possessions. But he applied the word "district" to those parts which once belonged to the Marathas. But the *Fergana*, according to him, was a smaller unit, more or less like a taluk, a number of which would make a district or a *circa*. Maber differed from this view and interpreted that the terms *Circa*, *Samsathan*, *Fergana* or district were all synonymous.
20. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 42.
21. *ibid.*
22. Cornwallis to Maber. April 17. 1791. *Sec. Fraz.*
23. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 42.
24. *ibid.* Vol. III. No. 42.
25. *ibid.*
26. *ibid.* No. 43.
27. Cornwallis to Maber. April 22. 1791. *Sec. Fraz.*
28. Cornwallis to Kemavay. April 3. 1791. *ibid.*
29. *ibid.*
30. *PRC.* Vol. III. No. 43.

31. Kennaway to Malet, April 16, 1790, *Sec. Proc.*
32. *ibid.*, May 31, 1790.
33. Cornwallis to Kennaway, April 12, 1790, *Sec. Proc.*
34. *ibid.*
35. Kennaway to Cornwallis, May 28, 1790, *Pol. Proc.*
36. Cornwallis to Malet, March 8, 1790, *Pol. Proc.*
37. *ibid.*, March 28, 1790.
38. Cornwallis to Palmer, May 20, 1790, *Sec. Proc.*
39. *Pol. Proc.*, Oct. 22, 1790, Const. No. 10.
40. Cornwallis to Palmer, May 20, 1790, *Sec. Proc.*
41. *PRC*, Vol. III, No. 109.
42. *Pol. Proc.*, Oct. 22, 1790.
43. *ibid.*, Oct., 20, 1790.
44. Cornwallis to Malet, Feb. 28, 1790, *Sec. Proc.*
45. Cornwallis to Malet, March 8, 1790, *ibid.*
46. *PRC*, Vol. III, No. 61 and 63.
47. Cornwallis to Malet, Feb. 28, 1790, *Sec. Const.*
48. Cornwallis to Meer Alam, April 5, 1790, *Pol. Proc.*
49. Meer Alam to Cornwallis, March 18, 1790, *Pol. Proc.*
50. Letters to Court, Feb. 15, 1790, *Pol. Dept.*, Paras 50-55.
51. Letters to Court, Feb. 15, 1790, Vol. I.
52. *ibid.*, April 12, 1790.
53. *Sec. Proc.*, Oct. 28, 1787, Malet to Cornwallis.
54. *ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1785.
55. Duff, Vol. II, p. 463.
56. *PRC*, Jan. 8, 1790, Vol. II, No. 88.
57. Cornwallis to Malet, March 8, 1790, *Pol. Proc.*
58. *ibid.*, March 24, 1790.
59. Sardesai, Vol. III, p. 154.
60. *ibid.*, p. 185.
61. *Sec. Proc.*, *Const.*, May 31, 1790.
62. *ibid.*, June 7, 1790.
63. Malet to Cornwallis, July 6, 1790, *ibid.*
64. Cornwallis to Kennaway, June 7, 1790, *ibid.*
65. Cornwallis to Kennaway, April 29, 1790, *ibid.*
66. Roberts, *History of British India*, p. 234.
67. *PRC*, Vol. III, No. 80.
68. *PRC*, Vol. III, No. 108.
69. *ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 123.
70. *ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 83.
71. *Mackenzie Mss.* Vol. LXVI, p. 56.
72. Letters to Eng., April 12, 1790.

CHAPTER VII

DIPLOMACY DURING THE THIRD MYSORE WAR (1790 - 1791)

TIPU DID NOT CEASE HIS ATTEMPTS to break the Confederacy even after the declaration of War. He carried on correspondence with important persons in both the Indian Courts to disengage them from the English and to terminate the War on better terms. By offering attractive concessions, he endeavoured to secure their withdrawal from the War. He opened negotiations even with the English. He wrote to General Medows in May 1790, professing his friendship and proposing to send a *vakil* to settle all disputes.¹ But the English rejected his offer and demanded reparations both to them and to their allies as a necessary pre-requisite for peace.² At that early stage of military operations, the English had not yet formulated their demands and Tipu was not prepared to make reparations.³

Tipu knew very well that the English would not pay heed to his overtures unless he waged war upon them. His sudden attack on Gajalhatti pass, the defeat of Colonel Floyd and the failure of the plans of Medows and Maxwell to invade Mysore, prompted Tipu again to open his negotiations. He treated the English prisoners well. The Madras Government wrote, "We have great satisfaction in observing that Tipu's engagements with Captain Evans were scrupulously adhered to and the troops composing the garrison which consisted of 317, including officers, were treated with respect and dispatched with a flag of truce to General Medows."⁴ Tipu sent his own escort of cavalry to deliver these prisoners to the General at Coimbatore on October 17, 1790. When at a later date a few more prisoners were captured at Erode, Tipu released them also.⁵ He was constantly writing to Medows expressing his desire to conclude the War.⁶ But the English were not willing to treat with him.

The advantages which Tipu gained in the first phase of the War by his sudden march to Coimbatore and by the destruction of the English magazines at Erode and Satyamangalam made the English apprehensive lest he should exploit the opportunity to break the alliance. Cornwallis, therefore, decided in December 1790 to proceed and take the personal command of the War. Though the English had employed the best army in the War, they had not proved effective. Cornwallis confessed within a few months that the War "swallowed up a large portion of the fruits of my three years' economy."⁷ The English were afraid that Tipu might intimidate the other two Confederates into negotiations for a separate peace.⁸ Cornwallis grew so desperate that he wrote to Bishop Litchfield, "I have in this war everything to lose and nothing to gain. I shall derive no credit for beating Tipu and shall be for ever disgraced if he beats me."⁹

Tipu being conscious of the fact that it was a temporary setback in the English affairs, opened his negotiations again after Cornwallis assumed the command. He wrote to the English that he was desirous of a separate accommodation with them.¹⁰ He ascribed his rupture with them to the instigation of self-interested parties. To settle all the disputes peacefully, he requested Cornwallis either to depute a proper person of rank to him or receive his own representative who would explain all the particulars.¹¹ But Cornwallis declined these proposals as he regarded Tipu as an aggressor "who had insulted the English in the eyes of the princes of Hindustan."¹² But he was prepared to open negotiations on one condition, namely, that Tipu should agree to pay reparations both to the English and their allies and that he should submit his peace proposals in writing.¹³ Tipu in his reply explained his position that he meant no insult to the English and again urged Cornwallis to receive a representative.¹⁴ But no reply was received, for Cornwallis was not interested in concluding the War which was "extremely popular amongst Englishmen in India because it meant profits."¹⁵

With the advent of Cornwallis, the events of the War turned favourable to the English, who captured Bangalore. Tipu renewed his overtures and desired to send a confidential person as no important matters could be committed to writing.¹⁶ But Cornwallis again turned down the offer.¹⁷ Tipu then invited the French to intervene and the French Governor, De Fresne, accordingly sounded the English assuring them that Tipu was sincere in his proposals. Cornwallis prescribed the same condition of a written statement of reparations from Tipu which

would be considered by the Confederates.¹⁸ Tipu continued his efforts to induce the English to accept separate terms. When, on May 15, 1791, Cornwallis proposed an exchange of the wounded prisoners, Tipu responded favourably and added that he would send an agent with peace proposals.¹⁹ Far from relaxing the reparations demand, Cornwallis imposed further conditions of "sufficient security, pledges or hostages" for entering into any negotiations with Tipu. If Tipu accepted these proposals, Cornwallis would summon a congress of the Confederates to discuss the terms of a general peace. If the negotiations failed, he promised to release Tipu from the pledges and restore the hostages. He insisted on just concessions and compensations to the Company and its allies.²⁰ These proposals were naturally unacceptable to Tipu as they demanded not only reparations but also securities and hostages. He replied that he would stand by his word of honour and that there was no necessity for pledges, securities and hostages.²¹ He assured that the other two Confederates would not object to his peace proposals and only the English had to make up their mind.²² But these proposals were also destined to fail.

With his closer approach to Srirangapatna Cornwallis grew more rigid and demanded harsher terms. But events took an adverse turn for the English whose army suffered miserably from the inclemency of the weather, fatigue, epidemics and the scarcity of grain. Want of provisions reduced them "to the necessity of subsisting chiefly on the putrid flesh of the dead bullocks and to add to the distress small-pox raged in the camp."²³ Cornwallis grew desperate, "My spirits are almost worn out, and, if I cannot soon overcome Tipu, I think the plagues and mortifications of this most difficult war will overcome me."²⁴ He was compelled to withdraw from Srirangapatna and commenced his "melancholy and mortifying march" towards Bangalore.

Hoping that this reversal would oblige Cornwallis to accept peace proposals, Tipu renewed his negotiations. The Governor-General relaxed his condition of written statement of terms and consented to receive Tipu's agent at Bangalore where he would consult the other Confederates also.²⁵ On May 27, 1791, Tipu sent a flag of truce with baskets of fruits and letters to Cornwallis who declined the present and replied that Tipu should first release all prisoners and consent to a truce.²⁶ Cornwallis thus suddenly shifted from his previous conciliatory stand, as his military conditions were now improved by the joining of the Maratha army.

The next phase in Tipu's negotiations with the English commenced

when Haripant joined Cornwallis. The English victories in the War excited the Maratha jealousy who wanted to check the British supremacy. Moreover as Tipu had endeavoured earnestly to induce them also to a peace, Haripant made an effort to mediate. He prevailed upon Cornwallis not to insist upon a written statement of terms from Tipu. The allies should be interested only in knowing whether Tipu was sincere in his peace proposals or not. He felt that there was no harm in receiving Tipu's agent as no decision could be taken unless the mutual consent of every Confederate was obtained. "If the terms proposed by Tipu were acceptable, a general congress could be summoned to discuss the peace."²⁷

Tipu was in constant correspondence with Haripant. On June 1, 1790 he addressed him a letter intimating the deputation of Appaji Ram and Srinivasa Rao as his envoys to discuss the terms of peace.²⁸ At first Haripant was reluctant to receive them and made the same condition as Cornwallis's that Tipu should convey his proposals through writing.²⁹ But Tipu wrote, "In so far as issues of major importance were concerned, the secrets of the hearts could only be conveyed by word of mouth."³⁰ The Marathas resented the uncompromising policy of the English and compelled Cornwallis to yield. Haripant was at last able to inform Tipu that if he should write separately to the three powers expressing his desire for peace, then the Confederates would consent to receive his envoys.³¹ The three parties appointed their representatives to meet Tipu's envoy, Appaji Ram, who was sent by him with letters to all the Confederates. Early in August he arrived at Bangalore and proceeded to the Maratha camp.³² Another *vakil*, Jalaluddin, was expected to join him soon. They were asked to go to Hossur where accommodation was provided for them. Cornwallis held a conference with Haripant on August 8 to discuss the procedure of the negotiations. He proposed to send a person from each of the parties to meet Tipu's *vakils*, but not to admit them into the allied camp. Haripant protested against this as it was contrary to the established rules and against the customs of Poona. Tipu had exhibited a genuine desire for peace and had complied with all the conditions and hence Haripant was in favour of inviting the *vakils* to the allied camp. Cornwallis did not agree to this and felt that the Confederates were not committed to a personal interview. He tried to draw a distinction between a *vakil* from a friendly power and another from an enemy. The latter, he regarded, was not entitled to an honourable reception from the allies. He still doubted the sincerity

of Tipu for peace. Moreover admitting an enemy's agent would be risky as it might lead to the leaking out of military secrets if the negotiations broke down. A personal interview with *rakils* was felt premature until the nature of Tipu's concessions were known. If his reparations were acceptable to all the parties, the *rakils* could then be admitted to a personal audience.⁵³ Cornwallis impressed upon Haripant that it was a delicate point involving intricate diplomacy and hence it should be tactfully dealt with. He advised him, therefore, to delegate these preliminary functions to subordinates. Haripant finally approved these proposed measures and Appaji Ram was accordingly informed of all this. But Tipu's *rakil* regretted that his orders did not permit him to treat with subordinates and insisted on his reception by and residence in the Confederates' camp. Appaji Ram's refusal broke down the negotiations. Cornwallis was also unconcerned about this result. He wrote, "I have not, however, been attentive to proposals of peace though Haripant permitted two of Tipu's *rakils* to come to the neighbourhood of allies' camp."⁵⁴ He was apprehensive that the Marathas would assume the chief role of mediators and that Tipu had caused dissensions among the allies. He suspected the Maratha conduct. "In the business of the *rakils* I have hitherto defeated the designs of Haripant who appears to have taken them under his protection and judging by an unguarded letter which Appaji Ram wrote seems to have promised to introduce them to me."⁵⁵ Haripant and Appaji Ram held private conferences, which the Maratha general defended on the ground of his old acquaintance with the *rakil*. Cornwallis did not approve of this and wrote to Malet "that in conducting negotiations, a power cannot at the same time be a party and a mediator."⁵⁶

Though Tipu had approached all the three Confederates with proposals to break the alliance, yet he concentrated his efforts more on the Marathas. His diplomacy had the desired effect of slackening the Maratha enthusiasm for the War. He offered them attractive concessions for their withdrawal from the alliance and held out the hope that they would become the chief mediators of peace. The successive English victories excited their jealousy, which Tipu exploited for his purpose. He convinced them that after his destruction, the English would reduce the Marathas. He employed the agency of the Rasta family to influence the Poona Court to withdraw from the alliance. In October 1790, he sent his *rakils* to the Rasta family at Bagalkot informing them of his military success in the first phase

of the War³⁷. Ali Reza, who was Tipu's *vakil*, was asked to proceed from Bagalkot to Poona to reside with the Peshwa and carry on the delicate negotiations.³⁸ But Nana was not prepared to receive the agent and laid down very harsh terms which Tipu rejected.³⁹ When Tipu renewed his negotiations with the English, Nana was enraged and offered fresh proposals to Tipu through Rasta which were also unacceptable to him.⁴⁰ The cession of the whole of Tipu's northern territories in addition to the payment of a large sum by way of tribute were considered exorbitant demands. Nana disclosed the secret overtures of Tipu to Malet.⁴¹ However, Nana had informed Tipu that in case of his demands being complied with, he would so manage the negotiations "as to prevent the operations of the Maratha armies being very destructive during the measures he may adopt for setting on foot negotiations."⁴² But the unjust harshness of the other proposals of Nana made any further negotiations impossible.

When the English response to the proposals of peace was not favourable, Tipu again turned to the Marathas in January 1791. But Nana did not encourage these negotiations and put forward the same condition that the consent of the other Confederates was equally essential.⁴³ The failure of these overtures helped only the English who urged the Marathas to further activity in seizing Tipu's country. They even persuaded Nana to take the field in person which would expedite the operations of the War.⁴⁴ Nana declined these suggestions, as a protracted war would serve his interests better which would ultimately exhaust the resources of both the English and Tipu.

Tipu approached not only the several high dignitaries of the Confederacy but even the subordinate chiefs whom he desired to win over with bribes.⁴⁵ The English were considerably annoyed at his efforts. He deputed Appaji Ram to Parsaram Bhao, to the great annoyance of the English.⁴⁶ Malet protested strongly, but the overtures continued. The fall of Bangalore and the march of the English towards Srirangapatna alarmed Nana, lest Cornwallis should become the sole arbiter of the peace.⁴⁷ But Tipu's efforts again failed, as Parsaram Bhao was a personal enemy of Tipu, who even refused to grant an interview to Appaji Ram.⁴⁸ Undeterred by this failure, Tipu approached Haripant, the Supreme commander of the Maratha force and the third in rank among the chiefs of the Poona court. Appaji Ram proceeded to his camp and persuaded him to undertake the mediation.⁴⁹ The effects of this step were favourable as it brought about a deliberate deviation in the original Maratha plan of opera-

tions.⁵⁰ Tipu had at the same time sent a *vakil*, named Mehdi Ali Khan, to the Nizam and the English suspected that a serious conspiracy was hatched by the Nizam's court in concert with Haripant and Govinda Rao.⁵¹ Nana who was not informed of these developments, expressed his surprise.⁵² But even these efforts were frustrated by the vigilance and skilful diplomacy of the English. However, they paved the way for Appaji Ram's embassy to the camp of the Confederates "at the warm instances of Haripant."⁵³ When Cornwallis proposed that the allies should appoint representatives to meet Appaji Ram, Nana was not inclined to delegate the powers to anyone, as he desired to keep the negotiations in his own hands.⁵⁴ There was considerable difficulty in securing Nana's consent to the appointment of a representative and only with great reluctance he authorized Haripant to conduct the negotiations.⁵⁵ In the alternative, Nana himself would have had to take the command of the forces, for which he was not willing. When Appaji Ram proceeded to the allies' camp, Nana desired Tipu's proposals to be communicated to him for consideration. When it was argued that the powers had been delegated to Haripant to avoid a reference being made every time to Poona, Nana refused to accept this procedure and denied to Haripant the right of negotiating peace. Cornwallis was perplexed and wrote, "Neither of the Confederates has a right to put the other into inconvenience by unnecessarily protracting any negotiations that may be opened."⁵⁶ Malet compelled Nana to delegate adequate powers to Haripant or any other person. But Haripant claimed that he had been already invested with the necessary powers. This controversy led the English to think that Nana was playing a double game.⁵⁷ Thus there were differences among the Confederates, which Tipu tried to exploit. But the failure of Appaji Ram's embassy did not improve the prospects of peace.

The English were not satisfied with the Maratha conduct of the War. They attributed the change in Nana's attitude to the intrigues of Tipu. Despite their best efforts, the Poona Court would not be stirred to activity. It was the earnest wish of Cornwallis that the Peshwa should himself lead the command, following the English example, and he persuaded him to do so. But Behro Pant explained that such a decision would slacken rather than improve the Maratha enthusiasm for the War. It would lead to unnecessary complications and difficulties in the way of peace, as the Peshwa might insist on equality of powers and other privileges on the ground of his high rank. In support of his argument he quoted an instance, that the Peshwa

would not have denied an audience to Appaji Ram if he had been present in the theatre of the War.⁵⁸ Therefore, the Poona ministry pleaded that his absence from the scene of action was a decided advantage to Cornwallis. It would give him sole discretionary powers and would add to the solidarity of the command. But this was not the sincere feeling of Nana but only an evasive explanation. Malet attempted in vain to urge Nana to quicken war activities and to take advantage of Tipu's adverse circumstances, which were evident from his constant overtures of peace. He pleaded that a vigorous attack would end the War and place before the allies unprecedented advantages.⁵⁹ But Nana would not be induced. The dismissal of Appaji Ram's embassy had not received the approval of the Maratha Court, which regretted the English action. The Peshwa himself addressed a letter to Cornwallis expressing his displeasure.⁶⁰ He felt that the mission would have at least revealed the real intentions of Tipu and hence ought not to have been dismissed.

The causes of Nana's lukewarm policy were various. The English ascribed it to the intrigues of Tipu, but the Poona Court, to natural causes. Bhao could not proceed because of the scarcity of provisions and Haripant was impeded by financial distress.⁶¹ Moreover, the Marathas were preoccupied with their affairs in the north and with the dissensions between Sindhia and Holkar. Nana's poor health was another factor. But these were only plausible causes, the real intention of Nana being the prolongation of the War between Tipu and the English. The War brought to the surface the Maratha-Nizam jealousy also. On one occasion Parsaram Bhao actually captured Khengheri, the Nizam's outpost, which he resented, and threatened to send Hashmat Jang to recover it by force.⁶² Cornwallis regretted that the mutual jealousies of his allies retarded the progress of the War and he alone was burdened with the prosecution of a dangerous war. The growing power of Sindhia in the north was another cause of apprehension to the English. Sindhia was interested in a protracted war in the South so that he might complete the process of conquest in the north. He was afraid that an early termination of the War would compel not only the English but also the Poona court to interfere with his ambitious programme. But the English felt relief when they saw the mutual rivalries of the Marathas would not prompt Sindhia to draw the Peshwa from the Confederacy, compelling them to conclude a premature peace. Thus a variety of forces prevented the Confederacy from being disrupted and Tipu's efforts to force an

early peace failed. Nana's policy was to exploit the adverse circumstances of both the Company and Tipu to promote his own interests. This attitude was so much resented that Malet bitterly wrote, "My Lord, I will here once for all make an explicit declaration that I believe these people as incapable of pursuing their object by direct means as the serpent is of proceeding in a straight line."⁶³

Tipu carried on constant correspondence with the Nizam and his advisers, Azim-ul-Umra, Mohamed Amin Arab and Tejwant Singh and induced them to withdraw from the War. He even invoked the religious sympathy of the Nizam that harmony between two principal powers of the Deccan would serve the interests of both better. But Tipu's influence in the Hyderabad court diminished with the death of Shams-ul-Umra. Tipu therefore wrote to the Nizam's officers and at first addressed a letter to Mohamed Amin Arab, expressing his desire to send a *vakil* to conclude the War. But the response was unfavourable and Tipu was accused of faithlessness.⁶⁴ Tipu then wrote to Azim-ul-Umra requesting his mediation and intimating the despatch of Mehdi Ali Khan on a confidential mission. The letter was accompanied with rich presents.⁶⁵ Receiving no reply to these overtures, Tipu wrote again seeking the Nizam's intervention to terminate the War. He even sought the mediation of Bakhsi Begum, the Nizam's consort.⁶⁶ The minister replied that Tipu had broken all his engagements and the Nizam would not mediate on his behalf.⁶⁷

Tipu then addressed the Nizam directly and made a moving appeal that the interests of their religion and their kingdoms demanded the co-operation of the two. "You will please suggest the ways and means for affording protection to the honour, life and property of the people who in fact constitute a unique trust held for 'God', the Real Master."⁶⁸ This appeal was rejected and Tipu was once again accused of aggression, cruelty and intolerance. Tipu was informed that peace could be concluded only on the lines given notice of by the English.⁶⁹ But Tipu incessantly endeavoured to impress on the Nizam that his ambition was "to strengthen the bond of union with the rulers of Hindustan and more specially with the Nizam in such a manner as to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies."⁷⁰ Mir Zain-ul-Abideen, who was in the service of Tipu, invited his brother, Meer Abul Khasim (Meer Alam) to Srirangapatna to enable Tipu to avail himself of his good-offices to persuade the Nizam. Zain-ul-Abideen wrote to Azim-ul-Umra impressing on him the necessity of unity and friendship.⁷¹

But Tipu's efforts failed, as he got in return the Nizam's admoni-

tions that he was guilty of persecution, banishment of his poor and helpless subjects and destruction of numerous flourishing cities.⁷² Nevertheless, Tipu despatched his *vakil*, Mehdi Ali Khan, to the Nizam's Court to disengage him from the alliance, in return for attractive concessions.⁷³ The *vakil* managed to go as far as Paungal, only fifteen miles from Hyderabad, which excited the English jealousy, and they saw to it that he was denied access to the Nizam.⁷⁴ The *vakil*, pretending that the road was beset with hostile *zamindars*, requested Meer Alam to accompany him.⁷⁵ It was alleged that the *vakil* held several meetings with Azim-ul-Umra, though the minister strongly denied this.⁷⁶

Disappointed in these efforts, Tipu wrote to the commanders of the Nizam's army, Tejwant, Mohammed Amin Arab and Asad Ali Khan.⁷⁷ Tejwant was suspected of being corrupted by Tipu and Kennaway lodged a strong protest against him.⁷⁸ In order to prosecute the War more effectively, the Nizam appointed Meer Alam to the command but later sent his own son, Sikandar Jah, and Azim-ul-Umra.⁷⁹ The Nizam desired that no negotiations should be held with Tipu till the minister's arrival and that the English Resident, Kennaway should also accompany them. Though, thinking that Tipu's intrigue might increase, Cornwallis was at first reluctant to permit the absence of both Kennaway and Azim-ul-Umra, he later consented to it.

In spite of the sincerity of the Nizam in collaborating with them in the War, the English suspected duplicity. Kennaway disclosed a proposal, made on November 14, 1791, of a pecuniary grant by Tipu to the Nizam to win over his favour.⁸⁰ After the fall of Bangalore, it was believed that the Nizam and the Marathas might withdraw from the War. Malet thought that the advance of Mehdi Ali Khan as far as Paungal would not have been possible without the consent of the Nizam's court acting in concert with Haripant and Govinda Rao.⁸¹ Despite the utmost exertions of the English, they could not compel the Nizam to a vigorous prosecution of the war. The Confederacy thus exhibited ample evidence of division within itself.

Ever since 1787, Tipu was desirous of securing French aid. For that purpose he had despatched an embassy to France, but it failed owing to the disturbed conditions of France on the eve of the Revolution. The French thereafter adopted strict neutrality in India and wanted to withdraw even their forces from India and station them in the Isle of France. As soon as the war with the English seemed

imminent. Tipu sounded the French in order to secure their assistance.⁵² The chief of the French Squadron, Macnamara, arrived at Mahé in December 1789 and desired to meet Tipu, who held an interview with him near the Travancore lines early in 1790. Macnamara was greatly impressed by the discipline of the Mysore troops. Tipu sent through him rich presents to the King of France, and letters soliciting French aid to the extent of 2,000 soldiers.⁵³ He undertook to bear all the cost of their despatch from the Isle of France and to send them back soon after the war was over. Tipu wrote a letter to Luzerens, requesting him to recommend the sanction of the troops he had applied for.⁵⁴ But Macnamara was killed in the Isle of France and Tipu's letters, written on April 24, 1790, reached Paris only on January 31, 1791.⁵⁵

After the actual outbreak of the war, Tipu sent two more letters to Louis XVI and contacted the French Governor in India soliciting military aid. He assured him that he would come to the French rescue, if Pondicherry was attacked by the English.⁵⁶ Tipu himself proceeded to the vicinity of Pondicherry in November 1790 and sent Zainul Abideen to its Governor to secure the French co-operation. Not being encouraged in his negotiations, he once again thought of sending an envoy to France with presents and letters. N. Leger, Civil Administrator in India, who knew the Persian language and who was the medium of Tipu's negotiations with the Governor of Pondicherry, was despatched to France, soliciting an aid of 5,000 troops whose expenses would be borne by Tipu. This appeal was also turned down as France was then in the midst of the Revolution. Louis XVI and his minister for Marines, Bertrand de Mouville, were eager to help Tipu, "but it was not in their hands to render assistance." The French Minister, Luzerne, wrote to the Governor, Fresne, to observe strict neutrality. On May 13, 1790, Comte de Conway informed Cornwallis that they would not support Tipu and that no treaty of alliance subsisted between him and the French. In accordance with the instructions from Europe, the French decided to remain strictly neutral in the war. Tipu was informed accordingly.

The French thought that Tipu had initiated a war with the English at a wrong moment. The Governor of Pondicherry, De Fresne, had written to Vicomte de Souillac, "The Prince is badly counselled but he will take profit of good advice that we will give him."⁵⁷ The advice the French gave to Tipu was to win over the Marathas at all costs. The French Governor at the Isle of France urged him to spare neither

money nor energy in dissolving the Confederacy. Tipu had written to him two letters requesting for a force of 5,000.⁸⁸ In reply Tipu received a letter which mentioned, "Do not engage big battles, but attack your enemies as often as possible to fatigue them. Do not allow them to have food or fodder . . . write to the Marathas and the Nizam; tell them your interests, that your enemies are also theirs. . . . The time has come to get rid of all those enemies. Otherwise they would put all the princes in jail as they have done before. . . . Make big monetary sacrifices, trust in what I tell you . . . what is the use of money? I hope your fame will surpass your father's. Your father showed the way to Delhi. It is left to you to go there and show yourself full of glory to the whole of Asia."⁸⁹

The reason why the French were not inclined to help Tipu was not only their distressed conditions at home during the Revolutionary days but also the consciousness of the fact that Cornwallis commanded the resources of three Presidencies, besides those of his Confederates. No doubt they knew the military abilities of Tipu, but the parties were greatly unequal. De Fresne observed, "In his position, I think, he must be afraid to commit his fort to the hazard of a battle."⁹⁰ They felt that Tipu should either conclude peace with the English or win over the Marathas and the Nizam. They did not regard the dissolution of the Confederacy an impossible thing as these were "quite ordinary Indian tricks."⁹¹ Another cause of the French indifference towards Tipu was their belief that he was not very keen on securing their aid. Marechal de Castries felt that Tipu knew well the French position but he had still made a request for help only to frighten the Marathas and the Nizam. Castries wrote, "In a way, I am sure that he does not positively expect such help, and since I know the politics of the *sarkar* of Tipu, I think he has dictated those letters with emphasis in his *darbar* and copies of them must have been sent to the Marathas and the Nizam and to all other Indian princes. If it was otherwise, it would be a big mistake to imagine that the demand will be so easy to execute."⁹² Therefore the French at first did not expressly deny Tipu any help but only informed him that they had reported to the authorities at home about the unjust war that his enemies had declared against him and that there was some hope that the French King would consent to his request.⁹³ Castries wrote to Tipu, "If I get some orders, I will not lose any time, but it is impossible for me to leave the post which is entrusted to me. Though there are some troops

in Mauritius, I cannot dispose of them at my will. Moreover the difficulty of the transport of troops over such a long distance prevents me from taking any positive step."⁹⁴ Tipu was further informed, "you must be aware that one cannot prepare for the war in a day. If the King were to act very quickly, the forces could not be sent before one year. Until that time resist the English and make sacrifices to win over the Marathas to your side."⁹⁵ But the revolutionary events in France did not permit these promises to be fulfilled and Tipu was finally informed that the French would remain neutral.

Thus after the declaration of the War Tipu concentrated all his efforts on breaking the Confederacy which in India was not a difficult job as no alliance was held sacrosanct by any of the parties. Haidar, for instance had successfully disengaged the Confederacy of the very same powers during the First Mysore War, and Hastings had broken a more powerful Confederacy during the Second Mysore War. But Tipu's efforts were unfortunately not successful for certain reasons. First neither the Marathas nor the Nizam had any effective say in the affairs of this War, for it was mainly a war between the English on one hand and Tipu on the other with the Marathas and the Nizam acting on the sidelines merely as auxiliaries to the English. In other words, it was something like a wolf and a fox hunting in the company of a lion. The first two could hardly meddle with the intentions of the last. Secondly the Poona Court itself appeared to be divided in making policies. Cornwallis decided that the Peshwa should command the Maratha army but as this was not possible, Haripant was put in charge. In the eighteenth century political authority was normally attached to the band-wagon of military leadership. This was nowhere more evident than in the functioning of the Maratha courts. Nana was a political genius, not a military leader. Naturally, in the midst of War he had to yield a part of his power to Haripant. Tipu was at a loss to know who was more powerful and whose voice was more decisive, Nana's or Haripant's. He approached both but found their ideas conflicting. Haripant was for accommodation with Tipu but Nana, who was under the influence of Malet, would not so easily budge. Hence the negotiations dragged on and often came very near success. His envoys and agents were present both at the Poona court and in the Maratha camp, but want of a clear policy on the part of the Marathas killed all hopes of a settlement between Tipu and the Marathas. Thirdly, the lack of understanding on Tipu's part in regard to the main objectives of the Confederates

frustrated all his efforts. He induced the Marathas to break from the Confederacy only by the generous offer of money. But the Marathas had not gone to the War merely for the sake of money. They desired to wrest from Tipu their lost territories. Had he been liberal enough to offer to surrender a few of the forts in the Krishna region, Nana would perhaps have yielded. That is what Haidar had done during the Mysore War. Nana was very eager now to prove that he was not second to Sindhia even in extending the frontiers of the Maratha empire. The prospects of securing the territory together with the honour of acting as a mediator might have induced Nana to relent, just as Sindhia had done in 1782. Tipu's lapse in not satisfying this territorial ambition of the Marathas dashed all his hopes to the ground. Tipu should likewise have touched the nerve centre of the Nizam's policy, namely to remove his dread of the Marathas. Having disengaged the Marathas by sacrificing a portion of his kingdom, which once really belonged to the Marathas he would have earned their good will and perhaps they would have agreed to his mediation in settling the Nizam's disputes with them. Such a policy would have involved the loss neither of money nor of territory so far as the Nizam was concerned. If the Nizam and the Marathas were separated, the English, who never listened to any reasonable peace proposals, could have been harassed in a long and protracted war. However, Tipu failed to understand the psychology and the real motives of his Indian neighbours. The Marathas certainly held the key to the whole issue, and Tipu should have considered no price too high to gain their favour. Lastly Tipu's negotiations with the Marathas failed because Cornwallis was extra vigilant. He would not permit Appaji Ram, Tipu's envoy even to visit Haripant. Cornwallis, knew too well the policy of the Indian powers which in the words of Malet, was as crooked as the movement of a serpent which never moves in a straight line. Therefore, Cornwallis was on guard all the time. While Tipu tried to please him by the release of prisoners, by offer of sweets and fruits and by constant correspondence, he could hardly be expected to agree to accommodate him when the prospects of crushing the inveterate foe appeared to be so bright. The English had never been so strong as at this time when they commanded the resources of all their three Presidencies, when their Governor-General himself was in personal command of the war, when they were assured of political, moral and material support from Home Authorities where Henry Dundas, the President of the Board of Control, was a personal friend of Corn-

wallis, and when the English commanded the support of two important Confederates. They never had a better chance to crush Tipu, and they would hardly let go such an opportunity. Therefore, a variety of factors such as the dominant role of the English in the Confederacy, the disunity in the Maratha camp, the failure of Tipu to understand the real motives of the Confederates and the firm determination of the English to beat Tipu, conspired against his attempts to break the Confederates. Although at times the English were reduced to great extremities for want of provisions and owing to outbreak of epidemics and reverses in war, the English tenacity and their firm resolve never to let go the opportunity to cripple Tipu frustrated all his efforts to make peace.

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CHAPTER VIII

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TREATY OF SRIRANGAPATNA

THE LAST PHASE of the war compelled Tipu to sue for peace. All his principal forts even up to the gates of Srirangapatna had fallen into the hands of his enemies and he was deprived of the revenues and supplies from a large part of his kingdom. His efforts to break the Confederacy had failed. Neither his inducements nor their internal differences compelled them to accede to his negotiations. He was not successful in defeating them in the field, as the allies had employed the resources of three big states. For two years he resisted, preferring this to the indignity of submitting to their terms, but the action on the night of February 6, 1792 compelled him to sue for peace. The last campaign of Cornwallis was very swift and decisive. Early in 1792, Tipu was encamped on the outskirts of his capital with strong defences. In January 1792, he had revived his negotiations with Cornwallis expressing his desire for peace.¹ The latter summoned a conference of the allies to discuss the peace proposals, but this also failed like all others. The English insisted on the release of the prisoners taken at Coimbatore as a prerequisite to the peace negotiations.² The military position of the Confederates had vastly improved. Bhao had reduced Bednore and other fertile territories in the north. Abercromby was advancing from Coorg. The Nizam's forces had joined the main army. That was why Tipu had renewed the overtures of peace but the impossibility of releasing the Coimbatore prisoners who had been widely dispersed broke down the negotiations.

By February 6, 1792, Cornwallis had come as near as six miles to Srirangapatna, with an excellent army of 22,000 troops equipped with 44 guns and 42 pieces of battering train. Abercromby commanded a force of 8,400 besides the Maratha and the Nizam armies each of which consisted of a large number of troops. Without the loss of any time, Cornwallis decided to attack, the very day he had

encamped near Srirangapatna. His plans remained such a guarded secret that even the other confederates were kept ignorant of them. Tipu was encamped outside his capital with strong defences of fortified works, and a big army of 40,000 troops equipped with 100 guns. Cornwallis chose the night for attack, being afraid of the strong defences of Tipu. He made a surprise attack on Tipu from three different directions, the centre being commanded by himself, and compelled Tipu to withdraw into the fort. This was a decisive victory for the English, which ended the war. Before dawn, he was in possession of the whole of Tipu's camp, his artillery had been seized and his army scattered. The English army even crossed the river and occupied the mainland towards Lalbagh. Though the fort was still in Tipu's hands, the English commenced preparations to storm it. The situation was gloomy and left him with no alternative but to submit.

Only two alternatives were before him now, either to fight to the last or sue for peace. The former was dangerous, but the latter, though painful, would yet provide him a chance to recover. He decided to sue for peace, however revolting it was to his independent spirit. Therefore he wrote a letter to Cornwallis on 8th February expressing his desire to come to terms and sent it along with Lieutenant Chalmers and other prisoners of war, captured at Coimbatore. The release of one of the Lieutenants, either Chalmers or Nash, was one of the necessary conditions of Cornwallis to entertain any peace proposals. The release of Chalmers and five others convinced Cornwallis of Tipu's sincerity. He consented to conclude the war. Certain other considerations also compelled him to desire peace. He was afraid that the other two Confederates might not support him in undertaking complete reduction of the fort. Without their consent, he had effected a night attack but the total destruction of Tipu would excite their jealousy. He bitterly remarked, "Our allies plague me not a little."² Even politically, it was more useful to allow Tipu to exist as a power than completely destroy him. It would avoid unnecessary complications. Therefore Cornwallis seized the opportunity of Tipu's offer to submit and replied on 11th February that he was willing to receive the envoys of Tipu.⁴

Tipu released the rest of the prisoners on the 12th and sent his *vakils*, Gulam Ali Khan and Ali Reza to the English Camp on the 13th for the peace conference. A tent was erected near the *Id Gah* where the deputies of the allies were ready to hear the proposals. Kennaway on behalf of Cornwallis, Meer Alam that of the Nizam

and Govinda Rao Kale and Bachaji Pandit that of the Peshwa were nominated to carry on the negotiations. After determining the preliminary procedure, they adjourned for the next day. The *vakils* presented Tipu's letter expressing his wish to know the terms on which the allies would make peace.⁵ As Cornwallis did not expect that Tipu would at once propose satisfactory terms to the allies, he presented high demands which were three in number.⁶ First, the cession of a region yielding an annual revenue of three crores of rupees, second, an indemnity of eight crores in ready money and third, the surrender of two of his sons as hostages till the fulfilment of the demands. The *vakils* were shocked to learn these harsh demands and pleaded that it was beyond the capacity of Tipu to comply with them. "The principal ambassador asked where so much treasure and territory were to come from and who was to indemnify his master for the losses he had sustained in the war."⁷ When the *vakils* pleaded the inability of Tipu, they were told that both Azimul-Umrah and Haripant thought that "Tipu could and ought to part with much more than these demands."⁸ The *vakils* argued that the Nizam and the Marathas had no right to obstruct the peace with high demands and that Tipu would adjust his differences with them separately. The establishment of peace with the English was the immediate object for which Tipu had desired to send a personal deputation to Cornwallis. But the *vakils* were informed that it was contrary to the principles of the Confederacy to receive separate deputations and hence Cornwallis rejected their offer. However, the allies were prepared to modify their demands to avoid a protracted negotiation. Cornwallis reduced them to five articles. First, the cession of half of Tipu's country of their choice adjacent to the dominions of the allies, second, payment of an indemnity of six crores of ready cash, third, release of all prisoners since the days of Haidar, fourth, surrender of the two princes as hostages and fifth, the maximum duration for the acceptance of these terms to be till the completion of the English batteries which had been constructed at great speed to reduce the fort. These were set as the irreducible minimum demands, requiring no further discussions, on the rejection of which the tents would be uprooted.⁹ The *vakils* implored that even these were very harsh terms and wanted an extension of time for Tipu's reply till at least the next day, when they would come again with their master's final decision. As for the hostages, they vainly endeavoured to confine the Confederates' choice to the eldest prince, as all the others were still young.

The next day, February 18, the Confederates resumed their work with Ali Reza presenting Tipu's decision, namely his willingness to surrender one-fourth of his country and two crores by way of indemnity. These terms failed to satisfy the allies who threatened to renew the war. Kennaway stated that nothing now remained but to break the conference. The *vakils* held a personal conference among themselves and then announced that one-third of the country would be surrendered, with two and a half crores by way of indemnity. But the allies who asserted that even five crores would not be acceptable to them would not relax their demands. They again threatened to dissolve the conference and uproot the tents. The *vakils* tried their utmost to convince them of the inability of Tipu to meet such exorbitant demands. They denied the possession by Tipu of fabulous treasures and explained that his military establishments and fortifications had depleted his resources. They said that they were even prepared to swear by the *Quran* that their master was not able to pay more than what was offered.¹⁰ If the allies were still unconvinced, they were invited to come and personally inspect the treasures. But the pleadings of the *vakils* had no effect and Kennaway declared "that the actual expenses of the allies on the war would not be met by the whole kingdom of Tipu and his treasures".¹¹ Meer Alam and Bachaji Pandit were also of the same opinion that there could be no reduction in the demands. It looked as if the negotiations were doomed to fail. The *vakils* held another meeting and Gulam Ali announced the offer of half the kingdom and three crores, that being the utmost extent to which his master could go. He pleaded that it was fruitless to expect anything more and even that could be met only by pooling together the resources of the entire kingdom. The Confederates still remained dissatisfied. But the *vakils* persuaded Kennaway to refer their latest offer to Cornwallis seeking his opinion.

Cornwallis was conscious of the fact that his original demands were too high and Tipu would bargain to reduce them. Moreover the situation was such that both parties needed peace. The English were tired of the war and their allies were untrustworthy. If Tipu's offer of half the kingdom, three crores by way of indemnity and the pledge of two sons was not accepted, there was every probability that he would, being oppressed and humiliated, renew the hostilities. He might accomplish by military decision what he failed in open entreaties, by making one more spirited attempt. The Marathas were not in favour of very harsh conditions. These forces compelled Corn-

wallis to accept Tipu's proposals. He held a conference of the allies in which Haripant approved of the English decision. He suggested one modification, an addition of sixty lakhs as "Durbar charges" to be distributed among the principal officers of the war. Mushir-ul-Mulk (Azim-ul-Umrah) proposed that Tipu should not be left with a country yielding more than one crore of rupees and that an indemnity of fifteen crores should be demanded, which was not beyond his capacity to pay¹². But these demands were considered too harsh and were rejected. Haripant insisted on the "Durbar charges" which would be the only reward for their exertions and that it was a customary payment. If sixty lakhs were regarded too much, he was willing to reduce them to thirty or even twentyfive.

On February 19, the consent of the allies was conveyed to the *vakils*. Gulam Ali expressed thanks and settled the new demand of "Durbar charges" at thirty lakhs. All the points of dispute being adjusted, the preliminaries of six articles were drawn up. They were:

1. Cession to the allies of half the kingdom of Tipu, adjacent to their boundaries, and in parts to be fixed at their discretion.
2. Payment of an indemnity of three crores in ready money.
3. Payment of another thirty lakh for Durbar charges.
4. Release of all prisoners held since the days of Haidar Ali Khan.
5. Surrender of two sons of Tipu as pledges for the fulfilment of the first four articles, on whose arrival in the allied camp hostilities should cease.
6. Exchange of the copies of the above articles after having been duly signed and sealed by the parties.

The *vakils* raised three objections: First, they objected to the words "at their discretion" in the first article, which might lead to endless complications. Under its cover Tipu might be deprived of even his ancient possessions; but Kennaway assured them that apportionment would not extend to hereditary dominions.¹³ Second, Ali Reza objected to ready money and enquired whether bullion, jewels and goods would also be accepted. Kennaway clarified that only rupees, *pagodas* and gold *mohars* would be received. Third, regarding the hostages, the *vakils* pleaded that Tipu would be greatly hurt to part with the princes and hence proposed an alternative of sending any other high officer. They returned to the fort to convey these terms to Tipu.

Tipu was conscious of the mischief latent in the condition "at their discretion" which might be applicable to any part of his country like Calicut, Bangalore, Savandroog, Hosur, Roydrug, Bednore and Gutty. As regards the indemnity, he agreed to pay one-half immediately of which 50 lakhs would be ready money, the rest in jewels, goods, houses and elephants. The remaining one-half would be discharged in instalments within a year or less if possible. The Durbar charges should not be mentioned in the preliminaries and should be left to his option for fixing the amount. The release of the prisoners should be mutual. Regarding the hostages, he was willing to deliver one of his sons for "there were family reasons which prevented his parting with them."¹⁴

The *vakils* presented these modified terms on 21st February. Cornwallis declined to restore Calicut to Tipu but he had no objection about Bangalore, Savandroog and Hosur. Secondly, the payment in kind was not acceptable except gold and silver. Thirdly, omission of the Durbar charges was not acceptable. Fourthly, payment of indemnity in instalments was acceptable provided half the Durbar charges was also included in the other half of immediate payment to make the figure of 165 lakhs (half of 3 crore and 30 lakhs). Lastly, the surrender of only one son was not acceptable and no relaxation would be made on that ground. However, any two of the three eldest sons would serve the purpose. The *vakils* pleaded in vain to relax this condition and confine their choice only to the third son, Moizuddeen, who was the favourite of Tipu. As he was tipped as the heir-apparent, Tipu was anxious to provide him the best education and nothing was more suitable than the company of the principal persons of the three states. The eldest Haidar Shah was depicted as highly obnoxious to his father and the second, Abdul Khaliq was sickly. In lieu of the second prince, Tipu would send a principal officer of the State. But these arguments had no effect on the allies.

As Cornwallis was firm on his points, Tipu conceded all of them. The preliminaries were signed, sealed and handed over with the omission of the condition, "the choice of the country to be ceded should be left to the allies." But Cornwallis would not yield even on this omission and the *vakils* had to get it rectified. But they protested strongly against Meer Alam's inclusion of Sira among the ceded districts but the English assured him that no ancient dominion would be taken over. The *vakils* desired a ceasefire immediately on the receipt of the peace terms, duly rectified. On February 24, Cornwallis

ordered the ceasefire. A tent was erected at the *Id Gah* for the princes who arrived there with great pomp on the 26th. They were received with a salute of twenty one guns. The deputies of the allies received them and conducted them to Cornwallis who treated them kindly and presented them each a gold watch. They behaved with great dignity and politeness. Tipu was satisfied with the reception of his sons. Cornwallis paid a visit the next day to the camp of the princes accompanied by other deputies. Pleased with the treatment of the princes, Tipu fired a royal salute from the fort on February 28. On that day he fulfilled another article of the truce by sending one crore and nine and a half lakhs of rupees to the allies.

Adjustment of the Definitive Treaty

Fulfilment of the preliminaries presented no great difficulty. The princes were sent, money was paid, ceasefire was effected and the release of prisoners was ordered. All those who were in custody at Srirangapatna were immediately set free. Abercromby withdrew to a distant place. Stuart was prevented from ravaging Lal Bagh and Ganjam. Tipu in his turn stopped the interception of supplies to the English from the western coast and ordered the cessation of hostilities in Coimbatore, Malabar and Gurrumconda. But the settlement of terms for the definitive treaty confronted both parties with numerous difficulties.

The main difficulty was felt in procuring the correct revenue accounts of income and expenditure which could satisfy the allies. They refused to recognise those as authentic which were presented by Tipu. They were afraid that Tipu was deceiving them by surrendering much less than what was their due. Ali Reza and Subba Rao, Tipu's chief *Paishkar*, brought the different revenue accounts and papers but they failed to convince the allies. They were called fictitious, as they bore no seal or signature of the *Qanungos* and *Serishtedars*. They suspected that the value of certain districts was deliberately raised high and of others brought down in order to cede to the allies as little of the country as possible. They maintained that the estimates of the border territories which were likely to be surrendered were marked high and those of the interior which would be retained by Tipu underestimated. The *vakils* denied these allegations. In support of the validity of accounts Subba Rao proposed an inquiry into the revenue of any adjacent village or district and declared that he staked his own character and reputation on their correctness.¹⁵ These accounts

fixed the total revenue of Tipu's kingdom at two crore seven lakh rupias (70 lakh Karshava Pagodas). Out of this kingdom Tipu would retain an area yielding one crore and ten lakhs. The allies declined to accept this offer and demanded the revenue figures of the first years, 92, 93 and 97.²¹ Further they wanted a bond to be executed by the *rakhs* binding their master to produce accurate accounts under threat of penalty.²² It was alleged that there were grave discrepancies between the estimates of Tipu and the allies for instance the taluk of Volamoor in Gund district yielded 20,800 pagodas according to the Marathas and only 8,800 according to Tipu. Likewise Bednore which was rated at seven lakhs yielded more than twice, and Srirangapatna was grossly undervalued.²³ The Marathas charged that the accounts were deliberately tampered with in order to cheat the allies. Haripuri expressed his desire to obtain Bednore at double the amount fixed by Tipu. On the plea that authentic accounts were not produced, the allies threatened that they would divide the country on the basis of their own accounts.²⁴ The *rakhs* pleaded that the records were destroyed during the campaigns of the war at Bednore, Chikmagalur, Chikital, Dharmav, Ganikavathi, Bangalore and Srirangapatna. Most of the frontier posts whose accounts were required were in the hands of the allies. The fire of February 9th had destroyed the records available in Srirangapatna.

Rejecting the estimates of Tipu, the allies prepared their own plan of partition, fixing the total revenue of Tipu at two crore and sixty lakhs net. Tipu protested against this arbitrary estimate, but ignoring his objections, the allies proceeded to draw the terms of the treaty. Cornwallis ordered the preparation of a separate list of the shares of every Confederate.²⁵ The Company's share was fixed at Rs. 41,45,235 consisting of Baramahal, Salem, Dindigul, Tellich, Kanur, Dharmapuram and Coorg. The Marathas had included in their share Basavapattana, Chikmagalur, Raichur and Hariparahalli. But the last one was dropped at the instance of the English. The shares of the Nizam and the Marathas stood at the figure of 22,57,929 pagodas, and including the share of the English at 43,12,624 pagodas, the share of each party was approximately fourteen lakh pagodas. Tipu's total revenue was estimated by the allies at 86 lakh pagodas of which they desired to appropriate 43 lakhs. But Tipu protested that his revenue was only 70 lakh pagodas of which they were entitled to 25 lakhs. Their appropriation of forty three lakhs was unjust and exceeded by eight lakhs which, he pleaded, should be cut down.

The allies refused to listen to Tipu's protests and drew up a draft of the Definitive Treaty on their own estimates. Kennaway completed it by March 9, 1792 and sent it to Tipu with a note on the exchange-rate of money to be paid by him. The treaty offended Tipu, as it included certain terms which violated the principles already agreed upon. The exchange-rate fixed was highly harmful to Tipu. The inclusion of Coorg in the English share was a flagrant breach of good faith. It was indefensible on any account. It shocked Tipu to find that his ancient dominions, which had been excluded from the terms of partition, were also taken away. The preliminaries had clearly stipulated that only districts adjacent to the borders of the allies would be ceded. Coorg was not adjacent to the English frontiers. Tipu called it one of the doors of Srirangapatna and was hardly more than a day's march. Likewise Dhanyakkana Kottai was very near Bangalore and very remote from the English border. The claims to Shankargiri, Salem, Gutti and Bellary were unjust, as these places were all separated from the borders of any of the powers.²¹ The *vakils* protested that the loss of every stronghold would cripple Tipu and hence requested the revision of the apportionment in the light of the fresh papers procured by Subba Rao. The allies flatly refused to do so. The English confessed that the inclusion of Coorg was contrary to the spirit of the preliminary treaty, but they were compelled to demand it out of necessity. As Cornwallis had already entered into an engagement with the Coorg Raja and promised him liberation from Tipu, the allies regretted that they would not relax this demand. Regarding the other places, he argued that they would be contiguous to the boundaries of the allies after the Treaty was completed. He asserted that the division was just and fair and hence irrevocable. He said that he was more considerate than he wished, owing to the presence of the princes.²² These arguments failed to convince Tipu of the justice of the English demands. Two days elapsed without a response from Tipu. A note was sent that the hostilities would be renewed and the operations in the trenches would begin unless Tipu immediately accepted the Treaty.

On 12th March a conference was held when the *vakils* announced that Tipu would sign the treaty, provided a few modifications were made. The dispute had been about a valuation in which the allies demanded forty-three lakhs but Tipu offered thirty-five. As a compromise, Tipu was prepared to bear half of the difference and expected the allies to waive the other half. That meant that the new valuation

the reciprocal delivery of the forts and taluqs soon after the Definitive Treaty was signed and sixth, no further claim by the allies on Tipu after the payment of the indemnity.

After long discussion Gutti and Bellary were relinquished by Azimul-Umrah, at the intervention of Cornwallis, in lieu of Gurrumconda, Cuddapah and Ganjicottah, which would form the complete share of the Nizam. The Marathas were required to give up Havanur and Bankapur, but they declined. Haripant suggested three modifications in the treaty. First, to delete the words, "the treaty binding on the heirs and the successors of the contracting parties," second, to guarantee protection of the Maratha pilgrims to the temple of Srirangapatna and third, to guarantee the continuation of the earlier Mysore-Maratha treaties. But Kennaway refused to include these clauses in the treaty. Regarding the Nizam's share, the *vakils* argued that Gurrumconda could not be surrendered as it was one of Haider's earliest conquests and a place where Tipu's uncle, Meer Saheb, was buried. But only Gutti was relinquished to Tipu and Gurrumconda was retained by the Nizam.

All vexatious points being settled, Tipu signed the Definitive Treaty on March 18. March 19 was fixed for its delivery to Cornwallis by the princes. Persaram recrossed the river. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the fort and the trenches were evacuated. But Haripant was not satisfied till very late and desired his modifications to be incorporated. He held a personal conference with Cornwallis, who prevailed upon him to withdraw all his objections. The treaties were exchanged as scheduled and their counterparts were delivered to the princes on the 22nd March. On 26th March the army commenced its march.

Tipu was not very happy at the way the Confederates treated him. They accused him of failure to surrender the territories of their choice, of producing fictitious accounts and strengthening the fortifications. These allegations were unfounded, as the English were first guilty of violating the preliminaries by their arbitrary demand for Coorg. It was not so much for honouring their engagement with the Coorg Raja that they insisted on its surrender as for their own self-interest. Cornwallis observed that he was determined to obtain it, "as being necessary to form a secure barrier for our new possessions on the coast of Malabar against every power above the Ghauts."²⁷ It was Cornwallis who broke the Preliminary Treaty by his unjust demand after receiving more than one crore of rupees and the princes, being fully

conscious of the fact, that, "it is not easy to suppose that he [Tipu] can have an idea of renewing hostilities."²⁸ Regarding the charge that Tipu deliberately tampered with the accounts to cheat the allies, it may be mentioned that he produced the best material at his disposal. Even such an unsympathetic historian as Wilks observes, "No doubt remains in my mind that the accounts furnished to Lord Cornwallis were actually extracted from the records of the revenue, and exhibited the most correct account that Tipu Sultan was capable of giving of the gross revenue of his country."²⁹ The allies relied on the accounts produced by interested parties and deserters. The third charge that Tipu constantly repaired the fort was also wrong. It was the allies who never evacuated the trenches, and even after the signing and fulfilment of the preliminary terms, Cornwallis judged it, "incumbent upon me to be prepared to support by force, if it should prove necessary the rights that we had acquired by the preliminaries."³⁰ Stuart ravaged the splendid Lalbagh garden by cutting all the cypress trees for escalade material. Abercromby terrorized the villages he had occupied in the south of the Cauvery. Asad Ali Khan had not ceased hostilities in Gurrumconda. In brief, the allies harassed Tipu to coerce him to submit to their terms. Therefore the charge that Tipu practised "every species of chicanery and every pretext for delay" was baseless. With respect to the release of prisoners, the allies were guilty. Bhao did not release Badruz-Zaman Khan till August 1792. Tipu's Diwan of Dharwar, Haridas Pant was retained all through the negotiations under the pretext of his desertion.

Owing to these violations of the preliminaries, Tipu at times felt like deciding to break away completely. With the intention of gaining more time, he desired to protract the negotiations. His situation had slightly improved. Khamruddeen had managed to enter the fort with large supplies from Bednore. A shortage of forage and provisions caused an alarm in the camps of his enemies. Pestilence and disease threatened to break out there. "Every successive day diminished the powers of the besiegers and augmented the chances of successful resistance."³¹ It was already the month of March and the monsoons were expected to begin in May. That was why Cornwallis declared, "A total breach in the negotiations would have been attended with great inconvenience in our affairs."³² The conditions of the invaders was such that they were reduced to the position of seeking *dolies* and bearers from Tipu to move the sick, after the signing of the Treaty. Raymond who was present in the camp commanding the Nizam's

European forces observed. "If he [Tipu] had known like me the state of his enemy he would have saved his money and his beautiful provinces." The Marathas, even militarily, the conditions of the allies were not encouraging. They had exhausted all necessary material for the reduction of the fort by cutting all the cypress trees of Lal-Bagh. The material they already had was useless as it was dry, brittle and inflammable. New material had to be brought from outside at the risk of obstruction from Tipu and of delay. Tipu was still the master of the fort, storming which was not as easy as rowing his camp unopposed in the night. That was why Tipu had grown rigid, and would not easily submit to the harsh terms. He strengthened the wall which would face the English attack. He cut off all negotiations and was about to resume hostilities. But the surrender of his sons had made him helpless. The English were conscious of his attachment to them. He had serious misgivings with regard to their safety. Ali Reza frantically implored him to remember that the lives of the *vakil*s would be in danger if the princes were removed from Srirangapatna. The paternal affection was decisive and Tipu submitted.

Reflections on the Treaty

The allies secured a very advantageous treaty which offered them more concessions than they had expected. The territories were divided on the principle of equal share to the Confederates. The previous engagement to concede the exclusive privilege of their "ancient possessions" to the Marathas and the Nizam was disregarded. The basis of partition was the revenue of Tipu's country and not its extent. The total revenue was rated at two crores and thirty-seven lakhs of rupees (75 lakh Kantirava Pagodas) half of which (i.e., 1,18,50,294 rupees) was made into three equal shares, each party getting approximately thirty-nine and a half lakhs. The Marathas acquired the northern districts which extended their frontiers to the Tungabhadra, which was their limit in 1779. The Nizam was granted territories in the north of this river which consisted of Cumbum, Cuddagah, Ganj-cotah, and the districts between the lower Tungabhadra and the Krishna. Whereas the Maratha acquisitions were compact, the Nizam's were divided in two parts and those of the English in three. The relinquishment of Gooty at the insistence of Cornwallis separated the two parts of the Nizam's share. As the partition had taken place on the basis of revenue, the shares of the Nizam and the Marathas were much less in size than that of the English who, on the plea that

their share was barren and mountainous, secured a larger area. The Marathas and the Nizam got territories with highly cultivated and fertile soil.

The English acquisitions though less fertile were of infinitely greater importance. They were of great value both in point of situation and in the potentiality for development. They were the most strategic places militarily, and very rich commercially, being abundant in pepper, cardamom, teak, sandalwood and a host of other lucrative plantations. Their share was spread over three different directions, in Malabar, Baramahal and Dindigal, surrounding Tipu's kingdom from all sides except the north. In Malabar they secured the country below the Ghats, lying between Travancore and the Cauvery river. These areas were strategically situated, helping to prevent any invasion from Mysore. The acquisition by the English of Palghat, the only outlet for any possible incursion into English possessions, precluded forever the threat of any attack from Mysore. Dindigal constituted a substantial protection to the southern provinces. Baramahal and Salem gave them the command of all the passes of the Ghats to the north of the Cauvery. Thus the prime consideration of Cornwallis was to secure a strong barrier to the Carnatic from all sides. The possession of a chain of formidable forts like Shankridroog, Namkal, Ottur, Krishnagiri and Royacottah further fortified the frontiers of the Company. The invading army could not pass them without risking the loss of its supplies. There were numerous other small posts, besides these strongholds, which further added to the English security. Royacottah in the frontier was a key in the east to the kingdom of Mysore, and in the west was Coorg which gained for the English an "iron boundary for Coromandel." Besides these territorial acquisitions, the English were happy over the humiliation of their inveterate enemy. They had reduced the power of one who was a constant menace to them. They hoped that he was so greatly crushed as not to disturb them any more. Their share of the spoils of war gave them a decided advantage even over their Confederates.

To Tipu the treaty was a disaster which disturbed his economic, financial and military stability. Never since the rise of Haidar had Mysore suffered such a blow. Tipu was robbed of half his best kingdom. His treasury was emptied, his sons were separated from him and his pride was humbled. The tiger of Mysore was clipped of his claws and caged into submission. His ambition of building greater Mysore was rudely destroyed. His reputation of a great general

suffered a serious damage. His dominion was dismembered on all sides. His remaining territories were subject to a similar threat as their natural and strong frontiers fell into the hands of his enemies. His resources were reduced. Almost all the strongholds and key passes were taken away from Tipu. The loss of Baramahal and Coorg opened up his country to invasion both from the east and from the west. "The surrender of Dindigal and the fertile districts of the Doab deprived him of the granaries of his kingdom."³⁴ Tipu regretted the loss of those parts that fell to the English share, for they were the most difficult to recover. The remaining half of his country was mostly hilly and barren, like Chitradurga and Mysore which were rugged and unproductive.

The results of the war particularly gratified the English who had suffered reverses in the first two Mysore wars. By fortifying the passes in the Ghats, a small body of troops could defend not only their new possessions but the whole of the Carnatic and Malabar. The ports ceded to them on the western side cut off Tipu from all communication with the French except through Mangalore.

However harsh the terms of the treaty might have been, the English aim in the Third Mysore War was not total destruction of Tipu's power. That task was left to another imperialist. Cornwallis did not desire for certain reasons the total reduction of Srirangapatna. This was not due to his moderation or military incapacity. His enmity towards Tipu was also in no degree less than that of Wellesley. He regarded Tipu as dangerous even after he had been reduced, because of the nature of his government which was strong, efficient, despotic and at the same time simple. If it had been within his power, Cornwallis would have destroyed Tipu. The maintenance of the balance of power in India was also not the chief motive of Cornwallis. It was quite a favourite notion with certain English politicians that a barrier should exist between the English and the Marathas, and Tipu could serve this purpose. They felt that a complete overthrow of Tipu would excite the Maratha jealousy and involve the Company in complications. But Cornwallis did not subscribe to this theory. He wrote to Dundas, "I shall therefore only express my hopes that the gentlemen who talked so much nonsense about the Balance of Power and the barrier of Tipu, will have the grace to be ashamed of their views."³⁵ He did not regard the Marathas so hostile and formidable as to require strong barrier against their invasion. He considered the Maratha Empire to be a loose confederacy of independent and warring

elements. "They could be detached from the public cause even by the most distant prospect of personal gain."³⁶

The real aims of Cornwallis were different. The Secret Committee was constantly urging Cornwallis to conclude the protracted war which had drained the resources of the Company. After impressing upon him the necessity of peace for their finances, they observed, "we are nevertheless particularly desirous that we should rather forego even some portions of the advantages which we might justly expect than risk the circumstances of the war."³⁷ They had emphatically commanded him to seize the first possible opportunity of concluding the war on reasonable and honourable terms. Cornwallis had been offered exceedingly favourable terms. If he had declined them and aimed at total extirpation of Tipu, the Governor-General would have been guilty of ignoring the instructions from home. He was conscious of the fact that Warren Hastings, despite his ability, courage and powerful friends, could not escape impeachment. What safety was there for Cornwallis who had already spent heavily and had appropriated for war the cash meant for China investment? Moreover, the European situation in 1792 was getting tense owing to the spread of revolutionary ideas and England seemed inevitably drawn into it. The King's ministers were anxious to get back their troops from India and Cornwallis dared not infinitely prolong a ruinous war. Despite the presence of Dundas and Pitt to defend him in Parliament, he was, in the initial stages of the war, assailed for having started an unprovoked war.

The attitude of the allies was also threatening. The diplomacy of Tipu was again active and the allies were suspected of secret contact with him. Haripant held a secret meeting with Tipu before the march of the armies from Srirangapatna in which Tipu expressed a prophetic warning, "You must realize I am not at all your enemy. Your real enemy is the Englishman of whom you must beware."³⁸ The Maratha performances during the war were lukewarm and they had tried every time to act as chief mediators. The Nizam's force was inefficient, though there was no risk of his being detached from the English. In such circumstances, securing peace on the best terms was regarded more beneficial than trying to overthrow the enemy completely. Cornwallis observed, "Those whose passions were heated and who were not responsible for consequences would probably exclaim against leaving the tyrant an inch of territory but that it was my duty to consult the real interests of the Company."³⁹ A few

Englishmen desired the complete overthrow of Tipu. General Medows was so much mortified on the cessation of hostilities that he tried to shoot himself, and only narrowly escaped. Munro thought that the English policy was so moderate and conciliatory that they would be "all Quakers in twenty years more."⁴⁰ But Cornwallis was not in sympathy with this extremist view, as he did not know what to do next if Srirangapatna fell. In utter perplexity he exclaimed before Srirangapatna, "Good God! What shall I do with this place?"⁴¹

Added to these factors, the difficulty of continued assault on the fort in the face of disease, pestilence, inclemency of the weather, shortage of forage and provisions and the scarcity of the necessary storming material, precluded the possibility of the complete overthrow of Tipu. The length of time that might be needed for the reduction of the fort was not known, in view of Tipu's constant strengthening of the fort. Cornwallis himself had been unable to beat Tipu except in fewer than three campaigns, and at the end he only surprised him by making a night attack. A soldier of Tipu taunted an Englishman, "I am not inclined to talk to people who come like thieves in the night, and attack their enemy when unprepared for their defence."⁴² That was why Cornwallis triumphantly wrote to Dundas, "We have at length concluded our Indian war reasonably and I think as advantageously as any reasonable person could expect. We have effectually crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable."⁴³

Thus the Treaty of Srirangapatna was the first greatest shock of Tipu's life. It had pushed a first-rate power like Mysore to the depths of despondency and despair. The rising star of Mysore, so bright and dazzling hitherto, suddenly seemed to disappear behind the dark clouds, and later in 1799 it passed off completely from the political horizon. Since the time of Haidar Mysore had not suffered the kind of humiliation she had now been subjected to. She had gone on making steady progress despite serious challenges and the machinations of numerous rivals. She had maintained her brilliant record of upward progress, in which for every step of retreat, there had been two steps of advance. But all this had now become a thing of the past, and Mysore was never again the same as it was before the Treaty of Srirangapatna.

The tortuous negotiations that followed the surprise night attack of February 6 fully revealed the intentions of the prime-mover of the Confederacy, namely to cripple Tipu beyond recovery. The English got all that they wanted, the coastal strips, the strategic forts, the rich

areas that produced commercial crops, a huge indemnity towards the expenses of war together with pocket money for the recompense of the military leaders, the surrender of hostages as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty terms, the encirclement of Tipu's kingdom on all sides, and more than all, the psychological satisfaction that their inveterate foe was finally humiliated. In the English contest of power since the time Clive had crushed Siraj ud daula, the English had never been so successful as during the Third Mysore War. Under the pretext of dividing the conquered territories according to the yield of revenue, the English obtained extensive territories, which were almost double the share of what the other partners got. Dindigal, Baramahal, Coimbatore, Salem, Krishnagiri, Coorg, Calicut, Cochin and Malabar were all invaluable territories which made the English supreme masters of the area to the South of Cauvery, together with their hold on both the eastern and the western coast. The conquest of the rest of India became dead easy, as they could close on the entire central parts at any time with a pincer movement both from the east and from the west.

As for the other two confederates, their triumph proved as transitory as a dream. They were very soon to experience the truth of the dictum of Thucydides, namely revenge, though sweet, is never successful. The territorial ambition of Nana was no doubt gratified, but not fully; and these conquests proved the beginning of the Maratha fall as much as that of Tipu. Once Tipu, the main bulwark, the solid wall of resistance against the English, was gone, the others were bound to fall at the mere show of force. It was only against Tipu that the English had to organize a powerful Confederacy. After his fall, they had no need for an alliance with any of the Indian powers, as English power and prestige were enhanced so much that they could easily hold the whole of India in their grip. If the Marathas had been unwise in joining the Confederacy, more so was the Nizam who was to suffer much more humiliation at the hands of both the Marathas and the English. For only a year or two later, the Marathas inflicted a severe blow on him at Kardla and hardly about six or seven years later, the Peshwa was to sign on dotted line to the Treaty of Subsidiary Alliance by which he was permanently reduced to a satellite of the English. In the negotiations for the treaty of Srirangapatna, his role was no more than that of a passive spectator witnessing a drama, in which Tipu the tragic hero was undergoing a mortifying experience because of his unforeseen misfortune. Both the Nizam and the Marathas had their full share in bringing about this misfortune, and they

were soon to realize that those who sow the wind of necessity will reap the whirlwind.

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The Third Phase
SURVIVAL PLANS (1793-99)

CHAPTER IX

POST-WAR RELATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH (1792-1797)

ANGLO-MYSORE RELATIONS remained peaceful from the Treaty of Srirangapatna to the advent of Wellesley. Cornwallis endeavoured to reconcile Tipu, as far as possible, to his humbled condition. Though the complete overthrow of Tipu was prevented by a variety of other reasons, the Governor-General was interested after the war in the integrity of his dominions as a check against the ambition of the Marathas. Tipu had a brief spell of peace between 1792 and 1798, which he utilised in repairing the ravages of the war. Excepting the adjustment of some boundary disputes or refuting the charge of hostile preparations, he had not much to do with the English. He discharged promptly all his treaty obligations and gave no cause of offence to the Company. He paid the indemnity and the English restored the princes. Apparently the two powers were on friendly terms. But in reality their deep-seated suspicions and jealousies were not removed. The English were apprehensive that Tipu was secretly preparing for a war to recover his losses. Wild rumours spread that he had already mobilised his forces, and that he was negotiating offensive alliances with the Marathas, the Nizam and the French. Fortunately the affairs of the Company were in the hands of a peace-minded Governor-General, Sir John Shore, who did not rely on interested propaganda. The war had disturbed the military, financial and economic stability of Tipu's kingdom. He reorganised the entire administration on efficient lines. The army, navy, commerce, trade, indeed every branch of internal economy was so thoroughly overhauled that, within a short period, he wiped off the stains of his defeat.

Soon after the Treaty, the Maratha ambition caused Cornwallis to remain at peace with Tipu. He discouraged the Nizam's intentions to secure Kurnool with the assistance of the English. The hos-

tages were treated with particular care and affection. Tipu was also so prompt in his payment of the indemnity to the English that Cornwallis sent a note that he would not receive the second instalment before the first was paid to the other allies. He was genuinely interested in sending back the princes before his departure from India but the reluctance of the Nizam to this measure put off the final release by a few months.

Despite the fact that Tipu had been reduced, Cornwallis still entertained apprehensions of his power. He thought that Tipu would never reconcile himself to his losses. Therefore, immediately after the departure of the allies from Srirangapatna, Cornwallis attempted to conclude a general treaty of guarantee against Tipu for the defence of the new acquisitions, on the ground that Tipu might attempt to recover his surrendered territories. The provision for such a treaty was in XIII Article of the offensive and defensive Alliance of 1790, which stipulated that if Tipu attacked unprovoked any of the Confederates, the other two should join to punish him. Cornwallis desired to give effect to this stipulation by concluding a definite Treaty of Guarantee consisting of ten articles. He wanted to preserve the old alliance of 1790 intact. The important provisions of this proposed treaty were: mutual co-operation of all the three powers in case of Tipu's aggression on any one, a prior attempt to compose the differences amicably, developments of any dispute to be made known to every party, acceptance of mediation by any party, if helpful, the company's initiative in cessation of hostilities to be followed by the other two, unanimous decision for peace, military preparedness at all times, prevention of war materials falling into Tipu's hands and declaration of war if the dependents of the Confederates were attacked.¹ An important feature of the treaty was that the parties were urged to explore and exhaust all peaceful methods and "temperate negotiations" to solve the dispute, and never to take up arms unless fully convinced of the wrong being done to them by Tipu.

Cornwallis asked Malet to obtain Maratha approval to this treaty which aimed at keeping Tipu in perpetual isolation.² It exhibited the inveterate hostility the English yet nourished against Tipu and their anxiety to preserve their preponderant influence in the Confederacy. It naturally excited the jealousy of the Marathas, and hence Nana at first evaded and finally rejected it. He contemplated an attack at this time on the Nizam for the recovery of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi*. Azimul-Umrah not only evaded their payment but also

sought English aid to resist their forcible exaction by the Marathas. The growing Anglo-Nizam friendship was resented by Nana, who turned down the proposals of the Treaty, not outright, but by preparing another treaty which was unacceptable to the English. In his new draft Nana proposed that the Company should recognize the Maratha right to *chauth* over Tipu.³ Cornwallis considered it a device to extend Maratha frontiers and hence rejected it.

The Nizam's response to the English treaty was different. He accepted it on condition that the English should assist him in securing Kurnool. But he soon withdrew his condition and accepted the proposals as very satisfactory to his interests. He conveyed his approval without waiting for the Maratha decision. He was happy to be a party to the treaty as he had pressed exactly for the same defensive arrangements in 1790, when they had been turned down in order to appease the Marathas. He grew anxious for its early conclusion. On being informed that Nana had rejected it, he pressed the English to ignore the Marathas and form an Anglo-Nizam alliance only. But Cornwallis was not in favour of excluding the Marathas, which might lead to complications. Sindhia had already warned the Nizam of its serious implications. The negotiations were protracted for nearly a year and Cornwallis finally dropped them in despair. "If the allies manifest any evasion or even backwardness to it, I do not desire that it should be pressed upon them, because it could answer no useful purpose."⁴

The failure of the treaty brought out the Anglo-Maratha rivalry. Cornwallis was not prepared to support any Maratha claim on Tipu beyond what was specified in the Treaty of Srirangapatna.⁵ In fact he was not in favour of the Maratha claim to *chauth* on any Indian power.⁶ He denounced the Treaty of Salbai, which had been so much praised by Warren Hastings, and particularly condemned that article which made the Marathas responsible for the peaceful Anglo-Nizam and Anglo-Mysore relations. He observed, "Nothing could have been more nugatory and useless than the articles of the Treaty of Salbai by which the Marathas without specifically agreeing to guarantee our possessions engaged to restrain Hyder Ali and the Nizam from committing hostilities against us."⁷

Adjustment of the Boundary Disputes

The adjustment of certain boundaries offered great difficulty. Cornwallis raised four objections. First, he complained that Tipu

had included in the English share certain villages which really belonged to others. Thus the villages of Alungar, Paroor and Kunutnayar, ceded to the English, were said to be the territories of Travancore.⁸ Cornwallis informed Tipu that the English would restore them to the Raja and hence he demanded from Tipu fresh allotment of an area equal in value to these. The second complaint referred to the fixing of the new boundary and the exchange of Venkatagiri for Cauveripur. Certain villages were surrendered to the English by the treaty without reference to their location or surroundings. As the division was effected on the basis of revenue, no care was taken to secure a clear demarcation of their extent. In many cases the presence of hills and rivers added to the confusion as the parties were given villages on either sides of hills and rivers. Later it was found more convenient to exchange these confusing bits to make the share of both the parties compact. On either side of the river Cauvery both the English and Tipu had portions of their villages and Cornwallis desired to adjust the boundary by an exchange of these. The village of Venkatagiri was on the English side of the river belonging to Tipu and Cauveripur was on Tipu's side belonging to the English, the mutual exchange of which would avoid difficulties. The third point of difference was regarding the military stores in the different forts evacuated by the English after the Treaty. The fourth point was the problem of English prisoners. Though a large number of them had been set free by Tipu, Cornwallis desired a full list of those who were still retained. The English wanted Tipu to comply with these four demands.

Tipu objected to their first demand, denying the right of the Raja of Travancore over the villages surrendered by him to the English and asserted his own indisputable right.⁹ Likewise, the French claim over Karighatta which was also included in the English share was denied by Tipu.¹⁰ He complained that he had surrendered to the allies, besides half of his kingdom, extra territory yielding four and a half lakhs, according to his estimates, but still the English grumbled over trifles.¹¹ Regarding the second dispute, the exchange of Venkatagiri for Cauveripur, Tipu maintained that the assessment of these places was wrong and that the revenue of Cauveripur was much more than entered in the schedule. Therefore he pleaded his inability to surrender Venkatagiri. Regarding the military stores, he promised to look into the accounts and promptly to deliver any of the stores still held back. As for the release of prisoners, he said that he had set free all of them and not one of them had been retained. He complained, on the other

hand, that the Raja of Travancore had still certain Mysoreans like Tarbiyat Ali Khan, Zaman Baig, Mohamed Haidar, Mohamed Ameer and others in his custody. The Marathas had not yet released Badruz Zaman Khan, nor surrendered Sunda as per the treaty. Besides, they carried on depredations in his country, lifted cattle and ravaged villages. Tipu asked the English to intervene and redress these grievances.¹²

These differences were not composed satisfactorily, and they caused constant trouble. The English accused Tipu of deliberately evading their just demands and Tipu viewed their anxiety as attempts to keep him permanently reduced. When these border disputes took a serious turn, Cornwallis suggested a commission to inquire into the details of the disputes. Both the parties were to appoint men to make inquiries and elicit the truth from the respective inhabitants. Yet another commission was proposed to settle the claims to certain villages of Raja of Travancore. Tipu accepted these proposals and agreed to send his representatives to whichever place the English chose on the border, which convinced Cornwallis of his sincerity.¹³

In the Treaty, great stress was laid on the promotion of commercial intercourse between the Company and Tipu. For this purpose Cornwallis desired to depute men for conducting a preliminary survey of the possibilities of English trade in Mysore.¹⁴ The main idea was to deprive Tipu of his rich trade and keep the English informed of his political activities and connections with any other powers. But these designs were never fulfilled and Tipu did not allow them to intervene in his internal affairs.

Another hostile and ambitious act of Cornwallis was his forcible occupation of Wynad which should have been legitimately given to Tipu. Its strategic situation and rich plantations prompted Cornwallis not to surrender the place, despite Tipu's repeated protests and a clear stipulation in the Treaty. Even the Bombay Government admitted the justice of Tipu's claim but the Governor-General refused to restore the district. Though this matter was also referred to a commission, its members were instructed not to deprive the Company of this place.¹⁵ Wellesley later surrendered Wynad, but this was a deception to lull Tipu into false security. Wynad was not the only place thus denied to Tipu. Corrubala, Amara and Sulya were yet others. Corrubala was in the vicinity of Wynad but the other two were near Coorg, whose Raja had annexed them on the plea of his

claim to them. Though he failed to produce authentic proof of his claim, the English supported and secretly encouraged his cause. When Tipu protested strongly against the flagrant breach of treaty terms, the English consented to refer the matter to a commission. Tipu appointed Shahab-ud-deen and Meer Muhammad Ali and the English deputed Mahony and Uthoff.¹⁶ The Raja had no papers to prove his right, but Tipu produced authentic documents in support of his claim. Still the Commissioners decided the issue in favour of the Raja. Their decision was that Amara should go to the Raja and Sulya to Tipu but, as the Raja was already in possession of both, he ought not to be dispossessed of either.¹⁷ It was a strange judgment in which Tipu was denied the place even after his claim was established by the Commissioners. His representatives could at best protest against the decision. Except for these border disputes, the relations of Cornwallis with Tipu were peaceful. When the Anglo-French war was likely to start in Europe, Tipu showed no anxiety to break with the English. The Bengal Government reported to the Court of Directors, "There was no intention whatever on the part of this chief to afford the smallest support or countenance to the French in the present war."¹⁸ Tipu wrote to Bengal, "The attachment and goodwill subsisting between us is so firmly established that no increase of it appears feasible."¹⁹ In spite of these circumstances Cornwallis was not sincere in his relations with Tipu, as was evident from his anxiety to revive the Defensive Alliance against him, to establish trade factories in Tipu's country and to retain the strategic places which should have been surrendered to Tipu.

Tipu and Sir John Shore

Sir John Shore, who succeeded Cornwallis was noted for his policy of non-intervention. With his advent, Tipu's relations with the English took a happy turn. He scrupulously avoided war and directed his energies towards the conservation of Company's power. He strictly adhered to the restrictive clause in the Charter Act of 1793 which mentioned, "To pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominions in India are declared to be measures repugnant to the wish, honour and policy of the nation".²⁰ The affairs of the Company at that time were very satisfactory, with a highly disciplined army, stabilised finances, vast resources, humbled enemies, devoted allies and safety from external danger. The reason why the Company did not go to war despite its favourable position, was entirely due to the pacific policy of the new Governor-General.

Except for the question of Wynad, Tipu's relations with him remained friendly and peaceful. Towards the last few months of Sir John Shore's regime, rumours of Tipu's military preparations caused anxiety. His first act of importance on his coming to power was the restoration of the princes to Tipu. In March 1794 they were returned to Mysore, accompanied by Captain Doveton. Tipu personally went to Devanhalli to receive them and felt great joy on their return. He conferred titles and bestowed gifts in their honour.

The second step Sir John Shore took was to determine the English policy towards the Malabar chiefs and their relations with Tipu. The situation was getting tense over the question of Wynad and Corrubala. Though Tipu had an undoubted right over them, the English were reluctant to restore them. The Governor-General would not take such a decision, thinking that the Malabar chiefs would regard his action as a sign of weak appeasement. At the same time, he did not wish to offend Tipu by denying his right openly. Therefore, as a compromise, he framed a policy of four points.²¹ Firstly, the Company was not to assert its own indisputable right over the two districts, Wynad and Corrubala, which might force a rupture with Tipu. Secondly, if Corrubala was occupied with his sanction, by Tipu's officers no opposition was to be made. Thirdly, if they proceeded beyond the limits of these two districts, the English should interfere and repel them. Lastly, if Tipu's officers committed predatory incursions without his knowledge, Tipu was to be informed of their conduct. Accordingly, instructions were issued to the Bombay Government warning them not to offend Tipu by asserting the Company's claim over the districts. He wrote, "Any claim on the part of Currumbala or Wynad should be received with every disposition to concede whatever he might be able to establish as his right."²² He confessed that the Company's claim over them was so weak that the Marathas and the Nizam would not be convinced of the justice of the case and could not be induced to support it in case of a rupture. He was afraid that the English would have to wage a solitary war. The Maratha jealousy had been excited at the rapid growth of the British power. The Nizam was also equally enraged by their policy of leaving him alone at the time of the impending Maratha attack on him. He had naturally permitted Raymond, who was in his service, to reorganize the French army on strong and disciplined lines. These factors compelled Sir John Shore to adopt a cautious policy towards Tipu.

The Nizam-Maratha war of 1795 changed the politics of the Deccan. The defeat of the Nizam, the humiliating convention of Kurla, the ascendancy of the Marathas, the neutrality of the English, the death of the young Peshwa, Madhava Rao II, the war of succession, and the rise of Bajji Rao II and Daulat Rao Sindhia, all these helped Tipu to play an important part in the affairs of the Deccan. They broke completely the old Triple Alliance of 1790 against him. At such a period, Sir John Shore decided not to revive it but to observe strict neutrality. He declined to support the Nizam against Tipu over the question of Kurnool and against the Marathas in their war. His policy towards Tipu was not to provoke a war with him but to remain prepared to fight, if it became inevitable. That was exactly the policy of Tipu who desired neither to offend them nor to tolerate gross injustice at their hands. The English did not expect that Tipu would risk a war unaided by the French or the Marathas. As both these powers were involved in their domestic troubles, the possibility of a war was reduced. As for the probability of a war by Tipu alone, Sir John Shore observed, "The defalcation of his territories and the deprivation of his property will impose silence on his resentment and restraint upon his ambition."²³

The relations of Tipu took an unfavourable turn with the English after 1795. Rumours were spread that he was preparing for a war. His contacts with the Indian courts were construed as negotiations for alliances. At first, Sir John Shore did not trust these reports and regarded them as mere conjectures.²⁴ But a consistent and organized propaganda forced him to adopt certain precautionary measures.

The nature of such propaganda was as follows. Imtiaz ud Daulah, the nephew of the Nizam and highly influential in the Hyderabad Court after the captivity of Azimul Umrah, had supported Tipu's project of an alliance against the Company. Tipu's agents, Medina Saheb, Sakka Ram and Qadir Husain Khan were employed for this purpose.²⁵ Tipu expected the Dutch and the French aid from Europe, after the arrival of which he would commence hostilities.²⁶ Captain Doveton also hinted at the possibility of a Mysore-Maratha alliance.²⁷ Another source conveyed the information that Tipu solicited the aid of Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan. Tipu was reported to have mobilised his forces for war,²⁸ and to have constructed an inner rampart on the west and north faces of the fort of Srirangapatna.²⁹ He was accused of having sent an agent, Abdullah Baig, to Sindhia with friendly letters to secure his military assistance.³⁰

These rumours were all baseless, except the one about the despatch of *vakils* to Hyderabad. It was but natural that Tipu as an independent prince entertained ideas of recovering his losses. The Treaty of Srirangapatna had imposed on him such harsh measures as were out of proportion to all his offences on the Raja of Travancore. Moreover there was no danger of a Tipu-Nizam alliance. Even if there had been any such possibility owing to the presence of Imtiaz ud Daulah, Roy Royan and the ascendancy of the French in the Hyderabad Court, it was soon removed by the return of Azimul Umrah and through the vigilance of Kirkpatrick. The party which had supported Tipu suffered a setback.³¹ The dismissed British detachment returned to its original place. The rebellion of Alijah further increased the British influence on the Hyderabad Court. The inconsistency of the Nizam's ministers, his ill-paid and inefficient army, his disaster at Kardla and the disordered state of his finances convinced even Sir John Shore of the absurdity of any Nizam-Tipu co-operation.³²

Tipu could not expect any assistance from the Marathas either, owing to the highly disturbed state of their affairs. Since the death of Madhava Rao II in October 1795, Poona had been the scene of revolutions and counter-revolutions. Intrigues and treacheries prevented any government from functioning for more than a few days. Nana was in the midst of inextricable difficulties owing to the intrigues of Baji Rao II, Daulat Rao Sindhia and Sharza Rao. In the midst of this chaos and confusion it was apparent even to Malet that Nana could not contract any offensive alliance with Tipu against the English.³³ If Nana had been so inclined, he would not have joined the English in denouncing Tipu's warlike activities and calling for an explanation.³⁴ Similarly, the arrival of a French force at that disturbed period was highly improbable. Rumours of Dutch assistance to Tipu were fantastic, and both the Bengal and the Madras Governments called them absurd.³⁵ Uthoff described these rumours as "misconception, selfish-interestedness or insidiousness."³⁶ The Bengal Government was convinced of the fact that these rumours were "destitute of any foundation."³⁷ Sir John Shore thought them to have been "fabricated for the purpose of deception or with a view to derive importance or reward."³⁸

On account of these factors, even if Tipu had so desired, it was difficult for him to secure assistance and without assistance, he could not go to war. Though he tried to get the help of the Nizam and other powers, the peculiar difficulties in the way compelled him to do with-

out it. Even Sir John Shore was conscious of the real intentions of Tipu and only a firm conviction that it was impossible for him to secure outside help compelled the Governor-General to follow a peaceful policy towards Mysore. Sir John had not expected any change in Tipu's character or pursuits and he believed that his losses had only moderated his violence which might be roused to a just resentment of his wrongs in course of time. Only the dread of Tipu prevented the English from supporting the Nizam against the Marathas lest Tipu should join the Marathas. "The ambition of Tipu has more and stronger motives for action than that of the Marathas and the consolidation of our alliance with the latter is an object of importance to us."³⁹

The English apprehensions were aggravated by their fear, suspicion and jealousy of Tipu's power. His rapid economic recovery and the repair of war ravages excited their jealousy. The military conditions of the Company after 1795 were in a way not satisfactory. The number of European troops in their service had been reduced only to 3,000.⁴⁰ They were widely dispersed on the coast to counteract the Dutch designs. Their forces in Malabar which was the place of trouble and the origin of all rumours were much reduced. The revolutions in Poona, the captivity of Azimul Umrah, the increasing influence of the French in the Nizam's army and his resentment over their failure to help him against the Marathas were the other facts that gave rise to incendiary propaganda against Tipu. Added to these, exaggerations by the English news-reporting agency completed the process of preparing a thorough case of Tipu's allegedly aggressive designs.

As a precaution, Sir John wanted to take certain measures. He ordered the Company's troops to be prepared for war. He despatched them to certain strategic points. He sent reinforcements from Bengal to Madras. He gave instructions in detail about the course of action which the Madras Government was to follow in case of Tipu's attack.⁴¹ If any considerable number of Tipu's troops should march towards Malabar, that should be deemed an indication of war.⁴² A mere remonstrance of Tipu's hostile activities was not judged adequate, unless supported with a threat of war. That would only provoke Tipu to a war, if he really meant peace. But if he was assisted by a large number of troops from outside, war was to be declared.⁴³ Thus the policy of Sir John was to remain prepared for war at all times. "We may assume it as an undeniable principle that to impose peace

on our neighbours by strength of a military establishment, ready at all times for active or extensive exertion, is not only the wisest, but the most economic system."⁴⁴ This policy was different from that of his predecessor or successor in that he did not desire to precipitate a war. He believed in remaining prepared but not in attacking Tipu unprovoked.

Sir John Shore was not in favour of the Company taking the initiative of sending a separate remonstrance to Tipu but wanted a joint note, signed by all the three Confederates, to be sent, complaining of his military preparations and calling for an explanation. Accordingly they sent a joint note expressing their concern over his mobilization of forces which would disturb the peace of the Deccan.⁴⁵ Such a joint note was felt more effective as it might convince Tipu of the existence of the old triple alliance and that it was not dissolved either by the revolutions in Poona or by his intrigues in Hyderabad. That might compel him to abandon any hostile project, even if he had already contemplated any, as it would be a serious warning of declaring war, if so compelled. It would break the Nizam-Tipu negotiations, if they meant any hostility to the English.

Tipu in reply to this remonstrance expressed great surprise and denied all the allegations.⁴⁶ He assured them of his peaceful intentions and informed them that he had discharged faithfully all the Treaty obligations and would do the same in future. He expressed his inability to comprehend the causes that prompted the allies to take such an extraordinary step of demanding an explanation. His dispatch of a small force to Gutti on the frontiers of the Nizam was only intended to collect his dues from Kurnool which had accumulated to twenty lakhs of rupees. He expressed his firm resolve not to violate peace and he mentioned that he was engaged at the time in performing the marriage of his seven sons.⁴⁷

These assurances failed to convince the English of Tipu's sincere desire for peace. They called him evasive and deceitful.⁴⁸ Their relations remained strained with him thereafter. But Sir John Shore did not precipitate a war and restrained the passions of those who wanted it. He followed the policy of peace towards all the Indian powers, Sindhia, Nana, the Nizam and Tipu. Such a policy secured for him the respect of all the parties except the Nizam who had grounds to be offended. But Sir John was not convinced of Tipu's sincerity for peace with the English; for he observed, "subversion of the British Power, as opposing the firmest barrier to his ambition, must naturally

be the object which he has most in view."⁴⁹ But he did not believe that Tipu would implement his designs immediately. He remarked, "His obvious policy is to wait until events produce a disunion amongst the Confederates and to foment it if he can."⁵⁰

Thus Tipu, the reduced and humiliated prince, was still a terror to the English. They were apprehensive that his defeat and disaster might yet galvanize him to more heroic action, more imaginative designs and more desperate ventures to recover his losses. That was the reason why, as long as Cornwallis remained in office, he never relaxed his vigilance on Tipu. There were still quite a few issues such as territorial disputes and release of prisoners which could have embroiled the English with Tipu, and hence Cornwallis attempted to keep alive the Confederacy of 1790. But the politics of the Deccan was not the same again as it was before the Treaty of Srirangapatna. Several new factors such as the defeat of the Nizam at the hands of the Marathas, the failure of the English to assist him in the hour of need, the revival of French influence at his court, the attempt of Tipu to improve his relations with his Indian neighbours, the death of Madhava II in Poona, and of Mahdaji Sindhia in Gwalior, the accession to power of Baji Rao II and Daulat Rao Sindhia in Poona and Gwalior respectively, had all changed the political scene in the country. Tipu was not slow to draw full advantage from such a situation. Consequently, the English were again nervous that he would disturb their peace. They tried to revive the treaty of 1790 in order to keep Tipu in perpetual isolation, but both the Marathas and the Nizam were careful this time and did not fall a prey to their machinations. Nana knew too well that any alignment with the English was not in the best interests of the Marathas, and the Nizam too soon learnt the same lesson, although the hard way. Like Haidar in 1770, the Nizam in 1795 implored the English for aid in order to ward off the danger from the Marathas, but his appeal proved a cry in the wilderness. The advent of Sir John Shore further helped Tipu to consolidate his position. There was again a change of policy in the English camp from the aggressive and militant one to one of pacific intentions, in order to consolidate all their previous gains. Sir John Shore was more interested in revenue settlement than in provoking costly wars. Therefore his policy of strict neutrality in the English relations with Indian powers and his apparently friendly attitude towards Tipu further encouraged the Mysore ruler to engage himself in his old venture of concerting all measures to defeat the English. Very soon even Sir

John Shore came to realise that it was only a matter of time before Tipu sprang a surprise again. The English were aware that before 1790 he had only a political reason to eliminate the English from India, but he had now a personal reason as well. The rivals who had brought about his calamity would hardly be forgiven or forgotten. With renewed vigour, therefore, he was preparing again for a contest although circumstances proved more disastrous now to his cause than before.

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CHAPTER X

RECONCILIATION WITH THE INDIAN NEIGHBOURS (1792-1798)

TIPU DESIRED TO CULTIVATE peaceful relations with the Marathas after the Treaty of Srirangapatna. Though they offended him by ravaging his country, by detaining his prisoners and by demanding *chauth* from him, he did not wish to break with them. But the Maratha-Nizam war diverted their attention and he was relieved of his anxiety. It afforded him leisure to consolidate his power which he did in a short time. His position was changed after 1795, when the Marathas began to seek his alliance and the English dreaded his power.

Immediately after the Peace of 1792, the Marathas violated the terms of the Treaty by carrying on incessant depredations in his country. Bhao committed such excesses that even Cornwallis observed, "I cannot help apprehending that he will commit many irregularities upon his march, for his corps has hitherto paid very little respect to the Treaty."¹ Tipu protested to the English against this indiscriminate plunder of his country.² The Marathas did not release Tipu's Governor of Dharwar, Badruz Zaman Khan who had surrendered the fort on capitulatory terms. Besides, his detention was contrary to the terms of the peace of 1792. There were a number of boundary disputes to be adjusted. According to the treaty, Tipu should have got the three taluks of Sira, Jamboti and Soopa but the Marathas retained them for themselves.³ To settle this dispute, Tipu proposed the appointment of a commission consisting of deputies by both the parties but the Poona Court rejected the proposal on the plea that no such dispute existed.⁴ Likewise, Sunda, ceded to Tipu in the Treaty, was not surrendered by them.⁵ Badruz Zaman Khan was released only after repeated remonstrances by Cornwallis.

With the arrival of Sindhia in Poona, the Maratha politics were completely changed. Tipu's differences with them were composed

and his relations with the Poona Court improved vastly. Sindhia had come from the north in June 1792 to assert his authority in the South. He had expressed his desire to join the English in the Third Mysore War but the condition he laid down, of British assistance to him for reducing the Rajputs prevented him from doing so. Being disappointed, he began to entertain hostility against the English. He went to Poona chiefly for two reasons, firstly, to force his mediation on the allies and thus entitle himself to participate in the gains of the Third Mysore War and secondly, to secure the Peshwa's recognition to his latest conquests. But by the time he came to Poona, the Mysore War was already over, much earlier than he had expected.

But his arrival was favourable both to Tipu and to the Nizam. As Sindhia was deprived of a share in the Mysore War, he was inclined to support Tipu. He was jealous of the rapid growth of British power after 1792 and desired to check it. He "made little secret of his opinion that Tipu ought to be supported as an instrument for restraining their dangerous aggrandisement."⁸ Roberts observes, "Sindhia persuaded to Peshwa that a serious mistake had been made in supporting the British power against Tipu and urged a closer connection with him."⁹ With this intention he carried on friendly correspondence with Tipu.⁹ He thought that Tipu's friendship was more useful for the Maratha designs against the Nizam than his hostility. The Nizam also was benefited by the presence in Poona of Sindhia whose rivalry with Nana acted as a barrier against the aggressive designs of the Poona Court.⁹ It was rumoured that the Nizam had bribed Sindhia to secure his assistance.¹⁰ Nana's rivalry with Sindhia was growing serious and the Poona Court had applied to Cornwallis through Earpant for a British Corps on the same terms as agreed to by the Nizam. Its purpose was "to reduce to obedience any dependant who might prove refractory."¹¹ As the aid was mainly directed against Sindhia, Cornwallis declined to grant it. Sindhia's jealousy was further excited, and he now began to support the Nizam. He offended the English also by demanding the *chauth* from Bengal through a letter of Shah Alam to Cornwallis. The English resented his action and viewed it as a hostile measure.¹²

These significant changes in the Anglo-Maratha relations relieved Tipu of the fear of external danger. When Cornwallis proposed a Treaty of Guarantee, Nana rejected it on the ground that the Company was not willing to recognise the Maratha claim of *chauth* upon Tipu. Such a stipulation offended both Tipu and the English. It failed not

because Tipu protested against it, but because the English did not like to encourage the Maratha ascendancy. The English were conscious of the shrewd diplomacy of Nana, who intended to undermine their influence. But their jealousy helped Tipu indirectly, as it frustrated the efforts of the English to conclude a hostile alliance and of Nana to impose the *chauth* on him. The old alliance of 1790 was practically dissolved. Their internal dissensions acted as a guarantee for Tipu's security. When the Nizam-Maratha war broke out, he felt partly avenged. He maintained strict neutrality in the war, as his relations were friendly with both. But his neutrality was taken more as an alliance with the Marathas. "Tipu Sultan also had a hand in increasing the Maratha-Nizam tension."¹³ The Nizam's reluctance readily to consent to the release of the princes, his designs on Kurnool and other border villages, his anxiety to conclude with the English a Treaty of Guarantee against Tipu and the English intrigues in the Hyderabad Court compelled Tipu to favour the Marathas.

With the outbreak of the Maratha-Nizam war, Tipu came into greater prominence. He became the central figure balancing the politics of the Deccan as his participation on either side would be a decisive factor in beating the other. The English did not support the Nizam, thinking that he would be induced to join the Marathas. They thought it difficult to resist the combined attack of the Marathas and Tipu. They regretted that the Nizam pursued a wrong policy in offending Tipu by unjust demands. They wished that he should have won the friendship of Tipu which would have helped him in resisting the Marathas.¹⁴ Kirkpatrick attempted to compose the Nizam-Tipu differences soon after the Peace of 1792 but the insistence of the Nizam's minister to detain the princes until the settlement of all the disputes offended Tipu.

A brief review of the Maratha-Nizam war gives us an idea of the complicated politics of the Deccan powers. By 1794 Nana's power had enormously increased. His long continuance in office, defeat of Tipu and the death of Mahadaji Sindhia and Haripant left him supreme in the Deccan. By the middle of 1794, his rivalry with the Nizam deepened to a crisis. To avert a clash, the Nizam deputed Meer Alam to Poona to settle the disputes. The issue was the payment of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. The Nizam did not deny the justice of the claim but only disputed the amount. The Marathas demanded the payment of full arrears. The Nizam sought the English assistance but they declined to help him. Sindhia who was at first

favourable towards the Nizam, changed sides and joined Nana in demanding the *chauth*. Sindhia added one more demand to the list, the cession of Bidar where his spiritual guide, the Muslim saint, Mansur Shah had his shrine.¹³ As neither party was willing for a compromise, the issue was decided in the battle at Kardla, about 125 miles from Poona, on March 12, 1795, where the Nizam was defeated. He was forced to surrender a territory yielding thirty-five lakhs of rupees, besides the fort of Daulatabad, to pay an indemnity of three crores and durbar charges, and to surrender Azimul Umrah as a hostage. This war completely disturbed the arrangements of the peace of 1792.

This war was very significant, as it gave the Nizam a bitter experience of his friendship with the English. It was in a way a fight between the English and the Marathas for the leadership of the Deccan. Sindhia had come down to the south for checking the British influence. The Nizam's growing intimacy with the English was resented both by the Marathas and Tipu. Moreover, an active interest in the rivalry of Nana and Sindhia and the march of the Nizam towards Bidar to interfere in their affairs, further embittered his relations with Nana. Sir John Shore warned against such measures but Azimul Umrah took no notice of them.¹⁴

The war brought out the faithlessness of the English. Cornwallis had repeatedly assured the Nizam that the English would never let down their ally.¹⁷ His letter of July 7, 1789 had specifically mentioned that the English were bound by their honour to protect the Nizam. Yet Sir John Shore denied help on the plea that they were verbal assurances and not specified in a treaty, that the Charter Act of 1793 had imposed strict neutrality, and that the English were bound to protect him only against Tipu. Even this help against Tipu would be rendered only so long as the Triple Alliance remained in force and "a war between two of the parties totally changes the relative situation of all."¹⁸ The necessity for this new interpretation of the assurances of help to the Nizam arose owing to the apprehension of the English that the combined forces of the Marathas and Tipu would beat the English. Sir John Shore confessed that "the impending consequences ought to be much stronger than that apprehension of future evils from the subversion of the Nizam's power."¹⁹ In other words the English felt that their aid to the Nizam would result in greater injury to their interests than their betrayal of an ally. But the English prestige suffered much by this infidelity. The defeat of their ally was their own defeat. The Nizam was left alone because of "the greater evils attending a

war with Tipu."²⁰ The English contemplated joining with the Marathas, for that would help them to resist Tipu better. This reveals that Tipu was the balancing force which prompted the English to remain neutral. His recovery was so complete that he was dreaded again by the English.

Thus the war contributed to the promotion of better relations between Tipu and the Marathas. The old feuds, the boundary disputes and the frontier depredations were all buried. The English ascendancy gained in the peace of 1792 was supplanted by that of the Marathas. Tipu gained due prominence in the politics of the Deccan and was an informal ally of the Marathas. Both tried to check the rapid growth of the English power.

But the battle of Kardla was the last great victory of the Marathas, after which their power decidedly declined. Tipu's relations with them were further improved after that war. With the death of the Peshwa, Madhava Rao II, in October 1795, a civil war broke out in Poona. Tipu was at first willing to help Nana but, on further reflection, he decided to avoid the complications. Persaram Bhao who bore inveterate hostility towards Tipu was in the opposite camp which prompted Tipu to think at first that he should participate in the civil war, but he soon revised his decision. The disturbed politics of Poona, made Tipu cautious because the instability of the Maratha affairs might involve him in endless complications. The English were afraid that he would join the party that was opposed to them.²¹ But Tipu decided not to intervene.

Tipu's Relations with the Nizam (1792-1798)

Just as Tipu's relations with the Marathas were strained in the beginning and were improved afterwards, his relations with the Nizam were at first embittered but took a friendly turn later. As usual, the boundary disputes, particularly the Kurnool question, caused considerable difficulties. The reluctance of the Nizam to consent to the release of the princes added to the misgivings of Tipu. But the situation improved after the faithless conduct of the English who deserted their ally.

The question of Kurnool strained the relations. It was a small principality, about one hundred miles in length and eighty miles in breadth, governed by Nawab Ranmast Khan. Haidar Ali had conquered and made it a tributary of Mysore in 1765. After 1792 a bitter controversy arose owing to the anxiety of both Tipu and the Nizam to

secure the principality. Ever since Haidar had reduced it, it had paid tribute to Mysore. In the Treaty of Srirangapatna, Tipu desired to transfer its tribute to the Nizam's share of indemnity. As the Nizam was not agreeable to this arrangement and as he professed his own claim to Kurnool, the matter was dropped, without full discussion.²² The whole of the principality was included in Tipu's share. The impression that was created in the conference was that though Azimul Umrah objected to Tipu's claim over the principality, he, yet, reluctantly conceded it. Kennaway had assured Tipu that he would not be deprived of the place and the established tribute coming from it.²³

When Tipu demanded the arrears of tribute from the Nawab, the Nizam intervened and prevented the payment on the ground that Tipu's claim to the place was irregular and unjust. He instigated the Nawab to reject Tipu's demand and he attempted to secure the place for himself. His contention was that Kurnool once belonged to the Subedar of the Deccan and he, as the Vicegerent of Mughal authority in the South, had a claim to suzerainty over the place. To accomplish his object, he sought English support and sent agents to Madras for the purpose.²⁴ He instigated the Nawab to detain Tipu's agents.²⁵ But both the Madras authorities and the Kurnool chief declined to comply with his request. He thought of forcible annexation with the assistance of the British auxiliary corps stationed at Hyderabad. But the Resident discouraged such attempts and refused the employment of the British corps. Cornwallis had specifically laid down that the English would not interfere, as that would involve them in difficulties with the Marathas and Tipu.²⁶ Even then the Nizam could not reconcile himself to its loss. He decided to secure the place even by paying the tribute himself to Tipu, which he did not consider improper.²⁷ He proposed to pay not only the future tribute but also the old arrears. This arrangement would have solved the dispute satisfactorily, as Tipu was interested only in the tribute, but the Resident was not agreeable. He considered it highly derogatory to the dignity of the Nizam, and threatened to withdraw the English support if Tipu attacked him on the Kurnool issue.²⁸ Cornwallis called it, "a submission to degradation and a private agreement" which would absolve the English from all consequences arising from it.

The anxiety of the Nizam to secure the place revealed his ambition. In reality Tipu had undoubted claim over the place, as it had been the tributary of Mysore for over thirty years. The Nizam had remained silent all these years, acknowledging the suzerainty of Mysore.

He had not pressed the matter to a final decision even in the Peace Conference of 1792. He had just raised the topic but had not pursued it. Tipu had denied the claims of the Nizam and asserted his own, which had convinced the other Confederates. It was then included in Tipu's schedule, which was neither opposed nor repudiated by the Nizam's deputies. The Nizam had no definite evidence to prove his claim conclusively when he was called upon to do so at the Peace Conference.²⁹ On the other hand, Tipu produced the receipts of the tribute paid to him and other papers. The Nizam's sole claim was that Kurnool once formed the military fief of the Subedar of the Deccan and hence he continued to be "Lord Paramount" of the place. But Tipu refuted this argument by stating the fact that the Nizam had ceased to be its overlord when he had not been able to protect his ally against Haidar Ali in 1765, when the latter had annexed it to Mysore. Another contention of the Nizam was that only by his superior force Tipu had compelled the Nawab to pay tribute. Kenna-way argued that the general practice prevalent in India of exacting tribute was by holding out a threat of war. "According to the usage of the country, the tributary state should be held to be dependent on the power to which tribute was paid."³⁰ Even Cornwallis did not appreciate the Nizam's contention. He observed: "Most of the great monarchies, now existing, were founded under the permission of His Providence, by the power of the sword."³¹ Even during the war, Ranmast Khan remained loyal to Tipu and his action was resented by the allies. He supplied them no grain, fodder nor horses, and despite their repeated remonstrances, had not severed his contacts with Tipu.³²

Ranmast Khan died in 1792 and a war of succession began between his two sons, Azam Khan, the elder son and Alif Khan, the younger. The latter had been nominated by the old Nawab as his successor and accordingly a will had been drawn, attested by the seal of the Qazi and the signatures of Azam Khan and his followers.³³ Ranmast Khan had also desired that the new Nawab should discharge the arrears of tribute to Tipu and pay it promptly in future.³⁴ Tipu, therefore, supported Alif Khan but the Nizam espoused the cause of Azam Khan, the elder brother. He decided to intervene in the war of succession and dispatch the British corps for the purpose.³⁵ But Cornwallis refused to permit their employment. No doubt by the Treaty of 1768, the Nizam was entitled to apply for this force but,

as the peace of 1792 would be infringed by it, the Governor-General pleaded his inability to oblige the Nizam. Moreover, the Nizam had been told, "Quarrelling with Tipu in matters in which the Company could not feel justified in supporting him, he would run the utmost risk of sacrificing to pride and passion those substantial and glorious advantages which had been obtained by the late Treaty of Peace."³⁶ The Nizam was dissuaded from taking active interest in the Kurnool question in view of his old age and his failing health, and on grounds of justice and policy. It might involve him in serious consequences as "no engagement existed by virtue of which the Company could unite with Your Highness." Therefore he was sincerely advised to withdraw from the contest. Cornwallis wrote, "I request, therefore, Your Highness to consider with what justice this right can now be contested or with what equity Tipu Sultan can now be called upon to produce the agreement of the Nawab of Kurnool. Tipu could justly complain of an infringement of the Treaty if a demand was then made."³⁷

Being thus discouraged by Cornwallis, the Nizam changed his tactics and won Ali Khan over to his side. He induced him not to pay tribute to Tipu but to send a *vakil*, named Bandullah Khan, to Hyderabad for concluding some new arrangements. He drew up a treaty by which Kurnool was to acknowledge the Nizam's suzerainty, Ali Khan was to pay the *Paishkash* of fifteen lakhs of rupees to him and his elder brother was to get a *jagir* of sixty thousand rupees.³⁸ The English again denounced these arrangements and desired the dispute to be left to Tipu and the sons of Ranmasi Khan. The Nizam was not willing and Meer Alam threatened Kennaway that unless the English fulfilled their old treaty terms of providing him aid, the Nizam would isolate himself in case of a war with Tipu.³⁹ Bandullah Khan stayed on in the court of Hyderabad, but the Maratha hostility against Hyderabad diverted the attention of the Nizam, and the Kurnool Question lost its importance. Bandullah Khan was dismissed in October 1793 without any definite agreement being concluded.

Finding himself betrayed by the Nizam, Ali Khan was once again in a serious predicament. Therefore he again accepted Tipu's suzerainty and promised to pay the accumulated tribute of twenty lakhs. Tipu sent Gulab Khan to recover this amount, when the Nizam again intervened.⁴⁰ The question of Kurnool continued to strain Tipu's relations with Hyderabad. While the English dissuaded the Nizam from active interference, they were equally keen on preventing its

total annexation by Tipu. They desired that he should merely collect the tribute. Cornwallis observed, "I should be sorry that Tipu should acquire any further right of ascendancy in Kurnool than that of enforcing the payment of the established *Paishkash*".⁴¹ The issue was raised again in 1797, when Azimul Umrah suggested a commission of the Confederates and Tipu to discuss the matter and settle it amicably.⁴² When Tipu massed his troops near Gutti in 1796 to exact tribute, the Nizam seriously apprehended the move and suggested the dispatch of deputies to ascertain his real intentions.⁴³ Threatened by this action of Tipu, the Nizam was willing to settle the dispute by conceding half of Tipu's claim to the tribute.⁴⁴ The question was no longer the right of Tipu to the tribute, but the actual amount to be paid. The dispute, however, was never finally and satisfactorily settled as long as Tipu lived.

Besides Kurnool, other border disputes caused anxiety to Tipu. The Nizam complained of frontier depredations by Tipu's army, but the latter denied the charge and levelled countercharges. Malik Isa, an officer of the Nizam, carried on devastations in the Mysore territory.⁴⁵ The English censured the activities of this officer and requested Azimul Umrah to appoint loyal and honest officers to frontier posts. The situation deteriorated and Azimul Umrah proposed the appointment of an English officer on the frontier to inquire impartially into all the circumstances of the dispute. The Nizam refused to consent to the release of the princes until these border disputes were settled, which necessitated the appointment of Commissioners by both Tipu and the Nizam.⁴⁶ Tipu deputed Miran Hussain and the Nizam sent Mohamed Amin Arab, both of whom worked from March 1794 to August 1794. The inquiry bore good results, as it preserved the tranquillity of the borders. When the Zamindar of Kappathal committed ravages in Mysore, Azimul Umrah issued pre-emptory orders requiring him to desist from his action. As a result of the inquiry, a few villages were mutually exchanged. When a promise was made that the Nizam would return a village, Hinchunhalli, claimed by Tipu, the latter was satisfied.⁴⁷ But all the disputes were not settled. In 1796, the Nizam complained that Hari Nayak of Kanakagiri had caused disturbances and asked the English to intervene and dissuade Tipu from his action.⁴⁸ Tipu complained that the Nizam had offended him by affording shelter to the Zamindar of Anegundi who had ravaged his dominion and disturbed the peace. The Nizam seemed at first very apprehensive of Tipu's power. He wrote to Cornwallis at the

time of his departure to Europe. "His Lordship's going to Europe at this time is like a man snuffing the fire in his own house and anxious for his own safety quits his house and leaves the other inhabitants of it to extinguish the flames."³¹ But Cornwallis did not expect any danger from Tipu and assured the Nizam that Tipu's conduct should not be judged by that of his officer's but by his own willingness to implement the terms of the treaty.³² Sir John Shore also held the same view that Tipu was not expected to perform more than his Treaty obligations. He resumed the Nizam's action of withholding the princes at a time when Tipu had distinctly fulfilled all his promises. He regarded it particularly unfortunate in view of the growing tension between the Nizam and Tipu. The English were conscious of the fact that the Nizam's power was inferior to that of both the Marathas and Tipu. That was why they refused to assist him lest they should involve themselves in insupportable embarrassments. The Nizam's mistake was that he quarrelled with both Tipu and the Marathas and relied too much on the British. Even after the English gave him a hint that they would not stand by him, he did not try to improve his relations with Tipu. Only after repeated remonstrances from the English he modified his consent about the release of the Mysore garrison.³³ His anxiety to conclude a Treaty of Commerce against Tipu further estranged his relations with Mysore. When the Marathas refused to be a party to such a treaty, he pressed for a separate treaty between the English and himself. He argued that his annual contribution would induce the Marathas also to join.

After the Maratha-Nizam War the relations surely improved, as the English had deserted the Nizam. Tipu's neutrality was a great relief to him. The participation of Tipu also in the war for the recovery of his losses would have further reduced the Nizam. Because of this neutrality, better relations prevailed in the later period. The Nizam was willing to enter into an alliance with Tipu, which would relieve him from his treaty obligations to the Marathas. The absence of Asaf-ud-Daulah helped the negotiations. Imad-ul-Daulah and Roy Rayan, who were in charge of the Nizam's administration, were highly favourable to an alliance with Tipu. They sent Muhammad Amin to sound Tipu, who responded favourably and despatched Nizam-ul-Rashid to Hyderabad in August 1795. This person took his residence with Roy Rayan and the matter was kept a guarded secret.³⁴ The Nizam was at this time embarrassed by the rebellion of his son Ali Jafar and by the Maratha demand of a large indemnity

of three crores. Immediately after his return from Kardla, he dismissed the British corps under his service and ordered its march to the confines of the Company's territories. To set off this deficiency, he encouraged Reymond to build up a large and efficient French army. A body of the French regular infantry was despatched to Cuddapah, the English border. These actions of the Nizam estranged his relations with the English but improved them with Tipu. Moreover, the threatening attitude of Sindhia towards Hyderabad prompted the Nizam to be very friendly with Tipu.

After the return of Kishnaji who gave Tipu a favourable report of the Hyderabad court, Tipu sent another agent, Sakka Ram, ostensibly to settle the Kurnool issue, but in reality to negotiate an alliance.⁶³ He wrote letters to the Nizam and Roy Rayan. His letter to Roy Rayan stated, "Whatever you have written has been understood; on that point I am ready but upon the following condition only that the understanding existing between your Sarkar and the English shall cease."⁵⁴ Owing to the rebellion of Ali Jah, these negotiations did not make much progress. Another attempt was made in July 1796, when Meer Alam proposed a triple alliance of the Nizam, the English and Tipu. But Sir John Shore denounced the proposal as being repugnant to the Marathas and contrary to the triple alliance of 1790 and the Charter Act of 1793⁵⁵. The English objected to a separate alliance also between the Nizam and Tipu against the Marathas.⁶⁶ When Meer Alam sought the English permission for such an alliance, Sir John Shore instructed Kennaway to frustrate these attempts to outwit the English. The Nizam was convinced that it was a dangerous measure and Tipu would never co-operate with him without demanding the restoration of his surrendered territories. It would dissolve the Confederacy and the English would not protect the Nizam if Tipu turned aggressor. Moreover, there was no necessity for such an alliance as the Maratha menace had subsided, owing to their internal disorders. Thus this project was frustrated by the English intrigue.⁶⁷

Despite the English efforts, the Nizam continued his negotiations. Tipu was always favourable to co-operation with the Nizam but he desired a triple alliance of the Indian Powers against the English. For this purpose, he sent another embassy, consisting of Qadir Hussain Khan and Syed Mohamed Madani, to negotiate a permanent treaty between the three states, Mysore, Hyderabad and Poona.⁵⁸ His agents expressed their master's eagerness that the Nizam should conclude his peace with the Marathas and all three should co-operate

against the Company.⁵⁹ But the Nizam did not encourage the embassy. The causes of its failure were many. The Nizam did not like to incur the hostility of the English. Moreover there was no danger of Maratha attack owing to their internal dissensions. Azimul Umrah had secured his release and was actually engaged in the politics of Poona. He managed not only to wipe off the stains of the Maratha Convention but also to push up the Nizam's ascendancy in the Poona affairs. Meanwhile, the English influence steadily increased in Hyderabad. The dismissed British subsidiary force was ordered back to its place on the plea that Tipu had hostile designs on Kurnool. Raymond's troops sent to Cuddapah were promptly recalled. The revolt of Ali Jah further strengthened the English influence whose detachment was required to deal with the extraordinary situation. The release and return of Azimul Umrah gained the British a powerful supporter. He destroyed the intimacy that was being developed between Tipu and the Nizam. Tipu's party, consisting of Imtiaz ud Daulah, Amjad ud Daulah and Roy Rayan suffered a serious set back. The Nizam's relations with the English were daily strengthened. Moreover, the Nizam was not sincere in his proposals of an alliance with Tipu. Confronted with the serious situation of Maratha menace, he only adopted a policy which would relieve the Maratha pressure on him, and secure for him favourable arrangements. He was in a way inducing the English to protect him against the Marathas, by threatening to join Tipu. He was more anxious to secure the Company's help than of Tipu. Tipu was also conscious of the difficulties of a permanent alliance with the Nizam, who was old and sick. There was no guarantee that his successor would honour his commitments. Tipu hesitated because he felt that Sikander Jah, who was the heir-apparent, might repudiate his engagements with the Nizam under the influence of Azimul Umrah.⁶⁰ Therefore his agents were just studying the trends of events and the opinions of different political parties in Hyderabad.

Tipu's last hope of an alliance was centred on the success of the French party in Hyderabad. Raymond's force had been increased to 14,000 regular disciplined troops. Its two battalions in 1792 were augmented to twenty-three in 1797, with twelve field pieces. Besides his military position, Raymond commanded political influence in the Court. A large territory had been surrendered to him for the maintenance of the French army. Additions of land were frequently made and arsenals and foundries were constantly formed. Sikander Jah, the Paigah Party and Tipu's supporters favoured Raymond. The

English army where desertions were quite common was not popular. Even a mutiny took place in their camp. The resources of the Nizam were passing into the hands of the French faction. Even Sir John Shore was apprehensive and imputed sinister motives to it. He wrote a letter to the Nizam protesting against his decision of placing a large force in the hands of the declared enemies of the English. He requested its dismissal. He suspected that the French commander would conspire with Tipu against the English. But even this hope of Tipu was destroyed with the advent of Wellesley.

Thus the post-war relations of Tipu with the Marathas and the Nizam were characterized by stress and strain to start with, but by reconciliation and compromise as years rolled by. The after math of the war caused disputes and controversies over the adjustment of borders and the faithful implementation of the treaty, with both sides attempting to derive as much benefit as possible from the loopholes of the treaty. But there was soon a radical shift in the trend of politics because of the numerous developments that took place. Chief among them were the growing ascendancy of the Marathas in the affairs of the Deccan, their strained relations with the Nizam, the refusal of the English to give him aid when he was in distress, the revival of the French party at his court, the increasing influence of Sindhia in the politics of Poona, the death of the Peshwa and the consequent war of succession, the emergence of Baji Rao II, and a shift in English policy from one of active intervention in the affairs of other powers to one of strict neutrality. All these factors gave Tipu an ideal chance to revive the ruling passion of his life, namely, to eliminate the English from the active politics of the country. He realized that the Marathas could certainly play a dominant role in any scheme to reduce the English, and hence he attempted to secure their support and co-operation. Although it was relatively easy to have won over the Nizam to his side particularly because of the faithless conduct of the English in not going to the Nizam's aid when he was confronted by the Marathas, Tipu did not prefer his support, knowing, full well the political inconstancy and the military weakness of the Nizam. Tipu preferred the Marathas hoping that they were aware of the ultimate consequences of adopting a short-sighted policy in respect of the English. Success or failure in a contest between two Indian powers would not hurt the interests of the country so much as it would in a war between an Indian and a European power. The Mysore-Maratha War of 1785-87, or even the Nizam-Maratha War of 1795 did not have any of those far-

reaching effects that followed the battle of Plassey, or the battle of Buxar, or the fall of Srirangapatna. Among all the princes of India, it was Tipu alone who had the understanding of these long-range repercussions of any misguided policy that might strengthen English hands. That was the reason why he preferred the Marathas, who too were unfortunately guided at this time only by fleeting and immediate gains. It was only after the fall of Tipu that they realised that he was the first to fall and that the next turn would be theirs. The Nizam was incapable of understanding the implications of honour or independence, for he would compromise any issue if his survival was guaranteed. He would not mind accepting English paramountcy which would reduce him to the position of a subordinate. Tipu's entire policy was different, namely to guard and preserve his own independence and that of the country. With this object he launched upon his project of cultivating the Marathas so that an alliance could be formed or at least their neutrality secured, if he were to be at war with the English. He was at the same time exploring the possibility of securing either the French or the Afghan support. Just in case he was fortunate enough to get the aid of either, he wanted to be very sure that the Marathas did not repeat what they had done during the Third Mysore War. Nor did he ignore the Nizam altogether. But he would only go so far as not to join the Nizam in a war against the Marathas. Yet he was quite aware of the value of the Nizam, whose resources and the strategic location of his country acted as a balancing force in any contest. Moreover, the breach of faith on the part of the English in not going to the Nizam's rescue when he was attacked by the Marathas gave Tipu an opportunity to strengthen the Mysore lobby at Hyderabad. The absence from Hyderabad of Azimul Umrah, who was an Anglophile and who was now away in Poona, encouraged Tipu to undertake a bold step, namely to advise the Nizam to increase the French troops in his army. Reymond, who was in command of this force, increased the number to 14,000. The increasing influence of the French both in Mysore and Hyderabad at a time when Napoleon's star was just rising was a matter of great significance. Tipu desired steadily to build up a situation whereby all forces opposed to the English could join hands for a final show-down. Thus the politics of the last decade of the eighteenth century was portentous with ominous signs. The country was back again in conflicts, confusion, rivalries and revolutions. The war of succession in Poona, the politics of Baji Rao II and Daulat Rao Sindhia, the Maratha War

on the Nizam, the role of the French adventurers in the courts of the Indian powers, and Tipu's own intrigues not only in Poona and Hyderabad but also in Mauritius and Kabul, all revealed the disturbed conditions in the country, which was ripe for one more bold venture. Tipu tried to exploit the situation for his own purpose, namely, scoring a point over the English; but they turned the tables upon him.

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CHAPTER XI

CLOSER CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH AND OTHER POWERS (1792-99)

ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH were of little help to Tipu in both the Second and the Third Mysore Wars, he did not break his relations with them. He still looked upon them as potential allies who would gratify his resentment against the English. He maintained a French corps which formed a distinguished part of his army. He despatched several embassies to France. But they disappointed him every time. In 1783 they concluded a separate peace with the English without consulting Tipu. In 1786, in spite of his persuasion, they remained neutral in the Mysore-Maratha War. In 1788, they turned down his offer of an alliance. In 1790, they declined to assist him in the Mysore War. But every time Tipu overlooked their short-comings as he was conscious of their difficulties and hoped that they would yet be able to help him in future:

The French were not happy at the British ascendancy in the Peace of 1792 and regretted that they were of no help to their ally. When Tipu proposed to increase his French corps to 1,800 men with 600 Europeans, they readily consented.¹ They were keen in 1792 to secure Tipu's aid as a fresh Anglo-French War was likely to break out. The Governor of Pondicherry instigated the French commander under Tipu to induce him to join the French in the war and recover his losses.² As Tipu had just then concluded peace with the English, he was not prepared to participate in the war. However, he expressed his desire to enter into a Treaty of co-operation if the National Convention in Paris would ratify it.³ His past experience of the French authorities in India compelled him to impose this condition. He demanded an aid of 10,000 men with proportionate artillery and ammunition, which should be placed under his command. The nature of warfare in India being different from that in Europe, he was not willing to entrust

the command to the French generals. After the conquest of British territories, the coastal area was to be ceded to the French and the interior to Tipu.¹ He contemplated the despatch of a separate embassy to accomplish these objects.² But the French declined these proposals. De Fresne, the French Governor, would not even approve of Tipu's despatch of an embassy. He wrote to the Minister of Marine in Paris, "I have infinitely blamed such an operation in 1787. It appears to me that nothing would be more embarrassing to us in Europe and more perplexing in India."³ Tipu was disappointed and hence he watched with indifference the capture of Pondicherry by the English on August 23, 1793, after the break-out of the Anglo-French War in Europe. He did not even reply to Chermont, the French commander, when he solicited his aid.⁴

Tipu had not much to do with the French after their loss of Pondicherry in 1793. But the arrival of Ripaud, the captain of a private ship in 1796 revived Tipu's interests in the French. His ship had been damaged in an engagement, for the repair of which he touched the shore of Mangalore. He proceeded to Srirangapatna where he represented himself as the French envoy specially sent to inform Tipu of the presence of a big force in Mauritius which would be despatched to him, if he applied for it. Tipu believed in him and decided to ascertain the conditions on which the troops would be available. He consulted his ministers about the advisability of entering into negotiations with the French.⁵ He himself was of the opinion not to let the opportunity go but to obtain the force by the despatch of two confidential persons, and conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with them.⁶ His ministers doubted the reports of Ripaud and regarded him an impostor. While they were convinced of the necessity of an alliance, they were not sure of an equal desire on the part of the French to join Tipu. Mohamed Reza and Purniah considered it dangerous to rely on the French promises. The revenue ministry was in favour of ascertaining the real facts in Mauritius and the Marine Ministry in favour of concluding a permanent alliance with them, but the Commerce Ministry was loud in denouncing Ripaud.¹⁰ "This Ripaud, that is come. God knows, what ass it is, whence it comes and for what purpose."¹¹ The Sultan was cautioned that some secret designs might be concealed behind such lavish promises.

In spite of the discouragement, Tipu selected four confidential men, Mirza Bakhar, Hussin Ali Khan, Meer Gulam Ali and Meer Yusuf Ali to be sent as envoys to Mauritius. They carried his letters

to the principal officers of the Isle and they were enjoined to conduct the business in the strictest secrecy. Besides their political mission, they were charged with the duty of bringing a number of artisans and craftsmen like cannon-founders, ship-builders, glass-makers and experts in other industries. But the main purpose was military and political, to demand a force of thirty to forty thousand, a suitable fleet and the conclusion of a Treaty. He undertook to bear the expenses of the troops who had to co-operate with Tipu in his offensive war against the English. The Treaty of Alliance he proposed was founded on "republican principles of sincerity and good faith." He wrote, "If you assist me, in a short time, not a single Englishman shall remain in India. We will purge India of these men. The springs which I have touched have put all India in motion, my friends are ready to fall upon the English." But he struck a note of caution also, "Do not let my attachment to your nation expose me to the same calamity which I formerly suffered."¹² He urged that the situation in India was highly unfavourable to the English. The Nizam was old and after his death a war of succession would disturb Hyderabad. The prince who was likely to succeed was on Tipu's side. The distracted affairs of the Marathas, the probability of Zaman Shah's invasion and the disturbances at Calicut afforded the best chance to strike at the English. He persuaded the French to profit by these circumstances and co-operate with him. But he warned them against making unfaithful promises. He suggested that Bombay would be ceded to them but he would retain Goa.¹³ The embassies were first despatched to Mauritius and then to Paris as ambassadors to the French Executive Directory. Pernaud, another French, was entrusted with the cash but he absconded with the money and his fraud roused Tipu's suspicions resulting in the arrest of Ripaud. Moreover, the original embassy had to be cancelled owing to the outbreak of monsoon and the internal dissensions among the envoys. It was substituted by another consisting of two, Hussain Ali Khan and Muhammad Ibrahim. The restraints placed on Ripaud were removed who along with the embassy embarked for Mauritius on December 5, 1797 and landed on the island on January 19, 1798. Ripaud misbehaved with the envoys on the voyage and seized Tipu's letters addressed to the French Chiefs. He returned them only after being satisfied that there was nothing against him.

Contrary to their expectations, the envoys were received with great public-honour and were conveyed to the Governor in State. One

hundred and fifty guns were fired to announce their arrival. The Governor-General, General Malartic, himself came out to receive them and their arrival remained no longer a secret. But the envoys were utterly disappointed to find that there was neither any force stationed in the island nor was there any hope of its arrival shortly. The French Governor expressed his regret that they were a bit too late in their approach for help. A European force of one thousand men had been despatched to the Dutch at Batavia, which could have been spared to Tipu if he had asked for it four months earlier. As for the conclusion of treaty, the Governor regretted that he was not vested with power to enter into any such negotiations. He could at best only forward the letters to the Executive Directory at Paris, which he did. He sent another ship to the Isle of Bourbon to fetch any troops, if available, but after eighteen days it returned empty.¹⁴ Therefore he issued a proclamation requesting the citizens of the Isle to enlist themselves in the army of Tipu who, "only waits for the moment when the French shall come to his assistance to declare war against the English whom he ardently desires to expel from India."¹⁵

The ambassadors were greatly embarrassed to find this extraordinary proclamation which was contrary to the spirit of their instructions from Tipu. They wrote to the Governor that Tipu needed a large force and he had been informed of its presence in the island. Lest he should be disappointed, the Governor was raising volunteers for him whom the envoys refused to enlist. The Governor was displeased to find their response to the proclamation. He wanted to fix beforehand the salaries of those who desired to go. "The officers and volunteers who are to accompany you, shall not make a journey of five hundred leagues to ascertain what pay Tipu Sultan may choose to fix for them."¹⁶ The Governor's appeal resulted in the enlistment of only very few volunteers who were less than one hundred. They embarked on the frigate *La Premeuse* and landed at Mangalore on April 26, 1798. The party consisted of two generals, thirty-five officers, thirty-six European soldiers, twenty-two coloured troops and four ship-builders the total being ninety-nine in number.

The French Chiefs in reply to Tipu's letters regretted deeply their inability to send any effective help. Descomber, a member of the Governing Body who had been in Pondicherry in 1792, appealed to Tipu to seek alliances within the country. He asked, "What is then the fatality which has divided the princes of Asia?" and himself answered it, "It is the dark policy of the English, their Machiavellian

principles. . . there is still time to crush this ambitious nation but it is necessary that the Courts of Poona, the Subah of the Deccan, the Tartars, the Raja of Travancore should unite to attack, to overthrow and finally to expel those haughty English. . . The princes of India who took up arms against you were not sensible."¹⁷ Malartic also urged Tipu to form a powerful confederacy of Indian powers against the English. He wrote, "Endeavour by every means in your power to point out to the Marathas their true interests by satisfying them that your enemies are in reality theirs."¹⁸

This account of Tipu's endeavour to seek French aid is furnished by the English sources translated from Persian papers found in the palace at Srirangapatna after its fall on May 4, 1799. They were published by the orders of Wellesley in August 1799 which exhibited Tipu's uncompromising hostility towards the English. But it is difficult to ascertain the real motives of the French General in issuing such an extraordinary proclamation. While Wilks, Bowring and P. E. Roberts do not doubt the authenticity of the embassy and the inveterate hostility of Tipu towards the English, Torrens, Mill and M. H. Khan defend Tipu against the charges of designs to overthrow the English. The attempts of the latter group take away much of the importance of Tipu's struggle to check the British growth in India. M. H. Khan, a modern historian of Tipu, is very sceptical of the whole transaction and calls it a pure and simple fabrication.¹⁹ His arguments in favour of his contention are the absence of the indigenous sources to confirm the English account, the improbability of Tipu's belief on Ripaud and of his envoys acting contrary to his instructions in leaking out the secrets of their mission, the doubts as to the authenticity of the Proclamation, the improbability of an alliance with the French whose past record was so disappointing and, lastly, the military unpreparedness of Tipu. Tipu was ignorant, it is maintained, of all that passed in Mauritius except the despatch of two peaceful merchants who were incidentally asked to enlist some soldiers for him. He was prompted to have them as the Nizam and Sindhia maintained a French force. In response to this, the Governor made an announcement calling the citizens to enlist in Tipu's service but such a simple event was magnified to condemn Tipu. The merchants were transformed into ambassadors and their business was exaggerated to the task of concluding an offensive alliance with the French.

But it is not fair to say that the whole transaction was a fabrication, deliberately invented by Wellesley to overthrow Tipu. The absence

of corroboratory indigenous sources is not very surprising, as most of the Persian histories of Tipu are not only inexhaustive but also sometimes misleading. None of them gives either an adequate or authentic account of Tipu's external policy. Their dates are often not correct and their treatment of many topics very defective. In some of them even the well-known facts are omitted as for instance, the absence of any reference to Tipu's attack on Nargund and Kittur in *Sultan-ut-Twarikh*. Therefore the silence of Kirmani, the author of *Tarikh-e-Tipu* and other Persian sources is not strange. Moreover, the mission was kept by Tipu a closely-guarded secret which might have escaped their notice. As to the fact that Tipu could not have been deceived a second time by Ripaud after the fraud of Pernaud was known to him, it may be pointed out that Ripaud successfully convinced Tipu of the presence of troops. It was a weakness in Tipu that he readily believed in such rumours as he consistently followed an anti-British policy. Tipu's response was always favourable to any proposal of alliance against the English either from the Marathas, or the Nizam, or the French. Ripaud excited his hostility and encouraged him to expect powerful co-operation from the French. Tipu desired to wreak vengeance on the English for his losses of 1792, and Ripaud, magnifying the resources of his nation, prevailed upon him at a psychological moment to execute his plans in co-operation with the French. Tipu had been just then disappointed in his efforts to form an alliance of the native powers and hence the news of the availability of a large force for the mere asking prompted him to seize the opportunity. Tipu was emotional in character, with a firm determination to pursue his object irrespective of the consequences. He reposed confidence in the French in spite of their past record. Therefore it is not difficult to believe that Tipu believed Ripaud a second time and sent a mission to obtain the French aid. The very fact which is indisputably accepted that the arrival of Ripaud resulted in the despatch of two envoys to Mauritius proves the effect of Ripaud's persuasion on Tipu.

With respect to the divulging of the secret by the envoys and their ultimate agreement with the Proclamation, it must be remembered that they were helpless in a foreign land and it was the imprudence of the general who took the extraordinary step and not of the envoys. Despite their protests, the authorities insisted on their being received in public with great dignity and honour. The French hated the English as much as Tipu did, and it was their policy to reduce

their rivals by any means. To them Tipu appeared whom they could exploit to be a fit instrument and thus, by sending a token aid, they desired to involve their enemies in a war in the east. The treatment of the envoys with great respect and the issue of a Proclamation were calculated to excite the English jealousy.

Regarding the authenticity of the Proclamation, we need not be in doubt. From the papers preserved in the Archives of Porte Louis, Mauritius, it appears that the Proclamation was not a spurious one but quite a genuine one. A copy of the original procured from the Archives offices of Mauritius gives the name of the printer in the end as Francis Nicolas Bolle and the place, north-west port, Isle of France. It could not have been a forgery as not even Mill doubts its authenticity. This proclamation was first published along with a number of other documents and state papers of Tipu as early as August 1799 and Wellesley had neither the time nor the necessity to tamper with the whole correspondence of Tipu at that time.

As regards the point that Tipu could not have taken the step after his failure to assist the French in resisting the capture of Pondicherry, it may be mentioned that the Franco-Mysorean relations were not strained at any period to breaking point. Tipu had proposed in 1793 a similar treaty and had insisted on its ratification by the National Directory at Paris. He never bore any hostility towards the French and maintained their corps in his army even after their faithlessness on two previous occasions. Lastly, Tipu was not in a way militarily unprepared. Ever since 1792, he was busy in consolidating his strength. The Madras Government wrote on July 10, 1798 to Bengal, "His resources are more prompt than our own and that a great part of his army is supposed to have long been in a state of field equipment."²⁰ Nor was the time inopportune to recover his losses. The triple alliance of 1790 had been dissolved with the defeat of the Nizam at the hands of the Marathas. The confusion in Poona, the presence of a large French force under Reymond in Hyderabad, the threatening attitude of Sindhia towards the English and the increasing intrigues of the French in the other courts particularly after the capture of Pondicherry and Chandernagar, encouraged Tipu to benefit by the situation. The Republic in Paris had approved the old policy of increasing the French forces in the armies of the various princes of India. The swift and decisive victories of the French revolutionary forces in Europe were related to Tipu in an exaggerated manner, which raised his

expectations. Witnessing the intense activity of the French, he could not resist the temptation to believe that a really large force awaited his orders for transshipment to India. That Tipu was not reconciled to his losses was obvious even to Cornwallis. He had concluded peace in 1792 with the full consciousness that his "mind was breathing with all the rage of disappointed ambition and humiliated pride."²¹

But the motives of Malartic in issuing such a dangerous Proclamation were different. Wellesley thought that it was the French jealousy and rivalry that prompted him to take the step. Another reason he gave was the anxiety of Malartic to get rid of the island from the revolutionaries who would be willing to go to India to popularize their ideas.²² Mill accounts for the behaviour of Malartic in a different way. He says that his conduct gives rise to three assumptions. Firstly, the whole transaction was a farce, a fabrication and a "bundle of gross falsehoods" deliberately got up to precipitate the English into an Indian war. Secondly, it was the "act of a mad man making public a communication which it was so much in the interest of both the parties to keep in profound secrecy."²³ Thirdly it was nothing but an act of "boasting and bragging folly with something of very small importance for its foundation."²⁴ Out of these Mill rejects the first two probabilities and supports the last one on the ground that Tipu exceeded all others in boasting and "might be regarded as a braggart even among orientals." The French also suffered from the same weakness which was responsible for the entire transaction.

But Mill's arguments are not convincing, as Tipu had strictly enjoined on his envoys not to make public the purpose of their mission. Moreover, Tipu's letters to the French Directory betray his acknowledgment of the English superiority and his own inability to defeat them. He does not indulge in self-praise and gives a fairly accurate picture of the relative importance of the different powers. Therefore it was the inadvertent folly of Malartic, who in his zeal to crush the English, abandoned all precautions and issued a rash statement. But it happened unwittingly as the French mind at this time was in a high degree of excitability by the events of their revolution. Being influenced by those ideas Malartic indulged in boasting and exaggeration. Tipu had cautioned the French not to expose him to danger by making futile promises. But Malartic was not concerned with the consequences that might affect Tipu. The French were influenced at this time by only two aims, to universalise their ideas and to crush their rivals. Malartic thought that his Proclamation would serve

both the purposes. He issued it in the name of the "French Republic, One and Indivisible." He quoted the revolutionary slogans "Liberty and Equality" at the top and the whole Proclamation breathed revolutionary and anti-English spirit. To involve the English in troubles war was one of the chief instruments. The arrival of the envoys offered them a chance, and they turned it to their advantage regardless of Tipu's interests.

Yet Tipu may be considered mainly responsible for the Proclamation, as his despatch of envoys offered the French a chance to issue it. He had deliberately sent a mission, despite his bitter experiences with the French in the past. That was because he regarded the situation in 1798 a propitious one for striking a blow against the English. Their allies, both the Marathas and the Nizam, had been disengaged from them. The probable invasion of Zaman Shah would divert English attention to the north. The preparations of Napoleon at Toulon and his actual advance to Egypt caused apprehensions to the English. The Company suffered from financial difficulties and its army had been widely dispersed. The conclusion of peace in Europe afforded the French the opportunity of sparing troops for the east. The Dutch had been assisted with one thousand troops. Hence there was nothing improbable in Tipu's expectation of French aid. Napoleon had written to him from Cairo, "You have been already informed of my arrival on the borders of the sea, with an invincible army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England."²⁵ He desired that Tipu should send him a confidential person to inform him of the political situation in the country. Therefore only the premature disclosure of Tipu's plans upset all his programmes. Even after Tipu was convinced of the impending war with the English, he maintained his negotiations with the French and urged them to come to his help.

Relations with Zaman Shah of Afghanistan

Tipu contacted Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan who ascended the throne in 1792. He was the grandson of Ahmed Shah Abdali and, like him, a man of great military reputation. He meditated an attack on India to restore the power of the Mughals in Delhi with whom he had marital connections. Moreover, he desired to emulate his ancestors who had enriched themselves by invading India. He had an efficient and large army ready to march towards India. Even before the advent of Zaman Shah, Tipu had negotiated with Kabul to secure assistance. He had written in 1790-91 to Timur Shah the

father of Zaman Shah, and to the ministers of the Court on the subject of Afghan co-operation with Mysore.²⁶ The negotiations, however, increased in tempo with the accession of Zaman Shah as both bore inveterate hostility towards the English. In 1796, two ambassadors, Mir Habibullah and Muhammad Reza were deputed to the Kabul Court with valuable presents, elephants and friendly letters to induce the Shah to undertake his meditated invasion and to form a plan of co-operation with Tipu against the English. The ambassadors were also charged with the duty of giving publicity to Mysore products, wherever they went. They were instructed to look into the working of the Mysore factory at Kutch and to open a new one at Karachi. Thus the purpose was both political and commercial.

The envoys urged Zaman Shah to assist Tipu by undertaking an expedition to India as the situation was highly favourable.²⁷ He was asked either to send a strong force or personally lead an expedition. If the Shah himself could not go, he was urged to instruct his commanders to join with the Rajputs and other chiefs of India in attacking the Deccan where Tipu would facilitate their task by engaging the attention of the English.²⁸ Tipu himself addressed a letter to the Shah praising his courage and referring him to his ambassadors for certain confidential affairs.²⁹ He desired to appoint two permanent ambassadors at the Court of Kabul for promoting friendly relations between the two countries. Mulla Abdul Ghaffar Khan, one of the important ministers at Kabul, was also addressed by Tipu, acknowledging the receipt of his letter sent through Ram Sahai, the Munshi of Zaman Shah and requesting him to arrange for the envoys an exclusive interview with the Shah to represent some important matters. Tipu, likewise, wrote to other high officers of Afghanistan like Gulam Muhammad Khan and Wafadar Khan, expressing the same sentiments of amity and concord.

In reply to Tipu's letter, the Shah expressed his determination to proceed to India and permitted the ambassadors to stay at his court. "We shall soon march with our conquering army to wage war so that the inhabitants of those regions may be restored to comfort and ease."³⁰ Tipu replied to this letter on January 30, 1799 stating that the English were about to take up arms against him and that Wellesley had made no secret of his designs. He deputed the former ambassadors a second time, requesting the Shah to execute his plans immediately and divert the English attention.³¹ A protracted correspondence between Afghanistan and Mysore began and both powers agreed as regards

their intentions and their plans. Mornington wrote to the Court of Directors, "The concert and correspondence subsisting between Tipu Sultan and Zaman Shah are now a matter of public notoriety."³² He wrote to Dundas, "With respect to the views of Zaman Shah, the papers found in the palace of Srirangapatna have completely justified our opinion of Tipu's disposition to obtain the assistance of that Prince, and of Zaman Shah's inclination to afford it."³³

Tipu failed to secure Afghan aid. He had not pinned high hopes upon it; yet he had attempted to instigate the Shah just to annoy the English. The Afghans also hated the English, as the Company was the chief obstacle in the way of their expansion in India. Tipu was not interested in securing their aid but he merely wanted to cause a diversion in the English attack. The anxiety of the Shah to liberate Shah Alam from bondage made Tipu feel that the Afghan co-operation was possible. As late as 1798, Zaman Shah had actually advanced to Lahore but early in January 1799, he was compelled to retreat to Afghanistan owing to the outbreak of serious revolts on his western frontier. Wellesley had a hand in fomenting trouble on the borders of Iran-Afghanistan by dispatching a Shia from Moradabad to Iran, who excited Shia-Sunni differences.³⁴

It is maintained by some historians that the danger of Zaman Shah's invasion existed only in Wellesley's imagination.³⁵ But the actual march of the Shah in 1798, the excellent condition of his army, the precedents of such Afghan invasions on India make it very difficult to believe that such a possibility never existed at all. The Shah himself had written a letter in June 1797, "It is our intention to visit Hindustan and at a proper season shall accordingly set out where we shall encourage friends and chastise enemies. We have, therefore, now deputed Ghoolam Ahmed Khan thither to ascertain who are our friends and who are our enemies, which we will communicate accordingly; let your mind be perfectly at ease and continue to walk in the path of allegiance and fidelity."³⁶ The Governor-General received another letter of more serious nature. Wellesley wrote to Dundas, "I have lately received a letter from Zaman Shah containing a declaration of his intention to invade Hindustan and a pre-emptory demand of the assistance of the Nabob Vazier [of Oudh] and of mine for the purpose of delivering Shah Alam from the hands of the Marathas, of restoring him to the throne of Delhi and of expelling the Marathas from their acquisitions on the North-Western frontiers of India."³⁷ The letter of Zaman Shah included a threat that the answer of Wellesley

would determine whether he was to consider the English as his friends or his enemies. The possibility of invasion was confined on two grounds, firstly, inadequate resources of Afghanistan to support such a big expedition and secondly, the currency of such rumours for a long time. But these were not the real obstacles in the way of the Shah. If his resources were scanty, he could augment them by plundering the subjugated country. It was not an empty threat that he made frequently. By 1798, he had overcome most of his domestic and foreign troubles and was free to launch his expedition. Sir James Craig observes "But on this point let us ever bear in mind that there is danger in being misled by the idea of the impracticability of the attempt. I have not a doubt that the Shah would attack us."⁴¹ His intentions to march towards India soon after the rainy season of 1798 were generally believed as a certainty. His advance to Lahore confirmed the English apprehensions that it was no empty threat. Not even the Sikhs resisted his advance. Between Lahore and the Company's borders, no one could stop him except Sindhia. But his absence in Poona and the confusion in the Maratha capital, rendered the possessions of Sindhia in the north defenceless. Zaman Shah was conscious of these advantages. The English rupture with Tigra would further facilitate his task. If the Shah proceeded as far as Delhi, he would grow exceedingly formidable. "The glare of victory, the influence of religion and the allurements of plunder will draw to his standard numbers probably greater than have appeared united in one cause since the days of Aurangzeb."⁴² The Rohillas, the Rajputs and other discontented chiefs would unite with him to liberate themselves either from the Marathas or the English. The presence of Sindhia in Poona would prevent the Pathans from joining the English as Sindhia was opposed to Nana's alliance with the Company.

This calamity was averted by the timely action of Wellesley. He intimated Sindhia that in case of an attack on the Maratha possessions in the north, the Company would co-operate with him to resist the invasion.⁴³ He proposed a defensive treaty with Sindhia and instructed Colonel Collins to conclude it. "Between the country of the Sindh and the frontier of Oudh, no barrier exists to check the motions of the Shah excepting the power of Sindhia. The dominions of Sindhia are so weakened by internal dissensions as to be in a state nearly defenceless, while Sindhia continues at Poona with the main body of his army and while his tributary chiefs, remaining in Hindustan, are notoriously disaffected to his cause, and are prepared to seize a

favourable opportunity of annihilating his power."⁴¹ Therefore Wellesley thought of "a system of defensive alliance against the approach of the Shah by entering into engagements, for that purpose, with whatever chief who should have succeeded to the largest portion of Sindhia's power."⁴² He instructed John Collins to guard against the activities of M. Perron, the French Commander in the service of Sindhia, who might join Zaman Shah in the event of Sindhia's fall.⁴³ Wellesley was further apprehensive that the approach of Zaman Shah towards the frontiers of Oudh would become the sign of general revolt and plunder in that province.⁴⁴

Wellesley sent the letter of Zaman Shah to Sindhia and impressed upon him the danger to his dominion. The Governor-General expressed his desire to enter into defensive alliance with Sindhia to frustrate the Shah's designs.⁴⁵ He threatened Sindhia that if he did not return to Delhi, the English would take no interest in the defence of a country abandoned by its own chief.⁴⁶ Besides these arrangements, the Governor-General approached the Sikhs, the Rajputs, the Rajas of Jainagar and Jodhpur to secure their co-operation against the Shah.

These activities of Wellesley bore good results and he was able to inform the Governor of Madras that Sindhia was willing to return to Delhi.⁴⁷ But his hope was frustrated and Sindhia did not move from Poona. Wellesley observed, "It is impossible for me to judge with any confidence what his conduct is likely to be in the event of a rupture between the Company and Tipu Sultan."⁴⁸ In August 1798, the Governor-General received reports that the Shah's invasion was a certainty as he was "relieved from all apprehensions, either of internal rebellion, or of foreign invasion."⁴⁹ In October 1798, a report was received that Gulam Muhammad, the Rohilla chief had returned to Rohilkhand with a mission from Zaman Shah and that he was exciting the Rohilla chiefs to rebel.⁵⁰ The Governor-General ordered the corps stationed at Fatehgarh to advance into Rohilkhand to arrest the probable leaders of the revolt.

The Governor-General was meanwhile hatching a new scheme to frustrate the designs of Zaman Shah. It was not to check the Shah's advance into India but to prevent his leaving Afghanistan. The idea originated in the mind of Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay and was approved by Wellesley. "I concur with you in thinking that the services of the native agent you have appointed to reside at Bushire may be usefully employed for the purpose mentioned in that letter."⁵¹ The native agent was a Shia from Muradabad, Mehdi Ali Khan, who

was to be sent to the court of Baba Khan, the Persian Emperor, to excite the Shia-Sunni differences. He was to excite trouble on the frontiers of Zaman Shah "so that he might be compelled to relinquish his projected expedition or may recall him, should he have actually embarked on it."⁵² The Persian court was promised of arms and military stores. Not content with this, the Governor-General wanted to obtain a similar help from Turkey so that Persia would be induced both by the British agent and by the Turkish minister to foment disturbances in Afghanistan. "It is my intention," writes Wellesley "to suggest to His Majesty's minister at Constantinople the expediency of endeavouring to engage the Porte to concur with us in exciting the ruling power of Persia to such measures as may alarm Zaman Shah for the safety of his hereditary dominions and may recall him from the prosecution of his designs against the tranquillity of India."⁵³ Zaman Shah's brother, Mahmud Shah, was made a useful instrument against his brother. The Governor-General further wanted to excite the people of Sind, Multan and Khandhar to alarm Zaman Shah for the safety of his possessions in those quarters who were under the subjection of the Afghan rule.⁵⁴ His plan was to induce the natives of the delta and the lower parts of the Indus to counteract the Shah's intentions.

On November 15, 1798, Major-General Craig wrote to Wellesley that Zaman Shah "was on the point of crossing Attock for the purpose of attacking Hindustan and that little or no resistance would be made by the Sikhs and I fear as little is to be expected on the part of the Marathas"⁵⁵ The Shah was at Lahore by December 10, 1798 with a large army. The distracted state of the Sikhs and the absence of Sindhia in Poona increased the danger. Vazir Ali who had suffered at the hands of Sir John Shore and had been replaced by Sadat Ali Khan was suspected to have conspired with Zaman Shah. He slew Mr. Cherry, agent to the Governor-General at Benares, and fled from Benares. Wellesley wrote to the Court of Directors, "I am already in possession of sufficient evidence to prove that a conspiracy had been formed for the purpose not only of restoring Vizier Ali to the throne of Oudh but also of favouring the invasion of Zaman Shah, and of expelling the English nation from the province of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa."⁵⁶ Shams ud Daulah, brother of the Nawab Naib of Decca, who addressed a letter to Zaman Shah through an agent called Sheik Ali was also a member of this secret league. He wrote, "If your Majesty's victorious standards shall be directed to-

wards these parts for the establishment of religion and destruction of enemies, by God's assistance Your Majesty will in a short time and without difficulty conquer this country and annihilate your enemies. Sheik Ali will state all these things particularly. I hope your Majesty will be graciously pleased to number me among your attached slaves."⁶⁷ But the precautions taken by Wellesley bore good fruit and Zaman Shah was compelled to retire from Lahore on account of the revolts which disturbed his frontiers on the Persian side. These facts show that the possibility of Zaman Shah's advance to Delhi was not imaginary, but real. Only the vigilance of Wellesley frustrated the designs of the Shah.

Relations with Turkey

Tipu's relations were not confined to the European, Indian and neighbouring powers but extended to such an outside power as Turkey. He sent embassies to the Sultan of Turkey and wrote several letters with the intention of developing intimate relations. His embassy of 1787 to Constantinople was despatched to conclude a treaty of alliance but it failed, as Turkey was endangered at that time by a conspiracy of her neighbouring powers to destroy her. As England had supported her, Turkey was not prepared to alienate the British sympathy by joining Tipu. In February 1799, under the shadow of the English threat, Tipu sent another embassy consisting of two persons, Syed Ali Muhammad and Syed Nuruddeen who had been earlier deputed to Mauritius with Hussain Ali Khan as their Secretary. Before this embassy set foot in Turkey, Tipu's overthrow was completed by Wellesley.

Prior to the despatch of this embassy, on September 20, 1798 Sultan Salim of Turkey addressed a letter to Tipu which was delivered to Spencer Smith, the British ambassador at the Turkish Court, who transmitted it to Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay to be forwarded to Tipu. But the letter was delivered through Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras with a covering letter from Wellesley. The Turkish Sultan traced in this letter the different circumstances which prompted Turkey to declare war on France. The Sultan mentioned that despite the close intimacy of Turkey with France, the latter had invaded Egypt unprovoked, which was a flagrant breach of trust. Therefore Turkey expected Tipu also to look upon the French as the enemies of Islam. "In a word, they are a nation whose deceitful

intrigues and perfidious pursuits know no bounds; they are intent on nothing but on depriving people of their lives and properties and on persecuting religion, wherever their arms can reach."⁵⁸ The Turkish Sultan cautioned Tipu not to fall into the snare of the French whose policy he called treacherous, faithless and unscrupulous. He further informed that the English were aware of Tipu's contacts with the French. "Should it be true, as we hear, that an intimate connection has taken place between your court and that nation, we hope that by weighing present circumstances as well as every future inconvenience which would result from such a measure, your Majesty will beware against it."⁵⁹ Tipu was warned not to harbour any hostile idea against the English. If there were any points of dispute with them, he offered to act as the mediator in settling them.

This letter was intended to impress upon Tipu that even the Turkish Sultan was on the side of the English. In reply to this Tipu wrote two letters, one of which was sent through the English channel. In it he professed his deep attachment to the sublime Porte and requested him to inform him of the steps the Turkish Sultan would adopt for the protection of Islam. He denounced the French faithlessness and called them the enemies of religion. "As the French have made themselves the enemies of your Highness, they had made themselves so to all the followers of the faith." But he condemned the activities of the Christians in general. "Be it known to those who stand at the foot of the Imperial throne that the treachery, deceit and supremacy of the Christians in the regions of Hindustan, are beyond the power of expression."⁶⁰

Tipu wrote another letter privately to the Turkish Sultan which was full of hostility towards the English and sent it through ambassadors extraordinary. As the Sultan of Turkey had offered to resolve the differences, Tipu mentioned all the points of Anglo-Mysore rivalry. He traced the rise of British power in India and mentioned that they had built up their power by deceit, chicanery and insatiable rapine. He condemned the French also in equally strong terms. He attributed the cause of the Third Mysore War to his despatch of an embassy to the Turkish court in 1787. He asserted that the English would subjugate the whole of India and he had sent ambassadors to Constantinople on some important business. This letter was written on February 10, 1799 but before it was received by the Ottoman Sultan, Wellesley had brought about Tipu's downfall.

Relations with Iran

Iran was yet another country with which Tipu had some contacts. In the year 1797, the prince of Iran, having quarrelled with his father, had arrived at Srirangapatna. Tipu received him with dignity and honour and lodged him in the suburb of Ganjam.⁶¹ He visited him frequently and, at the time of his return, Tipu mentioned to him, "After you have made your arrangements regarding the capital of the Sultanate of Persia, it is my wish that you and I in concert with Zaman Shah should endeavour to regulate and put in order the countries of Hindustan and the Dekhan."⁶² The prince agreed to this proposal and promised to co-operate.

But Tipu was more anxious to promote commercial relations with Iran, knowing full well its weakness on the military side. He desired to revive the old land-route for sending Indian commodities to Europe *en route* to Iran and Turkey. The construction of factories near the coast and the promotion of trade and industry would incidentally protect the independence of the eastern powers as they would be vigilant to safeguard their interests both on the sea and on land. Tipu desired that Iran should allow Mysore to have a few factories on its coast which would promote both commercial and political understanding between the two powers. He wrote a letter to this effect to the Shah of Iran. In return, he extended the same privileges to Iran which could import from India timber and other ship-building material. He sent his agent Nurullah to impress on the Shah the importance of political and commercial contacts.⁶³ Shi'a-Sunni differences were fanned by the British agents to defeat Tipu's attempts, and Tipu's short reign allowed few of his ambitions to materialize.

Thus with Tipu's embassy to Mauritius begins the fifth and Final Act of the drama that began with his war against the English and was to end soon with his death in this war against the English. Naturally this period is packed with developments of an extraordinary type. An incident of an apparently insignificant nature, namely the arrival at Srirangapatna of Ripaud, a French adventurer and impostor, let loose a chain reaction of far-reaching importance. Tipu was excited at the prospect of getting French aid from Mauritius, where, he was told, 10,000 troops were ready to be despatched for the mere asking. To a person whose life's passion was the subversion of British authority in India, this was too good a temptation to resist. However, he did not suddenly jump at the idea but deliberated for long, consulted all his ministers, sought their written opinion in the matter, and some

of them advised him not to venture on the project. Yet, ultimately, it was his own decision to try his luck. He was hoping that the whole affair would remain a guarded secret, but Malartic, the Governor of Mauritius, for reasons best known to himself, gave wide publicity in the Isles to Tipu's intentions, which were to remove the English from India. Malartic must have been too much steeped in revolutionary ideas, and like Tipu he too must have been emotional and sentimental. The romantic idea of the revolutionary days that France was the apostle of liberty and that she was the chosen instrument to universalise that ideal must have prompted Malartic to indulge in needless propaganda. France had fostered that idea in America and she was hopeful that she could do the same thing in India. Moreover, behind this facet lay the ulterior motive of every Frenchman that no stone should be left unturned to embroil the English in a global conflict. Tipu appeared very well to serve that cause, and thus a minor affair was made much of. But nothing would have happened if Sir John Shore had continued in office or any one less imperialistic than Wellesley had succeeded him. Wellesley's hatred of the French was perhaps equal in intensity to Tipu's hatred of the English. To the political animosity of Wellesley towards the French should be added a personal and psychological factor. It is said that in his youth Wellesley had been disappointed in love with a French lady and that he had then vowed vengeance against them. More than all, the meteoric rise of Napoleon, his bitter hostility towards Great Britain, his mastery over a good part of Europe, his ambition like that of Alexander the Great to win fame and glory from the east, his actual departure from France and his campaigns in Egypt together with his correspondence with Tipu, all indicated that the English could take chances only at their own peril. If the Frenchmen had been intoxicated by their love of liberty, the English, who were less revolutionary and more realistic, were equally moved by their national spirit. They believed that England expected every man to do his duty, and Wellesley was fired with the idea that he should go down in history as one who had done his duty to his country at a critical moment of its history. Therefore the apparently small affair of the Malartic Proclamation, which brought to India only ninety-nine persons, many of whom were mechanics, was blown up into a major cause for Tipu's destruction.

More fascinating is the account of Tipu's contact with Zaman Shah, and more bitter must have been Tipu's experience to find his hopes dashed to the ground right at the time they had a good chance

to succeed. Zaman Shah had actually moved from his capital and by December 1798 had come as far as Lahore. True to the Biblical saying that man proposes but God disposes, a conspiracy of several unforeseen forces compelled him to beat a hasty retreat. The instrument of God for this disposal proved to be Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, who conceived of a plan to cut steel with steel. He hastily despatched Mehdi Ali Khan, a Shia from Muradabad, to the court of Baba Khan, the Shia Emperor of Iran, whose territorial ambition over Afghanistan, a Sunni country, was well known at that time. The mission of Mehdi Ali Khan was to induce Baba Khan to exploit the absence of Zaman Shah from Kabul and his presence in India, and make a sudden attack on Afghanistan in order to snatch the country he had set his heart upon. This counsel clicked. The threat to his own homeland compelled Zaman Shah to withdraw quickly from India. Few instances in history can match this resourcefulness of the English, who deserve undoubtedly to be rated as political geniuses. What might have happened if Zaman Shah had marched on Delhi is one of the most fascinating "ifs" of history. But what is certain is that his most sudden withdrawal saved the English from a disaster, and in the same proportion, drove Tipu to his tragic doom.

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CHAPTER XII

BREWING OF THE STORM AND THE TRAGIC END (1798-1799)

LORD MORNINGTON was appointed Governor-General in October 1797. He sailed from England in November, came to the Cape of Good Hope in February 1798 and landed at Calcutta on May 17th. At the time of his arrival, Tipu was on good terms with the English. He wrote to Wellesley a letter congratulating him on his appointment to the high office and assuring him of his friendship towards the Company. Yet, within a short period, a war was precipitated, which destroyed Tipu.

Wellesley thought that a war was absolutely essential to protect the English interests. His arguments were these: Tipu's power had been enormously increased. The internal tranquillity of his kingdom, the improvement of his finances and the discipline of his armies upset the balance of power brought about by the Treaty of Srirangapatna. He had been active since 1792 endeavouring to stir the country's powers against the English.¹ He had negotiated with the Nizam for that purpose and, during the absence of Azimul Umrah, he built up his influence in the Hyderabad Court. He had many partisans there like Amjad ud Daulah, Chief of the Paigah party, and Imtiaz ud Daulah, the nephew of the Nizam, through whom he attempted to destroy the British influence in Hyderabad. He had communicated with Zaman Shah and induced him to invade Awadh and he contemplated an attack on the Carnatic.² He had contacted the Peshwa and other Maratha chiefs for an alliance against the English.

But the immediate cause was his despatch of an embassy to Mauritius seeking French aid to subvert the British power. He had completed his preparations at home and only awaited the arrival of the French force to launch his offensive. Whether small or big, the French had responded favourably to his request and had actually sent a force

which was accepted and enrolled in his army. He had approved the activities of his envoys and received them with honour which meant ratification of Malartic's Proclamation. If the French had sent him a larger force, he would have already declared the war. Though the help received was insignificant, the nature of Tipu's transactions was most provoking and insulting to the English. Tipu had taken these steps, unprovoked, at a time when the English were troubled by the Napoleonic menace in Europe and the break-up of the triple alliance of 1790 in India. The growing influence of the French in the various courts of India, the disturbed conditions in Poona and the 14,000 strong troops of Reymond in Hyderabad with whom Tipu was in correspondence through his *vakils*, Medina Saheb and Khadir Hussain Khan, would have considerably facilitated his designs, if he had decided on quick action.³

These activities were regarded as a breach of the existing treaties and contrary to the laws of nations which provide every state the right to preserve its independence. These rights entitle a state to call for an explanation. In case of a denial or evasion of an explanation, the injured party can resort to force of arms in vindication of its rights. But the offence of Tipu was considered by Wellesley not an injury but an open declaration of war. His activities were not looked upon only as being suspicious or ambiguous, compelling the British to call for just an explanation. Tipu was not merely guilty of enhancing his forces but stationing them near the Company's borders, of hostile negotiations with Poona, Hyderabad and Paris against the English and many more serious offences of the sort. "The act of Tipu's ambassadors, ratified by himself and accompanied by the landing of a force in his country is a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration and act of war, aggravated by an avowal that the object of the war is neither expansion, reparation nor security but the total destruction of the British Government. No state in India can misconstrue the conduct of Tipu".⁴ A mere explanation in such circumstances would be "disgraceful in its principle and frivolous in its object." It would exhibit to other powers the weakness of the Company, and would offer Tipu a pretext for war. The question of asking reparations was considered equally impolitic, as Tipu's actions were an injury only intended and not executed. Tipu had seized no property, invaded no lands and violated no rights and hence could not be legally asked to pay reparations. Yet he should be punished as he was guilty of a much more serious crime. While professing friendship with the Company,

he had completed the means of their destruction. His failure to secure adequate aid could not lessen the degree of his hostility. He was regarded as an irreconcilable, desperate and treacherous enemy. Therefore, only a substantial reduction of his power would satisfy the English and guarantee their safety. Since he would not voluntarily surrender such territory, the war was felt an absolute necessity. The Court of Directors, Wellesley maintained, had empowered him to declare war if the French landed in India. The French had actually landed and hence the parliamentary restraints of the Charter Act of 1793 had been removed. Though the number that had arrived was insignificant, Wellesley defended himself by saying that even a small force could cause great mischief.

These were the grounds on which Wellesley declared war. But the real cause of the war was neither the embassy of Tipu to Mauritius, nor the Proclamation of Malartic, nor Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, nor the threat of Zaman Shah's invasion, but the aggressive designs of Wellesley who made of them only his convenient excuses. The Court of Directors had changed their peaceful policy and deliberately chose an aggressive and ambitious Governor-General who fought with every important Indian power. Though apparently the authorities at home professed a pacific policy and denounced all schemes of conquests, they were not sincere in their motives. Dundas encouraged Wellesley to give up Shore's policy of neutrality and made him adopt a vigorous forward policy. Wellesley had already conceived his evil designs on Tipu long before he knew of the Proclamation. His letters from the Cape of Good Hope exhibit his schemes to reduce Tipu whose power and connections were exaggerated beyond all proportions. The Nizam's French corps was described as being connected with Tipu. He wrote, "I have averted in this letter to the increased assiduity with which Tipu had endeavoured to raise animosities against us among the native powers and to his intercourse with Zaman Shah. I wish to know from you whether we ought to suffer, without animadversion and spirited representation, such open acts of hostility on the part of Tipu."⁵ He desired to restore the political balance which had gone against the English. He came to India, highly prejudiced against Tipu. He hated everything that had any connection with the French or with Tipu.

Though Tipu had sent embassies before for the same purpose of seeking foreign aid, which was well known to the English, that was

at no time made the ground of war. Sir John Shore was aware of Tipu's overtures to the Poona and Hyderabad courts and yet he had taken no action. Nothing extraordinary had happened, since Shore left India, to justify a war. On the other hand, the death of Reymond, the frustration of Tipu's efforts in the courts of India and the ridiculously small force he had received from Mauritius proved that Tipu was less capable of disturbing the peace. Tipu had not offended the English in the strict sense of the term, and even Wellesley confessed that he had committed no legal wrong, "sacked no property, invaded no territories and violated no rights."

Tipu's bitter hostility towards the English was no new thing. The Anglo-Mysore rivalry was there since the rise of Haidar. The English knew very well that Tipu had not been reconciled to his losses of 1792 and that he would unite with any power, native or foreign, to oppose the English. Cornwallis had concluded the Peace of 1792 knowing full well that Tipu continued to entertain the same antipathy towards the English, yet he was spared because the essential question was the capacity of Tipu to subvert the British power. He had been sufficiently crippled in 1792, lest he should cause trouble in future. The Company was never before so powerful and extensive as in 1798. If Tipu could be defeated at the height of his power in 1792, he could more easily be punished in 1798 with only half of his original strength. With all the strategic forts and passes in the hands of the English and after the failure of Tipu to secure outside help, the Company was not in real danger. Whereas all the Indian powers had suffered, Tipu by his defeat of 1792, the Marathas by their interregne wars, the Nizam by the disaster of Kardla, it was only the Company that enjoyed real stability and had consolidated its position. It was intrinsically much stronger in 1798 than in 1792 when it seized the Dutch and French settlements. Even Wellesley confessed that Tipu alone, unaided by others, could not hazard a rupture with the English.

Therefore the only possibility of Tipu's offensive against the English would have been in the event of his securing enough aid from outside. In 1798, he had neither secured such aid nor was there hope of securing one. None of the country's powers was in a position to join him. Even the Nizam's French corps was not a source of great alarm to the English. Reymond was dead and the Nizam was willing to disband the corps provided the English substituted it with another of their own. Its easy and actual dismissal in October 1798 revealed how frivolous were the English apprehensions.

Regarding Tipu's negotiations with the French, it may be mentioned that the other Indian princes also had maintained and of late had increased the French corps in their armies. Tipu had always retained a French corps. Its addition was insignificant in 1798 and Wellesley himself acknowledged that its arrival had not changed Tipu's position. Even granting that Tipu's aim in securing French aid was hostilities towards the English, the mere solicitation of the aid does not constitute a breach of existing treaties. Tipu was an independent prince and he had the right to negotiate alliances with other powers. Even Malartic's Proclamation calling the citizens to enlist in Tipu's service does not constitute an offence. Wellesley's conduct could have been justified if enough forces had been despatched, or if the French had a strong squadron off the coast, or if they had fortified possessions on the mainland, or if Tipu was actually at war with the Company. But he proceeded on the ground of an injury intended and not executed for which the laws of the nations do not prescribe so serious a penalty as total destruction. Moreover, Tipu's activities were quite in accordance with the working of human nature, for any other prince in his place would have entertained similar ideas of retaliation and of recovery of his lost kingdom. Malcolm observes, "His conduct since the Peace of 1792 has shown that, though he possesses those feelings which are allowed not only to be natural but honourable, in a humble monarch (viz., a spirit of ambition to regain his lost power and fame and a spirit of revenge against the state that has humbled him). yet that he pursues these objects, not with heedless and impatient rage that characterizes a man wholly guided by his passions, but with that unremitting activity and zealous warmth which we could look for in a prince who had come to a serious determination to endeavour by every reasonable means in his power to regain what he had lost."⁸ The gravity of any offence is determined by the injury done. But Tipu had not caused any injury to the English. The trifling force of less than one hundred could not have endangered the security of the British dominions. The incident had caused no change in the relative strength of the different parties. It had helped the English, on the other hand, to determine the extent of mischief Tipu could cause to them.

Wellesley's apprehensions that the Franco-Mysorean co-operation might at any time endanger the Company's position were also baseless. The French had been steadfast in their hostility against the English for half a century and yet they had not been able to inflict any injury.

Even when the French and the Mysoreans had co-operated, they had not been able to reduce the English. Even Wellesley confessed that the French could not manage to support Tipu. "The vigilance of our Government at home and of our fleets, will oppose the approach of the French towards this quarter of the Globe."⁹ Even if there had been any danger to the British possessions in the east by the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt, his defeat at Aboukir Bay in 1798 had dispelled all doubts and alarms. The English fleet maintained such strict vigilance that the French lamented their inability to send one sail in safety to India.¹⁰ Napoleon could not have come overland after his defeat at the hands of Sydney Smith in Syria. The revolutionary upheavals and the constitutional crisis in Paris precluded any possibility of a large transshipment of French forces to India. Wellesley was conscious of this fact. "I do not apprehend unless some new revolution happens in the Isle of France that Tipu will be able to derive any considerable aid from that quarter."¹¹ Yet he did not relax his preparations for war.

The war was not felt a necessity by all the servants of the Company. When Wellesley first suggested its possibility, it came as a surprise to many. Memorandums were submitted to avert it and even the displeasure of the Governor-General was incurred by postponing it for a little while. If the war had been in self-defence, it would have received the universal approval of all. The Madras Government was not in favour of it and only the superior authority of Wellesley silenced the opposition. "This opposition I am resolved to crush; I possess sufficient powers to do so; and I will exert those powers to the extreme point of their extent, rather than suffer the smallest particle of my plans for the public service to be frustrated by such unworthy means."¹² Josiah Webbe observed, "The late intelligence from the islands, which leaves us no room to doubt that the military have been sent to France and the French marine dispensed, satisfies me that no immediate co-operation can take place; and consequently, that no rupture is to be apprehended but by our own provocation."¹³

Thus the main cause of the war was the ambition of Wellesley to reduce Tipu. A successful war would bring limitless advantages. The authorities approved and applauded his action because, "the only question was, whether or not the British interests were promoted."¹⁴ In only one case the Home Government would have censured

his activity, in the event of discomfiture and defeat, which Wellesley was determined to avoid by his thorough preparation.

If there had been any doubt as to the aggressive designs of Wellesley in the beginning, they were removed by his later policy to attack Tipu unawares after keeping him in false security for seven months. He went to war despite the instructions from the Directors "that the utmost discretion should be used that we may not be involved in a war in India without the most inevitable necessity."¹⁵ By November 1798, there remained no necessity for war. Nelson's victory, the liquidation of the French corps at Hyderabad, the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, the retreat of Zaman Shah, and Tipu's willingness for accommodation made it needless to resort to arms. The reorganization of the Company's forces, the superiority of its fleet and its readiness for any eventuality were additional securities against Tipu's aggression if he ever committed one. But Wellesley became more and more aggressive as his military preparations got completed. In the beginning his intention was only to demand a bare guarantee from Tipu, but eventually he proceeded to destroy him completely. He was at first prepared to adjust his differences with Tipu on these conditions: the exclusion of the French from Mysore, the admission of a British Resident, and the exchange of Canara and the coastal area for some other English district.¹⁶ But with every addition in the Company's strength, the terms were made more harsh, which exhibited either a spirit of revenge or love of conquest in Wellesley. Tipu was willing to concede any reasonable terms which would leave him "an independent prince."¹⁷ But Wellesley would not negotiate until a substantial part of Tipu's country was actually in English hands.

The aggressive designs of Wellesley became even more conspicuous when he denied Tipu a chance to explain his position and make "amend honourable." Even if he made a show of it, he was not sincere and only desired to escape the censure of home authorities if the war went against him. Even after the acceptance by Tipu of his demand to receive Major Doveton, the invasion was not stopped. Thus the war was not at all justified in 1798. It is true that Tipu was a confirmed enemy of the English, who intended to destroy their power. But, unprovoked by him and on the basis of imaginary dangers, the English had no moral or legal right to destroy him. The aggression was particularly unfortunate in view of the consistent professions by the Company of its pacific disposition. The Act of Parliament had categori-

"In this Sircar there is a mercantile tribe who employ themselves in trading by sea and land. Their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to Mauritius, from where forty persons French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment. Such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this Sircar. And the French who are full of vice and deceit have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports with a view to ruffle the minds of both the Sircars."⁴⁷

Regarding the deputation of Major Doveton who would communicate a new plan, Tipu did not feel its necessity, as nothing extraordinary had happened to justify it and expressed that the subsisting treaties among the allies were enough to preserve peace. "I cannot imagine that means more effectual than these can be adopted."⁴⁸ He professed his most sincere intentions to maintain peace but he could not agree to the new plan as it meant a new treaty involving fresh sacrifices on his part. It would not be different from the one just concluded with the Nizam which had compromised his independence.

Wellesley was enraged to find his proposals rejected by Tipu. His explanation of the embassy to Mauritius was regarded as a piece of gross falsehood, and his unwillingness to receive Doveton as criminal evasion. He called it prevarication and duplicity. He proceeded to Madras in December 1798, from where he wrote another letter on January 9, 1799. He charged Tipu with having conspired with several powers of Asia to subvert the British power. He stated that he possessed the full proceedings of Tipu's envoys at Mauritius and accused him of breaking the existing treaties by his solicitation of French aid, by his proposal of an offensive alliance with them and by his enrolment of a French force in his army. He once again called upon Tipu to receive Major Doveton, but allowed him only one day for the reply. He said, "Dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs."⁴⁹ He was not willing to waste time in lengthy negotiations lest the monsoons should set in soon. Impossible stipulations were proposed and hardly a day was allowed to take the momentous decision. Wellesley wrote again on January 11, forwarding a letter of the Turkish Sultan which condemned the French activity. It mentioned, "The further project of the French is to divide Arabia into various republics; to attack the whole Mohammedan sect, in its

was only one alternative to avert the impending calamity, namely, the unconditional acceptance of an English proposal which Major Doveton would present to him. He enquired about the place and date for the reception of Doveton and, in conclusion, he once again urged that compliance with the English demand alone would save him from destruction.

Wellesley no doubt accused Tipu of his connections with the French, but he did not set down the specific grievances of the British against him. He desired to convey them through Doveton but the English no longer wanted any redress of their grievances. Their aim was to impose a subsidiary treaty on Tipu similar to the one that was forced on the Nizam. It would have compromised Tipu's independence, as it meant the acceptance of a British Resident, the maintenance of a subsidised English force and the exclusion of all his contacts with outside powers. Wellesley wanted an implicit and unconditional acceptance of these terms, besides the surrender of the rich coastal area. The issue was no longer the discussion on, or explanation for, Tipu's offence of sending an embassy but the submission of Tipu to a further reduction of his power.

Tipu remained silent all along without protesting against the preparations for war by the English. He witnessed the dissolution of the French corps at Hyderabad, the conclusion of a new alliance with the Nizam, the appearance of the British fleet off the coast of Malabar, and the vigorous preparations of war by the English but he thought that the English would not take the offensive unless he provoked them. Being afraid that his protests might be exploited as a pretext for war, he refrained from even enquiring about the purpose of such military preparations. But, when the situation grew very alarming, he wrote a letter to Wellesley on November 20, 1798, expressing his concern over the hostile activity of the English. He once again assured them of his peaceful disposition. "I have no other intention than to increase the friendship and my friendly heart is to the last degree bent on endeavours to confirm and strengthen the foundations of harmony and union."⁴⁵

Tipu received another letter from Wellesley, intimating the British victory over the French at Aboukir Bay to which he replied on 18th December, expressing his great satisfaction over the event. He denounced the French activity and praised the English.⁴⁶ His tone was pacific and accommodative. Regarding his despatch of an embassy and the receipt of a French force he wrote:

"In this Sircar there is a mercantile tribe who employ themselves in trading by sea and land. Their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to Mauritius, from where forty persons French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment. Such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this Sircar. And the French who are full of vice and deceit have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports with a view to ruffle the minds of both the Sircars."⁴⁷

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religion and country and by a gradual progression to extirpate all Mussalmans from the face of the earth."⁵⁰ It advised Tipu not to hazard a rupture with the English. The Sultan himself offered to mediate and settle the existing disputes. Wellesley in his covering letter called the French conduct as full of "boundless ambition, insatiable rapine and indiscriminate sacrilege."⁵¹

Invasion of Mysore

When Tipu was convinced of the futility of evading the English demands, he announced his willingness to receive Major Doveton "slightly attended or unattended."⁵² Wellesley received the letter on February 13, 1799 but he formed an impression that Tipu was only gaining time. The preparations for war had been matured and orders had been given to General Harris on February 3, to advance upon Mysore. Tipu's offer to receive Major Doveton was received by him eight days later, which was made the excuse to deny Tipu a chance for peaceful accommodation. On February 22, Tipu was informed of the rejection of his request. "as it had come too late."⁵³ However, Harris was empowered to receive any ambassadors whom Tipu might depute to enter into a new treaty "on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace."⁵⁴ A commission was formed to assist Harris on political matters if Tipu opened negotiations. General Stuart was ordered to advance from Malabar to co-operate with Harris for the siege of Srirangapatna. Though Tipu was informed that Harris would receive any propositions which he might make, Harris was secretly instructed to forward this letter to Tipu only after he was within one day's march from the frontiers of Mysore. He was further instructed not to make any conditions of peace until the commencement of the siege of Srirangapatna or the occupation of an equally advantageous position.⁵⁵

Wellesley's design was to make it impossible for Tipu to propose any terms until the invading army was already in possession of some territory of Mysore. There were other secret instructions to Harris concerning the procedure to establish peace, if Tipu submitted to him. Two sets of the Draft of the Preliminary Articles to a new treaty were proposed, called Draft A and Draft B. Draft A, which was less harsh, was to be applied if Tipu sued for peace before the opening of batteries on Srirangapatna, and Draft B was to be enforced in case of his submission subsequent to it. Draft A consisted of these terms: First,

reciprocal reception of an ambassador from both the parties; second, dismissal of all Frenchmen and other Europeans from his service; third, renunciation of all contacts with the French in future; fourth, surrender to the Company of the whole of the Malabar coast, Panlacatachery and Pilney; fifth, relinquishment of all claims over Amerah, Souleah, Ersavara-seemey and the Tambacherry pass; sixth, payment of an indemnity of one and a half crores, half of it immediately and the balance within six months; seventh, release of all prisoners; and eighth, surrender of three of the eldest princes as hostages, besides certain fortresses (other than Srirangapatna). Cessation of hostilities was to be effected only after the surrender of hostages and payment of the indemnity, but the evacuation of Tipu's land would be only after the delivery of the security ports. A memorandum was added to these articles, setting apart a share to the Marathas, irrespective of their participation in the war. The Nizam and the Marathas were to get territories adjacent to their frontiers such as Gurrumconda, Gutty, Anegundi, Raidroog and Harpanahalli. The security fortresses demanded were—Sadasivgarh to the Company, Gutty to the Nizam and Raidroog to the Peshwa.

In Draft B, articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 were common with A, but the fourth and the sixth relating to the cession of territories and the indemnity of war were harsher. Instead of one-fourth, one-half of Tipu's remaining kingdom was demanded, besides two crores by way of indemnity. Tipu's entire possessions were estimated at $39\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas, out of which areas worth $19\frac{3}{4}$ lakhs in total and $6\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs were to be ceded to each of the allies.

Harris was instructed in detail about the mode of using these two sets of drafts. If Tipu opened negotiations previous to the arrival of the General at Srirangapatna or before commencing the siege of the capital, Harris was to consult the Commissioners but not disclose the full demands until all preparations were completed for the siege. Then, either through an embassy or through a flag of truce, Draft A was to be communicated, insisting on its compliance within twenty four hours, with a warning that its refusal would mean "Draft B." If Tipu accepted them, Stuart was to take immediate charge of Malabar. The Peshwa's share was to be in the Company's charge and Harris was to procure his assent to the treaty within three months. Srirangapatna was not to be evacuated until the surrender of the security forts. Even if the English suffered any reverses in the war, no treaty was to be concluded with Tipu unless he consented to the surrender

of the whole of Malabar besides making payment of a sufficient indemnity. Negotiations were to be discouraged until Tipu realized the danger to his capital and was made helpless. In no case was the advance on Tipu's dominions to be relaxed. The letter of April 23, 1799 imposed still harsher terms obliging Harris to reduce Tipu's power to the lowest possible extent and "even to utterly destroy it if the events of the war should afford the opportunity."⁵⁶

The English army that marched from Vellore on February 11, was quite formidable in ability, discipline and experience. It exceeded 20,000 men, with 4,000 Europeans, besides the Nizam's army of 16,000, the Bombay army of 6,000 and a considerable force from the South under Colonels Reed and Browne. The campaigns of the third Mysore war facilitated the operations by affording a thorough knowledge of the defences of Srirangapatna and of the routes leading to the capital. Tipu's efforts to stop the main army from Madras and the Bombay army from the west failed. Avoiding the route which Cornwallis had used in 1791, Harris judiciously decided to cross the Cauvery at Sosilly, about fifteen miles east of Srirangapatna, and encamped on the ground previously occupied by General Abercromby in 1792. He settled down for the siege of the capital on April 5, exactly one month after he had crossed the Mysore frontier.

As per Wellesley's desire that he should correspond in future with Harris, Tipu addressed a letter on April 9, enquiring about the purpose of the British invasion. Harris, in reply, referred him to the previous correspondence of Wellesley on the subject.⁵⁷ On April 20, Tipu wrote again expressing his desire to settle the dispute amicably and to depute confidential persons to open negotiations.⁵⁸ Harris, in reply, sent the second Draft (B) which contained the harsher terms, though it was contrary to his instructions. He made them still more harsh by demanding the surrender of four princes and four principal ministers as hostages, instead of the three stipulated in the Draft. Only twenty-four hours were given for the acceptance of the treaty and another twenty-four hours for the surrender of the hostages and the payment of the stipulated indemnity. If these demands were not complied with within the stipulated time, the English would further demand the surrender of the capital itself till the conclusion of the final treaty. Harris had thus departed from the spirit of the instructions in conveying the second Draft, instead of the first, with additional demands. The batteries had not yet been opened and so he should have sent the first Draft. Wellesley condoned this short-coming.

On the other hand, he approved the action of Harris saying that he himself would have taken a similar decision, if he had been present on the spot.

Tipu rejected these demands as they were very harsh. There was no guarantee that even these demands would be faithfully executed and would not be made more humiliating. As the instructions of Wellesley to destroy Tipu were very specific, the English were not in a mood to be conciliatory. These overtures facilitated Harris to cover up his preparations for the assault on the Fort.⁵⁹ The breaching parties had commenced their work. On April 25, a battery of four guns was employed to destroy the defences and, by the next day, Tipu's guns were silenced. His entrenchments had been attacked and crossed in advance, after an obstinate battle. By April 27 the British troops made their lodgements secure for the breaching batteries. When Tipu realized the danger to his capital, he sent another letter on April 28, expressing his desire to depute two persons to a conference as the delicate situation demanded a full and free discussion of all the problems. Harris replied that he would not make any modifications in the terms already proposed, that any deputation of ambassadors was useless unless accompanied by the hostages and the indemnity and that the time allowed for an answer would be only till 3 o'clock the next day.⁶⁰ This sealed all hopes of a settlement. Tipu was enraged at the arrogance behind, and unfairness of the conditions. His independent spirit and intrepid courage would hardly admit of submission to these harsh terms. He resolved to die honourably like a soldier rather than lead a dependent life like the pensioned Rajas and Nawabs. Therefore he did not reply to Harris. He was now convinced that nothing but his destruction would appease his enemies.

Fall of Tipu

Giving up hopes of peaceful accommodation, Tipu prepared himself to fight to the last. But the odds were too heavy against him. A formidable army was already well advanced in its siege of his capital. His trusted men were deserting him. Mir Sadiq and his group had entered into a conspiracy with the enemies as was evident from their crossing over the glacis on the night of May 3 to examine the breach and the manner of the British attack on the fort.⁶¹ It was in consul-

tation with them that May 4, midday, had been fixed for the assault. Mir Sadiq was to withdraw the troops stationed at the breach under the pretext of disbursing their pay.⁶² At last the fateful day came. "On the 4th of May, as he sat in the palace in the heat of the noon, he was roused from his dreamy gaze into the pit of fate by the shout of besiegers. The breach was stormed and Tipu, vainly endeavouring to rally his broken troops, was slain and trampled under foot in the streets of his plundered city."⁶³

Thus fell Tipu, who became a martyr to the cause of Indian independence. He laid down his life defending his country against the ambitious and unscrupulous foreigners. He was the only Indian prince who so consistently opposed the English. His unity of purpose, independence of thought and consistency of action had annoyed the Company. His death removed all the obstacles in the way of its rapid growth. The Fourth Mysore War was a major landmark in the history of the British expansion in India. It destroyed the regime of Tipu who had made the kingdom of Mysore a dominant power in the South. The joy of the Victors knew no bounds. They cried in exultation "India is ours". They had obtained Srirangapatna, "the tower of strength, from which we may at any time shake Hindustan to its centre."⁶⁴ The French influence was eliminated for ever from Indian politics. The British Empire was firmly established. Its territories were extended, frontiers strengthened, enemies destroyed and resources increased. The Company acquired territories of great intrinsic value in fertility, resources and strategic importance. The new conquest linked the coast of Coromandel with that of Malabar and secured the entire coastal line of Mysore with all the bases on the eastern, western and southern ghats. But the political advantages exceeded those of territorial gains. It made the Company paramount in India, having destroyed its most inveterate foe. The battle of Plassey had only allowed the entry of the British into the politics of India but that of Srirangapatna made them the masters of the country.⁶⁵ Auber goes to the extent of saying, "the Empire of the East is at our feet."⁶⁶ The death of Tipu relieved Wellesley of the worry of any obstacle to the realisation of his ambition. He was also happy to have escaped the embarrassment of what would have happened if Tipu had survived. The war ended the dynasty of Haidar and Tipu, which had made opposition to the British its unalterable purpose.

Settlement of Mysore

Wellesley proceeded to set up a new political framework in India. He had contemplated the partition of Mysore and the restoration of the old dynasty, long before the events of May 4. He had known full well that Tipu would not submit to the drastic reduction of his country and to political subordination, and that the Company would never be secure so long as Tipu retained the Malabar coast which would be the ready means of intercourse with the French. He had already thought of making Mysore a land-locked state in the heart of the Deccan plateau. As early as January 1799, he had invited the views of his various officials on the best mode of settlement. His military Secretary, Colonel Kirkpatrick, had suggested the same stipulations as in Draft B of the Preliminary Articles furnished to Harris on February 22, 1799. Josiah Webbe, John Malcolm and William Petric had also given their opinions, which had helped Wellesley in framing the Drafts A and B. But as Bannell rightly points out, "It may be supposed that Wellesley did not expect these terms to be accepted, to frame them was merely a politic way of arranging a campaign the aim of which was unconditional surrender."⁶⁷

After the fall of Srirangapatna, very intricate issues came up before the victors. On the one hand, there was the desire for the annexation of so vast and so rich a country and, on the other, the fear of consequent suspicions and censure both in Europe and India. The apparent principle of partition was that the victors should take only that much territory which was enough to indemnify their war expenses and provide security to their frontiers. The Hindus had been actively engaged in trying to secure the restoration of the throne to its earlier legitimate owners and had offered to pay the Company the expenses of war. Wellesley had secretly contacted the agents of this dynasty in order to use them for the speedy conclusion of the war.⁶⁸ Josiah Webbe had pleaded in a memorandum for their restoration, as that would please nine-tenths of the population. But Wellesley had not taken any final decision. After the fall of Tipu and the surrender of his sons, Purniah pleaded for the restoration of the throne to Tipu's son on the ground that, "the Mohammadan interest is so intimately blended with every department of the State in this country that no plan by which it is set aside in favour of a Hindu Prince could produce the very desirable effect of restoring tranquillity and of reconciling the troops as well as the most powerful class of the inhabitants to the change of

Government."⁶⁹ Purniah further assured the British that such a settlement would be acceptable to the entire country.

Wellesley at first desired to proceed in person to Srirangapatna to arrange the settlement, but later on gave up the idea. He sent William Kirkpatrick and Henry Wellesley, his military and private secretary respectively, and himself directed the affairs from Madras. He enquired about the views of Tipu's sons regarding their father's alliance with the French, and demanded more details about the Hindu family. He put forward as a basis of discussion the complete partition of Mysore between the Company and the Nizam with only small enclaves near Bangalore left to Tipu's family, and near Srirangapatna to the Hindu dynasty.⁷⁰ But this basis was discarded as it would excite jealousy in Poona and invite severe criticism from Parliament. It would also have necessitated another expensive war.⁷¹ Wellesley would not give an equal share to the Nizam, for that would make him dangerously strong. Hence, without waiting for the information called for from Mysore, the Governor-General came to the final decision, on May 27, of restoring the Hindu dynasty with Purniah as the Dewan, to govern over the central table-land. The rest of the kingdom was partitioned among the three allies. Though at first apprehensions were felt that Tipu's sons and their followers would oppose such a settlement, Wellesley was determined to force his decision. The claims of Tipu's dynasty were set aside on the ground that a hostile power would be only weakened but not destroyed if they were allowed to rule. He thought that Tipu's successors would be never reconciled to the reduction of their kingdom, the loss of their prestige, the cruel death of their father, and the political subordination to a foreign power. Being brought up on the principles of their father whose "antipathy to the English was the ruling passion of his heart, the mainspring of his policy, the fixed and fundamental principles of his councils and government, it would be too much to expect of them to remain loyal to the English."⁷² The dreadful fate of their father would also serve to excite the spirit of revenge and revolt in them. Having been instructed all their life to oppose the British, they would always conceive designs to subvert the agent of their misfortune. "The interests, the habits, the prejudices and passions, the vices and even the virtues of such a prince must have concurred to cherish an aversion to the English name and power and an eager desire to abet the cause of their enemies."⁷³ Even the Nizam was against the restoration of Tipu's family.⁷⁴ Legally, it was argued,

Tipu's sons had no claim, as the English got the throne of Mysore by their right of conquest. Cession of any part or territory was only a concession or a matter of policy, and not justice or right. Usurpation by Haidar further weakened the case of Tipu's successors whose restoration was ruled out on the basis that, "the foundations of the new settlement would have been laid in the very principle of its dissolution."⁷⁵ On the other hand, numerous advantages were offered to the English if they granted the throne to the old Hindu dynasty. It would owe everything to the English and would remain loyal. It had lost all hopes of restoration as the usurpation had subsisted for a long time and it had reconciled itself to its lot. If the English brought it back to power, there was every probability of its remaining submissive and grateful.

On account of these factors, Wellesley decided the settlement in favour of the old dynasty. He created a Commission for the affairs of Mysore composed of General Harris, Colonel Wellesley, Henry Wellesley, Lt. Col. W. Kirkpatrick and Lt. Col. Barry Close to complete the settlement. Two treaties were concluded, one for the partition of the country between the Company and the Nizam and the other for defining the relations between the Company and the Raja of Mysore. The Company reserved for itself a territory yielding 6.9 lakhs pagodas, consisting of Malabar, Dharmapuram, Coimbatore, the whole area between the Company's eastern and western coasts, all the heads and passes, forts and ports, the district of Wynad and the fort of Srirangapatna. The Nizam got Gutty, Gurrumconda and a few tracts in Chitaldroog (but not the fort), Sira, Nandidroog and Kolar. A territory yielding 2.6 lakhs pagodas only was set aside for the Marathas as they had not participated in the war. Their share was between one-half and two-thirds of what others got which included Harpanhalli, Sunda, Anegundi and some other forts. The Raja of Mysore secured an area yielding 13.5 lakh pagodas annually. The Company's share was by far the most valuable. The treasures of Tipu were reserved for the British army on the ground that it had stormed the fort. Mir Alam resented such a decision. The Nizam was not happy at the principles of partition and the portions allotted to him. He was deliberately denied an equal share as it would enhance his power, "beyond all bounds of discretion."⁷⁶ However, to appease him it was stipulated that if the Marathas rejected their share, the Nizam would get out of it twice as much as the Company. For Tipu's family some pensions and *jagirs* were provided and the family was

removed to Vellore. The Raja was placed on the throne on June 30, 1799. The new set up was described by Kirkpatrick thus: "Purnaiyah considers the country to be the Company's and the Raja a mere puppet."⁷⁷ A new subsidiary treaty was concluded with him according to which the English took over the defence of his principality, but the Raja had to bear the expenses by regularly paying a subsidy which could be enhanced in case of war. His entire kingdom would be confiscated if his administration proved unsatisfactory, which was actually done between 1830-1880. These arrangements placed the resources of his entire kingdom at the disposal of the Company.

The settlement was very advantageous to the English. It concealed the extent of English acquisitions under the cover of restoration of the kingdom to the Raja. It provided an excuse to Wellesley for giving a much smaller share to the Nizam. It prevented the Maratha jealousy as a Hindu prince was installed on the throne. It silenced opposition at home, which could otherwise have branded his actions as aggressive. The Company became the master of the entire kingdom of Mysore as the Raja was a mere puppet. The Nizam later ceded his acquisitions in exchange for its subsidy, and the Marathas refused their share. The Peshwa declined the offer as it contained the political strings of a subsidiary alliance. For he was to accept the share only after signing a treaty which would have ended his independence. The Maratha share was partitioned between the Nizam and the Company according to the previous arrangement of giving two-thirds to the Nizam and one-third to the English. But the subsidiary Treaty was revised with the Nizam in 1800 by which the Company acquired not only the possessions of the Nizam ceded to him in 1792 but also his new conquests of 1799. The Nizam resented the English action on another ground. His share of the spoils of war was much less than that of the English. While Harris alone received £1,42,902 out of the total prize money of £2,000,000, Mir Alam was given only £ 35,000 (one lakh pagodas) to be distributed among his 6,000 troops. Thus Wellesley managed in a shrewd way to secure the entire kingdom of Mysore, which became British in all things except in name and which caused jealousy in the Maratha and the Nizam's courts. The Company assumed paramountcy over Mysore. And the second effort of Wellesley to include the native powers in his scheme of Subsidiary Alliances was supremely successful.

Thus Wellesley proved himself Jack the Giant Killer. He aimed at the total destruction of Tipu and not in the reduction of his power.

Since the time of Plassey where British fraud rather than British might or heroism had laid the foundation of the British Empire, the English had never been guilty of a more deceitful conduct, more flagrant breach of trust or more naked aggression than at this time. The tragic end of Tipu brought to the surface certain facts of great importance. First, Tipu's destruction lay perhaps in the very logic of history. The British who never regarded their neighbours as equals could hardly tolerate a prince, who was so independent in his views, so intrepid in his courage, and so consistent in his opposition to their supremacy. When a die-hard imperialist like Wellesley had come down to India with a premeditated design of conquest, and with a fully matured policy of subsidiary alliances, when he was firmly resolved upon executing that policy at all costs, and when he commanded all the resources and wherewithal to enforce that policy, it is well nigh impossible to imagine events taking a different turn. Secondly, in a ruler's declining phase, all his measures, even the best-conceived ones, seem fated to recoil upon their author. There had been a period when Tipu dictated terms to the English, but after the third Mysore war, despite his best efforts everything he did seemed to go wrong. The Nizam had been deceived by the English in his war against the Marathas, and yet he would join hands with the English, and not Tipu. Zaman Shah, whom Tipu had induced to march on Delhi, had actually advanced as far as Lahore, but had to go back quickly to his own country owing to a conspiracy of events. Napoleon, who had assured Tipu of all his help, was surprisingly defeated in Syria, and compelled to retreat. Raymond, who commanded the French troops at Hyderabad, seemed to choose this time to die. Sindhia who was friendly towards Tipu, could not prevail upon Nana to support Tipu. Thus every measure Tipu took seemed destined to fail. His measures failed not so much because of his fault, but because of forces over which he had no control. The constant vigilance of the English and their timely diplomacy at Poona or Hyderabad or at Teheran or Constantinople forestalled all his designs. Moreover, their political insight and resourcefulness, their superior diplomacy and military preparedness, their vast resources and economic power, together with certain British traits such as resoluteness, sense of solidarity and flexibility, all combined to win them for a time the hegemony of almost the whole world. Since the time of Elizabeth I, England had kept up its unchallenged reputation that she might lose any number of battles, but not the last. This had proved true whether

the antagonist was Philip II or Louis XIV or Napoleon Bonaparte or Tipu, or later, the Kaiser, or Hitler. Tipu's lot was unfortunately thrown with an adversary of uncommon might and unequalled perfidy. Thirdly, the formation of British Empire in India was more the chance product of a few extraordinary and eccentric personalities like Clive, Wellesley and Dalhousie than the result of a deliberate policy either of the Company or of the British Government. What these individuals were doing in India was not even known to their masters in England, who were informed of the whole affair only after the fact was accomplished. The masters, who were merchants, were always interested in their profits, and hence they approved any measure, if only it brought them some benefit. Their wrath would fall on their Governors in India only when the measure failed. Therefore their clever servants would so thoroughly prepare themselves for any event that defeat was out of the question. Wellesley brought against Tipu the finest army such as had never been assembled before. His preparations were so thorough that he personally looked into every minute detail, political, military or logistic. Therefore, it can only be said that it was Tipu's ill-luck that the Company had sent a leader of the order of Wellesley whose sharpness, aggressiveness and resoluteness, no less than his unscrupulousness, knew no limits. No one other than Wellesley could possibly have destroyed Tipu. Fourthly, for Tipu's elimination from the Indian scene, Indians were also as much responsible as the English. The neutrality of the Marathas in the Third Mysore War and their active co-operation with Tipu in the Fourth Mysore War would surely have changed the political picture of the country. Likewise, if the Nizam had not actively supported the English in both these wars, the political and logistic position of the English would have been very weak. Moreover the Raja of Travancore, the Rani of Mysore, the Raja of Coorg and the Nayars of Malabar had all played into English hands. The British conquered India not just with the help of the Indian sepoys, but with the active co-operation of the Indian rulers. Lastly, the Fourth Mysore War is a watershed in Indo-British history. It marked the end of one era, and the beginning of another. It made the English complete masters of the country. Tipu was the last bastion of effective resistance against the English Company. The eighteenth century ended, however with one heroic deed, the martyrdom of Tipu, which did much to wipe off the disgrace that Indian rulers would not hesitate to compromise any principle. Tipu dead became more immortal than Tipu alive, for he left the

message that to live like a tiger for a day was far better than to live like a jackal for a hundred years. At the height of Napoleon's glory, Pitt is supposed to have remarked, "Roll up the map of Europe—it's not needed these ten years." Likewise, Tipu, while breathing his last, might have felt, "Roll up the map of India—it may not be needed for another century and a half."

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RETROSPECT

HAIDAR ALI AND HIS illustrious but ill-fated son appear on the Indian scene when the whole of India was in the throes of internal dissension as a result of the weakening of the central authority of the Mughals. Nowhere were the results of the shrinkage of the Imperial Mughal authority more evident than in the Deccan, where an unscrupulous struggle for power and unabashed quest for empire enabled the British, to replace all Indian powers and establish their rule over India.

Tipu Sultan actively tried to develop friendly relations with the other powers of the period, with a definite purpose. He was the only prince of that period who tried his utmost to have friendly contacts with distant powers like France, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. As a result of this, his kingdom, otherwise small in extent and resources, rose to the rank of a power having international relations. Throughout his reign, he had to battle against odds. His reign opened in a war and ended in a war.

Tipu had to function amidst unscrupulous foreign powers and ambitious Indian rulers, each trying to checkmate the other. Among them all, he had to deal most with the English. His attitude towards them was one of hostility and opposition, inspired not so much by jealousy as by contempt for their duplicity and fear of their machinations. He adopted such a policy as he did chiefly for two reasons. Firstly, the English gave him offence incessantly and desired to destroy his power. They did not honour even their treaties and engagements. They infringed the peace of 1784 very soon after it was concluded. For instance, Macpherson promised to support the Marathas, contrary to the earlier treaties with Mysore. Cornwallis concluded offensive alliances against him in 1790 and crippled his power in the Third Mysore War. Even after the Peace of 1792, he desired to keep alive the Confederacy by concluding a treaty of guarantee with the Nizam and the Marathas against Tipu. He refused to surrender Wynad,

Amerah, Souleah and a number of other places. Finally, Wellesley declared an unjust and unprovoked war against him.

The second cause of Tipu's estrangement with the English was his pursuit of a nationalistic policy, a policy of collaboration with other Indian powers against the foreigners. He desired to expel the English from the country. It is important to inquire whether they bore greater hostility towards Tipu and wanted to make him their tributary or whether he was bent upon reducing their power. His policy would be nationalistic and patriotic if he tried his utmost to arrest their expansion. It would be merely defensive if he struggled to maintain the integrity of his kingdom against their encroachments.

Most of the authorities, if properly studied, would lead one to believe that he aimed at the consolidation of his kingdom and the stabilisation of his rule as well as putting a check to the rapid extension of the power and influence of the British. His efforts to secure French aid and his appeals to the Turkish Sultan, Zaman Shah of Kabul, the Peshwa, the Nizam and even to the Mughal Emperor were not entirely for defending his country. He was regarded in his time as "unquestionably the most powerful of all the native princes of Hindustan."¹ The very dread in which the English stood of his power shows that he was not in need of foreign aid merely to protect his country from their aggression. His voluminous correspondence both with native and foreign powers proves that his purpose was to liberate the country from foreign domination. He opposed the English, not because they were an obstacle in the way of his expansion but because they desired to conquer the Indian Empire. But he would not be able to accomplish his purpose single handed. Hence he desired to conclude alliances with native and foreign powers. He always retained a French corps in his army, never broke his connection with them and sent frequent embassies to France to seek French aid. The purpose of such embassies was always to conclude a hostile alliance against the English, which he explicitly mentioned both in his instructions to the ambassadors and in his letters to the French authorities. The only motive of retaining their friendship even after their deceitful conduct repeatedly was his hope of securing their co-operation. For the same reason, he concluded his war with the Marathas, conceding liberal terms to them despite his superiority in the campaigns. His frequent negotiations with the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad were for the purpose of forming an Indian Confederacy against the English. His instructions to the envoys who were sent to Constantinople clearly

show his object. Even with the prince of Iran who visited his capital, he explored the possibility of co-operation between Iran, Afghanistan and Mysore. His agents at the court of Shah Alam were constantly inducing the Emperor to influence the Nizam not to join the English. His direct negotiations with the Nizam and through ShamsulUmrah, Imtiaz ud Daulah, Amjad ud Daulah, Roy Royan and others were directed to win over the Nizam, against the English. He had actively engaged himself in stirring up the country's powers, in communicating with Zaman Shah, in deputing embassies to France and in preparing himself for war, even at a time when a pacific and non-interfering Governor-General like Sir John Shore was in power. He pursued a clear and consistent policy of opposing the English by mustering together all his resources and by enlisting foreign support.

It is sometimes argued that he had undertaken an impossible task. His policy is criticised as negative and destructive. He sprang more surprises, it is charged, than he accomplished anything positive. He is accused of rashness. Knowing well that his power was incompatible with that of the British, he is said to have opposed them. Being conscious of the fact that the French were faithless, he is accused of having trusted them again and again. A wise statesman would have perceived that, in her disturbed and revolutionary condition, France could not have come to his rescue. A weak and degenerate Turkey could not help him to deprive the English of their Indian Empire. A capricious ruler like Zaman Shah could not be expected to help in a serious project. So also, the disturbed affairs of both Poona and Hyderabad would, he should have foreseen, compel those powers to consolidate their power first before they could think of participating with him in an offensive alliance against the English. His policy is thus criticised as defective because he could not accomplish his object without causing injury to his own interests. His excessive zeal for his country, unfortunately, made him suffer in all his wars. In spite of his best efforts, he could neither win the Marathas nor the Nizam to his side nor secure the foreign help of France or Turkey. His foreign policy turned out to be no more than a dazzling ambition, which was not at all effective. It was rash and imprudent of him to have opposed the English who were far superior to him in economic resources, military strength, including naval might, technical knowledge and diplomacy.

These are the unjust criticisms against him. The designs he conceived were not impossible designs. For Haidar had defeated the

English singlehanded in 1768 and had imposed a humiliating treaty on them. He had organized a triple alliance in 1780 consisting of Mysore, Maharashtra and Hyderabad which had brought the English to their knees. And Tipu was not in any way inferior in courage and energy to Haidar. He too had defeated them in the Second Mysore War. His crushing attacks on Bailey and Braithwaite had filled them with fear. He had then concluded a successful treaty with the English at Mangalore, which was so humiliating to them that they wished for its revision at the earliest opportunity. He compelled such a consummate General as Cornwallis to struggle for three years, despite his fine army, to make any headway. And Cornwallis had finally to surprise him in a night attack in order to defeat him. The discipline of Tipu's army, the efficiency of his administration and his own indomitable energy did not, therefore, preclude the possibility of ousting the English, if other circumstances had favoured him. The political conditions of that period were very uncertain and fluid. It was a time when neither the English nor the Marathas nor Tipu could claim absolute superiority. The balance hung delicately, when the co-operation of any two of them could have defeated the third. Tipu was conscious of the value of alliances with the other native powers and tried his best to secure their support. They too sometimes responded favourably. After the Mysore-Maratha war, Tipu had a fair chance of concluding a political and matrimonial alliance with the Nizam, and after the capture of Guntur by the English, the Nizam himself sent envoys to Tipu and initiated talks on an alliance. After 1795, there was every probability of Mysore-Maratha co-operation. Sindhia actually suggested an alliance in 1798, which Tipu approved. But, not being sure of Indian support, he sought foreign aid. He knew well the French hostility towards the English and their active interest in Indian politics. He thought that they would be useful to him just as they had been to Haidar and other native powers. Their power, though decaying, was yet not to be despised. The events of the Revolution did not altogether rule out the possibility of their aid. The coming of Napoleon to Egypt, the French anxiety to spread the revolutionary ideas and their daring exploits in other countries of Europe, far from discouraging Tipu, raised his hopes. The despatch of an embassy to them was not for gratifying his vanity by pursuing a dazzling policy. Haidar Ali had twice sent missions to Persia and once actually obtained one thousand troops from Shiraz in Persia.² And many a time the French too had co-operated with him. There-

fore, Tipu's expectations of foreign aid would have been realized, if other factors had favoured him. Moreover, he did not seek military aid from all the countries. He wanted the moral support of the Turkish Sultan. His contacts with Afghanistan were only to divert the English attention towards the north by inducing Zaman Shah to invade the Company's territories. The Shah's actual invasion of and his coming as far as Lahore in 1798 shows the wisdom of Tipu's policy. With Iran he merely wanted to have commercial relations. For all these reasons Tipu had not embarked upon a mad venture.

In spite of his best efforts his policy failed, firstly because of external circumstances and secondly because of his personal defects. The Company's position had enormously changed since Haidar's days. After 1784 it had considerably consolidated its power. The Pitt's India Act had reorganized its Government giving supreme authority to the Governor-General and liberating him from interference by his Council. He was entrusted with both military and civil authority, which eliminated the conflicts that existed previously with the other Presidencies. Both Cornwallis and Wellesley could concentrate their attention on Tipu to a far greater extent than any other previous Governor-General who had to counter the conflicting decisions of the Madras Presidency. The Parliamentary Act of 1784 gave greater control to the Home Government with the result that the Company benefited both by its wise counsels and by its vast resources. While Haidar had to fight only against the Company, Tipu had to struggle against the combined resources of both the Company and the English Government.

On the other hand, the Marathas and the Nizam never co-operated with him. Instead, they joined the English against him. He had thus to confront three formidable powers. He would not have lost the Third Mysore War but for their co-operation against him. Even neutrality on the part of the Marathas and the Nizam, if not their active support to him, would have been enough to embarrass the English. But the Marathas pursued a wrong policy. When in the Third Mysore War, Tipu needed their neutrality most, they joined the English. When, in the Fourth Mysore War he stood in urgent necessity of their active support, they declared their neutrality. In both ways they actively promoted the British cause and hindered his. The result was that Tipu's power was so much crippled in 1792 that Wellesley's task of finally destroying him was facilitated. Though the Nizam's participation was not very harmful to him in the military

sense, politically it dealt a severe blow to him. His neutrality, if not his alliance with Tipu, would have acted as a balancing factor and deterred both Cornwallis and Wellesley. His entry in the Fourth Mysore War was the deciding factor, as Wellesley could not have precipitated a war without the alliance of at least one native power. And the French were as usual disappointing. They only aroused false hopes in him without ever fulfilling any. Moreover, they were caught in the grip of revolutionary events at a time which coincided with Tipu's crisis. While they had supported Haidar, their present extraordinary situation prevented them from assisting Tipu. In spite of their cordial reception to Tipu's embassy and their anxiety to revive their power in India, they felt helpless. Finally, the excitement of Shia-Sunni differences on the borders of Afghanistan by Wellesley's despatch of Mehdi Ali Khan to Iran and Malcolm's intrigues in the Persian Court, compelled Zaman Shah to retreat from Lahore. These were the circumstances over which Tipu had no control.

But Tipu suffered from certain personal defects which were also equally responsible for his failure. He lacked Haidar's sober, resourceful and consummate ability and Nana's skilful and cunning diplomacy. Though he copied western diplomacy, he lacked their tact and shrewdness, with the result that his policy appeared brilliant, without being effective. Though his policy was dynamic and vigorous, it was not well planned and carefully executed. He exhibited great energy and courage, but lacked the necessary skill to implement his bold designs. He would sometimes not compromise on small issues, as for instance, on the occasion when his insistence to have his own way in Nargund precipitated a war with the Marathas. He was sometimes rash and irritating. When the Marathas demanded the tribute which Haidar once paid to them for the Krishna districts, he replied that he knew no such customary tribute but he knew that his father had left a fine disciplined army. The result was his war with them in which, though he overpowered them, he had yet to concede their demands for tribute and forts. He was intensely emotional, lacking in prudence and the patience to make a correct appraisal of a situation. The slightest injury to his rights would provoke him to take dangerous decisions. For example, on the Travancore question, knowing full well the English attitude, he attacked the Raja. Being conscious of the definite hostility of the English and the doubtful attitude of the other Indian powers he should have been more tactful. At times small sacrifices would have appeased the jealousies of the other Indian powers and

would have relieved him of their pressure and enabled him to devote his entire energy against the English. Tipu always had border disputes with his neighbours, which strained his relations with them. His too rigid assertion of his own indisputable rights gave them the impression that his purpose was self-aggrandisement. Tipu was, sometimes, hasty in decision, as in the case of his readily believing Ripaud's report of French forces in Mauritius. At other times he indulged in undue procrastination, as in his first evasive reply refusing reception to Major Doveton, which he later revised. His aim was good but was badly executed. On account of these various weaknesses, his policy failed in its main purpose.

His failure, however, does not lessen the importance of his policy. He was zealous and devoted to his cause. He was not motivated by self-aggrandisement. He never broke any treaty engagements and never failed to fulfil his promises. He never indulged in the pursuit of those selfish and narrow policies which his neighbours adopted. He never conspired with any foreign power to subvert their power. On the other hand he struggled hard to rally them on his side for the liberation of the country. He gave proof of his willingness to make sacrifices, as for instance, in his liberal treaty of Gajendragarh and his offer to cede to the Nizam his ancient dominions in lieu of his co-operation. He might have committed mistakes, but who is free from them? His mistakes, which proved injurious to his own interests, were not of such a nature as to bring on him the stigma of being unpatriotic.

Tipu's policy towards the other Indian powers was essentially peaceful. He sincerely tried his best to avoid wars with them. He consistently tried to conclude alliances with them. It was his earnest desire to revive the coalitions of his father's days. But they did not co-operate with him. The Marathas never forgot the loss of their Krishna districts. Soon after the Treaty of Salbai, they conceived a plan of joining the English to wrest back these provinces. When the Nargund incident precipitated a war with Tipu, they eagerly solicited the English aid. The purpose of the war was not so much the protection of the Nargund chief, as the recovery of their territories in the north of Mysore. That was why they turned down all proposals for peaceful accommodation. When the war did not go in their favour, even a liberal treaty could not appease them. Tipu had won the war, but in the expectation of securing their alliance for his project

against the English, he paid them an indemnity and surrendered to them a few forts. But, as these gains were much less than their expectations, they were still not reconciled to Tipu. When Cornwallis proposed a conditional alliance against Tipu by which the English were not obliged to support the Marathas if Tipu attacked them unaided by the French, Nana rejected the proposal only because it was conditional. He only insisted on another treaty which removed this conditional clause. This was at a time when Tipu had gone out of his way to please Nana in the Treaty of Gajendragarh. Tipu's constant contact with the Poona court, his assurances to Poona of his peaceful disposition, and his earnest persuasions seeking co-operation against the English had no effect whatsoever. Nana could not be convinced that the real enemy of the Marathas was not Tipu, but the English. He realized this too late, when Tipu was dead. "Tipu is finished", observed Nana, "the British power has increased, the whole of east India is theirs; Poona will now be the next victim. Evil days seem to be ahead. There seems to be no escape from destiny."³ These words proved prophetic, but Nana himself was responsible for the sequel. Despite the earnest appeals of Tipu, he had joined the Triple Alliance in 1790. Tipu had done his best to dissuade him, sent his *rakils*, offered a large sum of money and promised to pay much more in future. He had not asked for the favour of active support but only for Maratha neutrality. But Nana was tempted by the prospects of territorial acquisitions. The English exploited the opportunity and further excited his ambition by promising to cede not only his ancient possessions but also one-third share in the other conquests. But when the war was over, Nana got not a single district more than what others got. Again, the war definitely proved that the Marathas were playing only the secondary role as mere auxiliaries to the English. The British ascendancy was complete both in the military and in the diplomatic fields. The Marathas neither effected a decisive blow on Tipu on the field nor influenced the decision of Cornwallis in their favour in the peace negotiations. When both Nana and Haripant were keen on granting an interview to Appaji Ram for initiating peace proposals, Cornwallis ruled out their decision. When Haripant wanted to include a few minor proposals, only of religious importance, in the Treaty of Srirangapatna, Kirkpatrick flatly refused to incorporate them. The English took all the strategic forts, ports and passes and the Marathas gained rugged and mountainous tracts.

Even after the peace of 1792, Tipu was reconciled to his lot so far as the Marathas and the Nizam were concerned. He never tried to dislodge them from their new acquisitions. He again commenced sending deputations to their courts for an alliance against the English. The Marathas responded favourably but the disturbed conditions of their state after 1795 and the intrigues in Poona did not permit Tipu to trust any particular party. Nana had lost his influence and politics had shifted into the unworthy hands of Baji Rao, Sindhia and Sharza Rao. It was very difficult in that period of confusion to contact the Poona court for any serious purpose. Even then Tipu explored the possibility of joining the party which would be really helpful to him. When the Fourth Mysore War was impending, he successfully influenced Baji Rao to remain neutral.

Tipu's relations with the Nizam, who fought against him in all the three wars, were less happy. But Tipu's approach was quite friendly. The bond of religion and the earlier precedents of Haidar-Nizam alliances prompted him to try hard for mutual co-operation. But the Nizam's attitude was quite different. He was not reconciled to the existence of Mysore as an independent kingdom. He resented the acquisition of Cuddapah and Kurnool by Haidar and aimed at the recovery of these places. He considered himself the overlord of the Deccan and claimed Mysore as his tributary. Tipu was not willing to concede this demand which forced the Nizam to join the Marathas in a war against him. After the war Tipu adopted conciliatory measures and deputed envoys to the Nizam's court. The relations improved greatly during the period 1787-89, when proposals of even matrimonial connections were discussed. Hafiz Fariduddeen and Bahadur Khan came to Srirangapatna to conclude a secret treaty. Tipu responded favourably and even desired to have a personal conference with the Nizam. He even voluntarily offered to surrender certain districts once belonging to the Nizam and ordered a statement of such territories to be drawn up. But the Nizam was not willing and the negotiations broke down. When the English confiscated the Guntur Circar, he revived the negotiations again by sending Hafiz Farid and Ramachandra. The Nizam was keen on an alliance, invoked the religious sympathy of Tipu, sent a copy of the Quran and asked for his co-operation against the English. Tipu was again favourable. He suggested an offensive and defensive treaty and matrimonial connections between the two families which would end the old feuds. He sent his *vakils* Qutubuddeen Khan and Ali Reza. But

all these efforts failed. The Nizam did not desire an alliance with Tipu. It was to excite the English jealousy and secure their support against the Marathas that he negotiated with Tipu. It was not, as had been suggested, on the sentimental ground that a marriage in an upstart's family would be derogatory to the Nizam's rank that broke the negotiations but political considerations. His alliance with Tipu would have compelled the English to join the Marathas against him. Even Tipu's supporters in the Hyderabad court could not induce him to join Tipu. Moreover, the English not only assured him protection against external danger but also lured him by the prospects of conquests. The superior diplomacy of Cornwallis and his assurances in his letter of July 7, 1789 made the Nizam finally join the English. Even after the break out of the war, Tipu tried his best to disengage him from the Confederacy. But the presence of Kirkpatrick in Hyderabad and the unsympathetic attitude of Azimul Umra towards Tipu frustrated his aims. Even after the Peace of 1792, the Nizam was not well disposed towards Tipu. His reluctance to intercede for the release of the hostages and his anxiety to secure Kurnool estranged his relations with Tipu. Even Sir John Shore advised him not to alienate Tipu at a time when the Marathas were threatening his country. But the hostile policy was not modified, with the result the Nizam suffered disastrously at Kardla. The faithless conduct of the English and the harsh demands of the Marathas made the Nizam realize that neither the Marathas nor the English were his true friends. Tipu, whom the Nizam had thus opposed all his life, did not exploit this opportunity to recover his losses. The war improved the Nizam's relations with Tipu and once again envoys were exchanged and proposals of an alliance were discussed. The Nizam wanted Tipu's help to relieve him from the commitments of the Kardla treaty. Tipu responded favourably and wrote directly to the Nizam. But owing to the rebellion of Alijah, the negotiations could not make progress. The English frustrated Tipu's efforts by impressing on the Nizam that Tipu was only planning to recover his losses. But Tipu persisted in his efforts and sent two more envoys to negotiate a permanent treaty of Indian powers against the English. The Nizam did not encourage these proposals as Azimul Umrah had returned from Poona, the Maratha menace had subsided, Alijah's rebellion had been suppressed, Shamsul Umrah (Tipu's partisan) was dead and the dismissed British contingent had been called back. Tipu's last hopes were centred on Raymond's corps but Raymond's death

on March 25, 1798 and the disbandment of the French forces in October by Wellesley shattered all his hopes of co-operation with the Nizam.

The main difference between Tipu's policy and that of his neighbours was this. While Tipu adopted a forceful, nationalistic and enlightened policy, they lacked boldness and foresight and pursued narrow and selfish policies. The advent of Europeans had introduced Western diplomacy into Indian politics which aimed at the steady and imperceptible expansion of their power. The Indian powers failed to understand its true implication but Tipu discerned their real aim. His neighbours were deceived by the frequent professions of pacific disposition by the English and believed in the sincerity of such Acts as Pitt's India Act of 1784 and the Charter Act of 1793 which were supposed to restrain the Company from committing aggression on Indian powers. Both Cornwallis and Wellesley violated these Acts by fighting against Tipu who was conscious of their intentions.

The greatness of Tipu's policy rests on his firm devotion to his cause. He tried his utmost to accomplish his object by mustering up all his resources, by negotiating alliances with his neighbours and by seeking help from far-off countries. Finally he laid down his life itself for his cause. His independent spirit would never submit to a foreign power. He would rather die than lead a dependent life in the list of the pensioned Nawabs and Rajas. It was his maxim that a tiger's life for a day was far better than that of a jackal's for a hundred years. He passionately loved liberty. His courage, energy and ability never knew compromise on fundamental issues. He regarded the English both as his personal and his country's enemies. In one of his letters to the Nizam, he observed, "If they (English) persist in their evil intent they will be slaughtered like sheep on the occasion of *Id Uzzaha* and the vessel of their expectations will be drowned in the ocean of annihilation. They are contemplating the destruction of the Hydari state by force of arms; they themselves will be completely wiped out from the face of the earth."⁴ At a time when the Marathas and the Nizam failed to realize the effects of their policies, he struggled single-handed to stem the tide of British power. His policy was nationalistic as it aimed at liberating his country from the foreigners. It was enlightened as it desired to develop cordial relations with his neighbours. He tried to obtain foreign artisans for promoting the trade and industry of his state. His embassies were invariably instructed not only to give publicity to Mysore commodities but also

to bring technicians from abroad. He was a great patriot who, despite his insurmountable difficulties, struggled hard to pursue his objects. Defeats, misfortunes and humiliations further excited him to greater energy. The result of his policy was that, so long as he lived, English aggression was restrained. Within three years after his death, the independence of the two other major powers of the Deccan had been lost. That was why the English, at the moment of his fall, cried "India is ours." They had never been confronted with a more formidable enemy who preferred death to dishonour.

"No! Thou hast to thy warrior bed
Sunk like that burning sun,
Whose brightest, fiercest rays are shed
When his race is nearest done,
Where death-fires flashed and sabres rang,
And quickest sped the parting breath,
Thou, from a life of empire sprang
To meet a soldier's death.

CHORUS

Allah! 'tis better thus to die
With war clouds hanging redly over us
Than to live a life of infamy
With years of grief and shame before us."⁵

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2. Rice, *Mysore and Coorg*. Vol. I, p. 268.
3. Cited in Serdesai, Vol. III, p. 354.
4. 'Tipu's letter, *Daftari-Dewani O Mal.*, Jan. 1791', *Journal of the Indian History Congress*, Jaipur, Session Article by Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan.
5. *History of Haider Shah and His Son Tipu Sultan*, by M.M.D.L.T., p. 329.

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13. —, (*Political*), Vol. 22
14. —, *Joint Commissioner's Journal*, Vol. 13
15. —, *Records. Supervisor's Diaries*, Vol. 211

(8) *Bibliothèque Publique Pondichéry*

The Archives in Pondichéry attached to the Bibliothèque Publique contain a number of valuable French records. There are some original Persian letters also. These records throw light on Tipu's relations with the French. As Pondichéry was captured by the English in 1793, the records of their other settlements, which are also preserved here, are useful.

(9) *Archives of Fort Louis Mauritius*

These contain letters of Governor Cossigny to the Governor of Pondichéry concerning Tipu, his letters to Tipu Sultan (June 1791), the letter of the Colonial Assembly to Tipu concerning the good relations between Mysore and Isle de France (March 1798), list of Isle de France volunteers in the service of Tipu Sultan and the long correspondence between their commanding officers, M. Chapuis and the Governor Malaret. Chapuis graphically traces the situation which brought about Tipu's fall. There is a copy of the original Proclamation of Governor Malaret, printed by Francois Nicholas Belle (January 23, 1798), which was made the cause for war by Wellesley.

(10) *MacKenzie Manuscripts*

In the Madras Oriental Manuscripts Library, there are a number of Tamil, Telugu and Kannada papers concerning Tipu, of which the following are useful numbers:

1. Kannada Mss. No. 134-135 and 13-137
2. Tamil Mss. No. 134-141, 153-157, 158-163, 158-159, 159-161, 159-162
3. Telugu Mss. No. 15-27 and 154-36

(j) Marathi Records

In the Land Alienation Office, Poona, there are a number of Marathi records which are useful on the subject. Besides, the following published records are important:

1. Khare, *Aitihāsik Lekha Sangraha*, Vols. VII, VIII, IX and XI
2. Parasnis, *Itihāsa Sangraha*, Vols. I, III and VI
3. Rajwade, V. K., *Itihāsa Sangraha*, Vols. XIX and XX
4. *Itihāsa Sadhana*, Vol. VII

(k) Kannada Records

1. *The Records of the Sringeri Mutt*: The records of this *Mutt* throw light on the administration of both Haider and Tipu. They reveal that Tipu was tolerant towards the Hindus and respected the feelings of his Hindu subjects. He granted them *inam* lands, villages and *agraharas*. He helped the heads of the *mutts* to pursue their old traditional modes of religion and forms of worship. There are twenty-nine such records in the *mutt* which range from 1791 to 1798. He supplied adequate provisions to feed one thousand Brahmans a day. He sent two palanquins, one for the Goddess and the other for the Swami.
2. *Haider Nama*: This was composed by Nallappa. This is preserved in the Mysore Palace Library. It is a contemporary work and gives a dispassionate picture of the events of Haider and Tipu's reign (Extracts in *M.A.R.*, 1932).
3. *Haider Ali* by Appana Setty: This is a work written in 1897.
4. *The Vamsha Ratnakara*, 1887
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(l) Dutch Records

There are certain Dutch records in the Madras Records Office of which numbers I to V are important for the history of Mysore, particularly for the affairs of Cranganur and Ayicottah.

(m) Portuguese Records

Pissurlencar P.S. Antigualhas: *Estudors-e-Documents sobre a Historia dos Portuguese in India*, Vol. I

(n) Turkish Records

Mysor Sultani-Tipu ile Osmanali Padishah Larindan I Abdul Hamid VE III, Selim Arabicdaki Mektuplasma, Ankara, 1848: This is a Turkish translation of Tipu's correspondence with the Ottoman Sultans. Seven photographic copies of the original Persian letters are also given.

(o) Persian Records

There are three types of Persian Records: (i) unpublished contemporary works; (ii) unpublished papers and correspondence; and (iii) published works. Most of the contemporary-histories give no adequate information on Tipu's

diplomacy and foreign policy. They are useful only in determining his general policy and they lack the details on numerous delicate negotiations he carried on with different powers. The authors had no access to them as the nature of the transaction demanded secrecy.

1. *Tarikh-i-Khuda-dadi* (I.O.Ms. Ethe 2990): This book is quite brief (45 foll) and ends with February 1787. It abruptly begins with the siege of Bednur (1783) and ends with the Treaty of Gajendragarh (1787). It deals mostly with Tipu's wars and campaigns with the English and the Marathas. It is not reliable as it fails to mention even important incidents like Tipu's attack on Nargund and Kittur. Its author is not known, but Kirkpatrick thinks it to be the autobiography of Tipu himself. Prof. M. H. Khan thinks that this is improbable in view of its serious defects and gross distortions of even well-known facts. Tipu is represented in it as an intolerant bigot, which disproves his authorship, as he would not have condemned himself.

2. *Sultan-ut-Tawarikh* (Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras Mss. 288): Pages indistinguishable, appearance old, not dated and the scribe not mentioned. This is an account of the campaigns and expeditions of Tipu Sultan. It is just a duplicate of *Tarikh-i-Khuda-dadi*, with this difference that the latter is written in first person and the former covers a longer period from 1782 to 1789. Its author is also not known. Kirkpatrick thinks that Zainul-Abiddin Shustri, brother of Mir Alam, wrote it. It is not very useful with regard to the foreign policy of Tipu as it is merely a descriptive catalogue of the various events of his campaigns.

3. *Tarikh-i-Tipu Sultan* (Mackenzie Collection, Madras). The author of this also is unknown. It is the history of Mysore from 1713 to 1799. It is defective in its dates and cursory in its treatment. It thanks the English for their generous treatment of Tipu's sons after his fall.

4. *Tarikh-i-Hamid Khani* by Munshi Hamid Khan (Collection of Mahmood Khan, Bangalore): This is prejudiced against Tipu, as the author was the *Mir Munshi* of Mr. Cherry, Private Secretary of Lord Cornwallis. Though it covers the period 1782-1792, it is mostly the history of the campaigns of the Third Mysore War, with which it deals fairly accurately and elaborately. The author was present in the campaigns. But the earlier events described are very brief and sometimes incorrect.

5. *Tarikh-i-Coorg* (RASB Mss., No. 201): This is a translation from Kannada history by Husain Khan Lohari, a *munshi* of the Raja of Coorg, Vira Rajendra Wodeyar. It deals with the affairs of Coorg from 1637 to 1807. It is not of much use except for the fact that it describes the pressure brought on Cornwallis by Abercromby to demand the surrender of Coorg from Tipu in the Peace Treaty of 1792.

6. *Hukum Namahs* of Tipu Sultan (I.O. Mss., Ethe 526, 6 fols., RASB Mss., 1677): There are a number of *Hukum Namahs* both in the India Office Library and in the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Collections. They are very useful as they contain the detailed instructions of Tipu Sultan to ambassadors deputed to Constantinople and other places. The object of the mission deputed in the year 1787 to the Ottoman Court under the leadership of Ghulam Ali Khan (as appears from these instructions) was to engage France to renew hostilities in concert with Tipu

against Great Britain. The embassy to England seems to have been designed only to conceal the operations at the Court of France. Certain other documents refer to the mission sent in 1788 of Muhammad Usman and others to the Court of France. This embassy was different from the one that was previously sent by the route of Constantinople. Its instructions and its objects were essentially the same as those of the mission which preceded it, with this difference only that it was not charged with any presents or messages to the Court of London.

7. *Waqai-Manzil-i Rum* by Abdul Qadir (RASB Mss. No. 1678): This is the diary of Tipu's ambassador to Constantinople and other places written by his secretary Abdul Qadir. It is a useful record which describes the various places the envoys visited. But the diary does not cover the entire journey, and ends while the envoy and his team were still at Basra on their way to the Turkish capital. Their impression of the city and their activities in the capital are not recorded.

8. *Tarikh-i-Rahat Afza* (Asifiya Library, Hyderabad, Mss. No. 1001): The author is Muhammad Ali bin Muhammad Sadiq-ul-Hussaini. Though it is a general history of India, it deals more elaborately with the affairs of the Deccan. It is useful for Tipu's relations with the Nizam.

9. *Tarikh-i-Mahanamah* by Ghulam Hussain Khan Jauhar Mansabdar (Asifiya Library, Hyderabad, Mss. 410).

10. *Ma'asir-i-Nizami* by Mansa Ram (Asifiya Library, Hyderabad, Mss. No. 1749).

11. *Basat-ul-Ghanayam* by Laxmi Narayan Shafceq (Asifiya Library, Hyderabad, Mss. No. 282): This deals with the relations of the Nizam and the Marathas with Tipu Sultan.

12. *Tuhfat-ul-Alam* by Abdul Lateef bin Abi-Tahib (Asifiya Library, Hyderabad, Mss. No. 637).

13. *Unpublished Persian Records Preserved in the National Archives of India, New Delhi*: These are by far the most important documents for a study of the foreign policy of Tipu Sultan. There are hundreds of them. They consist of the correspondence of Tipu with the English and other powers. They throw light on the important negotiations Tipu carried on with Hyderabad Court. For example, they consist of the correspondence of Mehdi Ali Khan during his embassy to the Court of Hyderabad, the instructions to Ali Reza sent to Hyderabad in the year 1798 and 1799, the correspondence between Tipu Sultan and the various chiefs of the Nizam's army during the First Campaign of Lord Cornwallis, Tipu's correspondence with Khader Hussain Khan and Syed Madina Saheb who were sent to Hyderabad in 1796-7 and the instructions to Syed Ghaffar who was sent with a large force towards Kurnool in 1796 for collecting the arrears of tribute from Alif Khan. The object of Ali Reza's mission to Hyderabad was to form a hostile alliance against the British. The letters of Asad Ali Khan and other *sardars* of the Nizam to the Sultan, written while the allied forces were in the vicinity of Srirangapatna in 1791, illustrate the activity of Tipu to break the confederacy. Moreover, the letters of Walajah Muhammad Ali, the Peshwa, the Nizam, Tipu and other powers to the Company and their replies form a useful source of information for the foreign policy of Tipu Sultan.

14. *Records of the Bharat Khara Samhodiak Mandali, Poona*: These consist of the correspondence of the Nizam and the Peshwa concerning Tipu and throw light on the motives towards Mysore. They also show that the favourite object of Tipu's negotiations, both with Poona and Hyderabad had been hostility against the English. They refer, incidentally, to the dispatch of ambassadors by Tipu to Poona at different periods since the commencement of the reign and also to the correspondence between Tipu and certain of the Maratha chiefs.

15. *Dafatara-Dewan, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh*: The records preserved here are important for the Nizam-Tipu relations. It contains a long letter of Tipu Sultan to Nizam Ali written probably in January 1791, inducing the Nizam to break away from the Confederacy. The other papers relate to the border dispute between Tipu and the Nizam after the Treaty of Srirangapatna, the clarification of the Third Article of the engagement concluded at Yadgir between the Nizam and the Peshwa and the increased activity of Tipu to win over the Nizam.

16. *Khutbat-Tipu Sultan* (Manuscript in the possession of Prof. Askari, Patna University, Patna): The manuscript contains a number of letters copied by one Abdul Fatah in which letters from page 1 to 124 deal with Tipu Sultan. They relate to the correspondence of various nobles of Hyderabad concerning Tipu, Tipu's letters to Ramnath Khan and Alaf Khan of Kurnool, to Mahdi Ali Khan during his embassy to the Hyderabad Court, the letter of Ghulam Muhammad Khan Bado Sahib to Alaf Khan giving a graphic account of the death of Tipu and the correspondence of Mir Alam.

17. *The Register of Tipu Sultan's Dreams*: (Ethel 3001 I.O. Mss. 3563): These are written by Tipu's own hand and they are thirty-eight in number. They are valuable for knowing the inner working of Tipu's mind towards the English. Though dreams cannot form historical evidence to base our conclusions, they help us to know the psychology of the man concerned. His passion to defeat the English haunted him as much in sleep as when he was awake. Most of his dreams relate to his success over the English.

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2. *Fath-ul-Mujahidin*, Zainul-Abiddin Shustri. (Ed. Dr. Mahmud Hussain Khan, Karachi, 1952): The author was the brother of Mir Alam and the work deals with the military rules and regulations of Tipu's reign. It is of priceless value for Tipu's administration and his military organization, but of little importance for his foreign policy.

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